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ABSTRACT 
AN EVALUATION OF A GOVERNMENT-BACKED LOAN SCHEME IN 
MALAYSIA 
SMEs are considered to be an engine for growth in both developed and developing 
countries, by generating employment opportunities, strengthening industrial linkages, 
securing home markets and earning valuable export revenue. Government-backed loan 
schemes play a major role in many countries, by enabling small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) to access credit facilities. The Credit Guarantee Corporation in 
Malaysia has been charged with this key role in assisting SMEs, and its main financing 
instrument is the New Principal Guarantee Scheme CNPGS). 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which the NPGS is appropriate 
to the financing needs of Malaysian SMEs. The primary objective is to identify the factors 
that determine the utilisation of the NPGS; utilisation depends upon a number of demand 
and supply factors, as well as the characteristics of firms and owner-managers COMs). An 
important secondary objective is to investigate tbe effectiveness of the NPGS, by 
exploring the generation of finance and economic additionality, as well as the net cost of 
the Scheme to the Treasury. 
After a literature review, and the development of theoretical frameworks, a number of 
hypotheses are put forward. The methodological approach combines a questionnaire 
survey with case studies based on interviews with borrowers and financiers, and 
interviews with key informants. The questionnaire is principally concerned with the 
factors tbat affect the utilisation of the NPGS, whereas the case studies and interviews 
focus on tbe three elements of effectiveness. The questionnaire data are derived from a 
sample of firms from the CGC's database. The sample includes firms involved in a 
variety of activities, from the manufacture of high-technology goods to the processing of 
resource-based products. Firms were randomly selected to adequately represent racial 
composition, legal structure and loan size within the CGC's portfolio. The questionnaire 
data were supplemented by 15 in-depth case studies. 
Two major findings emerge from this study. First, a number of independent variables did 
have a significant relationship on the utilisation of the NPGS: the amount of security or 
collateral; limited company status; manufacturing sector; size of firm; use of external 
advisers for fund raising; and the existence of written business plans. However, the 
majority of the hypotheses relating to the characteristics of OMs were rejected; the 
researcher offers some explanations for this apparent anomaly. Second, the case studies 
demonstrate that NPGS has achieved finance additionality comparable with achieved in 
guarantee schemes elsewhere, as well as a significant degree of economic additionality. 
The net cost of the Scheme was difficult to determine with any degree of precision. 
On the basis of the research findings, the researcher is able to put forward a series of 
recommendations to improve the operations of the CGC. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
SMEs are considered to be an engine for growth in both developed and developing 
countries. They have the potential to play a crucial role in supporting balanced growth 
across the economy (Bannock and Albach, 1991). Furthermore, they play a major role 
in contributing to economic success (Schmitz, 1982; Fong, 1990a; Md. Salleh, 1990; 
Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Bank of England, 1997). A World Bank Report (1978) and 
ILO studies (1982) have shown that increasing employment, and thereby income, is 
the main reason for encouraging SME development in many countries. The 
development of SMEs can also assist in the transformation from developing to 
developed country; the experience of Japan and other newly industrialised countries in 
Asia seem to suggest that a modem SME sector is a necessary condition for sustained 
and accelerated development (Boocock, 1995). 
In Malaysia, the role of SMEs will be increasingly important as the nation attempts to 
move towards becoming a fully-industrialised country by the year 2020 (Malaysia, 
199Ia). The importance of the SME sector has been recognised for a number of years 
in Malaysia (Chee, 1992); indeed, this sector began to enjoy positive discrimination 
relative to large companies by the late 1980s (Fong, 1990a). According to Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia (Business Times, 5 November 1996), 
"SMEs have been, and will continuously be the driving force of the Malaysian 
economy ..... The Government recently established the Ministry of Entrepreneurial 
Development (MED) and the Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation 
(SMIDEC) in the hope that such institutions will further enhance the role of SMEs in 
generating employment opportunities, strengthening industrial linkages, securing 
home markets and earning valuable export revenue. SMEs now constitute 94 percent 
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of the total enterprises in Malaysia and employ 40 percent of the workforce. They also 
contribute 30 percent to the total value added within the economy and account for 
about 50 percent of industrial assets (Hashim, 1992). 
Government involvement in SMEs began mainly after the racial riots in 1969, which 
led to the implementation of the New Economic Policy (Chee, 1986a). The NEP had 
the two objectives of eradicating poverty and restructuring society in an attempt to 
produce a more equitable distribution of welfare, in particular to achieve 'inter-ethnic 
parity' in education, employment and corporate wealth ownership. The first Outline 
Perspective Plan (OPP), 1971-1990, sought to achieve the aims of the NEP. A key 
target was that, by 1990, ownership of the corporate sector would be 70 percent 
Malaysian (including 30 percent Bumiputera') and 30 percent foreign. Over the same 
20 year period, a series of Five Year National Plans were implemented. A critical 
objective of these Plans was to increase the participation of Bumiputeras in the 
Chinese-dominated economy. 
The New Development Policy (NDP) replaced the NEP in 1991, but retained the 
principal goal of achieving national unity. The 30 percent target for Bumiputera 
corporate ownership was retained in the NDP, as the NEP had only achieved 20.6 
percent ownership. Other ethnic groups held 43.4 percent, and foreigners held the 
remaining shares in corporates. There is no specific deadline to achieve the 30 percent 
ownership target for Bumiputeras (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997). The Second Outline' 
Perspective Plan (OPP2), 1991-2000, which encompasses the NDP, provides a 
framework for achieving certain socio-economic targets within a ten year time frame. 
The Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) and the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) set 
out the policies, strategies and programmes to operationalise OPP2 (Malaysia, 1992). 
The Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP) highlighted the importance of the SME sector in 
supporting large industries in producing parts and components (Malaysia, 1991 b). The 
Seventh Malaysia Plan (7MP) emphasises that the manufacturing sector should 
become more dynamic, with the focus on "high value-added, capital-intensive, high 
technology industries in order to achieve productive growth and competitiveness 
(Malaysia, 1996a, p.284)." SMEs are expected to contribute to the development of 
these knowledge-intensive industries. 
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Indeed, the Government has acknowledged that the development of SMEs has to be a 
foundation for Malaysia's future industrial thrust (Malaysia, 1991c). It is hoped that 
SMEs will become the backbone of Malaysia's long-tenn industrial programme. The 
sector's contribution to total output, value added and employment in the 
manufacturing sector had increased to 14.7 percent by 1995, 17.6 percent by 1995 and 
17.5 percent by 1995 respectively. SMEs in the manufacturing sector are involved in 
food and beverages (20 percent of finns in this sector are SMEs), fabricated metal 
products (18 percent), wood and wood products (17 percent) and basic metals (4 
percent). A key objective of the Government is to increase exports. However, exports 
account for only 20 percent of SME output, generating a mere 3 percent of the 
country's total export revenue (Business Times, 16 November 1996). 
In order to achieve the objective of national unity set out in the NDP, Bank Negara 
Malaysia (the Central Bank) provides guidelines to private sector financial institutions 
to channel funds to priority borrowers, including the Bumiputera Community, 
prospective house owners and small businesses. The SME sector is considered to be 
one of the most important elements in achieving an equitable distribution of income. 
A range of support and advisory services (encompassing project identification, project 
development, financing assistance, technological development, extension services, 
marketing, etc.) have been introduced, but the sector remains "very fragmented and 
characterised by a lack of product differentiation and appropriate technology (BNM, 
1992)." 
SMEs need appropriate financing in order to achieve their growth potential. However, 
ready access to institutional financing at reasonable cost, and with minimum 
paperwork, is one of the major problem faced by SMEs (explored in depth in the 
literature survey below). Such funding is important at the initial and take-off stages of 
SME development (Lin See Yan, 1994). As a consequence, government-backed loan 
schemes have been introduced in many countries, to enable SMEs to have access to 
funding at reasonable cost. The government guarantee is a substitute for collateral 
provided by the company. 
In Malaysia, the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) has been charged by the 
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Government with assisting SMEs, principally through its New Principal Guarantee 
Scheme (NPGS). The CGC Report (1993) highlighted its role as follows: 
"The CGC's role to bridge the gap between the needs of SMEs and the concerns of 
lenders by providing a commercially viable gnarantee system that is adequately 
backed financially, thereby giving credence to its ability to fulfill the guarantee 
commitments. " 
The CGC is owned by the BNM and a consortium of commercial banks and finance 
companies. The BNM issues guidelines to the commercial banks and finance 
companies stating the amount of lending to be undertaken under the CGC facilities. 
Furthermore, a specified proportion of these loans must be extended to Bumiputera 
borrowers. Since 1972, four main facilities have been offered by the CGC: 
1) The General Guarantee Scheme (1972 - 81) 
2) The Special Loan Scheme (1981 - 88) 
3) The Principal Guarantee Scheme (1989 - 94) 
4) The New Principal Guarantee Scheme (NPGS) in 1994 to date. 
The NPGS is the focus of this study. The NPGS guaranteed 15,784 new loans in 1997 
(1996:14,965) worth RM3.85 billion (1996: RM3.58 billion). 
It is critical to understand the extent to which the NPGS is appropriate to the financing 
needs of Malaysian SMEs. This study fills a gap in current knowledge by focusing on 
the factors that determine the utilisation of the NPGS, its effectiveness in generating 
finance and economic additionality, and the cost of the Scheme to the Malaysian 
Treasury. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The overall aim of this study is to assess the extent to which the CGC's main 
financing instrument, the NPGS, meets the financing needs of Malaysian SMEs. 
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The first order objectives are to: 
i. Identify the factors that determine the utilization of the NPGS, focusing on a 
number of demand and supply factors, as well as the characteristics of firms 
and entrepreneurs/OMs (hereafter referred to 'OMs')'. 
The second order objectives relate to the effectiveness of the NPGS, specifically to: 
i. Calculate the level of finance additionality presently being achieved 
ii. Estimate the level of economic additionality arising from the Scheme 
iii. Identify the net cost of the NPGS to the Malaysian Treasury. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Kanbur et al. (1995) estimated the utilisation of the 'Old' PGS (OPGS) offered by the 
CGC. Their study incorporated demand and supply factors, including the cost of the 
OPGS loans compared to conventional bank loans, the availability of conventional 
bank credit, the default rate on OPGS loans and the level of claims paid to the lenders. 
My research addresses many of these issues for the NPGS. For example, it seeks to 
assess whether there is a negative relationship between the cost and the demand for 
NPGS loans. Likewise, my research examines the relationship between the guidelines 
(quotas) imposed by BNM and the utilisation of the NPGS. Recent experience seems 
to suggest that financial institutions are under less pressure to approve CGC loans 
simply to meet their quotas. The NPGS has been extended to finance companies, to 
take account of the fact that SMEs are increasingly turning to non-bank sources of 
external finance. My research will explore the relationship between the availability of 
CGC support through finance companies and the utilisation of the NPGS. Finally, the 
CGC claims that the procedures to be followed in the event of the borrower's default 
have been clearly specified for the NPGS. My research evaluates the relationship 
between the number of bad debt claims processed by the lenders, the number of 
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claims paid by CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Raising finance is a complex and dynamic process which may be affected by a number 
of factors, both economic and social (Buttner and Rosen, 1988; Moore et al., 1992). 
My research examines the relationship between the characteristics of firms and OMs 
and the utilisation of the NPGS, issues covered in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Against the background set out in Section 1.1, and in relation to the objectives 
formulated in Section 1.2, the study attempts to answer the following questions: 
Demand factors 
1. Is there a negative relationship between the cost and the utilisation of the 
NPGS? 
ii. Is there a negative relationship between the availability of security or 
collateral and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
Supply factors 
i. Is there a positive relationship between the amount of bad debt claims 
processed by CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
ii. Is there a positive relationship between the amount of claims paid in relation to 
claims processed and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
iii. Is there a positive relationship between the guidelines (quotas) imposed by 
BNM and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
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iv. Is there a positive relationship between the availability of CGC support 
through finance companies and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
Characteristics of the firm 
i. Is there a positive relationship between private limited company status and the 
utilisation of the NPGS? 
ii. Is there a positive relationship between manufacturing firms and the utilisation 
of the NPGS? 
iii. Is there a positive relationship between the size of firm and the utilisation of 
the NPGS? 
iv. . Is there a positive relationship between the age of firm and the utilisation of 
the NPGS? 
v. Is there a positive relationship between the use of external advisers for fund 
raising and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
vi. Is there a positive relationship between the existence of a written business 
plan and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
Characteristics of the OM 
i. Is there a positive relationship between male OMs and the utilisation of the 
NPGS? 
ii. Is there a positive relationship between Bumiputera OMs and the utilisation of 
the NPGS? 
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iii. Is there a positive relationship between the older OMs and the utilisation of the 
NPGS? 
iv. Is there a positive relationship between the amount of technical training 
undertaken by OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
v. Is there a positive relationship between the amount of entrepreneur 
management training (EMT) undertaken by OMs and the utilisation of the 
NPGS? 
vi. Is there a positive relationship between the level of formal education of OMs 
and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
vii. Is there a positive relationship between the relevant business experience of 
OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS? 
Finance Additionality 
According to NERA (1990): 
Additionality is used to capture the idea that an intervention, in this case a guaranteed 
loan scheme, leads to an event which in full or in part would not otherwise have 
occurred. The extent of additionality is thus extremely important in judging the 
effectiveness of this policy instrument. If additionality is relatively low, then policy 
intervention is largely subsidising scheme beneficiaries to undertake activities that 
would have occurred in the absence of intervention. 
My research estimated the amount of finance additionality at the level of the SME. 
The key question is whether the NPGS represented a source of finance which would 
not otherwise have been available to SMEs or which would have been available only 
at a later date. A number of alternative sources of funds are potentially available to 
SMEs in Malaysia. My empirical work demonstrates that some SMEs, through the 
operation of the NPGS, have gained access to loans from commercial banks or finance 
companies, which they would not have obtained without the operation of the Scheme. 
It is not enough, however, simply to achieve finance additionality. An effective 
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scheme is where finance additionality is high without excessive incidence of default 
(Levitsky, 1993). The interlinked elements of finance additionality are explored in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
Economic Additionality 
Economic additionality refers to the additional employment, turnover and profits 
generated by the NPGS. The higher the additional employment, turnover and profits, 
the greater the effectiveness of any guarantee scheme. Economic additionality should 
strictly be calculated with reference only to those firms which receive 'additional' 
finance. However, because of problems in establishing the precise level of finance 
additionality for the NPGS, this pre-condition has been ignored, following the 
precedent established by Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996). 
My research focused on the displacement effects, i.e., whether additional economic 
activity in the assisted firms translated into a corresponding increase in the level of 
activity in the SME sector or the economy as a whole. Economic additionally was 
found to be low where general business and agriculture sector firms were involved. 
This finding confirmed that additional finance does not always lead to an increase in 
employment, turnover and profits (NERA, 1990). By contrast, manufacturing firms 
had greater economic impact and created more jobs. In particular, firms that exported 
their products had low displacement effects. (Pieda, 1992; Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 
1996). 
My research also examined the ability of NPGS-recipients to create a more dynamic 
and innovative society. The 'dynamism' was estimated from the attitude of NPGS-
assisted firms towards investment and innovation. Any conclusions on this point can 
only be tentative. 
These different components of economic additionality are explored more fully in 
Chapter 7. 
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Net Cost of NPGS 
Levistsky (1997a) stated that: 
All guarantee schemes contain some element of subsidy: either in the contribution 
(public. private or external donor) to setting up the guarantee fund. or in some cases 
in the form of a rent to cover some of the costs of administration of the programme. 
The subsidy may also be in the form of cheaper donor funds available for credit lines 
to SMEs (on which guarantees are offered). 
The net cost of any guarantee scheme stems from the costs associated with 
administering the scheme plus settling claims arising from bad debts, offset by the 
premiums charged to borrowers for the guarantees and security realisations. The 
difference between income and expenditure for any individual scheme will principally 
depend upon: the default rate of assisted firms; the premium charged; the percentage 
of cover offered by the guarantee; and, the contribution sought from private financial 
institutions (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996). 
In the United Kingdom, the net cost of operating the Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) 
has been estimated with some degree of certainty (NERA, 1990, p.41; Pieda, 1992, 
p.44). LGS lending was found to be marginally unprofitable for the banks. The direct 
cost of the LGS to the public purse was substantial - the Scheme would not produce a 
surplus unless the default rate was drastically reduced or the premium vastly 
increased. However, the positive impact of the LGS in generating economic 
additionality had to be taken into account. Revenue flowbacks from, for example, 
corporation tax on profits earned by assisted firms and savings on unemployment 
benefit in preserved jobs offset the direct costs. When such savings were taken into 
account, the LGS produced a surplus for the UK Treasury (NERA, 1990, Pieda, 
1992). 
Hatekayama (1996) estimated the cost to public funds of operating the credit 
guarantee schemes in a number of East Asian countries, including Malaysia. Most of 
these costs were in the form of central or local financial support, or as additional paid-
in capital to the guarantee fund to cover potential erosion and to bolster funds, so that 
investment income could rise to help cover operating expenses. 
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The NPGS was launched in February 1994 and it was hoped that premium income 
would rise to a sum sufficient to meet staffing and administration costs, leaving the 
settlement of claims to be me! by the CGC's principal source of income, interest 
earned on its investment funds. As a separate entity, the CGC has to meet the cost of 
running its offices, over RM2 million per annum. Income from guarantee premiums 
declined from over RM4.5 million per annum in the late 1980s to approximately 
RMI.7 million per annum in the early 1990s (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1994). The 
cost to public funds was estimated at US$0.2 million, for the year 1994 (Hatekayama, 
1996). However, that figure is questionable - refer to Chapter 3, S3.3.4. 
The net cost of operating the CGC has not been disclosed or established since 1994. 
The calculations would not be straightforward even if full information was disclosed. 
The CGC derives funding from a number of sources, a range of facilities (each with 
different terms and conditions) has been offered, there has been no consistent 
relationship between Non Performing Loans (NPLs) and subsequent payments to 
financial institutions, and the distribution of the proceeds of collateral between the 
CGC and the lenders is complex. 
Despite the difficulties involved, I investigated the net cost of NPGS by looking at the 
income from guarantee fees, interest earned on investments, the bad debt claims 
processed and the claims paid by the tGC. These figures were derived from the 
annual reports of the CGC, as well as interviews conducted with key informants. My 
findings are set out in Chapter 7. 
1.4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
As Sections 1.1-1.3 reveal, the rationale for undertaking this study stems from a 
number of interwoven factors. Firstly, SMEs are perceived to play a crucial role in the 
development of any economy (Bannock and Binks, '1989; Chee, 1992). Governments 
in both developed and developing countries have recognised that SMEs have 
difficulty in obtaining finance from financial institutions, owing to the high risk 
involved and the cost of administering SME loans (Levitsky, 1986). Financial 
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institutions, therefore, require collateral or other guarantees before lending to SMEs, 
but SMEs generally lack such collateral. For this reason, credit guarantee funds and 
mutual guarantee systems have been set up to provide guarantees to cover some or all 
of the losses incurred by financial institutions in the event of default by SMEs 
(Levistky and Prasad, 1989; Levitsky, 1993; Balkenhol, 1990; Siebel, 1995). 
Secondly, the mere existence of a guarantee scheme is not sufficient. This study 
investigates the utilisation of the NPGS. The Scheme's objective is to achieve a high 
level of uptake of loans by SMEs, but utilisation depends upon a number of demand 
and supply factors, as well as the characteristics of firms and OMs. The methodology 
used establishes the relationships between the demand and supply factors, the 
characteristics of firms and OMs, and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Thirdly, the research will investigate the effectiveness of the NPGS in terms of 
economic additionality, finance additionality and the net cost of the Scheme to the 
Malaysian Treasury. 
The research should prove extremely useful to CGC and the BNM. CGC has 
established a unit to offer training, advisory and consultancy services for SMEs. My 
research should assist this unit to target support services to firms and/or OMs in more 
effective ways. Thus the cost of the NPGS should be reduced. From a more general 
public policy perspective, BNM will be able to implement its lending policy to 
priority sectors in a more effective manner, if there is evidence of substantial 
economic and finance additionality in certain sectors. 
1.5 POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Sectoral Bias 
The loans guaranteed by the CGC are dominated by the general business sector, which 
accounted for 35,696 loans valued at RM7.7 billion, or 78.1 percent of the total value 
of loans approved and guaranteed in 1997. The major business activities financed 
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include the wholesale and retail trades, small-scale construction, transport and repairs, 
poultry farming and spawning, and the breeding and culturing of aquatic products 
(CGC, 1993). The manufacturing sector accounted for 5,927 loans valued at RM2.0 
billion, or 20.6 percent of the total value of loans approved and guaranteed (CGC, 
1998). However, the manufacturing sector often provides more significant benefits to 
the economy than general business. A sample drawn randomly from the underlying 
population of CGC borrowers would tend to favour general business firms, a sector in 
which displacement effects will be frequent and economic additionality will be lower. 
This outcome would have prevented the researcher from exploring the economic 
additionality of the manufacturing sector. To reduce the sectoral bias, the number of 
manufacturing companies in the sample must be increased to counter the composition 
of the population. 
Regional Bias 
My sample consists of SMEs based in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, 
Selangor and Perak and Iohor in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. These States 
include 64.4 percent of the total value of loans approved and guaranteed (CGC, 1998). 
The States from which the sample is drawn are dominated by certain races, in terms of 
number of loans and amount borrowed, and type of sector and loan size, which may 
not necessarily be representative of the population. Barkham et al. (1996) found that a 
regional study may suffer from bias, if differences in the characteristics of firms and 
OMs exist between regions. However, evidence from previous studies has refuted 
regional and locational factors as being important in the study of SMEs (for example, 
Mahmud, 1981; Hakim, 1989; Storey et al., 1989; Keasey & Watson, 1994). 
Furthermore, the focus on certain States, as opposed to a national sample for 
Malaysia, is justified on the basis of convenience (proximity to the researcher), and 
time and cost constraints. 
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Response-rate Bias 
This study uses three empirical research strategies: a mail questionnaire survey; in-
depth case studies; and interviews with key informants. 
The biggest administrative drawback of mail questionnaires is that the researcher has 
to risk the questionnaire being completed by those assigned by senior management but 
not involved in decision making. Therefore, the researcher has to: "accept the 
completed questionnaires on faith (Wahab, 1996)." 
In-depth interviews are critical for the development of the case studies. One of the 
preconditions for a successful interview is the willingness of the interviewee to accept 
the presence of the researcher in the organisation and to relay the relevant information 
(Bell 1993, pp.6-13). Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1994), in their study of the old PGS, 
experienced difficulties in gaining the participation of small firms. To conduct 
interviews with customers and their bankers, the researcher has to follow detailed 
rules laid down in the Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) 1989. More 
generally, in conducting interviews in a multi-racial and multi-lingual society like 
Malaysia, it is difficult to get full cooperation from certain OMs (Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1995). There is particular sensitivity over questions concerned with how the 
business is funded. Even where access to borrowers and their bankers is achieved, the 
generalisibiIity of data is questionable 
Interviews with key informants from CGC and financial institutions covered a number 
of sensitive areas, such as non-performing loans (NPLs), and claims processed and 
paid. It proved difficult to get detailed information on NPLs from the CGC because it 
is such a controversial issue. Furthermore, some officials from financial institutions 
were not willing to divulge borrower information, even though they had been given 
authorisation by their borrowers under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 
1989. 
However, the researcher has reasonable confidence in the accuracy of the data 
collected by this multi-method approach. Firstly, the same conclusion derived from 
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various methods will have greater validity and reliability than a single methodological 
approach to a problem (Gill and lohnson, 1991, p.150). Secondly, different 
methodological strengths and weaknesses will be cancelled out to produce more 
convincing findings (Smith, 1975). Thirdly, the various methods taken together 
normally produce convergent findings (lick, 1979, p.607). 
The issue of data collection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Economic Bias 
The questionnaire survey was conducted over the period March to May, 1998, a time 
when Malaysia was experiencing a deep economic recession. The slump was caused 
by adverse developments in the regional financial markets, following speculative 
attacks on the currencies of a number of East Asian economies. Markets were hit by 
panic reactions and foreign investor confidence evaporated. Malaysia was not spared 
from the contagious effect of these developments, despite its relatively strong 
economic fundamentals. The financial system was adversely affected. Banking 
institutions became preoccupied with managing the deterioration in asset quality and 
capital, and curtailed their lending operations drastically. Total loans outstanding 
extended by the banking system increased by only 1.3 percent in 1998 (as opposed to 
26.7 percent in 1997), with most of the slowdown in credit growth occurring during 
the second half of the year (BNM, 1998). 
The CGC experienced a sharp decrease in applications for NPGS loans. In 1998, 
2,711 loans, amounting to RM515.9 million were guaranteed by CGC. This 
represented a decrease of 82.8 percent in terms of the number and 86.6 percent in 
terms of the amount of loans guaranteed over the previous year. 
The perceptions of borrowers, lenders and policy makers towards the economy as a 
whole, and CGC in particular, were undoubtedly influenced by the economic 
recession. This could obviously affect attitudes towards the utilisation and 
effectiveness of NPGS loans. To minimise potential bias from this source, the 
researcher asked respondents to focus on the position before the onset of the 
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recession. 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters and organised according to the research 
process employed in this study (Figure 1.1). 
Fi ure 1.1: The Research Process 
Objectives & Research problems 
Riltlonale & Limitations 
Organisation oUhe Thesis 
Researth Strategies 
(Sur~" and Case Studies) 
SlImpling Frame 
Questionnaire Design 
Statistical Analysis 
Chapter 5 
• • 
Literature Survey 
Chapt" 2,3 
t 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
Direction for Future Research 
Data Collection 
(Mail Questionnaires &: Case Studies) 
Datll Analysis & TelIt ofHypothues 
Adapted and modified from Sekaran (1992 
The objectives, research questions and rationale for the study are discussed in 
Chapter One. The chapter also stresses the importance of SMEs in the 
industrialisation of Malaysia. Chapters Two and Three present a literature review on 
SME financing in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, and discuss the operation of the 
credit guarantee schemes in developed and developing countries. 
Chapter Four develops a theoretical framework in which the variables are identified 
and defined, and the relationships among the variables are postulated. A number of 
research hypotheses are generated to test these relationships. For the purpose of testing 
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the hypotheses, Chapter Five discusses the research design and methodological 
approach, and explains the statistical techniques used in the analysis. The findings 
derived from the survey and case studies are presented and analysed in Chapters Six 
and Seven. 
Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter Eight, together with a 
number of public policy recommendations and some suggestions for future research. 
1. The term Bumiputera refers to 'son of soil'. Although usually used in reference to the Malays. the 
term also encompasses other indigenous races such as the Orang Asli, Kadazans and Ibans. 
2. The term entrepreneur or owner·manager is used synonymously for ease of reference in the thesis. 
The researcher appreciates that the terms refer to individuals with dif.ferent characteristics, but these 
differences are not critical in this thesis. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE I: 
8ME FINANCING IN MALAYSIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The next section (2.2) reviews the 
importance of SMEs across the globe, while Section 2.3 examines the financing of 
SMEs in Malaysia. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the theoretical literature underpinning 
the financing of SMEs and the financing difficulties faced by SMEs respectively. 
Section 2.6 examines Government policy towards SME financing in Malaysia. Lastly, 
Section 2.7 summarises outstanding issues and questions. 
2.2 IMPORTANCE OF SMEs 
SMEs constitute the vast majority of businesses in most countries. They play an 
important socio-economic role in developed and developing countries (Othman, 1984; 
Ganguly 1985; Bums & Dewhurst, 1986; Batchelor, 1988a; ACOST, 1990; University 
of Cambridge, 1992; Keasey & Watson, 1993a). SMEs are not only recognised as a 
seed-bed for entrepreneurial talent, but they also act as generators for employment 
(Birch, 1979; GaUagher & Stewart, 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Storey and lohnson, 1986; 
Dyson, 1990). 
The importance of the SME sector is becoming increasingly significant in Malaysia. 
As the pace of industrialisation increases, it is expected that SMEs will complement 
the activities of Large Scale Enterprises (LSEs) through integration into the 
mainstream of industrial development. SMEs represent the largest category of 
establishments in the manufacturing sector, accounting for about 84 per cent of firms 
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in that sector (Business Times, 16 November 1996), They play a key role in supplying 
components and supporting services to multinational companies (MNCs). The 
continued presence of MNCs in Malaysia will be facilitated by a vibrant SME sector. 
The successful development of SMEs is also crucial in creating an indigenous 
industrial structure that is efficient and resilient. 
Another important area for strengthening the competitive advantage of SME 
manufacturing establishments in Malaysia is through the development and 
enhancement of indigenous technology. However, according to a survey conducted by 
MITI in 1995-1996, progress in this sphere has been limited because foreign partners 
transfer only Iow and medium grade technology to Malaysia. For example, the food 
and the non-metallic enterprises rely upon Iow grade technology in their production 
processes, while the fabricated metal and chemical products sectors have implemented 
high technology techniques. The inability of most SMEs to acquire advanced 
technologies stems from a number of factors, including a lack of financial resources, a 
lack of information on the most appropriate technologies, and the uncertainty and risk 
involved in buying imported technologies (Mohamed, 1996). 
Most governments acknowledge the importance of SMEs and are aware that smaller 
enterprises face problems not experienced by their larger counterparts. As a result, 
relevant support structures in the form of government agencies or small business 
development centres have been set up to promote the development of SMEs in many 
countries (Gibb and Manu, 1992). Malaysia is no exception, especially in the 
provision of financial assistance. Government support will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 2.6, while the next section concentrates on the financing of SMEs in 
Malaysia. 
2.3· FINANCING OF SMEs IN MALAYSIA 
In order for SMEs to contribute more effectively to the performance of the economy, 
the availability of funds to SMEs in the manufacturing sector will be critical. It was 
estimated that the total investment required by the manufacturing sector over the 
period 1996-2005 would amount to RM250 billion, RMIIO billion over the first five 
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years and RM140 billion for the subsequent period (BNM, 1996), SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector rely on three main sources of finance, namely internally 
generated funds, equity issues and debt. Internally generated funds, include earnings 
and depreciation charges, while debt finance encompasses private debt securities and 
borrowing from foreign sources, as well as funding from the banking systeml and 
specialised development finance institutions2• The major source of finance for SMEs 
in the manufacturing sector is still internally generated funds, accounting for about 48 
percent, while the share of equity financing has increased from about 4 percent to 14 
percent. The increase in the latter stems from recent developments in the capital 
markets. Debt financing makes up the remaining 38 percent (BNM, 1996). 
Internally generated funds may rapidly be used up, especially when SMEs are 
growing. This exhaustion of funds can constrain a firm's ability to respond to discrete 
changes in demand. In particular, young SMEs are likely to generate negative cash 
flows during the early years of operation and "are unlikely to generate sufficient (if 
any) retained profits to finance the significant increases in turnover and the capital 
base required for expansion (Harrison and Mason, 1986, p.536)." Unlike LSEs, which 
have recourse to the capital markets, SMEs have limited avenues for raising funds and 
tend to rely upon debt financing 
In terms of debt financing, SMEs in Malaysia depend on the banking system, for two 
thirds of their total debt finance (Boocock and Wahab, 1997). Petersen and Rajan 
(1992) suggested that SMEs tend to rely on banks for their external financing 
requirements because: "it is often their only source of credit." Private debt securities 
(PDS) and non-bank financial institutions account for less than 5 percent of total debt 
finance. The PDS market is not well· developed in Malaysia, compared with Korea 
where PDS account for about one-third of the debt finance utilised by SMEs (BNM, 
1996). 
The amount of lending by commercial banks and other financial institutions to SMEs 
during the period 1992-1995 ranged between RMW.60 billion and RM15.65 billion 
(Table 2.1). These figures can be considered very marginal as a proportion of the total 
outstanding credit facilities made available by the banking system. However, SMEs 
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also have access to funding from other sources, including publicly-backed 
development finance institutions (DFIs) and private leasing and factoring companies 
(Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996). It is estimated that outstanding credit facilities to 
SMEs from outside the core banking system were around RM9-1O billion in 1993 
(Lin, 1994). 
Table 2.1: Loans Outstanding by Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions 
BSt (RM M'Il" ) iy ec or  IOn 
End-1992 End-1993 End-1994 End-199S 
Agriculture 668.57 607.23 597.71 687.19 
Mining and quarrying 62.19 69.40 61.83 79.29 
Manufacturing 1,850.24 1,856.39 2,184.73 2,828.05 
Housing, real estate and 1,741.40 1,908.44 2,329.00 3,488.80 
Construction 
Wholesale, retail trade, 3,125.19 2,932.05 2,947.32 3,224.50 
restaurants and hotel 
Transport and stora~ 1,119.47 1,006.27 927.48 1,083.64 
Financing, insurance and business 715.22 832.77 1,051.14 1,453.67 
services 
Other services 777.42 815.41 886.26 1,136.50 
Miscellaneous 544.19 780.72 1,154.20 1,665.12 
Total loans 155482.20 173,494.20 206,106.60 264,303.40 
Total loans given to SMEs 10,603.89 10,808.68 12,180.90 15,646.76 
Of which: Bumiputera SME 3,171.84 3,417.84 3,545.03 5,180.35 
Source: BNM Report, 1996. 
Bumiputera-owned SMEs accounted for RM3.17 billion (30 percent) of loans 
outstanding at the end of 1992, and RM5.l8 billion (33 percent) at the end of 1995. 
These modest figures illustrate why it is important for BNM to set guidelines (quotas) 
to financial institutions for Bumiputera-owned SMEs. The use of quotas in the context 
of the NPGS will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.6. 
The reluctance of financial institutions to give loans to SMEs was confirmed by Abdul 
Hamid and Abdul Rashid (1996); SMEs are unprofitable owing to the higher 
administrative costs involved in appraisal and monitoring, a higher level of non-
performing loans, and the returns being incompatible with the risks involved. 
SMEs are a high risk for lenders, because of high mortality rates. Evidence of a high 
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mortality rate for SMEs in Malaysia, especially younger SMEs, is found in previous 
studies (Mohamed et al. 1992). The principal cause of failure was management 
weaknesses, especially in the area of financial management (Bador, 1985; Haron and 
Shanmugam, 1994). This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4. 
However, lending to SMEs can be profitable if a good working relationship exists 
between financial institutions and SMEs (Turnbull and Gibbs, 1987; Watson, 1986). 
Studies in several nations show that sustained banking relationships (,relationship 
lending') are associated with the greater availability of capital, lower charges for 
credit lines, less frequent pledging of collateral and lower monitoring requirements 
(Binks & Ennew, 1996b; Blackwell & Winters, 1997). 
In Germany, for example, SMEs benefit from long-term relationships with their main 
banks, with a constant exchange of information between the two parties. The absence 
of strong markets for venture capital in Germany means that SMEs rely almost 
exclusively upon banks for external finance. Not only do the banks represent the 
major financial intermediary supplying capital to SMEs, but they are also extensively 
represented on the supervisory boards of companies (Audretsch & Elston, 1999). 
Research by Harhoff and K6rting (1999) on 1,399 SMEs in Germany found that firms 
with more concentrated borrowing and long-lasting bank relationships fared better 
than other enterprisesin terms of credit availability, as well as collateral requirements 
and interest rates. 
In Japan too, SMEs continue to receive long-term credit and support from their banks. 
Banks can also hold shares in SMEs (BNM, 1996). 
Compared to the situation to Germany and Japan, and many other countries, banking 
relationships with SMEs in Malaysia are not very close (BNM, 1996). The focus in 
Malaysia is on collateral-based lending and bankers lack the industrial experience to 
establish close links with their SME customers. The failure to develop a close 
relationship may also be explained by restrictions on the ability of banks to invest in 
the shares of SMEs. Investments in the shares of manufacturing companies cannot 
exceed 10 percent of the paid-up capital of the company or 5 percent of a bank's paid-
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up capital and published reserves, whichever is lower; the aggregate value at cost of 
all such shares cannot exceed 25 percent of a bank's paid-up capital and published 
reserves. Apart from these legal restrictions, SMEs in Malaysia are reluctant to give 
up equity (ADB, 1990), an issue which is discussed below. 
The absence of a close relationship between banks and SMEs in Malaysia has 
contributed to problems associated with agency costs, principally asymmetric 
information (discussed in more detail in the next Section). In response to asymmetric 
information, a bank's typical reaction is to call for security or collateral. An SME 
without collateral and an established track record will therefore generally have 
difficulties in obtaining bank finance. Studies conducted by several researchers in 
Malaysia have demonstrated that a lack of material security has placed SMEs under 
severe financial constraints (Chee, 1986b, Yoon, 1988). 
Other issues which are also worthy of discussion with respect to agency costs are 
moral hazard and adverse selection, which I will be exploring in more detail in 
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. To counter moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
lenders impose stringent lending conditions on loans granted and raise interest rates 
for all SMEs. 
Apart from the problems associated with high risk and/or agency costs, banks in 
Malaysia and across the globe have been unwilling to finance high-technology (high-
tech) firms. The conservative lending policies of the commercial banks do not dispose 
them to lend to new, small scale projects involving unproven, innovative products. 
The ADB (1990) study highlighted the fact that "commercial banks have difficulty 
appraising the likely level of risk and profitability of innovative proposals, partly 
because they lack staff with experience and professional expertise to assess the 
technological and commercial prospects of the proposal." Venture capital could help 
remedy the situation facing high-tech SMEs. 
Venture capital was traditionally associated with small high-risk investments in high 
technology ventures, although venture capital across the globe has tended to switch to 
larger, less risky ventures. The formal venture capital market is relatively undeveloped 
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in Malaysia, although Boocock and Wahab (1997) observed that informal venture 
capitalists (business angels) play an important role in providing risk capital to many 
SMEs in Malaysia. A lack of awareness of the role of venture capital (BNM, 1994 and 
1995, Lin, 1992) has affected the demand for venture funds. There is also a significant 
amount of evidence that points to the reluctance of SMEs to 'open-up' their capital to 
outsiders and forfeit their independence and control (Hall, 1989; Binks & Vale, 1990; 
Binks et aI., 1992b; Mason and Harrison, 1993; Tannous & Sarkar, 1993; Bank of 
England, 1996a). The ADB (1990) study supported this argument by stating that: "the 
Malaysian business community places too high a value on the retention of ownership 
and control and on short-term gain." 
Another source of finance that is available to SMEs, notably technology-based firms, 
is the Over-The-Counter (OTC) market. The OTC market in Malaysia is the 
Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ). It 
was launched on 30 April, 1999, after a delay of more than 2 years. MESDAQ aims to 
attract high growth SMEs, especially those invoved in technology based activities. 
The minimum paid-up capital required by MESDAQ is RM2 million. Other listing' 
requirements include: 70 per cent of funds raised must be used in Malaysia; a 
company must have at least 50 per cent of its assets and operations in Malaysia; and a 
company must have a sponsor for the first five years (The Star, 26 April 1999). The 
launching of MESDAQ gives venture funds an exit route for their investments. 
MESDAQ could thus open up avenues for venture capital to play a more active role in 
financing the start-up and seed capital stages of new and technology-based firms 
(BNM, 1996). However, given the limited progress in attracting companies to the new 
market, it seems unlikely that MESDAQ will boost the supply of venture capital in 
Malaysia. 
In summary, therefore, the availability of funds for Malaysian SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector is derived from three main sources of finance, namely internally 
generated funds, equity issues and debt. SMEs face constraints in generating funds 
internally because of their inability to respond to discrete changes in demand. Thus, 
SMEs turn to external financiers, principally the banking system. In Malaysia a close 
relationship between banks and SMEs has not developed. In the face of high mortality 
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rates for SMEs, lenders typically raise interest rates for all SMEs (adverse selection) 
and call for collateral to counter the problems of asymmetric information and moral 
hazard. Banks in Malaysia rarely finance high-tech SMEs. Venture capital could play 
an important role in financing risky ventures. However, the venture capital market has 
not really taken off, and the stuttering start by MESDAQ is unlikely to boost the 
availability of venture capital. 
These factors point to the need for a credit guarantee scheme in Malaysia. For the 
present, however, it is important to strengthen the theoretical input on why SMEs face 
difficulties in raising external finance. The next section reviews an essential element 
of a modern finance theory (agency theory) which underpins much of the debate on 
the financing of SMEs. 
2.4 AGENCY THEORY 
One of the basic thrusts of modern finance theory has been to direct scholarly 
attention: "to the way in which the capital market enables allocation of scarce 
financial resources between individuals and business enterprises over time (McMahon 
et al., 1993, p.69)." An important contribution of modern finance theory has been the 
development of agency theory, a concept which has been applied to the financing of 
SMEs. 
In general, agency theory: "considers a business enterprise from the viewpoint of the 
various stakeholders it might have and explores how their financial interests are 
furthered and protected in their dealings with each other (McMahon et al., 1993, 
p.80)." Stakeholders include OMs, employees, customers, family members, creditors 
and the general public. An agency relationship was defined by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976, p.306) as: "a contract under which one or more persons, the principal(s) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent." 
In the case of SME finance, the agent is typically an OM and the principal is the 
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supplier of external finance. The task of the lender is to ensure that its agent (the OM) 
acts in accordance with the contract, i.e., repaying the loan plus interest. The 
'principle of self-interested behaviour' which arises in the agency relationship can be 
problematic because both parties (principals and agents) might pursue their own self 
interests (McMahon et al., 1993, p.81), even if their actions are detrimental to 
achieving common objectives (Hand et aI., 1982). The lender has to protect its 
position whenever the OM has an incentive to take action which would result in a 
decline in the worth of the security or the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Hands et al. (1982) stated that problems in agency relationships are likely to happen 
when the business is small and control is exercised by an OM with a major stake in 
the business. Any business risks represent personal risks for the OM. The OM will 
therefore try to minimise his personal risks, which might result in decisions which are 
detrimental to the finance provider. For example, Othman (1984, p.55) observed in the 
agency relationship between banks and SMEs in Malaysia that: 
It has been the experience of some banks to witness blatant misuse of funds. Loans 
approved to some small businessmen have been diverted to support various non-
productive activities like the purchase of stocks and shares; placement made in fixed 
deposits; purchase of non-business related properties; and personal consumption 
The crucial relationship between SMEs and their finance providers has been examined 
by a number of researchers. For example, Landstrom (1992) developed a framework 
to explain the interaction between private investors and OMs. Similarly, Deakins and 
Hussain (1992) explored the agency relationship between SMEs and their banks. 
These studies and others are now used to explore issues which stem from the 
principal/agent relationship and which provide insight into the 'funding gaps' 
controversies discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.4.1 Asymmetric Information 
Agency problems in the financing of SMEs often stem from asymmetric information 
(Barnea et al., 1981). The term refers to a situation in which the OM has more 
information on the financial condition and prospects for the business than the lender 
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(Ang, 1992; Berger & Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Weinberg, 1994). In the 
case of SMEs, information is less readily available (Storey, 1994a) and they do not 
publish the same quantity or quality of information on their financial position or 
earnings prospects as larger enterprises (Ang, 1991). Furthermore, Ang pointed out 
that SMEs are under no obligation to produce verifiable information, since their 
securities are not traded publicly, SMEs also fear that any information disclosed might 
be used against them, a term described as 'information impactedness' (Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 1989), Faced with information asymmetry, lenders may deny credit to 
SMEs that are entirely creditworthy but unable to document it (Coleman, 1998). 
The theoretical work of Stiglitz and others (Greenwald, Weiss and Stiglitz, 1984; 
Weiss and Stiglitz, 1981) offers insight into the possibility of credit rationing where 
information asymmetries are present. This rationing will be discussed in detail in 
Section 2.4.3. 
Rather than rationing or a debt gap, de Meza and Webb (1987) associate asymmetric 
information with the existence of different (but unobservable) entrepreneurial 
abilities. The difficulty in identifying different abilities results in an oversupply of 
credit: "if banks are unable to discriminate effectively between good and bad projects, 
they are likely to make some investments in bad projects and so 'over-invest' in the 
market place (Storey, 1994a)." 
The presence of information asymmetries will also contribute to higher costs of 
external finance (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Keasey & Watson, 1993b), In the agency 
relationship, lenders often demand high interest rates from SMEs, primarily to 
compensate for the possibilities of wealth expropriation (Pettit and Singer, 1985). 
The extent of information asymmetry varies according to the type of SME involved 
(Read, 1998). Storey (l994a) focused on the information asymmetries faced by the 
OM of a new firm or start-up. Such OMs may have little idea of whether or not their 
business will succeed. On the other hand, their lenders may have had previous 
experience of similar businesses at that particular stage of development. Similarly, for 
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SMEs which operate in a local market, a local lender may often have supenor 
knowledge of local business conditions (Read, 1998, p.35). In such cases, asymmetric 
information may work in favour of the SME and lead to more finance than anticipated 
being made available. 
Ang (1992) acknowledged that young SMEs, especially in the area of high-
technology, will experience greater information asymmetries than conventional firms. 
OMs in high-tech firms usually have a higher level of technical knowledge than their 
lenders, who are generalists. Vyakarnam and Jacobs (1991) refer to: "technology 
uncertainty, whereby the banks find it difficult to assess the potential profitability of 
technological propositions, as they are not in the position to understand the technology 
and cannot therefore have full understanding of a project's feasibility from a technical 
perspective." The OMs may also fail to communicate their knowledge of the firm to 
lenders (Mason and Harrison, 1991 b). Furthermore, evidence has shown that lenders 
have a tendency to treat all high-tech SMEs in a homogeneous fashion, even though 
some bankers are being trained to overcome the problem of technological uncertainty 
(Deakins and Hussain, 1992). 
In general, therefore, asymmetric information occurs where the OM has more 
information on the financial condition and prospects for the business than the lender. 
In most cases, the supply of credit is restricted or available only at a higher cost, 
especially to high tech firms. 
2.4.2 Moral Hazard 
The second issue arising in the agency relationship between SMEs and their finance 
providers is the existence of moral hazard. In these circumstances, an OM who has 
obtained a loan for a risky project has an incentive to take decisions which increase 
the risk of, and potential returns to, the project. If the firm has limited liability status, 
and finance is not secured on personal assets or collateral, the costs of default will fall 
on the firm and the lender, not the OM. The OM will benefit from upside gains but 
bear none of the down-side risks (Keasey and Watson, 1993a). Furthermore, for the 
relatively small amount of finance involved, it is generally not economic for the 
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lenders to monitor closely the internal operation of SME borrowers (United Kingdom, 
1994a), hence the prospect of moral hazard may again lead to credit being denied. 
2.4.3 Adverse Selection 
The third consequence of the agency relationship is adverse selection, a situation in 
which the principal (lender) faces problems in making correct lending decisions. As 
discussed in Section 2.4.1 on asymmetric information, Storey (1994a) describes 
adverse selection as: "differences in the access to information between the bank and 
the OM, which lead to an unwillingness on the part of the bank to use interest rates to 
bring the market -place for funds into equilibrium. The bank faces problems in 
selecting risky projects because of imperfect information." The banks prefer to set 
interest rates at a level where the demand for funds exceeds the supply, because they 
reduce the number of lending decisions required, and minimise the time spent on 
appraising and monitoring loans. 
Deakins and Hussain (1992) provide two typologies encountered in the adverse 
selection problem: Type I errors (turning away future successes); and Type IT errors 
(taking on future failures), or 'lemons' to use Akerlof's terminology (Akerlof, 1970). 
The lenders make decisions based on their knowledge of the agents' skills and 
competencies. This knowledge is frequently incomplete. Lenders may try to minimize 
their exposure by being risk averse towards SMEs; the probability therefore is that 
they will make Type I, rather than Type IT errors. Type IT errors will have adverse 
consequences for their careers, as the cost of bad debts are more obvious than the 
interest margin foregone (Philpott, 1994). 
To eliminate the potential problem of adverse selection in new technology-based 
SMEs, it has been suggested (Deakins and Hussain, 1991; Deakins and Philpot, 1994) 
that lenders need longer training programmes for technology specialists, to enable 
them to understand the impact of technological uncertainty and asymmetric 
information within the risk assessment process. 
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2.4.4 Agency Costs and Collateral 
Financial institutions are reluctant to lend because of the high mortality rate of SMEs 
(Scarborough & Zimmerer, 1984; Batchelor, 1989a: Smallbone, 1990). Storey et al. 
(1987, p.3) claim that: "the fundamental characteristic which distinguishes small firms 
from large is their relatively high probability of failure." The increased risk and 
severity of problems (e.g. information asymmetries, moral hazard and adverse 
selection) associated with the financing of SMEs means that agency costs will be high 
(McMahon et aI., 1993). 
For example, the lenders incur monitoring costs in an attempt to overcome the 
problems associated with moral hazard. Such costs are typically setting up contracts 
which formally bind the borrower to: "agreed types of behaviour and provide 
sanctions should actual behaviour deviate from that specified in the contract 
(McMahon et al., 1993, p.82)." In the case of bank finance, the monitoring costs 
include the preparation of loan or overdraft contracts, whereby SMEs face penalties if 
they do not comply with the stated conditions, notably repayment within an agreed 
length of time. Sanctions might include charging higher interest rates, larger fees or 
withdrawal of the facility. On the other hand, the provision of incentives, in the form 
of favourable interest rates, waiving of fees or repayment holidays, encourages SMEs 
to behave in a manner which is consistent with the contract. 
Lenders also have to guard against information asymmetries. The transaction costs of 
handling the financial data of SMEs are considerable if lenders are to judge the 
performance of SMEs accurately (McMahon et al., 1993). Furthermore Storey (1994a, 
p.207) stated that: 
Monitoring and assessment costs can be considerable if an accurate decision is to be 
made on the viability of the project. It is also assumed that the initial costs are 
invariant with the size of the loan which is sought, or are a decreasing proportion of 
the loan size. Furthermore, the financial institution has to pass on the costs of 
monitoring and assessment to its clients. This applies not only to those which are 
incurred in reaching a successful decision, but also where the institutions turn down 
proposals having already made viability assessments. 
The lender's response to the risks inherent in the agency relationship is typically to 
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reqUire the OM to provide a personal guarantee or other security on loans or 
overdrafts (Cosh and Hughes, 1994). 
Berger and Udell (1990) advocated that all those having access to information should 
have a say in deciding whether to commit collateral or not. They refer to this as the 
'sorting-by-private information' paradigm. The lenders use the collateral as a signal 
that the OM is committed to the success of the business (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Lenders cannot adequately distinguish between 
borrowers, since the latter usually have more information than the former. Given this 
assumption of asymmetric information, the Willingness of the OM to provide personal 
security or collateral sends a signal to the principal that the OM views the likelihood 
of success of the project as being high. On the other hand, theorists such as Morsman 
(1986) argue that the lenders have enough information to assess the relative risks of a 
range of projects, the 'sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm.' Therefore, lenders should 
seek collateral only from those borrowers they consider as having risky projects. 
Therefore, according to Storey (1994a, p.21O), "the role of collateral is threefold. 
Firstly, it limits the downside loss by providing an asset for the lender (bank) in the 
event of a project failure. Secondly, it provides an incentive to the OM to commit him 
or herself to the project. Thirdly, it provides a signal to the bank that the entrepreneur 
believes the project is likely to succeed - otherwise he or she would not commit their 
personal resources to it." Furthermore, the existence of personal security or collateral 
can be taken as a proxy for the quality of a financial proposition (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). 
However, personal collateral is typically valued at less than its market price by 
lenders. Ang (1991) found that over reliance by lenders on personal security will lead 
to OMs choosing less risky projects with lower returns, in order to safeguard their 
homes. 
New technology-based firms have particular problems with respect to collateral 
(Oakey, 1984a), especially where lenders face difficulties in valuing research and 
development output owing to its intangible nature. Such firms could face severe 
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liquidity problems if finance is denied. 
2.5 DIFFICULTIES IN RAISING FINANCE 
In the light of the theoretical background underpinning the debate on the financing of 
SMEs, it is now possible to examine the central issue of my research, the practical 
difficulties faced by SMEs in raising finance. 
2.5.1. Equity Gap 
When seeking external finance, SMEs fund their operations through equity or debt 
financing. There continues to be a 'gap' in both the equity and long-term debt markets 
for SMEs. A 'gap' in the provision of finance is defined by Storey (1991a, p.239) as: 
An unwillingness on the part of suppliers of finance to supply it on the terms and 
conditions required by small businesses. Expressed in its most casual form, 
indications of a 'gap' include the difficulties of obtaining small sums of equity 
capital, or the difficulties which some businesses have in obtaining bank finance. 
Evidence of high gearing is an indication of the existence of an 'equity gap' for SMEs. 
A study conducted by Davidson and Dutia (1991) on 86,000 firms in 343 industries, 
over a period of five years, found that SMEs tended to rely more heavily on debt 
capital than large enterprises. Their findings confirmed those of Gupta (1969), Walker 
imd Petty (1978) and Van Auken and Carter (1989). 
In the UK the existence of the 'equity gap' was first identified and reported by the 
Macmillan Committee (1931) and subsequently confirmed by the Bolton (1971) and 
Wilson Committee (1979). The MacmiIlan Committee reported that SMEs were 
unable to secure long-dated external finance for amounts of less than £200,000. The 
Committee's conclusions on the nature of the 'gap' are stated as follows: 
It has been represented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and 
medium-sized businesses in raising the capital which they may from time to time 
required, even when the security offered is perfectly sound. To provide adequate 
machinery for raising long-dated capital in amounts not sufficiently large for public 
issue, i.e. amounts ranging from small sums up to £200,000 or more, always presents 
difficulties. The expense of a public issue is too great in proportion to the capital 
raised. 
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The setting up of the Loan Guarantee Scheme in the UK in June 1981 stemmed from a 
recommendation made by the Wilson Committee (Pieda, 1992). That Committee 
proposed that the 'equity gap' had narrowed, particularly at the top end of the range, 
but maintained that there was still a problem in raising finance for SMEs, especially 
for development funds (from £15,000 to £150,000) and start-up projects requiring up 
to £10,000. The Committee considered that the introduction of a credit guarantee 
scheme might be justified on two grounds: 
The first would be if there were reason to believe that competition between the banks 
in this area was insufficiently effective to ensure that viable small businesses always 
had the necessary access to sufficient funds on reasonable terms. The second would 
be if it were felt that the public return from the activities of small firms was greater 
than the private benefit because, for example, of their importance to job creation. In 
the latter case, it would also follow that some public subsidy was justified. 
The Committee did not come out strongly in favour of either of these two grounds, but 
considered that a limited subsidy element was justified. This policy followed the 
philosophy of the Bolton Committee in nurturing SME activity to secure wider social 
and economic benefits. 
Even though the 'equity gap' had been narrowed by the formation of new equity 
providers including Charterhouse Industrial Development and the Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation Limited (Bannock & Doran, 1987), the gap still 
appeared to exist at the end of the 1980s (Bannock and Partners, 1991). However, the 
University of Cambridge (SBRC, 1992) stated that the perception of widespread 
financial constraints on SMEs could not be supported by evidence of disadvantaged 
firms. The consensus of opinion was that the equity gap had narrowed in the wake of 
developments in private sector markets and the introduction of government initiatives 
to complement the activities of the private sector. 
This broad view is supported by a recent review (Commission on Public Policy and 
British Business, 1997, p.135) which rejected some of the widely held views 
concerning the equity gap. A summary of its key judgements can be found in Table 
2.2. 
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1. Investment capital is generally scarce 
for SMEs 
2. Finance for start-ups is scarce. 
3. It is difficult for high-tech firms to 
obtain finance. 
4. Venture capitalists are reluctant to 
provide 'patient' capital for SMEs. 
Literature Review I 
VerdictlEvidence 
False. Most SMEs find few difficulties 
obtaining finance. 
Probably False. Especially in the 1980s 
when start-up finance was plentiful, 
although it is hard to measure the number 
of potential start-ups that are denied 
finance. 
Partly true. Theoretical and empirical 
evidence of difficulties in the early stages, 
es eciall for venture ca ita!. 
Partly true. But there is some evidence 
that SMEs are also reluctant to give up 
e uit . 
Source: Report of the Commission on Public Policy and British Business; 136 
Some of the commonly held views have been called into question because of 
significant changes in financial markets in the UK over the last decade or so. The 
Cambridge study found that between 80 and 90 per cent of SME finance requirements 
were being met (SBRC, 1996). This assertion is supported by the Aston Business 
School (1991), which suggested that the extent of any equity gap is small. 
Furthermore, it would appear that start-up SMEs have not experienced particular 
problems in obtaining finance; the level of business start-ups in the UK rose rapidly 
over the 1980s, with the main four clearing banks being enthusiastic lenders to start-
ups during the era ofthe Lawson boom (CPPBB, 1997). The Bank of England (1996a) 
also reported evidence of an increasing variety of finance available from banks, over 
the 1990s, with a substantial growth in term lending at the expense of overdrafts. 
However, some of the claims for the existence of the equity gap appear to hold some 
validity, for example, that finance is inadequate for young high-tech SMEs and that 
venture capitalists are reluctant to invest in such companies. SMEs experience greater 
difficulty than LSEs in raising finance, particularly high-risk and technology-based 
firms (Barber et ai., 1989; ACOST, 1990; Westhead & Storey, 1994; Moore, 1994; 
BNM, 1996). The Aston Business School (1991, p.13) found that SMEs with 
proposals for innovation were more likely to experience financial constraints. 
The Radcliffe Committee (1959, p.328) identified the existence of a 'technological 
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gap' and emphasised that: 
There are certain problems about the provision of finance for the commercial 
development by small businesses and private companies of new inventions and 
innovations of technique. One problem is that the amount of capital required to 
finance a development may be larger in relation to a small company's capital 
structure and apparent earning prospects than the financial institutions would 
ordinarily feel justified in putting up. The other problem is that of risks: the risks in 
the commercial exploitation of technical innovation are likely to be greater than those 
in expanding an existing line of production or extending into existing lines of 
business, and however promising the innovation, the risks are certainly more difficult 
to assess. This makes it more difficult for the company that wants to develop an 
invention to convince potential lenders that their money will be well invested. 
Many high-tech SMEs face problems finding finance because the scientific and 
technological knowledge involved creates an extra degree of uncertainty for finance 
providers. This is supported by case-study evidence that young high-tech SMEs find it 
more difficult to obtain bank finance than larger or less innovative firms (Oakey, 
1984; Advisory Council of Science and Technology, 1990; Roberts, 1991). However, 
Moore (1994) argues that high-tech SMEs, in general, do not experience any more 
difficulties in obtaining finance than other sectors. He concluded that businesses 
which are likely to experience difficulties in finance are those which are young, are in 
the manufacturing sector, have below average profitability and are smaller. 
The venture capital market in the UK has expanded rapidly in the last fifteen years, 
but the CPPBB (1997) reported that the proportion of UK venture capital invested in 
young high-tech SMEs had dropped steeply, from 26.4 percent in 1985 to under 10 
percent in 1992. This differs from the United States, where venture capital investment 
in young high-tech SMEs has been relatively high and steady at around 70 to 80 
percent (Murray, 1999). Murray also commented on the state of the venture capital 
industry in the UK: 
The Bank of England in its 1996 review of venture capital and its role in financing 
technology-based small firms showed that, while the growth in finance to UK industry 
was dramatic, this growth has not predominantly occurted at the critically important 
stages of seed capital, start-up or early stage investment. It is at this earliest and 
highly speculative stage that there is most likely to be failure in supply-side 
response .... This situation, in the Bank's opinion, and reflecting ACOST's 1990 
conclusion, allowed little confidence that the 'equity gap' problem had, or was likely 
to be solved by private venture capital firms. Thus, a financial constraint, often 
seriously faced by rapidly growing and high potential SMEs and first identified by 
Macmillan in 1931, seemed to be just as pertinent in the late 1990s. 
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The CPPBB (1997) recommended the use of mutual guarantee schemes (MGSs) to 
help close the equity gap. MGSs are used extensively in Europe and are specifically 
designed to reduce problems of information asymmetry. 
Boocock and Wahab (1997) stated that: "the precise extent of any equity gap, 
irrespective of which country in considered, is always open to question." Evidence 
from the UK is inconclusive. However, the equity gap facing Malaysian SMEs might 
be more significant. The majority of SMEs in Malaysia depend on the banking system 
for their external financing requirements and banklSME relationships tend to be 
somewhat distant. The reluctance of SMEs to dilute ownership and a lack of 
awareness of the role of venture capital has held back investment activity in that field 
(BNM 1994 and 1995). The discussion now turns to debt finance. 
2.5.2 Debt Gap 
According to Cressy (1999), "a debt gap exists when the demand for credit (typically 
business credit) exceeds supply and the price of credit does not adjust to equate the 
two. This may involve borrowers getting less than is justified on economic grounds 
(Type I rationing), and in some cases (Type II rationing) borrowers getting no money 
for viable projects." 
At the start-up stage, SMEs tend to depend on the OM's savings, contributions from 
family and friends, and trade credit ( Md. Salleh, 1990; Ang, 1992; Levy, 1993; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Ang, Lin, & Tyler, 1995; Berger & Udell, 1995; Binks & 
Ennew, 1996a; Cole & Wolken, 1996). According to the 'pecking order hypothesis', 
SMEs prefer intemal debt and equity to external debt, with external equity considered 
only as a last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cosh and Hughes, 1994). Most SMEs 
begin their operations without institutional help (Levitsky and Prasad, 1989, 
Balkenhol, 1990). However, when SMEs begin to grow and innovate, many studies 
(including: MacmiIIan Committee, 1931; Radcliffe Committee, 1959; Bolton 
Committee, 1971; University of Cambridge, 1992) have shown that institutional 
financing is needed 
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The debt gap experienced by SMEs stems from a variety of factors. As stated above, 
most young SMEs have a high mortality rate; 33 percent cease trading within two 
years from incorporation and 60 percent within five years (Pickering, 1989). SMEs in 
the US experience a 70 percent failure rate over a five year period and most of these 
occur in the first year of operation (Amer and Bain, 1990). The failure rate in 
Malaysia is also high, especially among younger SMEs. 
The processing, supervision and collection of loans to SMEs is often more expensive 
as a percentage of the amount raised compared to larger firms (Binks et al., 1986; 
Confederation of British Industry, 1993; United Kingdom, 1994a). Access to credit is 
restricted by financial institutions which impose stringent lending conditions on 
younger SMEs that have little or no track record (Binks, 1979a: Bannock, 1981; 
Oakey, 1984, Kee et al., 1986; University of Cambridge, 1992). A lack of material 
security is the most serious drawback for an SME seeking assistance from fmancial 
institutions (Binks et aI., 1986; Yoon, 1988) 
2.5.3 Information and Knowledge Gap 
The Economic Advisory Group (1971) surveyed a sample of small firms which had 
made unsuccessful approaches to financial institutions in the UK. They suggested that 
the 'finance gap' was an 'information gap' plus an 'availability of funds gap' (Aston 
Business School, 1991). The Group observed that most firms failed to obtain finance 
because they were insufficiently informed or poorly advised about appropriate sources 
of finance. This information gap has provided the rationale for the activities of many 
enterprise agencies which have sought to provide firms with comprehensive 
information on funding sources (As ton Business School, 1991). The EAG Report 
supported the argument made by the Bolton Committee (1971, p.191): 
Many small firms are prevented by a lack of information, by inexperience in 
presenting applications for finance and by a formidable barrier of prejudice against 
borrowing of all kinds, from making use of the full range of facilities available to 
them. 
Bannock and Partners (1991) and Harvey (1992) both identified a lack of knowledge 
or imperfect information as the main reason why SMEs failed to approach appropriate 
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funding bodies. However, as Bates and Hally (1982, pp.2-3) and CBI (1982) pointed 
out, the root of the problem often lies with the OMs themselves. They tend to react 
late to information and they do not approach the appropriate person for advice until 
after a funding crisis occurs. 
In Malaysia, the information gap is prevalent especially in the poor awareness and 
take up of various incentives offered by the Government, including the CGC's 
Schemes. Only 19 percent of SMEs are aware of the CGC-backed facilities (BNM, 
1995), a finding which is supported by Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) - discussed 
in greater detail in S2.5.8, 
2.5.4 Financial Skills Gap 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, poor financial management frequently contributes to the 
risk involved in lending to SMEs. For example, many SMEs suffer from a lack of 
capital (Broom and Longenecker, 1975; Bates and Hally, 1982; Bador, 1985; Haron & 
Shanmugam, 1994). This factor is acknowledged to be one of the leading causes of 
business failure (Broom & Longenecker, 1975; Hubbard & Hailes, 1988; Mohamed et 
al., 1992; Barclays, 1993). 
The financial skills gap also applies to the area of financial planning. Study conducted 
by Rahardjo & Ali (1986) found weak or non-existent financial planning to be 
prevalent among SMEs. In the UK, short-term debt in the form of overdrafts is the 
main source of finance for SMEs (Cressy, 1993a). Short- term funds of this nature 
may pose excessive financial risk to the firm, as the lender may withdraw the facility 
at any time. A survey in 1991 found that 49 percent of SMEs had never considered 
long-term finance, even though most of them clearly recognised its availability 
(Middleton et al., 1994). While financial planning is often an important key to SME 
survival (Stoner, 1983; Kee & Chang, 1985; Amer & Bain, 1990; Mohamed et al., 
1992), the majority of SMEs in Great Britain manage their own daily financial affairs 
without any form of financial training (Barclays, 1993). 
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2.5.5 Summary on 'Gaps' 
Funding gap controversies still exist in the financing of SMEs. The sources of alleged 
gaps stem from market deficiencies in supply and demand. The evidence on the equity 
gap appears to be inconclusive in the UK, but disadvantaged SMEs may be more 
prevalent in Malaysia especially in the high tech field. For example, the limited 
progress of MESDAQ suggests that SMEs will continue to struggle to find venture 
capital. 
In the case of the debt gap, lenders cover the risks in their relationship with OMs by 
requiring OMs to provide material security. However, OMs have limited resources 
and are therefore placed under severe financial constraints. Furthermore, SMEs might 
be discouraged from applying for debt finance because of high interest rates or a 
dislike of interference from outsiders, even when this does not involve the loss of 
voting rights (Cressy, 1999). An information gap exists in Malaysia, especially in the 
poor awareness and take-up of various incentives given by the Government. A 
financial skills gap also seems to affect SMEs in Malaysia. 
2.5.6 Characteristics of Firm and OM 
The characteristics of the firm and the OM are very important factors, often neglected 
in research on the finance gap (Chee, 1986a; Kee et al., 1986; University of 
Cambridge, 1992; Holmes and Kent, 1991; Landstrom and Winborg, 1995). The 
characteristics of the firm, such as legal structure, sector of industry, size and age of 
firm, use of external advisers and business plan, and the profile of the OM, based on 
gender, race, age, training, education and business experience, are all factors which 
will influence financial decisions. These factors will also influence the perceptions of 
external financiers in assessing applications for funds. 
Legal Structure 
The choice of legal structure of a business can influence its ability to obtain external 
finance. Achieving limited company status is perceived by OMs as a method of 
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solving problems in raising finance (Posner, 1986), because it gives greater credibility 
to lenders/investors (Freedman & Godwin, 1992). Unincorporated firms' are typically 
constrained by the availability of collateral in obtaining finance (Godwin, 1993), 
because they usually have only one major asset, i.e., the OM's family home. Godwin 
(1993), highlighted the fact that: 
Banks have also traditionally preferred collateral in the form of real property. 
Consequently, the price of houses is highly important to this sector. The property 
crash has had a substantial impact on the banks, who have been caught both by 
lending too heavily to such a volatile sector, and by losses on collateral for failed 
loans, and very small firms have been particularly hard hit by this shrinkage in the 
value of their main collateral asset. 
Godwin then suggested that "a system of credit guarantees could be introduced for 
those who, because of falling house prices, find their collateral eroded." 
However, Barlow and Robson (1999) found that, at least in the period since 1982, 
unincorporated businesses have generally not been significantly constrained in their 
ability to obtain finance; they found evidence of a positive relationship between the 
growth in bank lending to unincorporated businesses and the growth in housing 
equity, a measure of collateral availability. While house prices do exert considerable 
influence, private limited companies are generally more able to access bank finance 
(Storey, 1994b), and they certainly have more opportunity than unincorporated firms 
to obtain external equity CBinks et aI., 1986). 
Sector of Industry 
Lenders/investors tend to favour certain sectors (Read, 1998). Most studies of SMEs 
classify them into two sectors such as 'manufacturing' and 'service' firms (University 
of Cambridge, 1992), or 'manufacturing' and 'non-manufacturing' firms (Storey, 
1994b). 
Service sector start-ups are perceived as particularly risky. The markets are easy to 
enter, as capital requirements are low, and there are high exit rates through 
displacement. These factors tend to result in high competition (Fothergill and Gudgin, 
1982). Banks generally prefer to lend on tangible, hard assets such as plant and 
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equipment (Loscocco and Robinson, 1991) because of their desire to counteract the 
problems associated with moral hazard and adverse selection. Service sectors lack 
tangible assets; furthermore, assets tend to have Iow resale value in the event of 
bankruptcy, hence service sector firms often receive less favourable terms of credit 
than those in the manufacturing sector (Therrien et al., 1986; Riding and Swift, 1990). 
In the manufacturing sector, firms in the high-tech sub-sector, as stated above, find it 
difficult to obtain appropriate finance (Waite, 1973; Barber et al., 1989; Westhead & 
Storey, 1994; Moore, 1994; Barlow and Robson, 1999). Banks are typically cautious 
about lending to firms in the high-tech sector, particularly in the early stages of 
development (McNaIly, 1997). This reluctance to invest reflects the problems of 
distinguishing between good and bad technology businesses (Mason and Harrison, 
1994), as well as the limited collateral of high-tech firms (Baty, 1990; Moore, 1994; 
Philpott, 1994). 
Therefore, many high-tech SMEs have to turn to sources of external equity if their 
businesses are to survive beyond the seed stage (Baty, 1990; Slatter, 1992; Standeven, 
1993; Mason and Harrison, 1994; Moore, 1994) even though it means diluting the 
entrepreneur's ownership and control (Burns, 1992; Buxton, 1995; Manigart and 
Struyf, 1995). 
Certain sectors of industry, where SMEs dominate, also experience difficulties in 
financing owing to the absence of incentives for banks to favour long-term lending for 
productive investment. Chin and lomo (1996) highlighted the case of Malaysia 
whereby: 
Only slightly over a quarter of Malaysian commercial bank lending goes to 
manufacturing, agriculture, mining and other productive activities; the percentage is 
likely to be even smaller with foreign borrowings, most of which have been 
collateralised with assets such as real property and stocks. Hence, despite 
considerable government intervention in the financial sector, more than 70 per cent of 
bank lending in Malaysia has not been for productive investments in manufacturing, 
agriculture and mining, but for other purposes, especially real property and share 
purchases and consumer credit. 
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Size and Age of Firm 
The difficulties in raising finance appear to be inversely related to size and age, in that 
smaller and/or younger firms face more problems than larger or established firms 
(Chee, 1986a; Hankinson, 1991; Barrow, 1993; Terpstra and Olson, 1993). 
Apart from access to credit, LSEs enjoy lower credit costs on average (Zainal et al., 
1994). As lomo (1998) pointed out such discrimination was more pronounced during 
the recessionary years of 1985-86 in Malaysia, when the average cost of credit for 
LSEs was almost 11 per cent lower than SMEs. The smaller and/or younger the SME, 
the lower the value of assets which can be used as collateral (Binks, 1979; Bannock, 
1981; Binks et al., 1992a), hence they are likely to face difficulties in raising finance. 
The usage of bank credit is inversely related to firm size (Petersen & Rajan, 1994; 
Cole & Wolken, 1996). The same applies to trade credit (Freear, 1985; Binks and 
Vale, 1990). As SMEs become established and achieve a sound credit record, they are 
able to obtain more trade credit (Peterson & Shulman, 1987). 
The age of an SME also influences its sources of finance; younger SMEs appear to 
use less bank and institutional finance than established SMEs (Binks, 1979; Bannock, 
1981; Oakey, 1984a; Kee et aI., 1986, Peterson & Shulman, 1987; Van Auken & 
Doran, 1989b; University of Cambridge, 1992). 
Use of External Advisers 
It is widely recognised that accountants and bank managers are important sources of 
financial advice for SMEs (LoveU, 1980; Smallbone et aI., 1990 & 1993a; Curran & 
Blackburn, 1994). The type of assistance most commonly received from the bank 
relates to advice on borrowing (Back, 1977), and financial analysis and business 
planning (BarcIays, 1993; Smallbone et al., 1993a). Over a third of all OMs obtain 
advice from their bank managers beyond routine cash transactions (Curran & 
B1ackburn, 1994). Service sector SMEs have a low usage of financial advice 
compared to businesses which experience higher rates of technological and market 
change (Curran and Blackburn, 1994, p.96). However, Storey (l994b) argued that 
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SMEs generally do not use external sources of advice very frequently. 
Business Planning 
Loan applications are rarely considered without a well-formulated and well-presented 
business plan (Deakins and Hussain, 1991; Berry et al., 1993a; Catty, 1994). Business 
plans are used by the banks to evaluate the ability of an SME to repay loans and 
overdrafts. They also give the OM an opportunity to demonstrate his or her skills and 
experience (Read, 1998). 
However, most applications for credit by SMEs are not supported by a realistic and 
workable business plan (Fertuck, 1982; Roberts, 1983; Salazar, 1986; ACOST, 1990; 
Barrow, 1993; Boocock and Presley, 1993). ACOST (1990, p.31) highlighted the fact 
that: 
From the investor's viewpoint, the major consideration in deciding whether or not to 
supply capital is the quality of the business plan presented by the potential borrower. 
If a firm's management cannot formulate a coherent business strategy, analysing the 
market opportunity and competitive advantages of its products, together with a clear 
implementation plan, it can hardly be expected to induce an investor to access 
accurately, or bear part of, the risks of the business. 
Having discussed the characteristics of the firm, we now proceed to discuss the 
characteristics of OMs. 
Gender of OM 
Cole & Wolken (1995) found that SMEs run by women were less likely to use banks 
as a source of capital than businesses owned by men. The former may be less 
attractive to banks and other potential creditors because women-run firms tend to be 
small and viewed as being more risky (Coleman & Carsky, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). 
Lenders may not discriminate against women on the basis of gender, but on the basis 
of firm size, preferring to lend to larger and more established firms (Coleman, 1998). 
SMEs owned by women borrow smaller amounts and they are charged higher interest 
rates. 
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Hisrich and Brush (1987) perceived that banks were biased against SMEs owned by 
women. Banks are often: "unsympathetic and patronising" (Goffee & Scase, 1983, p. 
636), and base their lending decisions on sexual stereotypes, rather than the ability of 
female OMs to control their businesses (Buttner & Rosen, 1988). Carter and Cannon 
(1992) added that banks: "had a notorious reputation of failing to give womens' 
businesses the credibility they deserve." SMEs owned by women tend to be more 
heavily concentrated in service businesses which (as stated in Section 2.4.4) may not 
have assets that can be used as collateral (Riding & Swift, 1990; Coleman & Carsky, 
1996a, 1996b, 1997). 
SMEs owned by women are often required to provide more security or collateral than 
would be required for the same loan to a man (Godfrey, 1992). This finding is 
supported by Riding and Swift (1990) in their comparative study of male and female 
OMs in Canada. However, Coleman (1998) argued that the higher collateral 
requirements stemmed from the fact that female OMs have shorter relationships with 
their primary lending institutions than men. She suggested that: "developing a 
relationship with a primary institution may help them to offset their size disadvantage 
and to obtain more favourable lending terms in the form of lower interest rates and 
collateral requirements." 
Age of OM 
The age of an OM is positively related to the survival of his/her firm (The Sunday 
Times, 17 December 1995) but it seems to be negatively related to success in 
obtaining finance (Hustedde & Pulver, 1992). Mature (middle aged) OMs are more 
likely to own assets and therefore have more security/collateral than the younger or 
older OMs, hence the latter are more likely to face difficulties in obtaining finance 
(Cressy, 1993b). 
Race of OM 
Research in the US and UK has provided ample evidence of problems in financing 
ethnic minority firms. Bates (1991) found that start-ups owned by black OMs in the 
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US received smaller loans from banks than similar white-owned businesses and that 
SMEs owned by blacks were under-capitalised. These lower levels of capitalisation 
increase the risk of business failure. Bates commented that the failure of SMEs owned 
by blacks would be no different from SMEs owned by whites if they (black OMs) 
received similar levels of financial support from banks. 
Jones et al. (1994) compared the difficulties faced by Afro-Caribbean OMs in 
obtaining bank loans with those faced by Asian or white OMs. Afro-Caribbean OMs 
were twice as likely to experience problems in obtaining bank loans than their white 
counterparts. Banks looked most favourably on applications from Asian OMs. 
Furthermore, Asian OMs used more loans from family or friends than either white or 
Afro-Caribbean OMs. 
The Bank of England (1999), in its special report on 'The Financing of Ethnic 
Minority Firms in the UK', concluded that: 
• Financing problems faced by ethnic minority businesses are similar to those 
encountered by small businesses in general, although some studies suggest 
otherwise, at both early and later stages of development, 
• the Afro-Caribbean community perceive difficulty in gaining access to finance, 
• Some ethnic minority businesses perceive that they are being discriminated against 
by finance providers, even though there is no evidence to support it, and ... 
• Banks have taken steps to reduce this negative perception. 
The Bank of England (1999) report also claimed that ethnic minority SMEs face 
difficulties in raising finance because of the sectoral distribution of such firms. Ethnic 
minority SMEs tend to cluster in sectors of the economy where start-up and exit costs 
are low, and historic failure rates high. 
Bumiputera SMEs' face many of the problems encountered by ethnic minority 
businesses elsewhere, even though the Bumiputera community forms 60 percent of the 
population as a whole. For example, Bumiputera SMEs are clustered in certain sectors 
of the economy. Moha Asri (1993) found that new Bumiputera SMEs in Malaysia 
were concentrated in food, furniture and handicraft industries. These industries face 
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strong competition, with low profit margins and high mortality rates. The creation of 
new businesses in low technology, easy-entry activities does not lead to a net increase 
in employment because demand for such products is relatively fixed. Moha Asri also 
argued that Chinese OMs were more successful than Bumiputera OMs because they 
have wider business exposure and connections among the Chinese business 
community in Malaysia as well as in Southeast Asia. As a consequence of these 
networks, Chinese OMs are able to ward off Bumiputera encroachment on their 
territory (Jesudason, 1990). 
Fong (1990) found that Bumiputera SMEs were traditionally family-type businesses 
with limited financial resources. Bumiputera OMs start their business with personal 
savings or loans from friends and relatives. Aman & Mohd Desa (1990) found that: 
Despite assistance provided by the Government, they failed because of poor 
management skills, shortage of funds, difficulty in collecting debts, heavy interest on 
borrowings, heavy taxes and difficulty in getting credit facilities. They became too 
dependent on banks for financing and too dependent on Government contracts in 
order to survive. 
In cases where Bumiputeras have been granted Government contracts and licences, 
these contracts and licences are often subcontracted or leased to non-Bumiputeras, 
owing to a lack of financial capabilities (Abdul Khalid, 1990). 
In summary, therefore, Bumiputera SMEs are concentrated in sectors where 
technology is low, entry costs are minimal and failure rates are high. B umiputera OMs 
cannot compete on equal terms with their Chinese counterparts. 
Training, Education and Experience o/OM 
Management education and training in SMEs is critical for the development of the 
firm (Holliday, 1995, p.10). For example, growth requires considerable financial 
investment, but obtaining finance is often contingent upon the skills of the 
entrepreneur. Education and business (particularly managerial) experience are 
regarded by lenders as critically important when evaluating start-up companies 
(Brophy, 1989; Berry et al., 1993b). Berry et al. also found that lenders like to see a 
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connection between past experience and the skills required to start a new business, in 
order to avoid problems associated with adverse selection. Fong (1990b) emphasised 
that OMs have to acquire appropriate skills and know-how before they can venture 
into their own businesses. He reinforced his statement by stating that only 6 percent of 
OMs started their business immediately after graduation, while 46 percent of OMs 
were former employees of their firms. Fong (1990b) also found that on-the-job 
training was important to OMs before they ventured into their own businesses. 
The next Section discusses financing problems specific to Malaysia and assesses 
whether the situation is serious enough for remedial action to be taken by the 
Government. 
2.5.7 Financing Problems in Malaysia 
A recurring theme of the analysis above is that finance plays an important role in the 
development of SMEs. One of the major problems faced by SMEs and locally-owned 
firms in Malaysia is access to finance (Chee, 1986a & 1992; Chee & Jang, 1988; Md. 
Salleh, 1990). Financial incentives and assistance in the form of tax relief, grants, and 
soft loans have, therefore, been offered by the Malaysian Government. 
A wide ranging study of manufacturing establishments in Sarawak conducted by the 
Mara Institute of Technology (Iris et aI., 1990), found 10 major problems affecting the 
stability and growth of firms. The most important problems were limited accessibility 
to external funds or capital, and shortages of raw materials or components. Certain 
sectors of industry were most seriously affected, namely the plastic products, the ship-
building and repair, transport vehicles equipment and non-metallic industries. Another 
interesting finding was that small scale enterprises considered accessibility to funds as 
the main problem, while medium scale enterprises were concerned with shortages of 
raw materials or components and large enterprises complained about the high cost of 
production. 
A study conducted by Moha Asri (1993) on the textile and clothing industry around 
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Kuala Lumpur found that OMs were denied financial assistance by Government 
agencies, mainly because the firm did not have a good track record, or the OM lacked 
academic qualifications or relevant experience. Furthermore, certain institutions 
provided financial assistance to Bumiputera owners only; applications from non-
Bumiputeras were simply rejected. Moha Asri also discovered that SMEs in receipt of 
Government assistance had achieved only limited success in generating profit, 
turnover and employment. However, his study cannot be generalised to the SME 
population as a whole because his sample was small, the research was confined to one 
geographic location (Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya) and limited to one sector (the 
textile and clothing industry). 
Another study commissioned by MITI in 1994 (reported in Mohamed, 1996) revealed 
that 879 firms faced problems in getting finance from financial institutions in a 
sample of 1,900 SMEs. Nearly 50 percent of the SMEs faced problems in getting 
loans from commercial banks, 19 percent from development banks, 20 percent from 
Government banks and 11 percent from other financial institutions (Table 2.3). The 
major problems included financial guarantors (25 percent), red tape in preparing 
papers in support of applications (24.6 percent), and the need for collateral (19.5 
percent). As discussed in Section 2.3, these constraints reflect the caution exercised by 
financial institutions when dealing with SMEs. 
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T bl 23 F' a e . : mance - T lypeo fP bl ro b I ft t' em )y ns I U IOn 
Type of Institution 
Commercial Development Government Others 
Bank Bank Bank 
Problems No % No % No % No % Total 
I. Have to prepare 92 19.83 41 24.55 56 31.28 27 39.13 216 
many papers 
2. Need collateral 102 21.98 38 22.75 22 12.29 9 13.04 171 
every time 
3. Need too many 112 24.14 53 31.74 44 24.58 12 17.39 221 
guarantors 
4. Credit officers 15 3.23 3 1.80 5 2.79 0 0.00 23 
not conversant 
5. Credit officers 8 1.72 4 2.40 7 3.91 4 5.80 23 
not friendly 
6. Too much red 30 6.47 8 4.79 18 10.06 9 13.04 65 
tape 
7. Application 13 2.80 12 7.19 11 6.15 4 5.80 40 
form too 
complicated 
8. Unable to 9 1.94 1 0.60 3 1.68 2 2.90 15 
obtain credit from 
suppliers 
9. Period of credit 26 5.60 3 1.80 2 1.12 1 1.45 32 
too short 
10. Amount of 57 12.28 4 2.40 11 6.15 1 1.45 73 
credit insufficient 
Total 464 100.00 167 100.00 179 100.00 69 100.00 879 
Source: MITJ Survey 
A survey of 149 SMEs conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank) in 1995 
(Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid, 1996) showed that about 60 percent were suffering 
from financial constraints (Table 2.4). This survey suggested that financial constraints 
stemmed from too much red-tape, over-reliance on collateral and the risk-averse 
lending attitudes of financial institutions. Boocock and Wahab (1997) also found that 
insufficient finance was often a factor which held back growth and that SMEs faced 
problems relating to high interest rates and a lack of suitable collateral. 
Table 2.4: Financial Constraint b Size 
Size No. of Corn anies % of Total 
Small 51 34 
Medium 39 26 
Lar e 59 40 
Total 149 100 
Source: BNM Annual Survey 1995 
The 1995 Bank Negara survey also highlighted the poor awareness and take up of 
various incentives offered by the Government, including loans given under the 
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auspices of the CGC (Table 2.5). With regard to the latter, only 19 percent of the 
respondents were aware of the facility. The main sources of information about the 
CGC were the mass media (29. percent of the respondents), newsletters and 
publications (25 percent) and seminars (18 percent). The problem of awareness might 
lie with the personnel involved with Government schemes, as these individuals have 
no incentive to disseminate the information directly to SMEs. Language is another 
problem that hinders information flows. Most of the Chinese educated OMs are more 
proficient with Chinese or English, while the Malay educated OMs are more 
proficient with Malay and English. Therefore, information flows should take into 
account the language of the target group (Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid, 1996). 
Table 2.5: Type of Incentives 
Tvne of Incentives Aware I Taken VD 
Percentage of Total Respondents 
Pioneer Status 42 6 
Investment Tax Allowance 33 11 
Export Incentives 28 14 
Export Credit Financin2: 22 17 
Reinvestment Allowance 31 25 
Industrial Assistance Funds 25 -
CGC 19 6 
Vendor Development Programme 11 8 
Source: BNM Annual Survey 1995; 3 
Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) confirmed these findings on awareness; only a 
small minority of borrowers (9.4 percent) knew of the CGC's existence before the 
guarantee was issued. The majority (78.1 percent) learned of the CGC from their 
bankers, and the remainder (12.5 percent) through friends or the press. Most 
borrowers (81.3 percent) had obtained the CGC funding through their usual bank, and 
had relied on that bank to apply for t!le guarantee on their behalf. It was evident that 
the CGC has maintained a very low public profile, operating at arm's length from its 
ultimate clients, the SMEs, a situation which does not prevail in many other countries 
(Levitsky, 1993, p.6). In such circumstances, the CGC cannot hope to influence the 
attitude or ability of the debtor to repay the loan. 
The financing difficulties faced by SMEs in Malaysia can now be summarised. 
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Previous studies suggest that the majority of SMEs do not have access to finance, yet 
many SMEs are not aware of the existence of Government schemes which could help 
them. This could result from a weakness on the part of the relevant agencies in 
disseminating financial information to SMEs. While some schemes have reached the 
targeted SMEs, many firms continue to experience difficulties in raising finance 
owing to a lack of suitable collateral, high interest rates and the need for security! 
guarantors. The Moore (1994) study, mentioned in Section 2.5.1, suggested that 
young, smaller SMEs, with below average profitability and operating in the 
manufacturing sector, are likely to experience difficulties in raising finance. In 
Malaysia, the existing Government schemes have tended to focus more on the 
development of new Bumiputera enterprises, most of which are domestic-oriented and 
located in 'saturated' sectors such as the food, furniture and handicraft industries 
(Moha Asri, 1993). Moha Asri emphasises the problems inherent in providing support 
for Bumiputera SMEs: 
Continuing support to these firms may be among the reasons for inefficiency in 
general terms of the net economic benefit to society. This is because as new firms 
enter the market, other less efficient or less subsidised firms are forced out. Since 
competition was strong in the domestic market, the profit margins were expectedly 
low and their mortality rates were high. 
The next Section considers the extent to which the Government has adopted an 
'interventionist approach' in supporting SMEs in Malaysia. 
2.6 GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS SME FINANCING 
The financial system in Malaysia has evolved continuously since independence in 
1957. The Government operated a 'Iaissez faire' system in the 1960s, with limited 
regulation and no government intervention (BNM, 1992). There were few domestic 
commercial banks and other financial intermediaries, with foreign banks dominating 
the banking scenario (Pang, 1995). 
However, after the racial incidents in 1969, discussed in Chapter 1, the Government 
adopted a proactive role and passed the Banking Act of 1973 to govern the 
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establishment of new financial institutions. According to Aman & Mohd Desa (1996): 
Despite being heavily credit-based. the financial system does exhibit a fairly high 
variety of financial institutions. However. the characteristics of a credit-based 
financial system are manifested in the form of high concentration of financial 
institutions located in the commercial areas. 
The Banking Act of 1973 was replaced by The Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(BAFIA). 1989. which came into effect in October of that year. It was a 
comprehensive Act which covered the supervision/regulation of a range of financial 
institutions, for example building credit, development finance, factoring and leasing 
businesses (Pang, 1995). 
Bank Negara (1992) reported that most businesses were funded by financial 
institutions rather than capital markets, as discussed in the early part of this Chapter. 
Commercial banks are the major source of credit for SMEs, accounting for about 20 
percent of total new bank credit each year. The Government realised the importance of 
private sector financial institutions in rejuvenating the economy and began to reduce 
its intervention in the financial system in 1983, when a policy of privatisation was 
introduced. The Government introduced a comprehensive and broad ranging 
privatisation programme; 103 entities had been privatised by May, 1994 (Islam and 
Chowdury, 1996). However, the agricultural sector as a whole, and some key 
manufacturing activities (such as automobiles, paper and plastic resins, and a range of 
processed agricultural products) continue to receive a high level of protection from the 
Government. There is also limited protection for some key service-sector activities. 
Even though the Government attempted to liberalise the financial system, it still held 
considerable influence on the way funds were managed. The Government has 
established a number of specialised financial institutions and implemented various 
policy measures and programmes to make credit available more readily and cheaply to 
SMEs (ADB, 1990). The measures taken include the imposition of Priority Lending 
Guidelines and forcing commercial banks and finance companies to allocate a 
prescribed proportion of their loans to SMEs and the Bumiputera business 
community. For example, the 1996 Lending Guidelines required commercial banks 
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and finance companies to extend new loans to SMEs amounting to RM 1 billion and 
RM240 million respectively (BNM, 1997). For the Bumiputera business community, 
the quotas for new outstanding loans from commercial banks and finance companies 
were RM500 million and RMl20 million respectively. The CGC was given 
responsibility for overseeing the distribution of these loans. 
According to ADB (1990), the BNM lending guidelines: 
Tend to distort the market-determined direction of lending and contribute to 
misaHocation of resources. With an interest rate ceiling, banks have to lend on criteria 
other than potential profitability. Funds allocated to non-viable enterprises under 
these controls have a real opportunity cost. The special preference given to small 
enterprises, which is based mainly on an equity rather than an efficiency criterion, 
therefore needs to progressively give way to a system in which interest rates are set at 
a level which provides sufficient spread for the lending institutions to cover their risks 
as well as the costs of their services to clients. From the SMEs perspective as well, 
the ready availability of, and access to, credit together with suitable amortization 
periods are more important than subsidised interest rates alone. 
Such criticism has not prevented the Malaysian Government from pursuing an 
interventionist agenda. 
The Government has introduced a variety of agencies and schemes to promote the 
development of SMEs. In order to strengthen and streamline institutional support for 
SMEs, the Government has recently rationalised 30 agencies under 13 ministries into 
five lead agencies. The finance facilities will be coordinated by the Ministry of 
Finance. The funding schemes administered by the Central Bank (Bank Negara) and 
other Government Agencies are highlighted in Appendix 2. 
Despite efforts by the Government, the feeling still persists that SMEs are 
disadvantaged in the financial market; in particular, there appears to be an 'equity 
gap', for share capital andlor long tefm loans in Malaysia (Boocock and Wahab, 
1997). Nevertheless, it is unfair to pin all the blame on the Government, as SMEs 
have to make greater efforts to organise and improve themselves. SMEs should be 
more receptive to Government policies and should respond to the initiatives made 
available (Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid, 1996). 
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2.7 SUMMARY 
The first part of the Chapter discussed the importance of the SME sector, then 
reviewed the theoretical literature concerned with the financing of SMEs. It then 
covered the financing difficulties faced by SMEs in practice, dealing separately with 
the situation in Malaysia. Lastly, Government policy towards SME financing in 
Malaysia was discussed in more detaiL 
The importance of SMEs in generating socio-economic activity is well documented. 
The role of SMEs is becoming more important, especially in developing countries 
which adopt a policy of industrialisation to secure economic growth. SMEs play a key 
role in supporting LSEs through establishing networks in the supply of semi-finished 
products and supporting services. 
The availability of funds for SMEs in the manufacturing sector depends mostly on the 
banking system. Strong banking relationships are important to reduce agency costs, 
notably asymmetric information. In Malaysia a close relationship between banks and 
SMEs has not materialised, owing to various factors, including restrictions on 
investment by banks in the shares of SMEs. 
Agency theory helps to explain problems which arise in the relationship between 
SMEs (agents) and their lenders (principals), notably the problem of asymmetric 
information. SMEs tend to have more information on their operations than their 
lenders. SMEs do not publish as much financial information as larger enterprises; 
indeed they are under no obligation to produce verifiable information since their 
securities are not traded publicly. Furthermore, SMEs fear negative action will be 
taken against them if information is disclosed. 
Information asymmetries work in favour of start-ups. An OM might have imperfect 
knowledge on the likely success or failure of the firm, while lenders benefit from 
experience in evaluating similar businesses. Furthermore, a lender conversant with the 
local market might have superior knowledge of the operating conditions of SMEs in 
the vicinity. 
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Information asymmetries impact on young high-technology SMEs because of 
'technological uncertainty' and the difficulty of communicating knowledge easily to 
lenders. In the face of such uncertainty, the response from lenders is to deny credit, 
even to SMEs that may be creditworthy. 
Finance providers face the twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
moral hazard problem occurs when OMs take decisions which increase the risk of, 
and potential returns to, the project. It is not economic for banks to monitor SME 
loans closely, in view of the small sums involved. Banks may try to minimise the 
impact of adverse selection by being risk averse, and bankers prefer to avoid Type IT 
errors which might affect their careers. 
Financing problems in practice stem from the nature and size of SMEs. SMEs are 
alleged to face funding, information and knowledge, and financial skills gaps. Funding 
gaps seem to affect small, young firms especially start-up and high-technology firms. 
SMEs are also insufficiently informed and poorly advised about appropriate sources 
of finance and they suffer problems stemming from poor financial management and 
planning. 
Various studies have shown that the characteristics of the firm and the OM are 
important factors in the process of procuring capital. Characteristics such as legal 
structure, sector of industry, size, age, use of external advisers and existence of a 
business plan have been shown to have some influence upon the financing difficulties 
of SMEs. OM characteristics, such as gender, race, age, training, education and 
business experience, can also affect the perceptions and actions of external 
lenders/inverstors. 
SMEs in Malaysia face financial constraints in terms of access to finance. The 
Government objective is to assist creditworthy SMEs, which lack collateral and a 
track record, by giving them ready access to finance. Various policies and 
programmes have been directed to assist those SMEs which have the greatest potential 
for enhancing the health of the economy, generating employment, introducing new 
products, etc. 
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Notes 
I.The Banking system includes commercial banks. finance companies. merchant banks, the Islamic 
Bank, the Central Bank and discount houses. 
2. Development financial institutions include the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad, 
the Agriculture Bank Malaysia Berhad, the Borneo Development Corporation, the Sabah Development 
Bank Berhad, the Sabah Credit Corporation, the Export-Import Bank Malaysia Berhad, the Malaysian 
Development Bank Berhad and the Industry Bank Malaysia Berhad. 
3. Unincorporated firms comprise both sole proprietor firms and partnerships. Godwin studied VAT-
registered traders by legal structure and turnover in 1990 and found that unincorporated businesses 
form the majority of the smallest firms. 
4. In Malaysia, 'Bumiputera I businesses lag behind their Chinese counterparts in commerce and 
industry. A 30 percent target for Bumiputera corporate ownership was retained under the New 
Development Policy (NDP) and no specific deadline was setfor its achievement. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 11: 
CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES IN DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter reviewed the theoretical literature underpinning the difficulties 
associated with the financing of SMEs. Governments across the globe attempt to 
overcome those difficulties. This chapter reviews the literature on credit guarantee 
schemes in both developed and developing countries. Section 3.2 examines the 
rationale for credit guarantee schemes while Section 3.3 states the criteria for the 
operation of effective guarantee schemes. Section 3.4 reviews models of credit 
guarantee schemes in operation. Section 3.5 focuses on the operation of the CGC in 
Malaysia. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises outstanding issues and questions regarding 
the operation of guarantee schemes. 
3.2 RATIONALE FOR CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
Grabam Bannock and Partners, commissioned by the Overseas Development 
Administration, carried out a global study on credit guarantee schemes over the period 
1995-97 (Levitsky, 1997a). They identified 85 countries, both developed and 
developing, claiming to have such schemes operating in 1996. In several countries 
there was more than one active scheme, but schemes in some countries existed on 
paper only, especially in Africa. About 70 credit guarantee schemes are genuinely in 
operation in the world today. 
Some of the schemes have a long history, spanning the period from the late 1930s to 
the early 1960s. These are especially prevalent in developed countries, including 
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Japan (launched in 1937), USA (1953), Germany (1954), Italy (1960) and Canada 
(1961). In several countries the schemes are relatively new, notably those in the 
Eastern Bloc Region; for example, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Romania all launched their guarantee schemes over the period 1992-
1994. Other schemes introduced since 1991 are found in Egypt, Honduras, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. In general, however, most of the schemes in developing 
countries have now been operating for more than 10 years. Table 3.1 shows the 
starting date of the credit guarantee schemes (CGSs) in several developing countries. 
Table 3.1: CGSs in Selected Develo ing Countries (Start Date of 0 
Chile (1980) Colombia (1981) India 
Indonesia (1971) Korea (1974) Malaysia 
Pakistan (1972) Peru (1979) Philippines* 
Sri Lanka (1979) Taiwan (1974) Thailand 
Zimbabwe (1978) 
'Virtually inactive until revised in 1976 
Source: Levitsky, 1997 
erations) 
(1981) 
(1972) 
(1952) 
(1986) 
Levitsky (1993, p.4) described the rationale for CGSs in developed and developing 
countries as: 
The reluctance of banks to take on the high risks and administrative costs of lending 
to small businesses has been the reason for the establishment of credit guarantee 
funds and mutual guarantee systems. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, S2.3, banks perceive SME lending as high risk, and they 
exercise caution because SMEs are unable to provide sufficient security or collateral 
to cover their advances. Furthermore, the administrative costs of lending to SMEs are 
high (in relation to loan size) which reduces the profitability of such loans (Levitsky, 
1997a). Guarantee schemes and/or mutual guarantee systems have therefore been set 
up to provide guarantees to cover some or all of the losses incurred when SMEs 
default on loans (Levitsky and Prasad, 1989; Levitsky, 1990; Balkenhol, 1990; Siebel, 
1995). Discussion over recent years has focused on how much to compensate the 
lender for the risk incurred in the case of borrower default (Levitsky, 1997a). 
However, not all researchers agree that inadequate collateral on the part of SMEs is 
the stumbling block for lenders. For example, Gudger (1997) found that reducing 
transaction costs is the key to increasing lending to SMEs. The guarantor (credit 
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corporation) can help an SME to meet lender requirements by assisting In the 
production of an acceptable application, feasibility study and business plan. The 
guarantor may even carry out a full credit analysis before approaching a bank with the 
application (Steams, 1993). Guarantee schemes can also help in lowering 
administrative costs by reducing the expense of handling collateral (Levitsky, 1997a). 
It is important to note that guarantee schemes can help in encouraging banks to lend 
beyond their risk-transaction frontier. Steams (1993) focuses on how banks weigh up 
risk and transaction costs, to identify their 'comfort zone' (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: The Risk-Transaction Cost Frontier of Banks 
Perceived 
Risk 
High A 
Bank 
Zone 
Low 
:.--\------D 
High 
Transaction 
Costs 
Adapted and modifiedfrom Steams (1993) 
Guarantee schemes are designed to encourage banks to lend beyond their 'comfort 
zone' by helping to push the frontier out (or bring potential borrowers in) so that 
SMEs become acceptable borrowers. According to Steams: 
The distance that targeted borrowers lie outside the risk-transaction cost frontier is a 
critical factor for designing an appropriate guarantee mechanism. Sectors close to the 
frontier, such as well established businesses with creditworthy projects but slightly 
insufficient collateral, may require a scheme that only reduces the bank's risk 
slightly. Sectors farther from the frontier may require a significant reduction in risk, 
as well as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs. 
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As shown in Figure 3.1, borrower D has high transaction costs but low risk compared 
to borrower A, which has low transaction costs but high risk. In order to bring 
borrower D to B (the bankable borrower according to Steams), the guarantee scheme 
has to reduce transaction costs. Mechanisms to achieve this reduction could include 
training bank staff to assess SMEs more efficiently or providing consultants to help 
SMEs provide proper documentation before approaching the banks. 
Altvater (1994) proposed that transaction costs could be lowered in a number of ways: 
the guarantor collects data and information relating to the loan application and 
appraises the proposed investment; information about existing collateral is obtained; 
and, the guarantor could undertake to recover loans in default. 
Turning to risk reduction, borrower A can become an acceptable borrower (move 
from A to B), if the guarantee mechanism ensures that the bank assumes a relatively 
low percentage of the risk, for example, 15 percent. 
For borrower C, having both high risk and high transaction costs, the guarantee 
mechanisms have to ensure that the bank and guarantor share both the risk and the 
transaction costs equitably. The move from point C to B (Figure 3.1) can be achieved 
by combining the reduction of transaction costs and risk as explained above. 
CGC provides guarantee cover to reduce the risk associated with SME lending (i.e., to 
enable the bank to move from Point A to Point B in Figure 3.1). However, the CGC 
has made no arrangement to reduce transaction costs apart from the Block Guarantee 
Scheme described in Section 3.5.1 below. 
This Section covered the rationale for the establishment of credit guarantee schemes. 
The next Section focuses on the criteria for the operation of effective guarantee 
schemes. 
3.3 CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
Steams (1993) summarised the criteria required for guarantee schemes to function 
effectively. Firstly, there must be sufficient liquidity in the banking system. This will 
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induce banks to lend to targeted sectors such as SMEs. Low liquidity encourages 
banks to concentrate only on preferred borrowers, generally LSEs. The need for 
adequate liquidity is critical because: "financial markets in most developing countries 
are not perfectly competitive and are sometimes complicated by non-economic, non-
financial considerations (Allahar and Brown, 1995)." Secondly, the participating 
banks must be responsible financial institutions. Many development banks experience 
a high level of arrears and are basically insolvent (World Bank, 1989). Thirdly, banks 
must ensure that transaction costs are efficiently managed, through better 
management, adequate levels of staffing, and efficient procedures in handling loans to 
SMEs (Levitsky, 1986). Fourthly, there must be an incentive structure that motivates 
bank participation and responsible behaviour on the part of all participants. This 
incentive structure should be based on efficient and effective loan and guarantee 
approval processes, appropriate risk sharing among all participants, a credible 
guarantee, and a fair distribution of costs and fees that enables banks to make 
profitable guaranteed loans. Finally, a guarantee scheme must result in increased 
utilisation by SMEs if it is to be considered a success. 
The interest spreads on guaranteed loans should encourage lenders to earn a 
reasonable return. Allahar and Brown (1995) advocated that lenders should be free to 
apply an interest rate commensurate with their risks. Furthermore, they argued that 
interest rates· are "inextricably connected to administrative costs." 
Levitsky (1993), as discussed in S3.2 above, emphasised that a key criterion for the 
success of a guarantee system is the lowering of administrative costs for lenders. The 
guarantor can relieve the burden of the lenders by assuming some of the 
administrative costs entailed in project appraisal by helping SMEs to compile their 
business plans for loan and guarantee applications, and monitoring the repayment 
behaviour of SMEs. 
Allahar and Brown (1995) discussed the loan guarantee programme in Trinidad and 
Tobago, where the interest rate charged by lenders to SMEs is one percent above the 
prevailing prime/base lending rate. Even though the authorities have maintained the 
interest rate at a low level, the main lenders are prepared to guarantee loans to SMEs 
because some of the transaction costs are borne by the guarantor. Allahar and Brown 
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(1995) explained that: "providing developmental services such as business 
counselling, extension services, technical assistance and business information puts the 
guarantor into a relationship with the borrower which would not exist in a 'pure' 
guarantee programme." 
In an alternative, but complementary, viewpoint, Oehring (1997) concluded that a 
guarantee scheme can thrive where there is: 
• A market where banks do not meet demand for funding from SMEs. 
• Available credit resources in the financial system. 
• Guarantee legislation which covers provisioning, capitalisation, and incentives. 
Guarantee funds should be capitalised adequately to meet their obligations and 
provisions for doubtful debt should be kept aside to cover defaults. As discussed 
above, the incentive structure must also motivate banks to lend to the targeted 
sector. 
• Bank supervision which recognises the guarantees as adequate security. 
• Second tier reinsurance to absorb some risks. For example, banks III Japan 
reinsure 70-80 percent of their guarantees to specially created government 
institutions, Small Business Credit Insurance Corporations (SBCICs). Some 
countries in Europe, especially those which operate Mutual Guarantee Systems, 
use Government reinsurance as a lender of last resort. 
• Bank loans to SMEs must still be sufficiently profitable even at reduced risks, and 
hence lower margins. 
Stearns (1993) and Oehring (1997) give an overview of the framework in which 
guarantee schemes can operate successfully. By contrast Levitsky (l997a) focuses on 
the activities of guarantee providers at a micro level. To achieve the objective for 
which a guarantee scheme was created, a number of criteria have to be present. These 
are set out below. 
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3.3.1 Risk Sharing 
The basic feature of any guarantee scheme is the sharing of risk. However, there is no 
golden rule as to the division of risk between the lenders and the guarantee providers. 
In Japan and France, for example, the loans are 100 percent guaranteed while in other 
countries the guaranteed amount ranges between 50-90 percent of the loan. Levitsky 
and Prasad (1989) commented that: 
Where the risk of the lending institution is 30 percent or more, the institutions are 
less interested in guarantee schemes because they must go through the process of 
appraisal and obtaining collateral to cover their part of the risk and the costs do not 
justify adhering to the formalities necessary to obtain a guarantee. In schemes where 
the risk of the lending institution is lower than 20 percent, there is a danger that more 
risky loans are sent for guarantees since the lending institution has little to lose. 
Oehring (1990) asserted that: "guarantees of less than 50 percent are of little interest 
to banks, and 100 percent invites abuse." Thus, the guaranteed amount should ideally 
be in the range of 70-80 percent. This was supported by Levitsky (1993 and 1997a), 
who stated that banks considered it very unattractive to have risk sharing of 50 
percent or less, especially where administrative costs remain high. Levitsky (1997b) 
emphasised that: 
The risk sharing proportion will depend on the track record of the financial 
institution's SME loan portfolio, the adequacy of the guarantee fund, and the general 
culture of debt repayments in the country. 'Best practice' indicates that lenders 
assume at least 30-40 percent of the risk and never less than 20 percent. Risk sharing 
at 50 percent may significantly lessen the banks' interest in participating in the 
scheme and may reduce the additionality generated. 
However, Levitsky (1997a) stated that lower guarantees are acceptable in certain 
cases. For example, the guarantee scheme in Egypt offers attractive financial 
incentives to the participating banks, hence low risk-sharing is not a major 
disincentive. 
Levitsky and Doran (1997) reviewed 70 different guarantee schemes in developed and 
developing countries and found that 17 of them (about 25 percent) covered only 50 
percent, while 8 (11 percent) covered 100 percent of risk. The majority (64 percent) 
covered between 60 to 80 percent. Most guarantee schemes also set an upper limit for 
the value of any single guarantee. 
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The problem of risk sharing is associated with the problem of information asymmetry, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, S2.3.1. A lOO percent coverage would encourage 'moral 
hazard' on the part of the borrower (if the extent of the guarantee coverage is known). 
The bank also has no incentive to reduce moral hazard. However, experience from 
guarantee schemes in Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain and South Africa shows that 
100 percent guarantee coverage is workable, provided that the guarantee schemes 
have sound management and are backed by a strong finance and banking sector 
(Levitsky, 1997a). 
Finally, the level of risk sharing would not be a concern if lenders approved loans 
only if they were certain that the project was viable and the client creditworthy, and 
the lenders made all possible efforts to collect the loan repayments (Levitsky, 1993). 
3.3.2 Guarantee Fees 
The payment of a fee or premium by the borrower is an essential requirement for all 
guarantee schemes, whether in developed or developing countries. The guarantee 
payment can be an initial payment for providing the facility, along with an annual fee 
paid by the borrower, or simply an annual payment or premium based on the amount 
of the guarantee. (I could find no evidence of Schemes in which both the initial 
guarantee fee and annual premium are waived.) The scheme in Malaysia has no initial 
guarantee fee, but an annual premium, whereas in the US there is no annual premium 
after the initial payment has been made. An additional 0.5 percent of the oustanding 
balance is charged as an annual service fee in the US (Table 3.2). 
Levitsky (1997a) stated that raising guarantee fees to 4 percent annually, or even 
higher, might deter borrowers from using the scheme. The amount of the fee per se is 
not critical, but Levitsky argues that it should be set in relation to interest rates. He 
cited the case of Japan having a 1 percent guarantee fee; even that figure was 
considered high in 1995, when the prime rate of Japanese commercial banks hit an 
all-time low of 2.1 percent. By contrast, Malaysia typically has interest rates of 9-10 
percent and an annual guarantee fee of 0.75-2.0 percent is not regarded as a major 
deterrent by potential borrowers. 
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Table 3 2- Characteristics of Selected Credit Guarantee Schemes 
-
. 
Coun' Risk Coverage Terms 
t" Sharine 
Size of Working Fixed Re- Initial Annual Fee Interest Tenn of Personal 
Guarantee Capital Asset financing Guarantee Paid by Rate Loan Guarantee 
Purchase Fee Borrower restric~ Required 
tion 
UK 85%or Yes Yes No 1% of loan 1.5% on No 2 to 10 No 
70% outstanding years 
whole 
credit or 
0.5% on 
fixed rate 
loans 
US 75% to Yes Yes Yes 2.0% to 0.5% of Yes Up to Yes 
80% 3.875% of outstanding 25 years 
guarantee balance 
loans 
Malay 50% to Yes Yes No No 0.75% to Yes 3 years Yes 
sia 90% 2.0% of for 
guarantee loans 
loans with no 
fixed 
tenure' 
Sources: Levltsky and Prasad, Department of Trade and Industry (UK), Credn Guarantee 
Corporation and Small Business Administration. 
1. For overdrafts and other credit facilities with nO fixed tenure (e.g. facilities subject to periodic 
review). 
3.3.3 Guarantee Claims and Debt Recovery 
Steams (1993) suggested a bad guarantee system is characterised by cumbersome 
procedures for the payment of claims. The procedure for settlement of claims should 
be clearly spelled out or the lenders' trust in the reliability of the guarantee agreement 
will be undermined (Levitsky, 1997a; AIlahar and Brown, 1995). 
Graham Bannock and Partners (1997) also emphasised that the conditions for 
triggering claims and for repayment should be set out clearly in a detailed contract 
between the guarantee corporation and the lender. In order to avoid problems of non-
compliance and to encourage voluntary participation by financial institutions in the 
guarantee schemes, Bannock suggests that a claim for repayment of a loan should be 
triggered when: 
• Arrears and non-payment reach 90 days 
• The lender has been formally informed that the loan is in default 
• The outstanding loan has been called in 
• The loan has been written-off in the accounts of the lender 
• Legal proceedings have been initiated to foreclose on any collateral and to recover 
the debt. 
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Best practice seems to indicate a claims rate in the order of 2-3 percent of the total 
amount guaranteed. Although there might be exceptions, a zero claims rate would 
surely indicate an overcautious approach to the approval of guarantees. 
Levitsky (1997a) emphasised that: 
A guarantee claim level rising above 5 percent of the total amount guaranteed should 
give a signal that there is a need to take some remedial action. Claim rates are 
influenced both by the economic situation in the country and the competence of the 
financial and banking sector. In Thailand, for instance, claims rose in 1994 and 1995 
as the economic situation changed. 
It is critical to note that confidence in a guarantee scheme will be shaken if disputes 
arise over claims for repayment. Lending to SMEs involves risk and banks expect the 
guarantees to be honoured in the event of the borrowers' default, provided that lenders 
have complied with any reasonable requirements imposed by the guarantee 
organisation. Furthermore, settlement of claims should be neither protracted nor 
costly (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1994). This has been a major source of friction 
between CGC and the banks in Malaysia. This issue is explored in some detail in 
Section 3.5 below. 
The importance of a fair and efficient claims mechanism has been stressed in the 
above Section. Another element of the effectiveness of a guarantee scheme is the net 
cost of operating the scheme. The next Section discusses this issue. 
3,3.4 The Net Cost of Operating Guarantee Schemes 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, several studies have estimated the net cost of operating 
the Loan Guarantee Scheme in the UK (NERA, 1990, p,4l; Pieda, 1992, p,44). The 
net cost of that Scheme was £18S.Sm over the period June, 1981 to March, 1992 (DTI 
Figure). This figure represents payments under the guarantees, less receipts from 
premium income and security realisations. (The running costs of the LGS Unit are 
subsumed within overall government expenditure). The heaviest losses were sustained 
during the early 19805, before the failure rate of LGS firms stabilised at around 40 
percent, slightly higher than for the small firm sector as a whole (Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1994). 
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The costs of operating CGSs in selected East Asian countries in 1994 have been 
estimated by Hatekayama (1996), shown in Table 3.3. 
I 33 C Tab e . . osts 0 co 'peratIng S I e ecte d CGS (1994) s 
Japan Korea Indonesia Malaysia 
Costs of processing a $1000 loan $28.27 $71.23 $75.30 N/A 
Costs to the public funds of operating $68m $3m $20m $O.2m 
the COS 
Source: Levltsky, 1997a 
There are great differences in the cost of processing loans. In Japan, the costs of 
processing a guaranteed loan of US$ 1 ,000 were US$28.17, with the equivalent figures 
being US$7 1.23 in Korea and US$75.30 in Indonesia. Staff costs were much higher in 
the latter two countries. No figure is available for Malaysia. 
However the cost to public funds of offering the CGS was estimated at US$68 million 
in Japan, US$3 million in Korea, US$20 million in Indonesia and US$0.2 million in 
Malaysia. The apparently high cost of operating the Scheme in Japan (US$68 million) 
is explained by the heavy subsidies provided by the Small Business Insurance 
Corporation (SBIC) and the increased incidence of defaults during the recession of 
1994. Nonetheless, Hatekayama concluded that the Japanese guarantee scheme had a 
low default rate over its lifetime and a high recovery rate compared to other Asian 
programmes. Its success stems from a long history and a highly developed database. 
Many of the guaranteed loans are to repeat users; there is full information on most of 
these borrowers, hence the overall default rate is low. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
p.ll, the figure for Malaysia (US$0.2 million) has to be seen as questionable. The 
cost of operating the CGC is extremely low because it is able to benefit from interest 
arbitrage on soft loans received from BNM (the Central Bank). Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff (1996) criticised the CGC for failing to disclose information on the costs of 
operation, stating that "a more open approach to disclosure, with a breakdown of the 
cost for the individual schemes, might encourage sustained usage of the NPGS." 
3.3.5 Additionality 
Additionality consists of two elements: finance and economic additionality. Finance 
additionality is defined as the intervention of a govemment-backed loan scheme that 
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enables SMEs to gain access to loans from commercial banks or finance companies, 
which would not have been available in the absence of the scheme. Economic 
additionality relates to how much additional employment, turnover and profit has 
been generated by the Scheme. Meyer and Nagarajan (1996) stated that: "it is difficult 
to measure additionality in SME lending because additional loans must be good loans, 
repaid, and produce positive results for the borrowers." Levitsky (l997a) commented 
on how additionaJity might be achieved, for example, by authorising guarantees for 
first-time borrowers only, and concluded that such conditions would be too restrictive. 
Some guarantors insist that borrowers show evidence that their loans have been 
rejected by banks before they can apply for a guarantee; this is hardly conclusive 
proof of additionality in most cases. Another problem that distorts additionaJity might 
occur if there are 'quotas' or penalties imposed by the government (Oraham Bannock 
and Partners, 1997). As discussed in Chapter 2, S.2.6, this situation exists in Malaysia 
and other developing countries such as Pakistan, India and Indonesia. These quotas 
might cause banks to approve guaranteed loans for high-risk borrowers simply to 
meet the quota (ADB, 1990; Levitsky, 1997). 
Despite the difficulties involved, several researchers have attempted to estimate 
finance and economic additionality (NERA, 1990; Pieda, 1992; Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1996). With regard to finance additionality, Robson Rhodes (1984) suggested 
that fewer than one-half of the LOS loans were genuinely additional, a pattern which 
was confirmed by NERA (1990). The most recent survey (Pieda, 1992) indicated that 
68 percent of the Scheme's lending by value was additional, a remarkable 
improvement. However, Pieda did point out that a high default rate was associated 
with cases of high finance additionality, typically lending to OMs with no record of 
achievement, or to businesses with little prospect of generating high returns. Turning 
to economic additionaIity, the Pieda study (p.67) stated that 'almost all' of the firms 
which felt able to comment on this issue considered that output, employment and 
profits were higher than would have been the case without the LOS. The Pieda study 
(1992, Chapter 8) also stated that economic additionality, for the economy as a whole, 
was found to be low where service sector firms, especially retailers, were involved. 
Manufacturing firms generally have a greater economic impact and create jobs. At the 
national level, it was rare for LOS-assisted firms to export their products or substitute 
for imports. 
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Oehring (1996) reported that FUNDES, the Swiss-based international guarantor for 
SMEs in Latin America, estimated finance additionality for its schemes to be 90 
percent, with significant economic additionality. Graham Bannock and Partners 
(1997) commented that "no explanation is given as to how this figure was reached 
except that this was the conclusion after a full review of guarantees granted in 1993 
and 1994 in six countries - Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile and 
Colombia." Another study conducted by Riding and Haines (1995) estimated that 
"approximately one-quarter to one-third of Small Business Loans Act (SBLA) 
borrowers are unquestionably additional." They also found that, even though only 20 
percent of SBLA loans represent economic additionality, the SBLA "nonetheless 
contributes significantly to economic prosperity, job retention and creation." 
Finally on this theme, Levitsky (l997a) concluded that finance additionality of at least 
30-35 percent exists in all guarantee schemes that are properly designed and 
implemented. However, he added that: 
Economic additionality (strengthening businesses, increasing profit and sales, 
employment, export, and so on) may be considered by most designers of guarantees 
as a more important objective than financial additionality. Finance additionality of at 
least 60 percent should be the minimum acceptable for justiJYing a CGS. Sample 
studies should be carried out by CGSs every two to three years to verify the degree of 
additionality achieved in lending to SMEs. 
3.4 MODELS OF CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
Credit guarantee schemes are usually established with government financial backing, 
to compensate the banks and financial institutions for the losses sustained when 
borrowers default on loans. Publicly funded guarantee schemes operate in many 
countries. In other countries, guarantee schemes are financed, at least partially, by 
funding from external donor agencies or funded through contributions from regional 
authorities, associations or membership organisations and the financial institutions, or 
from fees or premiums paid by the borrowers (Table 3.4). 
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T bl 34 F d' a e . : 'un lOgo rc urren tS h c ernes 
OECD' CEN. ASIA AFRI LAT. MID. CAR' Total 
EUR CA AM EAST BEAN. 
Public 12 7 15 3 9 2 2 50 
Funded (57%) (88%) (88%) (60%) (69%) (100%) (50%) (71%) 
Schemes 
Non-Public 9 1 2 2 4 0 2 20 
Funded (43%) (12%) (12%) (40%) (31%) (0%) (50%) (29%) 
Schemes' 
Total 21 8 17 5 13 2 4 70 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Graham Bannock & Partners Survey, 1997 
I. Partial funding from external donor agencies and others. 
2. Comprised of 29 countries including Europe and North America which have guarantee schemes. 
Levitsky (1993) explained the operation of non-publicly funded schemes: 
This concept of credit guarantee involves a different approach and may also be 
considered as an attempt to decentralise guarantee schemes. In this approach a credit 
guarantee association (CGA) or, as it is often called, a mutual guarantee society or 
system (MGS), is a group of people who come together to undertake a common 
guarantee for a loan application of a member of the group in favour of the lending 
institution. As such, the CGA Or MGS is a form of 'self help' on the part of the target 
group. 
CGAs or MGSs have mainly been established in European countries (the term MGS 
is taken from the French name, the French Organisation de Credit Mutuel). At present 
Italy and France have far more MGSs than Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg and 
Spain, as shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: MGSs in the Euro ean Union (EU) 
Country Number of MGSs 
Belgium 18 
Denmark 12 
France 286 
Germany 28 
Italy 642 
Luxemburg 2 
S~n D 
Source: lIughes, 1994 
Deakins and Philpott (1994) described a key element of MGSs as SMEs cooperating 
with banks and other trade-related associations to pool information about the 
credibility of a particular project. CPPBB (1997) confirmed that "there is a strong 
element of networking in an MGS since it specifically involves SMEs helping 
themselves and each other to gain access to finance more easily by reducing 
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uncertainty and pooling risks." Brusco and Righi (1989) gave an example of an MGS 
operating successfully in Modena, Italy. A consortium of 3,500 craftsmen had 
guaranteed 10 billion lire in loans and suffered losses of a modest 70 million lire in 
unrecovered debts. The Modena loans are mutually guaranteed by scheme members 
who have strong incentives to prevent default, and a strong moral pressure not to 
default themselves (Hughes, 1994). 
However, MGSs have the potential to operate as closed shops, with established firms 
preventing new entrants from gaining access to reasonably priced finance. To 
alleviate this problem of access, governments encourage healthy competition and 
cooperation among the MGSs by getting more banks and Chambers of Commerce 
involved in this process. 
Finally, Hughes (1994) recommended that MGSs should receive seedcorn money 
from governments at their start-up stage because "there is likely to be an undersupply 
of such schemes unless the state underwrites or subsidises their creation." MGSs 
could be a potent force in the future, as the European Commission (EC) has promoted 
MGSs since 1991 and helped to create a European Guarantee Association in 
November, 1992 (Llorens, 1997). 
The advantages of MGSs over government-created guarantee funds stem from the fact 
that SMEs exert considerable peer pressure on MGS members to repay loans. 
Furthermore, the MGSs act as intermediaries between banks and borrowers. The 
MGSs conduct independent appraisals on the borrowers' proposals and, once satisfied 
with the business's credentials, provide a guarantee to underwrite the loans given by 
banks. Since the MGSs have a stake in the loans, they exercise care in guaranteeing 
any loans from their members. 
MGSs in the developing countries usually take the form of 'self-help' groups. They 
have had little success, except in the case of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh where 
'peer group pressure' plays an important role in loan repayment. Some countries, 
including Malaysia with its Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) Scheme, operate self-
help programmes for poor and under privileged groups. A detailed study of AIM by 
the Malaysian Government concluded that it was a more cost-effective strategy for 
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poverty alleviation than all other approaches (Social Economic Unit, 1991). 
Subsequently, the Scheme was included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan as a central 
element of initiatives to overcome rural poverty by promoting self -enterprise (Hulme, 
1993, p.6). Huq (1996) also found that AIM borrowers have benefited from the 
Scheme; about 92 percent of the borrowers have been able to repay their loans. The 
Scheme has made a positive contribution in terms of creating assets, generating 
income, expanding the mobility of professions and achieving self-reliance for micro 
enterprises. 
Where MGSs have had most success, the banks have taken an active role. MGSs can 
reduce risk and uncertainty in SME lending through networks of co-operation among 
the business community and the banks. Governments can also play an active role by 
providing seedcorn money in the early stage of MGS development. According to 
Graham Bannock (1997), even though the European experience has been adopted by 
credit guarantee organisations in Asia and other parts of the world, the MGS concept 
has rarely been exported. Attempts to implement an MGS in Francophone countries in 
West Africa, for example, has not been successful (Bakenhol, 1992). A scheme in 
Kenya supported by KfW Germany and USAID collapsed in 1985, and another in the 
Philippines has not progressed well (Graham Bannock and Partners, 1997). 
In summary, MGSs can play an important role in bridging the gap between the mutual 
guarantee organisation, the business community and the banks in terms of reduced 
risk and uncertainty in SME lending. Even though the MGS model has not been 
implemented in Malaysia on a large scale, some philosophical and practical aspects of 
the model can be applied to the operations of the CGC. This issue will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 3.5. 
Apart from MGSs, Steams (1993) identified three basic guarantee scheme models that 
have been used to promote financing for SMEs. 
i) Individual Model 
This is the simplest model enabling financial institutions to lend to SMEs (Figure 
3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Individual Model 
Loan 
Guarantee 
Fee 
Guarantee 
to Lender 
Adapted and modified from Steams (1993) 
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Three parties are involved in this transaction, Le., individual borrower (SME), lender 
(financial institution, or public enterprise, such as local government) and the 
guarantor (a guarantee corporation set up for that purpose, or the Central Bank). 
According to Graham Bannock and Partners (1997), the: "participation of banks as 
partners in the equity of a national or regional guarantee corporation is quite a 
common feature of recently created schemes in both advanced and developing 
countries. The participation may not be voluntary in certain countries, and the use of 
the scheme's services by the banks may be their only route to obtain some return on 
the capital they have invested." An SME with insufficient collateral or track record is 
referred by the lender to a guarantor, subject to final approval from the guarantor. The 
lender accepts the guarantee and, if the SME fulfils other criteria, the lender will 
approve a loan. The guarantor is paid a guarantee fee by the SME, although the lender 
may collect this fee on behalf of the guarantor. 
If an SME defaults on the loan, the guarantor must pay the amount agreed between 
lender and guarantor. As discussed in Section 3.3.1 on risk sharing, Steams (1993) 
described the mechanism of the guarantee cover: 
Some guarantees cover a percentage of loan principal lost by the bank, while others 
guarantee a percentage of principal and interest lost. Still others guarantee a 
73 
Literature Review 11 
percentage of the amount lent. If a guarantee covers 50% of the amount lent, then 
the bank will suffer losses only when more than 50% of the loan is defaulted. If the 
guarantee covers 50% of the amouut lost, however, the bank and the guarantor will 
share all losses. These risk related design features are some of the most important 
determinants of the acceptance and use of a guarantee mechanism by banks. 
If the SME pays the loan back without any problems, a credit history will be 
established and this will facilitate future loans with the lender. Some guarantee 
corporations under the Individual Model also offer technical assistance to both 
borrowers and lenders, thereby reducing transaction costs. They provide borrowers 
with assistance by, for example, producing a detailed business plan to meet the 
lender's requirements. They may also help lenders by training credit officers in the 
assessment of SME applications. On the other hand, others may approve the lenders' 
recommendations after only a cursory evaluation of the applications, provided the 
borrowers meet the programme participation requirements. 
A comprehensive study on the Individual Model was conducted under the auspices of 
the World Bank by Webster (1989). He studied 70 guarantee schemes around the 
world, and confirmed that institutions with serious repayment problems were involved 
in ineffective schemes. In such circumstances, as discussed in 53.3, the lending banks 
were often publicly-owned, development banks, the guarantor was not credible, and 
banks were not keen to participate because of insufficient incentives. Levitsky (1986) 
highlighted the problems of development banks where: 
Most of these institutions are suffering from heavy arrears on their loans, with more 
than a quarter of them having more than half their portfolio affected in this way. One 
sample of such institutions reported that their net income during the period 1981 to 
1983 averaged only 0.8 percent of their total assets and even this figure may not 
reflect the true situation because in most cases inadequate provision was made for 
losses~ 
The role of development banks will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, the case 
studies. 
ii) Portfolio Model 
The Portfolio Model (Figure 3.3) reduces the guarantor's role in assessing and 
approving loans and relies upon direct interaction between lenders and SME 
borrowers. It is more efficient than the Individual Model because the lender alone 
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approves the loan, rather than lender and guarantor. The guarantor negotiates specific 
borrower criteria with the lender such as: loan size and terms; level of assets; 
turnover; employees; profit; and type of qualifying business. SMEs who meet these 
criteria can be approved by the lender for the loan and the guarantee. The lender and 
guarantor negotiate the conditions of the guarantee, such as percentage guaranteed, 
fee, reporting requirements from the lender to the guarantor, and procedures for 
claiming upon the guarantee. 
Figure 3.3: Portfolio Model 
Guarantee 
ofP 
Guarantee 
Fee 
Loan 
Guarantee 
Fee 
Adapted and modified from Stearns (1993) 
Some of the weaknesses of the Individual Model can be rectified by the Portfolio 
Model, for example, by relieving the guarantor of responsibility for loan approval, the 
administrative costs of the guarantee mechanism are reduced. However, it is difficult 
for the guarantor to ensure that borrowers fit the programme's purposes. To prevent 
the lender using the guarantee for its normal clients, the guarantor will sometimes 
charge fees to the lender for the use of the guarantee scheme. 
Some schemes under the Portfolio Model have been considered fairly successful, such 
as those found in India and the US. In India, the Government has been encouraged by 
a high uptake of loans by SMEs. Financial institutions in India are required by law to 
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lend a portion of their portfolios to SMEs (Levitsky and Prasad, 1989). However, the 
slow settlement of claims by the guarantee corporation has resulted in a loss of 
credibility with financial institutions. In the US, the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) introduced the Preferred Lender Program (PLP) in 1982, to encourage the 
greater participation of banksl and allow them to approve SBA-guaranteed loans 
without prior SBA approval. The lending banks were given guarantee cover of 90 
percent instead of the 75 percent under the SBA's normal guarantee program. Rhyne 
(1988) suggested that the PLP was a reward for banks which shifted from the 
Individual to Portfolio Model. The PLP reduced the administrative costs of the banks 
because they no longer had to wait for SBA approval. However, the banks were 
charged a 2 percent guarantee fee to discourage them from simply lending to safer 
borrowers. Thus Rhyne (1988, p.ll5) explained that: 
While a reduction in the default rate is desirable, it is not beneficial if achieved 
primarily by increasing the number of guarantees going to already bankable clients. 
The best way to protect against such duplication is to charge a fee that makes it 
unattractive to apply the guarantee to already creditworthy loans. Thus, the 
combination of the preferred lender programme with the 2 percent guarantee fee 
enacted in 1986 should make for an improved programme. 
Nevertheless, the Portfolio Model has also experienced some drawbacks, especially in 
the case of the Loan Guarantee Facility managed by the Agency for International 
Development (AID) in Botswana. According to Lintz et al. (1990), the banks agreed 
to participate because of political pressure from the Botswanan Government, rather 
than because they wanted to increase their activities with small businesses. From 
August, 1988 to September, 1990, only 18 percent of the $1.6 million available was 
used for guarantees. The reasons for the programme's low utilisation rate included: 
• Proposals to guarantee SME loans were rejected owing to weak business planning 
and insufficient managerial skills, rather than a lack of collateral. 
• Banks considered the programme solely as an insurance scheme, rather than as an 
incentive to increase lending to riskier borrowers. The guarantee did strengthen 
the collateral position, but banks were seeking to lend only if the projects were 
viable and a good management team was in place. 
• The demand for credit from SMEs was much smaller than was perceived by the 
Botswanan Government. 
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• Banks had a shortage of qualified banking staff to manage SME accounts, in a 
situation when there was excess liquidity in the banking system. As a 
consequence, there was no incentive to venture into the SME sector as it was less 
profitable than lending to LSEs. 
Overall, the AID Guarantee Unit was seen as politically driven rather than operating 
in a socially responsible manner or broadening the customer base of the banking 
system (Lintz et al., 1990, p. 74). 
The facility in Botswana is part of the AID to help SMEs in developing countries. 
Other countries also experienced a low utilisation rate. In some developing countries, 
the macroeconomic system changed and governments, imposed credit constraints on 
the banking system. This restricted lending by banks which would have utilised the 
AID guarantee programme. In other countries, SMEs did not know how to approach 
the banks and vice versa. Therefore, AID implemented a training programme for 
participating banks and SMEs (USAID, 1992). According to Meyer (1996), African 
usage rates under the AID guarantee programme were only 19 percent on average 
compared with 34 percent in Asia. On the other hand, the leverage achieved so far is 
impressive. Graham Bannock and Partners (1997) reported that 
USAID claims that on average $1 of appropriation has supported $25 in lending. In 
1994/5, the annual allocation was $\.5 m, which was designed to allow a further 
$40m of guarantee commitments to be added to the portfolio. If fully utilised this 
would support $80m of additional lending. 
Overall, therefore, the Portfolio Model is more efficient that the Individual Model 
because the lender alone approves the loan, rather than lender and guarantor. This is 
significant since the administrative costs of the guarantee mechanisms are reduced. 
Furthermore, the processing of loans is much faster when one party (the lender) 
processes and approves the loans rather than both the lender and guarantor. The CGC 
adopts the Individual Model and there is evidence from SMEs that it takes a long time 
for the loans to be processed. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 
3.5. 
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iii) Intermediary Model 
The Intermediary Model has been developed to assist the microenterprise2 sector. This 
model recognises that microenterprises exceed the lender's normal risk/transaction 
cost frontier, as outlined in Figure 3.1 above. A specialised organisation therefore acts 
as an intermediary between lenders and borrowers (Figure 3.4). The intermediary is 
usually a non-governmental organisation (NGO). The NGO, a non-profit organisation, 
undertakes the appraisal, approval, monitoring and supervision of loans, and develops 
procedures specifically for its clientele. The guarantors usually come from donor 
agencies such as the AID, the World Bank, and Accion International. 
Figure 3.4: Intermediary Model 
Guarantee of Loan to 
Guarantee 
Fee 
Adapted and modified from Stearns (1993) 
In the Intermediary Model, the bank does not lend to the final borrower, but to an 
NGO. This avoids the high costs associated with making a host of smaller than 
normal loans, reducing the transaction costs significantly. The NGO will be 
responsible for the losses sustained by the default of its borrowers. The NGO itself 
will only default on its loan from the banks if it suffers massive defaults by its 
borrowers. 
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Table 3 6' Strengths and weaknesses of the Intermediary Model , , 
Stren2ths Weaknesses 
I. There is a clear division of responsibility, with I. Scarcity of effective credit intermediaries. The 
the intermediary (supported by a guarantee) fully lack of effective intermediaries may be a critical 
responsible for repayment to the bank. The problem for funders trying to channel 
intermediary is also fully responsible for rediscounted lines of credit to the small business 
recovering the loans to the final borrowers so and microenterprise sector through the 
that it can repay the bank loan. commercial banking system with a guarantee 
mechanism. 
2. Inexperience on the bank's part is less of a 2. An intermediary guarantee mechanism will not 
problem because the bank can assesS the be widely used if less expensive sources of funds 
intermediary's financial situation and portfolio are available to the intermediaries. 
quality before making the loan. Intermediaries 
are similar to the bank's typical clients, making 
it easier for the bank to assess their 
creditworthiness rather than that of a 
microentrepreneur. 
3. It is easier for the guarantor to assess the risk 3. If the targeted borrowers are not prepared to 
of, and monitor, one loan to an intermediary, pay higher-than-commercial rates for loans, then 
than many loans to small borrowers. the Intermediary Model cannot be effective. 
4. An intermediary with credit experience has 
more potential to manage the risks involved in 
borrowing than do individual OMs, and the 
intermediary can spread the risks across a 
portfolio of loans. 
5. An intermediary providing credit to small 
businesses and microentrepreneurs can use 
specialised methodologies for these sectors that 
minimise the level of arrears and defaults. 
6. Intermediaries can absorb some of the losses 
themsel ves, without defaulting on the bank loan. 
7. The intermediary and its board of directors are 
more visible members in the local community 
than individual small OMs. The importance of 
their reputation within the financial sector. the 
business community and among the donor 
community. can be a strong motivation for 
preventing a default by the intermediary. 
Source: Steams, 1993 
Table 3.6, outlines some of the strengths of the Intermediary Model. First, the 
intermediary is responsible for repayment of its loan from the banks and for the 
collection of loans from the borrowers. Secondly, the bank can assess the 
intermediary's financial situation and portfolio quality better as a single entity rather 
than evaluating individual microenterprises. This is particularly important where the 
bank has limited experience in dealing with microenterprises. Finally, the 
intermediary should haye a good reputation within its local and donor communities. 
Some of the weaknesses of the Intermediary Model are also shown in Table 3.6. The 
Intermediary Model will be ineffective if there is a scarcity of NGOs to channel the 
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funds to SMEs. In Malaysia, for example, not many NGOs are actively involved in 
lending to SMEs, except for certain schemes which are run by CGC together with 
NGOs such as AIM and 'Project Tekun'. Secondly, if subsidies are not available, then 
SMEs would face difficulties in getting loans. For example, the Chief Executive 
Officer of CGC highlighted the problem of CGC having limited capacity for lending 
to SMEs. One source of credit is the World Bank, which provides rediscounted lines 
of credit in the form of subsidised interest rates, to guarantors (governments) who 
disburse the funds to financial institutions and finally to NGOs. Finally, since NGOs 
depend on funds from financial institutions, they will charge a higher rate of interest 
to SMEs, to compensate for the risks of default. Such a situation is unlikely to be 
imposed in Malaysia where low interest rate ceilings are imposed by BNM on loans to 
priority sectors such as SMEs and Bumiputera OMs (ADB, 1990). Despite these 
weaknesses, however, the Intermediary Model has the greatest potential to produce a 
high level of utilisation and a low level of losses for microenterprises (Stearns, 1993). 
In summary, there are three models under which credit guarantee schemes operate in 
developed and developing countries. These are the Individual, Portfolio and 
Intermediary Models. The Individual Model is the most widely used, and Malaysia is 
no exception. The financial institutions participate as partners in the equity of the 
CGC, a situation prevalent elsewhere. The NPGS is based on the Individual Model, 
which means there is no contact between the CGC and its ultimate SME borrowers. 
Hence, the NPGS reduces risk for the banks, but not transaction costs. However, CGC 
does adopt the Portfolio Model in certain circumstances. For example, there are 
facilities under a Block Guarantee Scheme (see page 82) whereby the CGC allows the 
banks to guarantee smaller loans under the NPGS umbrella. The CGC does not follow 
the Intermediary Model, owing to its lack of capacity for lending and the limited 
number of NGOs involved with SMEs in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the CGC does 
utilise this approach in conjunction with NGO partners, for example, the AIM scheme 
described above. 
The next Section focuses on the operation of the CGc. 
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3.5 OPERATION OF THE CGC IN MALAYSIA 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The CGC in Malaysia was established in 1972 to assist SMEs to obtain credit 
facilities at reasonable cost. The Government considered that such an organisation 
was necessary owing to the impact of a number of interwoven factors. These factors 
have been discussed above, but are repeated here to emphasise the key points. The 
first factor is the reluctance of financial institutions to shoulder the higher risk 
associated with lending to SMEs, a risk which stems from the high mortality rate of 
such enterprises. Secondly, SMEs lack acceptable collateral to protect the lender in 
case of default (Chee, 1992). The Government hoped that provision of guarantee 
cover would make SMEs more attractive to financial institutions. Thirdly, SMEs 
rarely keep proper records, such as balance sheets and income statements, to use in 
support of loan applications. Faced with information asymmetry, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, S2.4.1, a lender's response may be to deny credit to SMEs that are entirely 
creditworthy, but unable to produce acceptable documentation (Coleman, 1998). 
The CGC itself does not lend to SMEs; all the funds are provided by the banks and 
other financial institutions. If borrowers default, the CGC settles claims based on the 
amount of the guarantee. The CGC provides guarantee cover for credit facilities 
extended to eligible SMEs in three broad sectors, namely, general business, 
manufacturing and agriculture. 
The CGC's capital is held by BNM, the commercial banks and finance companies, in 
the ratio 20:50:30 respectively. BNM issues guidelines to the commercial banks and 
finance companies covering the amount of CGC-linked lending to be undertaken. This 
is a critical factor, one which has a pervasive influence on the utilisation of the CGC's 
Schemes. Penalties are levied on individual financial institutions for non-compliance 
with targets, a frequent occurrence (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1995). In March, 
1996, for example, the target (Bank Negara, 1996) for loans below RM500,OOO was: 
The guarantee cover must be at least RMI billion for the commercial banks and 
RM240 million for the finance companies. In addiition, one-half of the allocated 
quotas have to be extended to Bumiputera borrowers. 
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The commercial banks and finance companies had to comply by 31 March, 1998, 
with one-half of the minimum requirement to be met by 31 March, 1997. The impact 
of the quota system will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Based on the Individual Model, the CGC is approached only after a lender has 
declined a request for conventional funding. In theory, the guarantee is only approved, 
provided that conventional finance would have been offered if collateral had been 
available. However, in my discussions with financial institutions, it emerged that the 
CGC has considerable discretion to reject loans. There are instances in my case 
studies where genuine applications for NPGS loans were rejected by the CGC without 
valid reason: The relationship between SMEs and financial institutions can become 
strained if the CGC does not explain the reasons why the loans are rejected. Lenders 
feel aggrieved that the CGC has rejected applications, but has not incurred any costs 
of appraisal. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
The CGC has taken steps to reduce and simplify the lender's administrative 
procedures by introducing the Block Guarantee Scheme (BGS) within the NPGS. 
However, the Block Guarantee Scheme only applies to NPGS loans for RM50,OOO 
and below, and the maximum guarantee cover is 70 percent of the value of the loans 
in each block, irrespective of the security offered (CGC, 1998). As Stearns (1993) 
pointed out in S3.4, the BGS (based on the Portfolio model) should be more efficient 
because the entire processing and approval functions are entrusted to the lending 
institutions. This will reduce transaction costs. However, this measure has not been 
implemented for NPGS loans over RM50,OOO. 
On the same theme, the Government has recently attempted to reduce transaction 
costs for the banks for smaller loans, as the Entrepreneur Development Ministry and 
the CGC have taken over the processing of loans under the Small Entrepreneur Fund 
(Utusan Malaysia International Edition, 4 June 1999). This a temporary measure to 
speed up the processing of such loans in the face of complaints by the SMEs. The 
Government, through BNM, directed the CGC to set up the Small Loans Unit to 
process applications for loans and adopt a 'hands-on' approach in settling a backlog in 
applications (Utusan Malaysia International Edition, 21 June 1999). 
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The next Section will explain in more detail the operation of the CGC's major 
schemes, to put in context the issues and problems faced by the CGC when 
implementing these schemes. 
3.5.2 The CGC's Guarantee Schemes 
Since 1972, four main facilities have been offered by the CGC: 
1) The General Guarantee Scheme (GGS), operating from 1972-81; 
2) The Special Loan Scheme (SLS), 1981-88; 
3) The Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS), 1989-94 
4) The New Principal Guarantee Scheme, from 1994-to date. 
The concentration here is on the period since 1980 (Table 3.7). The initial 
introduction of each new scheme has led to an increase in the number and value of 
loans granted. However, momentum has not been sustained. At certain times Malaysia 
has been experiencing rapid growth and the facilities offered by CGC were 
inappropriate for the needs of a growing economy. As a consequence, the 
Government and CGC decided to repackage the Key Schemes at the start and end of 
the 1980s. 
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Table 3.7: The number and value (in RM millions) of CGC approved loans, 
1973-98 
Year ...... . ..... .......• . .. . ... Types ofloan ... . . .<.>< .. 
.<.. . GGS GGS ... SLS· SLS> ··.···PGS· PGS I· NPGS . NPGS 
...... No. . Value No •. Value No. Value No. Value 
1973 2,292 11.8 
1974 21,363 164.3 
1975 12,189 125.8 
1976 9,538 89.4 
1977 9,209 89.1 
1978 9,638 115.1 
1979 8,552 142.3 
1980 6,103 124.3 
1981 1,148 25.8 17,161 498.2 
1982 294 9.7 16,664 519.3 
1983 236 7.2 10,327 298.3 
1984 150 4.0 7,841 208.2 
1985 77 2.7 5,295 140.0 
1986 40 1.8 4,560 122.5 
1987 33 1.3 3,346 75.2 
1988 20 0.7 2,450 49.8 
1989 5 0.3 1,032 21.4 1,638 78.5 
1990 5,641 313.3 
1991 3,349 206.3 
1992 2,180 174.7 
1993 2,302 205.8 
1994 352 32.0 3,146 530.1 
1995 7,935 1,758.7 
1996 14,965 3,578.8 
1997 15,784 3,847.4 
1998 2,711 515.9 
Notes: 
GGS: General Guarantee Scheme; SLS: Special Loan Scheme; PGS: Principal Guarantee Scheme 
(withdrawn 28 February 1994); NPGS: New Principal Guarantee Scheme (from 1 March 1994 to date) 
Source: CGC 
The General Guarantee Scheme (GGS) was the earliest Scheme to be offered, with 
loans not exceeding RM200,OOO for Bumiputera and loans not exceeding RMI00,OOO 
for non-Bumiputera borrowers. The CGC decided to phase out the GGS and replace it 
with the Special Loan Scheme (SLS) in 1981. The SLS was subsequently phased out 
in 1989. A key factor in the decision to withdraw the SLS was the existence of non-
performing loans after the recession of the mid-1980s, and the inability of banks to 
appraise and monitor the loans according to the strict terms and conditions set by the 
CGC (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996). The confidence of the commercial banks 
was shaken in the face of disputes over claims for repayment of non-performing 
loans. 
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The CGC replaced the semi-dormant GGS and the declining SLS with the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (PGS). The PGS offered support to larger firms, with net assets or 
shareholders funds of up to RM500,000. The guarantee cover was 70 percent in 
respect of both clean (unsecured) and secured facilities. The availability of these 
higher borrowing facilities was eagerly grasped by the banks and SMEs alike. 
Although 42 percent of PGS loans approved in 1992 were for amounts below 
RM30,000, the average size of loan had increased from RM27,000 (under the SLS) in 
1986 to RM80,000 in 1992 (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1994). 
The interest margin was pegged to float at 1.5 percent above the base lending rate 
(BLR) for PGS loans, rather than a fixed rate. While the banks preferred to lend 'in 
house' to SMEs wherever possible, the 1.5 percent margin over BLR allowed them to 
earn a reasonable return in meeting the quotas for PGS lending. However, Boocock 
and Mohd Shariff (1996) concluded that: 
There was no evidence in our study that raising the interest margin (to 1.5 percent 
above base lending rate, or BLR) had resulted in the active promotion of CGC loans 
by banks. 
It is significant that the supply of PGS loans slowed down sharply when an interest 
rate cap of 9 percent was enforced in 199112 (Kanbur et aI., 1995) 
Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) suggested that restrictions on interest rates by the 
authorities can distort the efficient allocation of funds to SMEs, as was the case for 
the artificiall y low rates applied to CGC loans in the 1980s. In such circumstances, the 
banks had to ration credit, since the returns did not reflect the risks involved (Weiss 
and Stiglitz, 1981; Greenwald et aI., 1984). Some commercial banks preferred to face 
a financial penalty rather than comply with the guidelines, a situation which still 
prevails today. 
The ADB (1990) study on the financing of SMEs in Malaysia recommended that 
interest rates should be set at a level which provides sufficient spread for the lending 
institutions to cover their risks as well as the costs of their services to borrowers. For 
the NPGS, the interest margin was raised to 2.0 percent over BLR and, according to 
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Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1995), this is now comparable with other guarantee 
schemes across the globe. 
In early 1994, the CGC announced a 'New' PGS which was more comprehensive than 
the existing PGS. The NPGS itself was revamped in early 1998, when some relatively 
minor changes were made to the Scheme's guidelines. My questionnaire survey was 
conducted over the period March to May 1998 and was based on the previous features 
of the NPGS (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8: Previous and Revised Features of NPGS (Eligible for all borrowing 
Approved by Financial Institutions after 1 January 1998) 
FEATURES REVISED PREVIOUS 
Definition of Businesses in the priority sector are Businesses in the priority sector are 
Priority Sector those engaged in activities promoted by those engaged in activities 
the Government and include those with promoted by the government and 
net assets or shareholders' funds not include those with net assets or 
exceeding RM250,000 shareholders' funds not exceeding 
RM500,000 
Maximum Unsecured Portion Unsecured Portion 
Guarantee Cover Non·Priority RMO.5 million N on-Priority RM1.0 million 
Priority RMO.75 million Priority RM1.5 million 
Manufacturing RM2.5 million Manufacturing RM2.5 million 
There is no capping imposed on the 
secured portion as in the current 
arrangement 
Percentage of Unsecured Secured Unsecured Secured 
Guarantee Cover Portion Portion Portion Portion 
Non-Priority 50% 60% Non-Priority 70% 80% 
Priority 70% 80% Priority 80% 90% 
Manufacturin~ 80 % 90% Manufacturing 80% 90% 
Guarantee Fee Loans np to RMl million Loans up to RMI million 
Unsecured Secured Unsecured Secured 
Portion Portion Portion Portion 
Non-Priority 1.50% 1.00% Non-Priority 0.75% 0.50% 
Priority 1.25% 0.75% Priority 0.75% 0.50% 
Manufacturing 1.00% 0.75% Manufacturing 0.75% 0.50% 
Loans above RMl million Loans above RM I million 
Unsecured Secured Unsecured Secured 
Portion Portion Portion Portion 
Non-Priority 2.00% 1.00% Non-Priority 1.00% 0.50% 
Priority 1.50% 0.75% Priority 1.00% 0.50% 
Manufacturing 1.00% 0.75% Manufacturing 1.00% 0.50% 
Source: CGC 
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On average, the CGC guarantees between 70 and 90 percent of the amount of loans, 
charging a guarantee fee of between 0.50 to 1 percent of the loan amount (CGC, 
1996). The issues of risk sharing and guarantee fees were covered in Section 3.3.1. 
The key points of Section 3.3.1 were that the guarantee cover should be ideally in the 
range of 70-80 percent and the guarantee fee should be considered in relation to the 
prevailing level of interest rates. 
The guarantee cover for the NPGS was therefore in line with other guarantee 
schemes. The business community grasped the opportunity offered by the NPGS with 
enthusiasm. This was understandable since the old PGS had many weaknesses. 
Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1995) suggested that several factors might have 
combined to the increase of uptake of NPGS loans: the use of the guarantee to cover 
all borrowing rather than the excess over the value of collateral - the average value of 
each loan has risen sharply; the provision of loans by finance companies as well as 
banks; and the conversion of conventional bank or 'old' PGS loans to the NPGS. 
However, some of these assumptions are investigated in my current study. For 
example, the relationship between the availability of CGC support through finance 
companies and the utilisation of the NPGS is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
My discussions with financial institutions and borrowers regarding the level of 
guarantee fees highlighted some dissatisfaction, especially concerning the 
implementation of the payment of the guarantee fees. Payment of the fee to the CGC 
is due on the drawdown of the facility. However, the customers frequently pay for the 
guarantee before NPGS loans are released. The period for approval of the guarantee 
by the CGC sometimes lasts longer than 3 months. This naturally causes difficulties 
for borrowers, an issue which will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
The revised features of the NPGS redefined the priority sectors and guarantee limits, 
as well as the guarantee fee structure. These changes were designed to take into 
account the needs of the SMEs while reducing the credit risk exposure of the CGC 
(CGC, 1998). These revised features will obviously have an impact on the utilisation 
of the NPGS, particularly the non-priority sector without security/collateral. Such 
borrowers require higher loans, but the guarantee cover was lowered from 70 percent 
to 50 percent and the guarantee fee increased from 1.0 percent to 2.0 percent (for 
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loans above RMl million). The rationale for revising the NPGS was raised during 
interviews with key informants, discussed in Chapter 7. 
The CGC experienced temporary setbacks in the utilisation of NPGS loans over the 
period 1997-1998. As discussed in Chapter I, Malaysia, in common with other East 
Asian countries, experienced an economic downturn from July 1997. The contagion 
effect spread into the financial system. The financial institutions curtailed their 
lending operations and the CGC reduced the number and value of its guaranteed loans 
in line, in line with a drastic decline in the number and value of loans approved by the 
financial institutions. The CGC revised its guarantee target from RM2 billion to 
RMSOO million for 1998. It was able to meet the revised target and managed to 
guarantee 2,711 new loans with a value ofRMS1S.9 million (CGC, 1998). 
Other schemes operated by the CGC in 1997 included an Interest Free Banking 
Scheme (IFBS), the Franchise Financing Scheme (FFS) and the Small Entrepreneur 
Financing Fund (SEFF). The overall value of these additional schemes was RM265 
million in 1997 (CGC, 1997). In 1998, as mentioned in S3.S.1. the CGC introduced 
the Small Entrepreneur Fund (SEF) which offers loans ranging from RM2,OOO to 
RM20,OOO to microenterprises. The SEF replaced the Loan Fund for Hawkers and 
Petty Traders and the Association Special Loan Scheme. Loans under SEF are made 
available through three types of financing packages, namely the Individual Financing 
Package for individual borrowers, the Integrated Financing Package for groups of 
borrowers and the Hawker Centre Financing Package, which is promoted jointly with 
local authorities. By the end of 1998, 4,034 loans involving RM43.0 million had been 
approved (CGC, 1998). 
The CGC also introduced the Flexi Guarantee Scheme (FGS) in March, 1999. This is 
the latest measure designed by the Govemment to ensure greater access to credit for 
viable SMEs lacking collateral, especially those eligible for loans under the Fund For 
Small and Medium Industries (FSMI), the Rehabilitation Fund for Small and Medium 
Industries (RFSMI), the New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF) and the Fund for Food (3F). 
Appendix 3 summarises the main features of the FGS. 
88 
Literature Review Il 
According to CEO of the CGC (The Star, 11 March 1999), there are three differences 
between the NPGS and the FGS. Firstly, the FGS will accommodate a guarantee even 
if the borrower does not have a good record, provided there is business viability. 
Secondly, under the FGS, the annual guarantee fee will be absorbed by the lending 
institutions, unlike the NPGS where it is borne by the borrower. Thirdly, the extent of 
the guarantee cover will be negotiated by the financial institutions, instead of being 
determined by CGc. Thus, the banks determine the parameters in terms of guarantee 
fee and cover and can set a higher premium compared to the NPGS. Whether these 
factors will result in higher utilisation will depend on future economic conditions. 
This is beyond the scope of this study since the FGS has only been implemented quite 
recently. 
The Section above discusses the activities of, and the problems encountered, by the 
CGC when implementing the various schemes over the period 1980 to 1997. The next 
Section will compare the effectiveness of the CGC with other guarantee schemes, 
using empirical results obtained in previous studies. 
3.5.3 The Effectiveness afthe eGe 
Levitsky and Prasad (1989) surveyed 18 programmes in developing countries for the 
World Bank. They found that 13 of the programmes followed the Individual Model, 
and highlighted some weaknesses in the operation of these programmes. For example, 
as discussed in S3.3, the effectiveness of the CGC in Malaysia was weakened by a 
lack of credibility and the high costs/fees of the CGC's schemes (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9: CGC Reviewed by Levitsky and Prasad 
Country 
CGC, 
Malaysia 
Dates 
Covered 
1972 to 
1985 
% of Loan Volume of Loans 
Guaranteed Guaranteed 
60 Over 74,000 loans with 
guarantees outstanding 
as of 1983. 
Source: Levitsky and Prasad, 1989 
Characteristics 
Poor handling of claims to 
collect guarantees on defaulted 
loans; many claims rejected. 
Insufficient capital in fund to 
cover claims. 
Insolvent operation 
Decreasin utilisation b banks. 
Banks had lost confidence in the schemes operated by the CGC. In addition, the CGC 
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had insufficient capital to cover the claims. Levitsky and Prasad also pointed out that, 
even if "the guarantee fee were raised and the share capital increased to RM40 
million, these measures alone would not make the CGC sol vent unless the manner of 
its operation was changed." The remainder of this Section assesses whether these 
severe criticisms still hold true. 
As mentioned above, Levitsky and Prasad (1989) described the CGC as a passive 
institution which kept its liabilities to a minimum by rejecting claims on the grounds 
of technicalities. Prior to 1985, the CGC processed 1,935 claims; only 429 resulted in 
payment. Over the period from 1986 to 1993, the CGC processed 3,563 claims, 
totalling RM36.4m, but only 1,505 claims, totalling RM9.3m, were settled. The 
remaining 2,058 claims (RM27.lm) were either rejected by the CGC or withdrawn by 
the banks (Kanbur et al., 1995). 
It was asserted by CGC that the screening of guarantee applicants was improved on 
the introduction of the Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS) in the early 1990s and that 
the claims procedures had been set out in greater detail. The rules for loan 
applications were tightened to ensure that banks met the technical requirements of the 
CGC before the issue of the guarantee. This was intended to avoid any acrimonious 
disputes arising from the default of the borrower. However, Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff (1995) argued that the CGC rejected the majority of claims retrospectively: 
"the banks, rather than public funds, have had to suffer the bulk of the losses 
stemming from bad debts whereas the cost of operating the CGC has not been 
ascertained. " 
The claims procedure is a continuing source of irritation for the lenders. It was 
therefore anticipated that problems experienced in claiming under the NPGS would be 
a frequent source of complaints in my case studies. This proved to be the case - refer 
to Chapter 7. 
The Levitsky (l997a) study claimed that the guarantee claims (or loss) rate for the 
CGC was down to 0.28 percent by 1995. The loss rate is defined as total claims for 
default paid out as a percentage of loans guaranteed (Levitsky and Prasad, 1989). The 
claims paid for 1995 totalled RMS.3 million against outstanding loans guaranteed of 
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RM 1.9 billion (CGC, 1995). The low figure of 0.28 percent may give a distorted 
view, owing to the considerable increase in the volume of guarantees over 1994-95 
(refer to Table 3.7). Levitsky (1997a) explained that comparing the level of guarantee 
claims was difficult where the volume of guarantees was rising, because most 
borrowers do not default in the first year after a loan is disbursed. The rate of claims 
on the guarantees outstanding can be assessed only after five or more years of 
continuous operation. Moreover, the loss rate of 0.28 percent for CGC is somewhat 
inaccurate because the payment of claims is not automatic, as would be the case in 
guarantee schemes operating elsewhere. The CGC does not now release accurate 
information on claims processed or paid, so it is difficult to ascertain the current 
position. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
The cost of operating the NPGS is an important area to determine its effectiveness. 
CGC benefits from interest arbitrage on soft loans received from BNM. Boocock and 
Mohd Shariff (1996) stated that information on the costs of operation for the CGC 
was not available, concluding that: 
A more open approach to disclosure, with a breakdown of the cost for the individual 
schemes, might encourage sustained usage of the New PGS. 
The CGC has a leverage level of 8 to 1 (the ratio of outstanding guarantee 
commitments to the guarantee fund) relatively Iow by global standards (Bannock and 
Partners, 1997). In these circumstances, CGC should be able to guarantee more loans. 
However, the danger of losses is a deterrent to the CGC's management, hence its 
activity level is low. Graham Bannock and Partners (1997), suggest that: 
In some cases the failure to reach a high level is not due to risk aversion or 
unwarranted conservatism on the part of lending or guarantee organisations, but 
rather a result of weaker than anticipated demand for guarantees by SME borrowers 
and reluctance of banks and other financial lenders to make full use of the schemes. 
There is also, in many cases, a complete lack of information or even total ignorance 
of potential users on the existence of the facility and how it operates. 
The CGC guarantee fund is based on the endowed funds from BNM and financial 
institutions. Their support for the CGC is welcome, provided that they are able to 
represent their interests effectively. However, if financial institutions are simply 
coerced into investing in the CGC without seeing a commercial benefit from 
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participation, problems will surely ensue. This issue will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7. 
Another element of the effectiveness of the NPGS concerns finance and economic 
additionality. A study conducted on the Old PGS in Malaysia (Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1996) showed that 63 percent of the value of CGC loans could be classed as 
additional finance. However, the degree of finance additionality found in that study 
was questionable, mainly because it proved difficult to isolate the influence of the 
quotas mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the figure of 63 percent refers to bank finance 
only, whereas other studies include data on non-bank funding. With reference to 
economic additionality, Boocock and Mohd Shariff found that local displacement 
effects were high in Malaysia, export activity or import substitution was low, and 
innovation was infrequent. 
Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) considered whether finance and economic 
additionality would improve or decline in light of the abolition of the quota system for 
the NPGS. They stated that "attempts to distort market forces, by imposing quotas, 
have not resulted in high levels of finance and economic additionality." Turning to 
economic additionality, for the NPGS to achieve a higher degree of economic impact, 
they suggested that the CGC's portfolio of companies would have to be radically 
altered. The key question is whether the differing objectives of the various parties (the 
CGC, the banks, SMEs and the authorities) could be reconciled. For example, the 
exclusion of certain types of proposition (particularly retailers) would offer higher 
economic additionality, but a preponderence of high-risk innovative companies might 
result in increased bad debts. 
The availability of training and external advice for SMEs, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
2.5.7, affects the utilisation of guaranteed loans. The CGC was revamped, with the 
proposal to establish two new divisions, Business Development Services and 
Technical Extension Services, to help SMEs in starting-up, expanding and upgrading 
their activities. While the CGC aims to provide support services, this ambition has not 
yet been implemented. The researcher supports the argument of Allahar and Brown 
(1995) that: "providing developmental services such as business counselling, 
extension services, technical assistance and business information puts the guarantor 
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into a relationship with the borrower which would not exist in a Pure Guarantee 
Programme." The availability of a support service could help to reduce defaults which 
stem from poor management on the part of OMs. However to date, the CGC has only 
provided information sessions and exhibitions to create public awareness of the its 
facilities. During 1998, a total of 36 sessions were held attracting 7,160 participants 
(CGC, 1998). 
3.6 SUMMARY 
Credit guarantee schemes in developed and developing countries have been the focus 
of this Chapter. It opens by discussing the rationale for credit guarantee schemes, 
namely the banks' reluctance in lending to SMEs. This reluctance stems not only from 
inadequate collateral, but also from high risks of failure and high transaction costs, 
which result in low profitability for the banks' portfolio of SME lending. Guarantee 
schemes encourage banks to lend beyond their comfort zone by helping to bring 
potential SMEs within an acceptable risk/return profile. 
For any guarantee scheme to be considered effective, it must fulfil a number of 
criteria (Levitsky, 1997a). 
Firstly, it must result in increased utilisation by SMEs. The issue of utilisation is a 
focal point of Chapter 4. Secondly, it must generate additionality; SMEs should gain 
access to loans which would not have been available without the operation of the 
scheme. However, there is a balance to be struck, as high default rates are associated 
with cases of high finance additionality. Economic additionality has been found to be 
low where service sector firms, especially retailers, are involved. Manufacturing firms 
generally have a greater economic impact in terms of output, employment and profits. 
The issues of finance and economic additionality for the NPGS are present! y the 
subjects of heated debate, and these issues will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
Thirdly an effective guarantee scheme must ensure that its net cost is kept to 
manageable levels. The default rate has to be low and the loan recovery rate high. The 
guarantee institution must also ensure that the procedure for payment of claims is 
explicit and clear; payment on claims must be prompt and the guarantee institution 
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should have direct control of the fund. In order to increase the loan recovery rate, a 
comprehensive database on all clients and transactions must be developed. 
Of three possible models discussed, Steams (1993) suggested that the Intermediary 
Model is more effective than either the Portfolio or Individual Model, in situations 
where the SME sector is composed of many small borrowers which exceed the banks 
risk-transaction cost frontier. Furthermore, Steams stressed that the use of the 
guarantee must be profitable to banks, and the incentive structure must motivate 
responsible lending and borrowing behaviour by all parties. This is achieved by 
careful design of the guarantee mechanism with regard to: risk allocation; costs 
(including transaction costs) and fees; and type of guarantee. Several issues from the 
Steams study will be explored in Chapter 7. How can the CGC promote maximum 
utilisation of its Schemes? Can CGC utilise the Individual Model as effectively as the 
Intermediary Model? 
The CGC has been in operation since 1972 to assist SMEs to obtain credit facilities at 
reasonable cost. It provides guarantee cover to SMEs in the general business, 
manufacturing and agriculture sector. The performance of CGC has been subject to 
criticism by researchers, especially its claims procedure in handling loans. The CGC 
does not release accurate information on claims processed or paid, therefore, it is 
difficult to ascertain the current position. However, discussions with financial 
institutions still highlight the problem of claims processed and paid. This issue will be 
further explored in Chapter 7. The interest margin for the NPGS was raised to 2 
percent over BLR which is comparable with other guarantee schemes across the 
globe. The guarantee cover and fee for the NPGS is in line with other guarantee 
schemes. However, the payment of guarantee fees frequently precedes the issue of the 
NPGS loans. The waiting period for approval of a guarantee facility sometimes takes 
longer than 3 months. This is unacceptable to SMEs. 
The CGC revised the features of the NPGS from Januaryl998. The guarantee cover 
was lowered from 70 percent to 50 percent and the fee increased from 0.75 percent to 
1.50 percent. Experience from other guarantee schemes has shown 50 percent 
guarantee cover is of little interest to the financial institutions, and 100 percent invites 
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abuse (Levitsky and Doran, 1997). My study covered the operation of the NPGS 
before the revised features were implemented. 
In terms of the effectiveness of the NPGS, previous research on the old PGS showed 
that 63 percent of the loans were classified as additional finance (Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1996). However, the degree of finance additionality found in that study was 
questionable, mainly because it proved difficult to isolate the influence of the quotas. 
Furthermore, the figure of 63 percent refers to bank finance only, whereas other 
studies include data on non-bank funding. On economic additionality, local 
displacement effects were high in Malaysia, export activity or import substitution 
were low and innovation was infrequent. 
Finally, the cost of operation for the CGC in Malaysia is extremely low because it is 
able to benefit from interest arbitrage on soft loans received from BNM. However, 
information on the detailed costs of operation for the NPGS is not available, therefore, 
it is difficult to ascertain the net cost to the Treasury. This will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 7. 
Notes 
1. Small Business Committee on Capital Access, "Increasing Capital Accessfor Small Business", 
Unpublished, October 1982, p.18. 
2. Microenterprises are firms employing 4 employees or fewers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters comprise the literature review that form the basis of tbis 
study. The next step was to develop working definitions of the variables identified in 
the literature review and to formulate the 'conceptual frameworks.' These frameworks 
relate to the utilisation and effectiveness of the New Principal Guarantee Scheme 
(NPGS), and allowed the researcher to generate hypotheses governing the 
relationships between the chosen variables. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 4.2 presents the conceptual 
frameworks. Section 4.3 focuses on the variables thought to influence the utilisation 
of the NPGS and contribute to its effectiveness. Sections 4.4 and Section 4.5 define 
the variables used in the analysis and set out the hypotheses, respectively. Section 4.6 
is a summary of tbe chapter. 
4.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The literature review identified certain factors that determine the utilisation of credit 
guarantee schemes across the globe. These factors assisted in formulating the 
conceptual frameworks underlying this study. In order to achieve the objectives of this 
thesis, two conceptual frameworks are put forward. The first is concerned witb the 
utilisation of the NPGS; the second focuses on the effectiveness of the NPGS in 
meeting the needs of SMEs in Malaysia. 
I put forward four main groups of factors to explain the utilisation of the NPGS. These 
factors or 'independent variables' are categorised as demand and supply factors, and 
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the characteristics of firms and OMs. The schematic diagram of the conceptual 
framework for the utilisation of the NPGS is shown in Figure 4.1 below. Each 
independent factor is postulated to make a distinctive contribution to the utilisation of 
NPGS loans, the dependent variable (Factor analysis is used in Chapter 7 'to assess 
whether these factors are in fact, independent, i.e., to determine any correlation among 
the variables). The groups of independent factors are set out below: 
i. Demand factors 
Cost ofloan 
Amount of security or collateral 
ii. Supply factors 
Claims processed in respect of bad debts 
Claims paid as a proportion of claims processed 
Level of quotas imposed by BNM (Central Bank) 
Involvement of finance companies 
iii. Characteristics of the recipient firm 
Legal structure of a business 
Business sector 
Size of firm 
Age of firm 
Use of external adviser in raising funds 
Existence of business plan 
IV. Characteristics of the OM 
Gender 
Ethnic group 
Age 
Formal technical and entrepreneurial/management training 
Formal education 
Business experience 
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Figure 4.1: The Utilisation of the NPGS: Schematic Diagram of the Theoretical 
Framework 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
A schematic diagram in respect of the effectiveness of the NPGS (dependent variable) 
is shown in Figure 4.2 below. The term 'theoretical framework' is perhaps not 
appropriate in this instance, as the three elements below have a high degree of 
interdependence. My contention is that the effectiveness of the NPGS is based on: 
i. Finance additionality 
ii. Economic additionality 
iii. Net Cost of the Scheme 
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Figure 4.2: The Effectiveness of the NPGS: Schematic Diagram of Framework 
for Anal sis 
ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
4.3 MAJOR VARIABLES 
4.3.1 Demand Factors 
Cost of Loans 
It has been established that high interest rates rank as an important problem facing 
SMEs in developed and developing countries (Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Bradford, 
1993; Mohamed, 1996; Boocock and Wahab, 1997). Bank finance is more costly than 
other sources of finance but it generates higher rates of return for SMEs as they retain 
control of the business (Keasey and McGuinness, 1990). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
S.3, LSEs have greater recourse to capital markets than SMEs; the latter tend to rely 
upon bank financing for raising funds (Boocock and Wahab, 1977), and bank finance 
is often their only source of credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1992). 
Chee (1986a) and Schoombee and Smith (1995), however, have argued that access to 
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finance, rather than its cost, is the major problem for SMEs in developing countries. A 
prime objective of the CGC is to enable SMEs to gain access to institutional credit at a 
reasonable cost (CGC, 1993). The total cost of an NPGS loan consists of the interest 
rate, fixed at 2 percent above Base Lending Rate (BLR), plus the guarantee fee'. The 
cost of borrowing under the NPGS is typically below the average rate for SME 
borrowing, which ranges from 2.5 to 4 percent above the BLR. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, S3.5.2, the guarantee fee payable to CGC ranges from 0.5 percent to 1 
percent of the guarantee cover. Levitsky (1997a) considered a guarantee fee of around 
2 percent to be an acceptable level in developing countries. The total cost for NPGS 
borrowers is therefore cheaper than bank borrowing and comparable with other 
guarantee schemes across the globe. 
The interest margin of 2 percent over BLR received by financial institutions on NPGS 
loans is sufficient to ensure that the financial institutions are willing to supply finance. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, S.3.5.2, the Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) study found 
no evidence that an interest margin of 1.5 percent over BLR resulted in the active 
promotion of CGC loans by banks. The focus here is on demand from borrowers. 
It is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between the cost of NPGS loans 
and the utilisation of the Scheme. SMEs seeking access to external funding will utilise 
NPGS loans provided that the rate is competitive with the rate of interest charged by 
financial institutions. 
In my empirical work, the questionnaire survey focuses on the interest rate element of 
the total cost of NPGS loans, while the guarantee fee is discussed in the case studies. 
Amount of Security or Collateral 
As discussed in Chapter 2, S5.7, insufficient collateral is one of the main reasons for 
the failure of SMEs to raise finance (Fong, 1990a; 3i/Cranfield European Enterprise 
Centre, 1992; Yusof, 1992; CBI, 1993; Abdul Hamid & Abdul Rashid, 1996). This 
does not apply solely to start-up firms. Cowling and Clay (1995) argue that relatively 
established SMEs are deprived the opportunity and ability to finance growth because 
their assets are tied up with existing loans. Hall (1989, p.55) concluded that the "risk 
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inherent in the SME sector as well as the endemic conservatism of bank managers" 
means that SMEs are required to provide a higher level of security than LSEs. 
Hutchinson and McKillop (1992) also contend that the increased risk of SME lending 
warrants higher collateral levels. 
Government-backed loan schemes are used to overcome these problems (Meier and 
Pilgrim, 1994). However. according to Levitsky (1993, p. 5): 
Banks do not generally like guarantee schemes, and prefer to obtain material 
securities as collateral for loans, where they feel they are in better control of the 
situation. Banks generally fear bureaucratic complications when the guarantee has to 
be paid out if a default occurs. Since they also regard small enterprise lending not 
only as risky but also as incurring high transactional costs, and therefore resulting in 
low profitability, there is usually a major problem in getting banks to participate in 
guarantee schemes. 
To overcome misgivings on the part of banks, guarantee schemes usually insist that 
some form of collateral, even if insufficient to cover the whole loan, is provided by 
the borrower (refer to Chapter 3, S3.1). The pledging of security reflects the owner's 
commitment (Thornhill, 1989; Berry et al., 1993; Storey, 1994a), and the greater this 
commitment the higher the probability ofthe firm's success (Van de Ven et al., 1984; 
Alias, 1990; Cowling et al., 1993). 
Levitsky (1993) stated that "only the difference between the collateral offered and that 
required by the bank should be covered by a guarantee scheme. This is essential to 
ensure that borrowers do not come to regard the guarantee scheme as another form of 
government hand-out, and they therefore do not have to be too concerned about 
repaying the loans". Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1995) highlighted that the guarantee 
under the NPGS can be used in two ways: 
First, it can cover all the facilities made available at the time of approval; the 
guarantee will cover 70-90 percent of the borrowing. Alternatively, the lender can 
take the secured part of the lending packsge outside the arrangement with the CGC. 
Thus, in the case of a firm wishing to borrow RM200,OOO, with collateral valued at 
RMJOO,OOO, the bank (or finance company) could choose to have all the borrowing 
guaranteed by the CGC or simply the excess over the security. 
While guarantee schemes are designed to overcome a lack of security on the part of 
SMEs, some security is usually a prerequisite for bank borrowing to be made 
available. On balance, however, after reviewing the above literature and current 
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practice adopted by the CGC, it is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship 
between the availability of security or collateral and the utilisation of the NPGS. This 
would imply that borrowers able to offer collateral would obtain conventional bank 
borrowing, leaving the NPGS as a top-up facility for those borrowers without security. 
The use of the NPGS as a top-up facility was prevalent in practice. The relationship 
between security and utilisation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, S.6.6. 
4.3.2 Supply Factors 
Claims Processed and Paid in Respect of Bad Debts 
Kanbur et al. (1995) stressed that the willingness of financial institutions to utilise 
CGC loans depends on the returns available on CGC lending, the level of bad debts 
incurred and, critically, the CGC's willingness to settle claims. The views of key 
informants in the banking community on these issues are given in Chapter 7. 
This study is based on CGC data from 1994-1998, a period in which the actual default 
rate of CGC-guaranteed firms was not published. The CGC traditionally published 
annual figures for loans classified as non-performing (NPLs), as well as information 
on claims processed and paid. The information in Table 4.1 for 1986-1993 is taken 
from the CGC's Annual Reports. 
The CGC claimed that banks exaggerate the value of NPLs (Kanbur et al., 1995). The 
figures for the number and value of NPLs (Columns 1 and 2) tend to overstate the 
potential losses on CGC loans over the period 1986-1993. Kanbur et al. (1995) 
established that "the value of claims processed (col 5) has certainly been consistently 
Iow compared to outstanding NPLs. This is to be expected as claims processed is an 
annual amount, whereas the figures for NPLs are cumulative." Claims paid were not 
settled in full. 
My study is based on CGC data from 1994-1998. Unfortunately, the CGC failed to 
give accurate information on NPLs and claims processed/paid over this period, 
although it did release the 1998 figures in its Annual Report. 
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Table 4.1: Bad Debt Claims Processed and Paid 
Non Performing Loans" Claims Processed 
Utilisation Number Value %** Number 
(RMm) (RMm) 
(Coil) (Col 2) (Col 3) (Col 4) 
1986 124.3 12,208 201.2 26.8 210 
1987 76.5 13,902 229.3 34.2 221 
1988 50.5 12,709 239.5 40.7 228 
1989 100.2 11,589 236.3 49.2 604 
1990 313.3 10,515 223.2 38.9 909 
1991 206.3 9,588 215.0 35.7 641 
1992 174.7 8,467 209.0 36.0 301 
1993 205.8 7,787 184.8 34.0 449 
Total 1,251.6 N/A N/A N/A 3563 
1994 530.1 17,500 261.0 32.0 1,501 
1995 1,758.7 18,000 416.8 25.0 1,605 
1996 3,578.8 18,500 704.0 22.0 1,983 
1997 3,847.4 19,200 844.8 20.0 314 
1998 515.9 18,500 622.5 17.2 232 
Total 10,230.9 N/A N/A N/A 5635 
Notes: 
'Banks' estimate of potential bad debts 
** Non Performing Loans as a percentage of outstanding CGC loans 
Source: Kanbur et al., 1995 and CGC Annual Reports 
Value 
(RMm) 
(Col 51 
1.99 
2.02 
2.74 
2.92 
9.10 
8.40 
3.90 
5.30 
36.37 
12.52 
16.40 
17.30 
29.10 
27.00 
102.32 
Claims Paid 
Value % 
(RMm) 
(Col 6) (Col 7) 
0.25 12.56 
0.54 26.73 
0.65 23.72 
1.04 35.62 
1.19 13.08 
2.02 24.05 
1.30 33.33 
2.40 45.28 
9.39 N/A 
7.38 58.95 
5.30 32.32 
7.20 41.62 
7.63 26.22 
5.50 20.37 
33.01 N/A 
Since claims processed and paid are important independent variables for this project, I 
estimated NPLs and claims processed and paid, based on figures released by the CGC, 
BNM and newspaper reports over the period 1994-1998. I also questioned key 
informants from financial institutions on their perceptions of the default rates on 
NPGS loans. 
On the basis of the literature search, published information and discussion with key 
informants, I formulated two hypotheses. 
My first hypothesis is that there will be a positive relationship between the amount of 
bad debt claims processed by CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. Financial 
institutions should be willing to utilise the NPGS (whatever the absolute level of 
defaults) if they were confident that claims will be met. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
S3.1, the level of the CGC guarantee increased from 70 percent under the Old PGS to 
80 percent (non-priority sectors) under the NPGS. However, the impact of the revised 
level of guarantee cover on utilisation is judged to be marginal, compared to the 
critical importance of the acceptance and prompt settlement of claims. 
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My second hypothesis is that there will be a positive relationship between the 
proportion of claims paid by the CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. The critical 
relationship is between claims paid and claims processed - Col 6 divided by ColS in 
Table 4.1. As this ratio increases (Col 7), financial institutions should be more 
inclined to utilise the NPGS because there is greater prospect of a claim being paid. 
The two hypotheses relating to claims processed and paid are fully examined in 
Chapter 7. 
Level of Quotas Imposed by BNM (Central Bank) 
The lending guidelines or quotas for the NPGS were retained until 31 March 1998, 
when the quota system was abolished for the Scheme. However, quotas were retained 
for all financial institutions offering loans of RM500,OOO and below to SMEs (BNM, 
1997). As shown in Table 4.2, even though the overall quota for 1994 was achieved, 
five commercial banks and 15 finance companies failed to comply with their 
individual quotas. Likewise, the overall quota for Bumiputera firms was achieved, but 
five commercial banks and 18 finance companies were fined for failing to achieve the 
guidelines set by BNM. These figures suggest that the relationship between the 
imposition of quotas and utilisation of the NPGS is not clear cut. Moreover, the quotas 
also influence finance additionality. Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) found that old 
PGS loans were simply offered by bankers to pre-selected customers until their quota 
was exhausted. Branch managers were reluctant to grant CGC-backed loans to firms 
offering high finance additionality, fearing that a high level of bad debts would affect 
their promotion prospects. 
Notwithstanding these complications, it is hypothesised that there is a positive 
relationship between the guidelines imposed by BNM and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
As with the claims processed and paid, it was not possible to test this hypothesis using 
the questionnaire survey. The influence of the quotas was tested using secondary 
information provided by BNM (Table 4.2) and interviews with financial institutions. 
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Table 4.2: Lendin Guideline for NPGS 
NPGS 
Total guarantee cover (RM million) 
Commercial banks 
Finance companies 
Non-compliance (no. of institutions) 
NPGS 
Commercial banks 
Finance corn anies 
(for Bumiputera community) 
Total guarantee cover (RM million) 
Commercial banks 
Finance companies 
Non-compliance (no. of institutions) 
Commercial banks 
Finance corn anies 
Source: BNM annual reports 1996 
Support from Finance Companies 
Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses 
Lending Guideline 1994 
corn Iiance date 31 March 1996 
Target 
(3113/1996) 
350 
60 
175 
30 
Achieved 
859.7 
161.8 
5 
15 
217.5 
70.8 
5 
18 
As discussed in SA.3.1, in order to ensure greater access to finance for SMEs, the 
NPGS was extended to finance companies (CGC, 1993). A total of 77 finance 
companies, with a network of more than 2,000 branches, were invited to participate in 
the NPGS (CGC, 1993). Finance companies form the second largest group of deposit 
taking financial institutions in Malaysia after the commercial banks. Their lending 
operations are oriented towards consumer lending, principally hire purchase, housing 
loans and other consumer loans (Pang, 1995). However, finance companies are also 
involved in leasing and factoring. Various incentives were introduced to encourage 
finance companies to participate in CGC-backed lending, such as a reduced weighting 
for NPGS loans in the calculation of their capital adequacy ratios and simplified 
administration procedures for the processing of NPGS loans. 
It is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the availability of CGC 
support through finance companies and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
4.3.3 Firm Characteristics 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, S2.5.7, achieving limited company status can help SMEs 
to solve the problems involved in raising finance (Posner, 1986), because such status 
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gives greater credibility to lenders/investors (Freedman & Godwin, 1992). Private 
limited companies are more likely to rely upon bank finance (Storey, 1994b) because. 
they are less constrained by the availability of collateral in obtaining finance (Godwin, 
1993). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between limited 
company status and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
It is acknowledged that banks generally prefer to lend on tangible assets (Loscocco 
and Robinson, 1991) because of their desire to counteract the problems associated 
with increased risk, moral hazard and adverse selection. Service sector firms lack 
tangible assets since their assets have low resale vale in the event of bankruptcy, 
hence such firms receive less favourable terms of credit than those in the 
manufacturing sector (Therrien et al., 1986; Riding and Swift, 1990). Within the 
manufacturing, firms in the high-tech sub-sector find it difficult to obtain bank finance 
in their early stage of development (Moore, 1994; McNally, 1997; Barlow and 
Robson, 1999). Certain sectors of industry (where SMEs dominate) also experience 
difficulties in financing, owing to the absence of incentives for banks to favour long-
term lending for productive investment (Chin and Jomo, 1996). The Malaysian 
Government has emphasised the manufacturing sector as a priority for the NPGS. The 
lending guidelines have directed financial institutions to place more emphasis in these 
sectors. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between 
manufacturing firms and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
It has been established that the age and size of SMEs influence the cost of their credit. 
LSEs have a lower average cost of credit than SMEs (Jomo, 1998). Firm size was also 
found to be an important determinant of access to credit, as lenders impose more 
stringent requirements on smaller companies. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the size of a 
firm and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
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On the same theme, the smaller and/or younger the SME, the lower the value of assets 
which can be used as collateral (Bannock, 1981; Binks et al., 1992a). The usage of 
bank credit is inversely related to firm size; the smaller the SME, the less likely it is to 
use bank credit (Cole and Wolken, 1996). Also younger SMEs with no track record 
appear to use less bank and institutional finance than established SMEs (Oakey 1984a; 
University of Cambridge, 1992). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the age of a 
firm and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
It is widely recognised that accountants and bank managers are important sources of 
financial advice for SMEs (Smallbone et aI., 1990b & 1993a; Curran & Blackburn, 
1994). The type of assistance most commonly received from banks relates to advice 
on borrowing (Back, 1977), but help with financial analysis and business planning is 
also available (Barclays, 1993; Smallbone et al., J993a). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the use of 
external advisers for fund raising and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Loan applications are rarely considered without a well-formulated and well-presented 
business plan (Deakins and Hussain, 1991; Berry et al., 1993a; Carty, 1994). Business 
plans are used by the banks to evaluate the ability of SME to repay finance, and they 
also give the OM an opportunity to demonstrate his or her skills and experience 
(Read, 1998). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the existence 
of a business plan and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
The hypotheses relating to the characteristics of the firm will all be tested by the 
questionnaire survey. 
4.3.4 OM Characteristics 
It is widely acknowledged that SMEs run by women are less likely to use banks as a 
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source of finance than businesses owned by men. The former may be less attractive to 
banks and other potential creditors because women-run firms are small and viewed as 
being risky (Coleman & Carsky, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). In addition, SMEs owned by 
women tend to be more heavily concentrated in the service sector (as stated in section 
2.5.7), hence they may not have assets than can be used as collateral (Riding & Swift, 
1990). However, lenders may not discriminate against women on the basis of gender, 
but on the basis of firm size, preferring to lend to larger and more established firms 
(Coleman, 1998). SMEs owned by women borrow smaller amounts and they are 
charged higher interest rates. SMEs owned by women are often required to provide 
more security than would be required for the same loan to a man (Godfrey, 1992). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is positive relationship between male OMs and 
the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Research in both the US and UK has provided evidence of problems in financing 
ethnic minority firms. Black OMs in the US receive smaller loans from banks than 
white-owned businesses, and SMEs owned by blacks were under-capitalised, 
compared with white-owned firms (Bates, 1991). In the UK, Afro-Caribbean OMs 
were twice as likely to experience problems obtaining bank loans as white applicants 
(Jones, 1994). Banks look more favourably towards giving loans to Asian OMs 
compared to white and Afro-Caribbean OMs. 
Evidence in Malaysia found that Chinese OMs are more successful than Bumiputera 
OMs because the former have long steady business experience and wider connections 
among the Chinese business community in Malaysia and across Southeast Asia (Moha 
Asri, 1993). By contrast, Bumiputera SMEs are traditionally family businesses with 
limited financial resources (Fong, 1990), and they tend to depend on banks for finance 
and government agencies for the award of contracts (Aman & Mohd Desa, 1990). The 
Malaysian Government has certainly attempted to discriminate positively to redress 
racial inequalities. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between Bumiputera 
OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
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The age of an OM affects a firm's ability to obtain finance. Middle-aged OMs are 
more likely to own assets (Hustedde & Pulver, 1992), hence younger and older OMs 
are more likely than middle-aged OMs to face difficulty in obtaining external finance 
(Cressy, 1993). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between middle-aged 
OMs and the utilisation ofthe NPGS. 
Management education and training in SMEs is critical for businesss development 
(Holliday, 1995, p.10). Education, both general and managerial, is regarded by 
. ) 
lenders as critically important when evaluating companies, especially those in the 
early stages of development (Brophy, 1989, Berry et al., 1993b). 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there are a positive relationships between technical! 
EMT, formal education and business experience and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Once again, the hypotheses relating to the characteristics of the OM will all be 
tested by the questionnaire survey. 
4.3.5 Finance and Economic Additionality 
As discussed in Chapter I, S.1.3, the concept of additionality encompasses finance 
and economic additionality. The extent of additionality is extremely important in 
judging the effectiveness of the NPGS. Finance additionality occurs as a result of 
SMEs gaining access to NPGS loans which would not otherwise have been available. 
Finance additionality is measured at the level of the firm. For the NPGS to be 
effective, finance additionality should be high without excessive incidence of defaults 
(Levitsky, 1993). In terms of economic additionality, the higher the additional 
employment, turnover and profits generated by the firm, the higher the effectiveness 
of the NPGS. Economic additionality should also take into account displacement 
effects, i.e., whether additional economic activity in the assisted finns translates into a 
corresponding increase in the level of activity in the SME sector or the economy as a 
whole. Finally, economic additionality should also capture the 'dynamism' of the 
NPGS-assisted firms in relation to investment and innovation. 
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4.3.6 Net Cost 
The net cost of the NPGS can be assessed by deducting claims paid by the CGC, and 
the cost of running its offices from the income from guarantee fees, interest earned on 
CGC funds and the proceeds of security realisations. These figures will be taken from 
annual reports of the CGC, as well as interviews conducted with key informants. 
4.4 DEFINITIONS 
4.4.1 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) 
• 
There is no generally accepted definition of an 5MB. One study by the Georgian 
Institute of Technology, US, for example, identified over 55 different definitions in 75 
countries (Manuh and Brown, 1987). Moha Asri (1999) noted that "most definitions 
appear to have been governed by the interest of the perceiver, the purpose to be 
. served, and the stage of development of the particular environment in which the 
definition is to be employed." The criteria for defining an 5MB, however, are mostly 
based on quantitative measures such as the number of persons employed, the value of 
shareholders' funds (and/or fixed assets), the value of sales and turnover, or some 
combination of these measures. 
However, the Bolton Report (1971) on Small Firms found that it was impossible to 
define an 5MB solely in terms of quantitative measures. A more useful approach, in 
their opinion, was to focus on the qualitative dimensions by defining an 5MB as an 
independent business, managed by its owner or part owners and having a small market 
share. Bolton, however, did adopt a number of quantitative measures for statistical 
purposes. The Committee recognised that size was relevant in relation to business 
sector and that it might be appropriate to define an 5MB by the number of employees 
in some sectors, but turnover in others. 
Governments across the globe categorise firms according to numbers of full-time 
employees or their equivalent. The University of Cambridge (1992) study 
characterised an 5MB as firm with 10 to 199 employees. Firms with fewer than 10 
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employees were considered 'micro' firms. In developing countries, small and 
medium-sized firms tend to be defined as enterprises with 1 to 49 employees and 49 to 
200 employees, respectively. The employment yardsticks differ from country to 
country. A small enterprise could cover 'micro' enterprises (less than 5 employees) 
and a medium enterprise could cover firms with 49 to 500 employees. For example, in 
Japan and Korea, SMEs are defined as firms with fewer than 300 employees, while 
China, Argentina, Colombia and other Latin American countries classify SMEs as 
those with fewer than 200 employees. 
Many countries use capital or assets to define an SME. In the US, an SME has been 
defined as a firm with fewer than US$5 million in total assets (Walker and Petty, 
1978; Tamari, 1980). In India, an SME is defined as having fixed assets of fewer than 
R. 6 million. Some countries use employment and other criteria, for example, the 
Philippines: 10-99 employees (and capital up to Pesos 5.0 million) is classed as small; 
100-199 employees and Pesos 20 million as medium-sized enterprises 
In Malaysia, different definitions have been used because various Government 
departments or agencies have adopted different definitions for their specific purposes. 
T bl 43 P a e 
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Al!encvlResearcher Catel!orv Defined As 
Chee11985\ Small Firm fewer than 200 full-time workers 
The Industrial Co-ordination Act Small Firm fewer than 75 full-time workers and 
1986 paid up capital of less than RM2.5 
million 
Md. Sallehl1990 & 1991) Small Firm fewer than 50 full-time workers 
World Bank (1984); United SME Small-scale enterprise - establishment 
Nations Development Organisation employing fewer than 50 workers; 
(1986); Asian Development Bank Medium-scale enterprise ~ between 50 
(1990) and 199 workers 
MITI (1997) SME fewer than 75 full-time workers and 
paid up capital of less than RM2.5 
million 
CGC (1998) SME Fewer than 150 full-time workers and 
shareholders' fund of up to RM2.5 
million 
MITI (1998) SME fewer than 150 full-time workers. 
annual sales turnover of not more than 
RM25 million and paid up capital of 
less than RM5 million. 
Source: Moha Asrl, 1999 
There has never been a formal, legal or clear cut-categorisation of what constitutes an 
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SME in Malaysia. SMEs are defined according to turnover, paid up capital or' 
employment, or some combination of these criteria, as shown in Table 4.5. 
Chee (1985), in his study of small industry in the manufacturing sector, defined SMEs 
as those employing fewer than 200 full-time workers. This was the generally accepted 
definition for many years. Nowadays, the definitions used by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MIT!) are widely used. MITI formerly defined 
SMEs as those employing fewer than 75 full time workers or having paid up capital of 
less than RM2.5 million (approximately £425,000). 
In early 1998, MITI redefined SMEs as firms that employ fewer than 150 full time 
workers or with paid up capital of less than RM5 million (approximately £850,000) 
and annual sales turnover of not more than RM25 million. 
To complicate matters further, the CGC adopts a definition of SME based on 
employment, and shareholders' funds (a term which includes paid-up capital, retained 
profits and other reserves). What this means, in practice, is that established firms will 
not be eligible for CGC assistance as they build up shareholders' funds and breach the 
limits applied by CGC. This would not be the case if CGC used the MITI approach of 
defining an SME in terms of paid-up capital. 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher is using the CGC database, hence the 
definition of an SME will be a firm with fewer than 150 full-time employees and 
shareholders' funds of less than RM5 million. 
4.4.2 Dependent Variables 
Utilisation of the NPGS 
For the purpose of this study, the utilisation of the NPGS is defined as the value of 
loans guaranteed under the NPGS. 
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Effectiveness of the NPGS 
The effectiveness of the NPGS is defined in relation to high levels of finance and 
economic additionality, and a low net cost to the Treasury. 
4.4.3 Independent Variables 
Characteristics of Firm 
Age of Finn 
The age of the firm is measured by the number of years the firm has been established 
up to the date of the survey. 
Size of Firm 
The size of the firm is measured in terms of employment, and the number of 'people 
presently working' is an appropriate measure of size. Even though the CGC does not 
have a definition for the size of the firm, the MITI definition of the size of firm will be 
used. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the number of employees includes full-
time and part-time employees. 
Legal Structure of a Business 
Since the study is concerned with SMEs, three major types of legal structure are 
considered, sole proprietor, partnership and private limited. 
Business Activity 
The CGC classifies business activity according to general business, manufacturing, 
and agriculture (including mining and quarrying). 
Use of External Adviser in Raising Funds 
An external adviser could include: relatives and friends; bankers; accountants and 
auditors; Chamber of Commerce; and others. 
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Existence of Business Plan 
A business plan is defined for my research as a document which contains an analysis 
of a firm's current position and "charts the course and destination of a company in 
specific terms for the first twelve months of operations and in general terms for at 
least the second and third years of operations"(Knight and Knight, 1993, p.33). 
Characteristics of Owner -Manager 
Ethnic Group 
The ethnic groups in Malaysia were categorised under Bumiputera, Chinese, Indian 
and other. 
Training, Education and Experience of OMs 
The level of training, education and experience of OMs is measured in terms of 
attendance on entrepreneurial and technical training courses, educational background 
and prior business experience. For the purpose of this study, training is defined as 'the 
process of acquiring the knowledge and skills related to work requirements by formal, 
structured or guided means' (Johnson & Gubbins, 1992, p.29). 
Finance Additionality 
The measurement of finance additionality is calculated at the level of the firm. The 
first step was to establish how much the financial institution (thereafter referred to as 
FI) and others were lending as part of the total finance made available to the firm. The 
second element was to estimate how much the FI could have lent in the absence of the 
NPGS, as shown in Table 4.6. The formula is as follows: 
Estimated Finance Additionality = Total finance (Col 3) - FI (Col 4) x 100 
NPGS loan (Col 2) 
Firm 1 has zero additionality, Firm 2 has 100 percent and Firm 3 has 50 percent 
additionality. 
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Table 4.4: The NPGS Finance Additionalit (all fi ures: RMOOO) 
Firm Funding Package from Financial Institutions and Fls and Est. Add 
others others' Amount (%) 
maxamt 
PIs & others NPGS loan Total (Col 4) (Col 5) 
Call) (Col 2) (Col 3 
I 0 5 5 5 00 
2 30 15 45 30 15(100) 
3 0 80 80 40 40(50) 
Notes 
I.Financial institutions and others including government bodies = an estimate of the maximum amount 
available of credit from financial institutions and others, if the NPGS had not existed. 
2.Est. Add = the estimated level of finance additionality, after taking into account what the financial 
institutions and others could have advanced. 
Source: Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996 
This concept of finance additionaIity is explored in much greater detail in Chapter 7. 
Economic Additionality 
Economic additionaIity will be measured in terms of additional employment, turnover 
and profits generated by the NPGS. The analysis will again be based at firm level. 
Another important element of economic additionaIity is its indirect impact on the 
wider economy. My analysis will also take account of displacement effects andlor 
export activity undertaken by the recipient firms. The 'dynamism' of NPGS-backed 
firms will be estimated using variety of measures. 
4.5 STATEMENTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Drawing upon the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, the researcher formulated 
some testable hypotheses. The literature is used selectively to focus on issues of most 
interest to the researcher, Le., the utilisation and effectiveness of the NPGS. 
4.5.1 Demand/actors 
HI: There will be a negative relationship between the cost and the utilisation of 
the NPGS, 
H2: There will be a negative relationship between the availability of security or 
collateral and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
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4.5.2 Supply factors 
H3: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of bad debt claims 
processed by the CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of claims paid by 
the CGC in relation to claims processed and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
H5: There will be a positive relationship between the guidelines (quotas) 
'. imposed by BNM and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
H6: There will be a positive relationship between the availability of CGC support 
through finance companies and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
4.5.3 Characteristics of firm 
H7: There will be a positive relationship between private limited company status 
and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
H8: There will be a positive relationship between manufacturing firms and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
H9: There will be a positive relationship between the size of a firm and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
HlO: There will be a positive relationship between the age of a firm and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
Hll: There will be a positive relationship between the use of external advisers for 
fund raising and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
H12: There will be a positive relationship between the existence of a written 
business plan and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
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4.5.4 Characteristics of OM 
H13: There will be a positive relationship between male OMs and the utilisation of 
the NPGS. 
H14: There will be a positive relationship between Bumiputera OMs and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
HIS: There will be a positive relationship between older OMs and the utilisation of 
the NPGS. 
H16: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of technical training 
undertaken by OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
HI7: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of Entrepreneur 
Management Training (EMT) undertaken by OMs and the utilisation of the 
NPGS. 
HI8: There will be a positive relationship between the level of formal education of 
OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
HI9: There will be a positive relationship between relevant business experience of 
OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
4.5.5 Finance Additionality 
H20: There will be a positive relationship between the level of finance additionality 
and the effectiveness of the NPGS. 
4.5.6 Economic Additionality 
H21: There will be a positive relationship between the level of economic 
additionality and the effectiveness of the NPGS. 
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4.5.7 Net Cost of NPGS 
H22: There will be a negative relationship between the cost of the NPGS to BNM 
and its effectiveness. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented two 'conceptual frameworks' which underpin the 
relationships among key variables. The dependent variable in the utilisation of the 
NPGS is the value of loans guaranteed under the NPGS. In attempting to explain the 
utilisation of the NPGS, four groups of independent variables will be used: demand 
and supply factors, and characteristics of the firm and OM. The elements used to 
explore three elements of the effectiveness of the NPGS: finance additionality; 
economic additionality; and the net cost of the Scheme. 
The Chapter then defines what is meant by an SME, and key variables included in the 
conceptual frameworks, and concludes with the presentation of hypotheses, developed 
to test whether the relationships that have been theorised hold true. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter developed theoretical frameworks to identify the key research 
questions and important variables, and to assist in formulating the hypotheses for my 
study. The next stage is to design a research methodology that constitutes the best 
way of data gathering, in order to test the hypotheses. This chapter will focus on the 
design of such a methodology. Oppenheim (1992, p.6) defined research design as: 
The basic plan or strategy of the research, and the logic behind it, which will make it 
possible and valid to draw more general conclusions from it. Thus, the research 
design should tell us how our sample will be drawn, what sub-groups it must contain, 
what comparisons need to be measured (when and at what intervals), and how these 
measures will be related to external events, for example to social, medical or other 
interventions. Research design is concerned with making our problem researchable 
by setting up our study in a way that will produce specific answers to specific 
questions. 
The importance of research design is described by Hakim (1987, p.!71) as follows: 
Research is in the nature of sailing off to chart unexplored seas or, more correctly, 
trudging off to map unexplored territories. Research design is about aiming in the 
right direction, getting your bearings right (from previous studies) and making sure 
you are adequately equipped to get there and back. Columbus set sail to find the 
western route to the East Indies and came across the West Indies and America 
instead. Research designs which fail in their original intentions are not always quite 
so lucky, but it helps if one is clear that the original plan made sense, can offer some 
reasons on why it went awry, and describes what was discovered instead. 
This chapter starts by reviewing some of the research methodologies that have been 
used in past studies. This is followed by a description of the nature of my research, 
and a discussion of data collection and sample selection procedures. The design of my 
questionnaire and pilot study is covered in some detail, and the use of case studies to 
supplement the qualitative data is explained. Finally, the chapter describes the 
techniques that I used for data analysis and a discussion of non-response bias as it 
relates to my survey. 
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5.2 RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
5.2.1 Previous Research Methodologies 
In selecting the research design for this study, the researcher reviewed the 
methodologies adopted by researchers in previous studies of small firms and then 
focused on research methodologies used to assess the utilisation and effectiveness of 
government-backed loan schemes. 
Recent research on small firms, especially studies on small firm entrepreneurship 
finance, has tended to be exploratory in nature (e.g. Oakey, 1984a, 1984b; Van Auken 
and Carter, 1989; Bums and Walker, 1991; Austin, 1993; Peel and Wilson, 1996). For 
example, Oakey (1984b) investigated the effect of different capital investment 
funding patterns on innovation in small firms, and used chi-square and correlation to 
analyse the results. 
Descriptive research is also prevalent (e.g. Tamari, 1980; Osaze, 1981; Dunkelberg & 
Cooper, 1983; Calof, 1985; Hutchinson et al., 1988; Hajjar, 1989; Jones et al., 1994; 
Keasey & Watson, 1994; McKillop and Hutchinson, 1994). For example, Hajjar 
(1989) investigated the provision of finance for small businesses with a mail 
questionnaire and interviews, and presented his findings using percentages only. 
Other research studies have tested hypotheses to explore the nature of certain 
relationships or discussed the differences among groups or the independence of 
various factors (e.g. Bracker & Pearson, 1986; Ahmed, 1987; Bracker et al., 1988; 
Carter and Van Auken, 1990; Keasey and McGuinness, 1990; Hasan, 1990; 
Mckiernan and Morris, 1994). For example, Keasey and McGuinness (1990) used 
published data to evaluate the returns to alternative sources of finance of new firms, 
and analysed the results using correlation and regression. 
The studies above illustrate the wide range of survey methods available to collect 
primary data in research on small firms. The methods include questionnaires, 
interviews and observation. 
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While questionnaires are the most widely used method of data collection in survey 
research (de Vaus, 1986), field study has been adopted by some researchers (e.g. 
Osaze, 1981; Oakey, 1984b). Field study involves the examination of a phenomenon 
in a wide variety of natural settings and is essentially a snapshot of practices, 
situations or views at a particular point in time, undertaken using questionnaires or 
(structured) interviews. Several studies have also utilised the case study method (e.g. 
Binks et al., 1986; Ahmed, 1987; Austin et al., 1993), conducting in-depth study of 
firms in their natural context. The researcher mayor may not have clearly defined 
independent and dependent variables in case study research. 
The most frequent methods used to collect primary data are questionnaires and 
interviews, although several studies have relied solely upon published data. No 
studies have used participant observation or ethnography, despite the fact that this 
technique is acknowledged to be the only true way to study the life of a small firm 
(Curran and Burrows, 1986b; Stockport and Kakabadse, 1992; Holliday, 1992). 
Holliday (1992, p.l76) stated that ethnography "provides a detailed insight into the 
day-to-day activities and operations of small firms" and it also "provides a means for 
generating better quality information and knowledge of entrepreneurship (Stockport 
and Kakabadse, 1992, p.188)." 
My research design also took into account methodologies adopted across the globe in 
evaluating the utilisation and effectiveness of government-backed loan schemes. The 
key criteria in judging effectiveness are finance and economic additionality. As with 
the studies of small firm finance, the methodologies mainly utilise in-depth interviews 
and survey questionnaires. Three UK studies of the Loan Guarantee Scheme illustrate 
the most common approaches. 
Robson Rhodes (1984) interviewed borrowers at their place of business. The study 
assessed LGS recipients in terms of capital gearing, loan repayment schedules, 
availability of complementary finance, the extent of OM commitment (financial or 
otherwise) and finance additionality. The authors also tried to ascertain any features 
that could distinguish between survivors and failures among LGS recipients. My 
study could not compile a profile of defaulting companies because of problems in 
information from the CGC. 
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NERA (1990) used interviews with borrowers and their bankers. Since economic 
additionality was a particular main focus of attention, the interviewers were anxious 
to establish the extent of additional employment, turnover and value added by LGS 
recipients. 
Pieda (1992) used a multi-method approach, allowing the researchers to triangulate 
these methodologies to derive separate conclusions in solving the same problem (Gill 
and Johnson, 1991). Pieda used structured interviews with borrowers and lenders to 
study complex issues such as additionality and displacement. Postal questionnaires 
were also used to assess the long term impact and performance of the LGS on 
recipients, by examining output and employment growth as well as profitability and 
market penetration. Telephone discussions with key informants in financial 
institutions, venture capital funds and enterprise agencies also helped to gauge the 
success of the Scheme. 
Cowling (1995) differed from the three studies above in his method of data collection. 
He analysed the take-up and failure rates of LGS recipients by using econometric 
modelling, based on secondary data obtained over the period 1981 to 1993. As 
explained in Chapter 3, S.3.5.2, his study focused on the adjustment of two key LGS 
parameters (guarantee percentage and premium paid) under changing macroeconomic 
conditions as measured by real GDP changes. 
In Europe, Camino and Cardone (1998) also used secondary data to study the Loan 
Guarantee Associations (LGAs) in Spain. They developed a model for estimating the 
costs and implicit benefits associated with loan guarantee programmes and presented 
their findings simply in terms of percentages and ratios. 
In Canada, Riding and Haines (1995) explore the economic impact of the Small 
Business Loan Act (SBLA), the degree to which guaranteed loans were incremental 
and the risk profile of borrowers. They carried out a questionnaire survey, followed 
by telephone interviews with SBLA borrowers. The data were analysed using 
descriptive measures and logistic regression. A more recent study by Riding and 
Haines (1998) assessed the effectiveness of SBLA loans and the costs of running the 
Programme. Using a structured questionnaire, they interviewed 682 borrowers to 
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determine the impact of the SBLA loans on revenues, profits, employment and 
survival. The data were analysed using descriptive and 'event history' methods. 
In Malaysia, as discussed in Chapter 4, S4.3 .2, two studies are relevant to my 
research. Kanbur et al. (1995) explored the determinants of the utilisation of the 
CGC's facilities, using secondary data over the period from 1984-1993. The data were 
analysed using an estimation model derived from the ordinary least squares COLS) 
method. Another study by Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) used in-depth interviews 
to study 32 surviving CGC-backed firms. The results were presented in summary 
form using percentages and ratios only. 
Table 5.1 is a summary of previous methodologies used in the assessment of 
government-backed loan schemes .. 
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Table 5.1: A Summary of Previous Methodology for Assessment of Government-
Backed Loan Guarantee Schemes 
Authors Major Areas Sample Data Gathering Data 
Population Method Analysis 
Robson Profile of typical LGS 100 surviving Secondary data of Percentages, 
Rhodes borrowers; finance firms and 25 DTI and bank Ratios. 
(1984) additionality; survivors and LGS failed files, interviews 
failures; business failure within firms. with bankers and 
six months and twelve months; borrowers. 
quality of the LGS proposals; 
the nature of banks I assessment 
and monitoring; reasons for 
failure and likely failure rate of 
LGS firms. 
NERA Effectiveness of LGS with 100 surviving In-depth Percentages, 
(1990) regard to finance and economic and 25 default interviews. Ratios. 
additionality; bank firms. 
performance; defaults and small 
firms lendil1g. 
Pieda Assess the extent to which LGS 188 surviving In-depth Percentages, 
(1992) generated finance and economic and 25 interviews. Ratios. 
additionality defaulted 
firms. 
300 surviving postal survey 
firms. 
Cowling Analysis of take-up rates and 33,000 LGS Secondary data Econometric 
(1995) failure rate of the LGS to the loans from 1981 to modelling. 
scheme parameters. 1993 
Riding Economic impact of loan 176 SBLA Questionnaire Percentages 
and guarantees, the degree to which borrowers Survey and and logistic 
Haines guaranteed loans are follow-up regression. 
(1995) incremental, and changes in the telephone 
risk profile of borrowers interviews 
Kanbur The determinants of the ValueofCGC Secondary data Ordinary 
et al. utilisation ofCGC's facilities loans from 1984 to least squares. 
(1995) 1993 
Boocock Relationship between small Pilot study on In-depth Percentages, 
and firms, banks and CGC; the level 32 surviving interviews. Ratios. 
Mohd of finance and economic CGC-backed 
Shariff additionality of the Old PGS firms 
(1996) 
Riding Assessment of the extent to 682SBLA Telephone Percentages, 
and which the benefits of the loan borrowers interviews Ratios. 
Haioes guarantee outweigh the costs. 
(1998) Investigation of which 
parameters best allow the goals 
of the programme to be 
accomplished. 
earnino The study of the cost-benefit 19 Loan Secondary data Percentages, 
and side of government or mutual Guarantee during the period Ratios. 
Cardone sponsored loan programmes Associations 1991-1995 
(1999) (LGAs) 
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The most common research strategy is in-depth interviews. Romano (1989, p.4l), 
however, commented that: 
The choice of our research methodology must not be influenced by more popular and 
regularly adopted scientific approaches. Rather consideration should be given to the 
relevance or usefulness of research and the researcher must select the most 
appropriate methodology to fulfil this goal 
5.2.2 Present Research Strategy 
The research methodology adopted for my study involves a combination of a mail 
questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews to develop case studies, and interviews with 
key informants. These methods are now discussed in turn below. 
There are three different ways in which questionnaires can be administered: 
telephone, mail and in-depth interviews. 
Telephone interviews are best suited for asking structured questions where responses 
need to be obtained quickly from a geographically spread sample (Sekaran, 1992). 
The main disadvantage of this method is that respondents can unilaterally terminate 
the interview without warning or explanation by hanging up the telephone. In a 
developing country like Malaysia, it is very costly and time consuming to conduct 
telephone interviews. Furthermore, the interviewer cannot observe the non-verbal 
responses of the respondent. Therefore, my research will utilise the two methods 
discussed below. 
The mail survey is best suited when a substantial amount of information is to be 
obtained through structured questions from a geographically dispersed sample. A mail 
survey was used in my study because it could cover a large geographical area in West 
Malaysia! at a lower cost and in considerably less time than other methods. 
The mail survey approach has several advantages such as: 
i. The sample size can be increased compared to in-depth interviews, because 
the costs are reduced. 
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ii. In order to be representative, a sample has to be dispersed all over the country. 
It is therefore economical and efficient to adopt the mail survey approach in 
the data collection. 
iii. The researcher can disguise his personality behind a well designed 
questionnaire, in order to avoid non-acceptance and rejection on the part of 
respondents during face-to-face interviews. 
iv. Mail questionnaires can reduce bias; in-depth interviews might give distorted 
findings because of the way questions are asked (May, 1993). 
However, there are some weaknesses of the mail questionnaire. According to May 
(1993), these include: 
i. There is no possibility of probing the answer given by respondents. 
ii. The need to keep questions relatively simple and straightforward is 
paramount, as the researcher has no control over how respondents will 
interpret the questions once the document has been posted. 
iii. There is no control over who answers the questionnaire. 
IV. The response rate may be low and it is possible that bias in the final sample 
cannot be checked. 
When the mail survey is used appropriately, however, it may be expected to produce 
results ranging from almost as good, to substantially better, than those that can be 
obtained by more costly methods (Sudman and Bradbum, 1984). 
In-depth interviews enable the interviewer to probe the experiences of interviewees. 
A number of my research questions focus directly on the way businesses are funded, a 
sensitive topic for OMs (borrowers). The interviewer might also be able to observe 
what actually happens in the daily activity of firms that are being studied (an element 
of ethnography). This approach, therefore, allows the interviewer to understand and 
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share the experience of problems and issues faced by the subjects. The whole process 
helps the interviewer to understand the rationale behind certain courses of action 
taken by the firms being studied (Bell, 1993, pp.6-13). Lastly, the process of in-depth 
interviews allows the interviewer to concentrate on specific situations and to attempt 
to identify the various interactive processes at work, an outcome which could not be 
achieved in a mail survey (Bell, 1993, pp.6-13). 
While the in-depth interview allows the researcher to concentrate on a specific issue, 
it also has several limitations, including: 
i. The approach requires a very long time to elicit the appropriate information 
for the study. Within a limited time scale, the researcher can focus on only 
certain aspects of the problems or issues that need to be studied in some depth 
(Bell, 1993, pp.6-13). The NERA study (NERA, 1990) took about 17 months 
to cover 125 interviews. Another study carried out by Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff (l996a) used four researchers to conduct in-depth interviews, but took 
about three months to cover just 32 firms and their bankers in the States of 
Kedah and Penang, in Malaysia. 
ii. The approach requires the researcher to concentrate on one group or small 
sample over a period of time. It is only economical if the sample is located in 
the same geographical area. It was too expensive, for example, for NERA to 
conduct a UK-wide study. Thus the study may focus on only a few firms 
within the vicinity of the researcher and, as a consequence, the 
representativeness ofthe sample might be questionable (Bell 1993, pp.6-13). 
In-depth interviews are essential for this study but the generalisibiIity of data is a 
potential problem. One of the preconditions for a successful in-depth interview is the 
willingness of the interviewee to accept the presence of the researcher in the 
organisation and to relay the relevant information (Bell, 1993, pp.6-13). This 
precondition is especially true in Malaysia; for example, to interview the bankers, the 
researcher had to follow the rules laid down under the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act, 1989, which requires prior permission from borrowers. Also, in 
conducting interviews with small firms in a multi-racial and multi-lingual society, 
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certain OMs are notoriously sensitive about releasing financial information (Boocock 
and Mohd Shariff, 1996). 
In-depth interviews are often used to construct case studies, an approach that was used 
as part of my research strategy. 
Hakim (1997), commented on the use of case studies as: 
... typically based on two or more methods of data collection. Whether the case study 
is descriptive, explanatory, or is concerned with rigorous tests of received ideas, the 
use of multiple sources of evidence and, very often, multiple investigators makes the 
case study one of the most powerful designs. The fieldwork for case studies may 
incorporate the analysis of administrative records and other documents, in-depth 
interviews, larger scale structured surveys (either personal interviews or postal 
surveys), participant and non-participant observation and collecting virtually any type 
of evidence that is relevant and available. 
It can also be useful for research on policy implementation and evaluation (Hakim, 
1997). My case studies developed explanatory analysis of the CGC in relation to 
evaluation of the NPGS. 
Whilst the case study method provides detail and depth, thus maximising the validity 
of results, it does limit the representativeness and generalisibility of the findings 
(Zelditch, 1971; Walton, 1973). It is accepted that one of the solutions to the 
generalisibility problem is to study more than one firm (Hakim, 1997; Bryman, 1988). 
This is supported by Sudman (1976, p.26): 
Confidence in the general significance and robustness of research findings increases 
with the number of sites in which a survey is conducted, although the largest single 
gain occurs when the number of sites is increased from one to two. Similarly, 
confidence in the generalisability of the results of a case study design increases with 
the number of cases covered, with the greatest proportional gains being achieved 
when the number of case is increased from one to two, three or more. 
Furthermore, "evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and 
the overall study is therefore regarded as being robust (Yin, 1984, pA8)." Previous 
studies of small firms suggest that multiple case studies are capable of addressing 
generalisability, if they are understood in theoretical rather than statistical terms (e.g. 
ACOST, 1990; Austin et al., 1993). 
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The suggestion was made above that participant observation (or the ethnography 
technique) generates the best quality information and knowledge of entrepreneurship 
(Stockport and Kakabadse, 1992). Besides the difficulty in gaining entry into the 
research setting (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), this technique is very costly and 
time consuming (Stockport and Kakabadse, 1992). As my study involves firms across 
the whole of West Malaysia, this approach would have seriously limited the collection 
and analysis of the data. Nevertheless, one area emphasised in participant observation 
was used in my research, i.e, the use of key informants for data collection. 
A multiple research strategy (Burgess, 1982) or between-methods approach as 
described by Brannen (1992, p.32) "can serve as an exercise in clarification: in 
particular it can help to clarify the formulation of the research problem and the most 
appropriate ways in which problem may be theorised and studied." My view on the 
issue has been influencedby Brannen's (1992, p.9) statement: 
Issues about the representativeness of the sample and the generalisibility of the 
findings are not salient; rather it is the issue of establishing a theoretical link within 
each case. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first objective of my research is to determine the 
utilisation of the NPGS, by relating utilisation to a number of demand and supply 
factors, as well as the characteristics of firms and OMs. I chose the questionnaire 
survey to test hypotheses because its strength lies in the ability to collect data from a 
large number of firms, allowing quantitative analysis in the testing of inferences and 
the generalisation of findings. My second objective relates to the effectiveness of the 
NPGS. Tackling this issue requires in-depth interviews with borrowers and their 
lender on which case studies can be formulated. The research is exploratory in nature. 
In-depth interviews allow the researcher to probe finance and economic additionality, 
issues which could not be assessed using the questionnaire survey. In addition the 
questionnaire survey and the case studies are research methods which both facilitate 
descriptive analysis. 
As has been pointed out earlier, each of the approaches has its own strengths and 
weaknesses: "it is these strengths and weaknesses that lie behind the rationale for 
integrating them (Bryman, 1992, p.59)." Finally according to Sapsford and Jupp 
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There is no single best way of collecting data; the method chosen depends on the 
nature of the research questions posed and the specific questions you want to ask 
respondents. The aim of all methods is to obtain valid and reliable data - true 
answers to questions, not distorted by the methods of collection or prone to chance 
fluctuation - which can be uses as the basis for credible conclusions. 
5.3 SAMPLING FRAME 
A sampling frame is a list from which a sample can be taken and which leads 
ultimately to the sample of units about which information is to be obtained. Hague 
and Harris (1993) highlighted the following characteristics of a good sampling frame: 
1. The frame should contain a list of members of the defined population. 
ii. The frame should be a complete, up-to-date list of the population. 
iii. No population members should be listed more than once. 
IV. The list should contain information about each unit that could be used for 
stratifying the sample. 
My study required a comprehensive list of borrowers (firms) using the New Principal 
Guarantee Scheme in West Malaysia. The database of the CGC was utilised to draw 
such a sample. A sampling frame of 36,203 borrowers, as at 30th November 1997, 
was available to conduct systematic random sampling. The CGC initially provided 
certain details for each borrower, such as reference number, date of approval of 
application, race, legal status (limited company, partnership, sole proprietorship), 
sector (general business, agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing) and loan 
amount. 
A total of 800 borrowers were selected from the reference numbers, to ensure 
adequate representation of firms with regard to location, racial composition of OMs, 
legal structure, sector and loan amount. Curran and Blackbum (1994) consider 
published lists of any kind do not provide sufficient information to be able to 
construct a good sampling frame: "even when complete, such source(s) date quickly, 
because small enterprises are very far from a static population (Curran, 1986, p.6)." 
130 
Research Design & Methodology 
By its nature, the small firm sector tends to be heterogeneous and difficult to track. In 
this instance, fifty reference numbers given by the CGC proved to be unusable; some 
of the addresses of the borrowers were insufficient and the names of some borrowers 
were repeated, having had a loan from more than one financial institution. However, 
the sampling frame was sufficiently robust to meet the criteria of a good sampling 
frame suggested by Hague and Harris (1993) and Roscoe (1975): 
i. Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most 
research studies. This criterion has been satisfied for my sample size of 92 
borrowers. This is neither too small nor too large for the study of SMEs. 
ii. Where samples are broken into sub-samples (Bumiputeralnon-Bumiputera, 
manufacturing/non-manufacturing, etc.), a minimum size of 30 for each 
category is necessary. In analysing the findings of my questionnaire survey, 
the sample size of 92 borrowers was broken into sub-samples, for example, to 
investigate utilisation by Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera borrowers. In 
testing most hypotheses, the sub-samples met the minimum size criterion. 
iii. In multivariate research (including multiple regression analysis), the sample 
size should be several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large as the 
number of variables in the study. There were many variables in my study, and 
a larger sample size was required to carry out multivariate research. I 
therefore, chose not to do so. Furthermore, multivariate research was 
unsuitable to capture certain elements of effectiveness of the NPGS, such as 
finance and economic additionality and the net cost to the Treasury. 
Table 5.2 below shows the number of borrowers in the population and survey sample 
broken down by States in West Malaysia. 
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Table 5.2: Number of firms in the o ulation and surve sam le 
States Po ulatiou Sam le 
No. of firms % No. of firms % 
Federal Territor 7,811 22 176 22 
Iohore 3,969 11 88 11 
Kedah 2,633 7 56 7 
Kelantan 1,182 3 24 3 
Malacca 1,467 4 32 4 
Ne eri Sembilan 1,538 4 32 4 
Pahan 2,312 6 48 6 
Penan 2,935 8 64 8 
Perak 4,597 13 104 13 
Perlis 426 I 8 1 
5,990 17 136 17 
Teren anu 1,343 4 32 4 
Total 36203 100 800 100 
5.4 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
The overall aim was to develop a questionnaire to address the research objectives 
effectively, yet one which was as 'viewer friendly' as possible, to avoid imposing too 
much time upon busy borrowers. A number of questions used in this questionnaire 
were adopted from previous studies, especially the NERA (1990) and Pieda (1992) 
studies on the LGS. Other questions, however, were developed specifically to meet 
the needs of this research. A copy of the questionnaire used during the main survey is 
presented in Appendix 5.1. 
According to Berdie et al. (1986), the number and quality of responses is positively 
correlated with the format and the layout of the questionnaire. Several steps were 
taken to ensure a satisfactory response rate. Following the suggestion of DiIIman 
(1978) and Sudman & Bradbum (1982), a booklet type questionnaire was used. 
Sudman & Bradburn (1982) listed three reasons why the use of the booklet format in 
questionnaires is desirable: 
i. It prevents pages from being lost or misplaced. 
ii A booklet makes it easier for the respondent to turn the pages. 
iv. A booklet looks more professional and is easier to follow. 
The questionnaire was printed on both sides of the pages to reduce mailing costs and 
to conserve paper. The questions were deliberately structured for ease of answering. 
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The questionnaire opened with salient and non-sensitive/non-threatening questions 
(Dillman, 1978; Sudman and Bradbum, 1982). Sensitive/threatening questions were 
asked towards the end of the questionnaire. The format of the questions was clear and 
consistent with instmctions given throughout the questionnaire. For example, for 
questions which required only one response, the respondent was asked to circle the 
appropriate answer, while for multiple response questions, the respondent was asked 
to tick all relevant answers. Separate instructions were given for questions using a 5-
point Likert scale. Space was provided at the end of the questionnaire for respondents 
to make comments; since this request was optional, it should not have been perceived 
as threatening (Sudman & Bradbum, 1982). 
The purpose of the questionnaire was basically to elicit two different types of 
information: first, descriptive data on characteristics of the borrowers and their firms; 
second, data on the utilisation and additionality of the NPGS loan. After analysing the 
information and data, generalisations could then take place from the sample of 
respondents to the population as a whole. 
5.4.1 Contents of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was based upon the literature survey and it incorporated all the 
variables discussed in Chapter Four. Even though the variables were discussed in 
S4.4.4, the information is briefly repeated here as the choice of variables forms a key 
element of my thesis. 
Background of firm and OM/owner manager (Questions 1 - 8) 
Legal status 
Since the study is aimed at SMEs, the respondents were required to state the legal 
status of their firm (sole proprietorship, partnership or private limited company). 
Ageoffirm 
The age of the firm is measured by its number of years in existence prior to the 
survey. 
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Business activity 
The respondents were required to indicate the type of business activity (general 
business, manufacturing, agriculture, or mining and quarrying). 
Size offinn 
The size of the firm is based on the number of people working full-time and part-time, 
including the owner, and shareholders funds of less than RM5 million. 
Gender of the OM 
The gender of the OM was sought. 
Ethnic group of the OM 
The respondents were required to indicate whether they were Bumiputera, Chinese, 
Indian or another ethnic group. 
Age of the OM 
The respondents were required to indicate their age, using lO-year bands except for 
the extremes of 'below 20' and 'above 60' . 
Highest academic qualification 
The respondents were asked whether their highest academic qualification was: 
primary school, Lower Certificate of Education, Malaysian Certificate of Education, 
Higher School Certificate, diploma, degree in science/technical subject, degree in 
business and/or management, or other qualification. 
Application for Loan Backed by New Principal Guarantee Scheme (Questions 9-13, 
16-20, 23, 24) 
Establishment of Business 
The respondents were required to indicate whether their business was new or was 
already established at the time of the NPGS application. 
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Use of External Advisers in Raising Funds 
The respondents were asked to state whether they used external advisers in raising 
funds: 
RelativeslFriends 
Bank Manager 
Accountant! Auditor 
Chamber of Commerce 
Other 
Experience and Training 
The respondents were required to state their level of: 
Experience in running a small business 
Entrpreneurl management training 
Technical training 
Business Plan 
The respondents were asked whether they had prepared a business plan 
Elements of the Package 
The respondents were asked to provide details of the financial package of which the 
NPGS loan was a part; and given the choice of: 
NPGS loan 
Owners equity 
Third party equity 
Other bank loan 
Bank overdraft 
MARAloan 
Other 
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Use of Money 
The respondents were required to state how they used the money raised through the 
NPGS: 
Working capital 
Purchase of property 
Purchase of plant and machinery 
Other property costs 
Product development 
Other 
Acceptance of the NPGS loan 
The respondents were required, based on a 5-point Likert scale, to answer a series of 
questions on why they chose the NPGS: 
Rate of interest was lower 
No need to have collateral or security 
Easy to apply through finance companies 
Easy to apply through commercial banks 
No alternative source of finance 
Low repayment terms of NPGS loans 
Other 
Security/guarantees 
The respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they had to provide security or 
personal guarantees in order to obtain the NPGS loan: 
None 
Personal guarantee/other guarantors 
Mortgage on property 
Stock Exchange securities 
Fixed deposit 
Other 
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Finance Additionality (Questions 21 and 34) 
Raising offinance 
The respondents were asked to indicate whether they would have been able to raise 
the same amount of finance if the NPGS had not been available: 
Yes, from the same source without delay 
Yes, from alternative sources without delay 
Yes, from alternative sources with a delay 
No, I would have raised less 
No, I could not have raised the finance 
Importance of the NPGS loan 
The respondents were asked to state the importance of the NPGS loan to their firms: 
Vital 
Very important 
Important 
Unimportant 
Economic Additionality (Questions 22, 25 - 332 
Impact on the development of the business 
The respondents were asked to state whether the absence of the NPGS loan would 
have had any impact on the development of their business. 
No, business would have developed as it did 
Yes, development of business would have been slower 
Yes, business would not have developed as much as it has 
Yes, business would not have survived 
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Business performance against forecasts 
The respondents were asked how their business had performed against the anticipated 
levels of turnover, profit and employment in terms of: 
Exceeded 
Achieved 
Under-achieved 
Annual turnover, net profit margin before tax and employment 
The respondents were asked to provide approximate figures for annual turnover, net 
profit margin before tax and employment, prior to using the NPGS-backed funds. 
Level of annual turnover, net profit margin before tax and employment 
The respondents were then asked to state the impact of the NPGS-backed funds on 
their level of annual turnover, and net profit margin before tax and employment by 
stating current figures for these three items. 
New business 
The respondents were asked to state the proportion of new business gained from: 
Within their state 
Elsewhere in Malaysia 
Export business 
Increased sales 
The respondents were asked to indicate the proportion of increased sales won from: 
Competitors located in their state 
Other firms in Malaysia 
Overseas firms 
5.4.2 Pilot Study Prior to Questionnaire Distribution 
Oppenheim (1992, p.47) stated that: 
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Questionnaires do not emerge fully-fledged; they have to be created or adapted, 
fashioned and developed to maturity after many abortive test flights. In fact, every 
aspect of a survey has to be tried out beforehand to make sure that it works as 
intended. 
Dillman (1978) suggested that a questionnaire should be pre-tested by three different 
groups: colleagues; potential users of the data; and SMEs drawn from the sample. 
This process was followed in my research. 
As mentioned above, the questions in this document were mainly adopted from 
previous studies, notably NERA (1990) and Pieda (1992). The survey instrument was 
pre-tested on three lecturers in Loughborough University Business School and two 
research students. These individuals provided constructive comments, notably on the 
layout and sequence of questions in the questionnaire, and the contents of the 
covering letter. 
In addition, certain questions had to be reformulated to conform to the requirement for 
the data to be analysed by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
After the questionnaire had been pre-tested on the three groups, it was revised on the 
basis of the feedback received. A full pilot test was then conducted by sending the 
questionnaire to 15 respondents drawn from the sample frame. The questionnaire is in 
English, but was also translated into two other languages (Bahasa Malaysia and 
Mandarin), to reflect a multi-cultural, multi-lingual society (Appendices 5.2 and 5.3). 
Considerable care was taken to choose the correct language for each respondent. A 
total of five completed pilot questionnaires (33 percent) were returned, a response rate 
which is reasonable for SMEs in Malaysia. The Wahab (1996) pilot study received a 
response rate of only 22 percent. The final version of the questionnaire took account 
of the borrowers' comments. 
5.4.3 Data Collection 
The final questionnaires were sent out with a personalised cover letter addressed to 
the manager/owner of the firm, and an endorsement from the Assistant General 
Manager of the CGC asking for their co-operation. A copy of the cover letter is 
reproduced in Appendix 5.4. Three weeks after the questionnaires were posted, the 
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researcher contacted non-respondents by mail, seeking their co-operation in returning 
the completed questionnaire. A total of 92 usable questionnaires were returned, 11.5 
percent of the 800 despatched. The CGC database contained the addresses of 40 
borrowers who could not be traced; in addition, three borrowers failed to answer most 
of the questions (even though reminder letters were sent to them). The remainder of 
the questionnaires (665 in total) were not returned, illustrating the difficulty in getting 
full co-operation from the borrowers. Firms were probably reluctant to answer 
questions on turnover and profits (Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996c). 
Table 5.3 shows the composition of the survey sample and the sample collected 
according to: State; race of borrower; business sector; and legal structure of the 
business. The profile of the sample collected was not much different from the survey 
sample derived from the population (Appendix 5.5). The low representation of firms 
in certain States, for example, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, should not lead 
to sampling bias, because other States have the same characteristics as the 
underepresented States in terms of the business profile and legal structure of the 
businesses. Evidence from previous studies has suggested that regional and locational 
factors are rarely important in studying SMEs (Mahmud, 1981; Hakim, 1989, Storey 
et al., 1989; Keasey & Watson, 1994). 
Table 5.3: Surve 
States Collected Sam le 
No. of firms % No. of firms % 
Federal Territor 176 22 17 18.5 
Johore 88 11 7 7.6 
Kedah 56 7 11 12 
Kelantan 24 3 1 1.1 
Malacca 32 4 1 1.1 
Ne eri Sembilan 32 4 1 1.1 
Paban 48 6 1 1.1 
Penan 64 8 5 5.4 
Perak 104 13 21 22.8 
8 1 1.1 
136 17 22 23.9 
Teren anu 32 4 4 4.3 
Total 800 100 92 100 
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R . IC ... aCla omposllon 
Racial Composition Survey Sample Collected Sample 
N % n % 
Bumiputera 343 42.9 49 53.3 
Chinese 377 47.1 33 35.9 
Indian 80 10.0 10 10.0 
Total 800 100.0 92 100.0 
Business Sector 
Business Sector Survey Sample Collected Sample 
N % n % 
Agriculture etc 64 8.0 7 7.6 
Manufacturin~ 296 37.0 36 39.1 
Gen Business 440 55.0 49 53.3 
Total 800 100.0 92 100.0 
Constitution 
Constitution Survey Sample Collected Sample 
% n % 
Private Limited Co 455 42.9 52 56.5 
Partnership 169 21.1 15 16.3 
Sole Proprietorship 176 22.0 25 27.2 
Total 800 100.0 92 100.0 
5.4.4 Non Response Bias 
Oppenheim (1992) emphasised that non-response bias will occur in mail surveys, 
despite increasing sophistication in the approaches to respondents. Diamontopoulous 
and Schlegelmich (1996) confirmed non-response as the most serious problem in mail 
questionnaires; this has implications for both the quantity and quality of the data 
obtained. Non-response bias arises when the researcher fails to obtain information 
from a sufficiently large portion of the population owing to, for example, the inability 
of recipients to respond to questionnaires. Two strategies suggested by 
Diamontopoulous and Schlegelmich (1996) for counteracting non-response are: 
i. Make some allowance for non-response by estimating non-response bias or by 
sampling non-respondents. 
ii. Try to minimise the non-response at the outset through careful design and 
execution of the survey. 
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Despite my efforts to follow the advice of Diamantopoulous and Schlegelmich and to 
guard against non-response bias, the response rate of 11.5 percent meant that it had to 
be tackled in my study. The missing responses could have affected my conclusions 
about the key variables. 
After the data has been collected, another method to handle non-response bias is to 
estimate its effects on the key variables and conclusions. This approach is critical 
when the researcher is faced with time and financial constraints, and as efforts to 
increase the rate of return become ever more costly and time consuming. 
Amstrong and Overton (1982) proposed a time trend extrapolation method for 
estimating the effects of non-response bias. They assumed that sample respondents 
who respond less readily (either by answering later or by requiring more prodding 
before answering) have similar characteristics to non-respondents. The characteristics 
of groups which respond readily/slowly are compared and extrapolated. If the groups 
do not differ in their characteristics, it is assumed that there are no systematic 
differences in their responses, suggesting that non-response bias is not a significant 
factor. I adopted this method to analyse non-response bias. The respondents were 
divided into two groups comprising the first 30 and the last 30 responses received. 
The intermediate respondents were excluded to demarcate early and late respondents 
clearly. The groups were then compared in terms of supply and demand factors, and 
the characteristics of firms and OMs. 
Using a 2-tailed Hest, the results in Table 5.4 show that no variables tested produced 
significant t-test differences (at the 5 percent level of significance) between early and 
late respondents. This suggests that biases (in terms of supply and demand factors, the 
characteristics of firms and OMs) do exert an influence, for example, the gender of 
the OMs affected the responses. Overall, however, the biases were not a significant 
factor which could affect the findings. 
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Table 5.4: Non-res onse bias between earl and late res ondents 
Major variables Degree of 2·tailed Significant at 
freedom si niticance 95% level? 
Cost 59 .682 Not si nificant 
59 .572 Not si nificant 
59 .737 Not si nificant 
firms 59 .766 Not si nificanl 
Size of firm 59 .099 Not si nificant 
A e of firm 59 .953 Not si nificant 
Use of external advisers 59 .841 Not si nifieant 
Written business lan 59 .253 Not si nificant 
MaleOMs 59 .422 Not si nifteant 
Bumiputera OMs 59 .522 Not significant 
A eofOM 59 .933 Not si nificant 
Technical trainin undertaken b OM 59 .378 Not si nifieant 
Business management training undertaken by 59 .056 Not significant 
OM 
Level of education of OMs 59 .686 Not si nifieant 
Previous business ex erience of OMs 58 1.000 Not si nifieant 
5.5 CASE STUDIES 
The case study approach was used to generate more information on the process of 
applying for NPGS loans and the impact of NPGS loans on the performance of the 
recipient firms. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2., the case study approach relies heavily 
on in-depth interviews with borrowers and their financial institutions. The case study 
approach captures reality in considerably greater detail than is possible with a 
questionnaire survey. Whilst my questionnaire yielded important information on 
relationships among variables, the data gave a limited perspective on the dynamics of 
the firms. The case study analysis injected an element of dynamism into the empirical 
work. It was also important to gather information on the contribution of CGC-backed 
firms to the economy as a whole, and to question the firms, their financial institutions 
and key informants about the effectiveness of the NPGS. Analysis of the case studies 
shed important light on all these areas. 
The firms chosen for the case studies were selected from the sampling frame of the 
survey respondents. The firms selected were from those sectorslsubsectors associated 
with the manufacture of high technology or resource-based products. These sectors 
were thought likely to generate a higher level of economic additionality. 
143 
Research Design & Methodology 
The discussion in S.5.2.2 on generalisability and validity problems implied that the 
ideal number of cases should be more than one. Hakim (1997) suggested that: 
As the number of cases increases to substantial figures, the logic of statistical 
inference begins to complement, and even replace, the logic of analytical inference 
from a small number of carefully selected cases. 
A checklist for borrowers and their lenders used in Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) 
was adapted and modified for the in-depth interviews. However, it was clear that this 
interview checklist was too long. Some questions could be omitted because they had 
already been asked in the questionnaire. In piloting the interview survey instrument, 
one lecturer suggested the use of 'prompt' questions would enable the researcher to 
extract more information from the interviewees. 
To save time and money, two pilot interviews were conducted in the UK on two 
foreign postgraduate business students with previous experience of working in 
financial institutions in Malaysia. Based on feedback from these pilot interviews, the 
number of questions was reduced still further. Questions that were considered less 
pertinent were omitted. Final interview checklists for borrowers and lenders are 
shown in Appendices 5.6 and 5.7 respectively. 
Twenty firms were contacted initially by letter, enclosing a list of issues to be 
discussed and asking for agreement to participate in the interview programme (refer to 
Appendices 5.8 and 5.9). Three firms indicated that they were unwilling to participate 
and two firms did not reply. Fifteen firms agreed to participate and follow-up 
telephone calls were made to confirm the date and time for the interviews. Their 
financial institutions were also invited to participate in the interviews, a vital element 
in measuring finance additionality. 
The interview checklists were semi-structured in nature and, on average, each 
interview lasted about fifty minutes. Some of the OMs agreed to the interview being 
recorded, on the understanding that the information was treated as confidential. Apart 
from exploring the issues raised in their mail questionnaire responses, the semi-
structured interviews were also used to probe the following issues in more detail: 
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A. Applicationfor NPGS loan 
Purpose and amount of loan 
Decision to use the NPGS 
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Total package of finance of which the NPGS loan formed a part 
Other potential lenders approached 
B. Security and/or Guarantees Sought by the Lenders 
C. Impact of NPGS loan 
Performance of the firm since obtaining the NPGS loan 
Important investment projects since the NPGS loan was obtained. 
The interviews with the borrowers' financial institutions again used a semi-structured 
checklist of questions. The majority of the financial institutions agreed that the 
conversations could be recorded. The interviewees were generally experienced 
lenders with considerable experience of dealing with CGC applications. The 
interviews usually lasted more than an hour. often because of interruptions by 
telephone calls from customers. 
I also benefited from a short attachment with the CGC. enabling me to conduct 
interviews with key informants. including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). These 
interviews concentrated on critical issues, for example. the number of claims 
processed and paid. the penalties (quotas) imposed by BNM. and future of the NPGS. 
A considerable amount of secondary data on the NPGS was also collected from CGC. 
The case studies are discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
5.6.1 Measurement of Variables 
Variables such as the age of the firm and OM are usually known as interval/ratio 
variables since the difference between the categories is identical. However. when 
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these variables are grouped into categories, they become ordinal variables (e.g. Siegal 
& Castellan, 1988; Bryman & Cramer, 1990, p.65). Other important variables in this 
study are grouped into two-category variables, such as 'have/not have any experience'; 
'had/did not have a written business plan'; and 'have attended OM training/did not 
attend OM training'. These dichotomous variables are usually known as ordinal 
variables (Siegal & Castellan, 1988). 
5.6.2 Bivariate Analysis: Measures of Correlation and Test of Significance 
The research tried to establish whether the relationships or correlations postulated in 
the hypotheses hold true. Correlation indicates both the strength and direction of the 
relationship between a pair of variables. Two types of measure can be distinguished; 
measures of linear correlation using interval variables and measures of rank 
correlation using ordinal variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1997, p.I72). When 
variables are interval/ratio, the most common measure is Pearson's Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient, known as Pearson's r. It is a matter of some debate whether 
Pearson's r can be used for ordinal variables (for example: O'Brien, 1979). However, 
two prominent methods for examining the relationship between pairs of ordinal 
variables are available - Spearman's rho and Kendall's tau. Most research findings are 
based on the former. The main problem with the values of Kendall's tau is that "they 
have no obvious probabilistic interpretation, and consequently the meaning of a value 
of 0.7 (tau a) or 0.6 (tau b), say, cannot be expressed in words in terms of 
probabilities or error in prediction (Everitt, 1977, p.63). " 
If pairs of variables are of different types - for example nominal or ordinal scale 
independent variables and an interval dependent variable, the Eta correlation 
coefficient (thereafter referred to as the Eta coefficient) warrants consideration 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1997, p.186). Since most of the variables in this study were 
nominal or ordinal scale independent variables, the Eta coefficient was frequently 
used. The Eta coefficient only varies between 0 and positive 1 and, therefore, can only 
measure positive correlation between two variables - this was therefore, appropriate 
for my study. 
To examine the means of three or more groups of scores (such as business activity) a 
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one-way ANOV A (hereafter referred to as ANOV A) was used. As Ruck and Cormier 
(1996) explain, "an ANOVA permits the researcher to use the data in the samples for 
the purpose of making a single inferential statement concerning the means of the 
study's populations." 
The first step in an ANOV A is to test the homogeneity of the variance in the sample. 
The basic assumption of this approach is that each group obtained from the scores is 
an independent random sample from the normal population and the variance of the 
groups are equal in the population (Norusis, 1993). The Levene test was used to 
determine the homogeneity of the variance in the population. If the significance level 
is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the variances in the population are equal 
should be rejected. 
The second step in ANOV A is to determine whether or not a significant difference 
exists between the means of the groups. In an ANOV A, the variability of the 
observation is divided into two parts: the within group variability, and variability 
among the group means. If the null hypothesis is true, the population means for all the 
groups under observation are equal; if more than one of the observed sample means 
are significantly different, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
The statistical test for the null hypothesis in an ANOV A is based on the F values 
calculated from the ratio of the between group means square to the within group 
means square: 
F ratio = Between group means squareIWithin group means square 
In order for the null hypothesis to be true, the F ratio should be approximately equal 
to 1 and if the observed significant level is greater than 0.05 (i.e., 0.5) the null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
Norusis (1993) commented that a significant F value indicates only that the 
popUlation means are probably not equal, but it does not reveal which pair of groups 
is unequal. To further determine whether or not to reject the null hypothesis that all 
population means are equal, my study used Fisher's LSD (hereafter referred to as 
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LSD) multiple comparison procedure. Data for this test were provided by an ANOVA 
subprogramme of SPSS. 
An ANOV A can also be conducted if comparing two means (for example, gender) by 
using an F ratio or t-test. According to Huck and Cormier (1996), "the F-test 
conclusion regarding the null hypothesis will always be identical to the conclusion 
reached by a t-test. Hence, it really doesn't matter whether researchers compare their 
two means using a I-test or F-test." 
Figure 5.1 below shows the statistical techniques adopted in my research for 
hypothesis testing involving bivariate analysis. For Hypotheses 1 to 3, Spearman's 
correlation coefficient was used because these hypotheses did not meet the linearity 
criterion specified for parametric tests; the variables were monotonic (that is, the 
value of one variable remained the same or changed in a fixed direction with increases 
in the other variable). ANOVA and/or Eta coefficients were used to test Hypotheses 4 
to 16, because the relationship between independent and dependent variables was 
non-monotonic. 
Figure 5.1: Simplified Decision Tree for Tests of Association or Relationship 
Between Two Variables 
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5.6.3 Factor Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, S4.2, each independent factor is considered as distinct in 
analysing the utilisation of NPGS loans. However, some of these factors may be 
correlated with each other and some underlying dimensions (known as common 
factors) may be related to these variables. In an attempt to examine whether the 
demand and supply factors, and the characteristics of firms and the OMs are affected 
with these dimensions, factor analysis was used. 
Daimantopoulos and SchlegelmiJch (1997), defined factor analysis as "a range of 
techniques the aims of which are to describe a larger number of (metric) variables by 
means of a smaller set of composite variables (so-called factors) and to aid the 
substantive interpretation of the data." Therefore, the main objective of factor analysis 
is to reduce a wide-ranging number of variables into more manageable groups of 
factors (Lechman, 1989). Factor loadings utilised from factor analysis are used to 
indicate the correlation between each attribute and each score. The higher the factor 
loading, the more significant that attribute is in interpretating the factor matrix (Hair 
et al., 1995). 
A number of requirements have to be met in utilising factor analysis, principally the 
variables under study have to be at least of interval scale (Sproull, 1988). In my study, 
however, most of the variables are ordinal. Kim (1975) found that ordinal variables 
can be treated as interval scale if the distortion introduced by assigning numeric 
values to ordinal categories is not very substantial. This is supported by Kim and 
Mueller (1987), who indicated that many ordinal variables might be given numeric 
values without distorting their underlying properties. In my study, the distortion effect 
is not significant as a result of assigning numeric values to ordinal data. My findings, 
therefore, pass all the tests put forward in this paragraph. 
To determine whether to proceed with ·factor analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy test and the Bartlett test of sphericity were 
used. A small value on the KMO test indicates that factor analysis may not be a good 
option; a KMO which measures more than 0.5 should be considered appropriate to 
proceed in factor analysis (Kinnear and Gray, 1994). Norusis (1992) quoted Kaiser 
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(1974) in suggesting that KMO measures in the 0.90s are considered as "marvellous", 
in the 0.80s as "meritorious", in the 0.70s as "middling", in the 0.60s as "mediocre", 
in the 0.50s as "miserable", and below 0.50s as "unacceptable" for the purpose of 
factor analysis. 
The Bartlett test of sphericity, and its significance level, indicate a relationship among 
variables in an identity matrix and determine whether factor analysis is an appropriate 
technique to use. If the Bartlett test value is significant (i.e., its associated probability 
is greater than 0.05), there is a danger that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix 
(where the diagonal elements are I and the off diagonal elements are 0) and is 
therefore unsuitable for further analysis (Kinnear and Gray, 1994). What is required is 
that the value of sphericity is large and the associated significance is small, that is, 
less than 0.05. When these criteria are present, further use of factor analysis is 
suitable. The results of the factor analysis conducted for my study will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
5.7 SUMMARY 
The Chapter discussed the importance of an appropriate research design in order to 
test the hypotheses. The researcher reviewed the research strategies employed in 
previous studies. For this study, the researcher chose the combination of mail survey, 
in-depth interviews and case studies, and interviews with key informants. A mail 
survey was chosen because of its ability to collect data from a large number of firms, 
allowing quantitative analysis in the testing of inferences and generalisation of the 
findings on the utilisation of the NPGS. In-depth interviews with borrowers and 
lenders were chosen because they allowed the researcher to explore the degree of 
finance and economic additionaIity, issues which could not be assessed using the 
questionnaire survey. On the basis of these interviews, and discussions with key 
informants, fifteen case studies were compiled. 
The questionnaire sample was derived from the database of the CGC. A sampling 
frame was available to conduct systematic random sampling based on States, race, 
legal status and sector. The questionnaire survey was designed to elicit information on 
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the utilisation of the NPGS. A number of questions from previous studies were 
reviewed critically and adopted for this study. In order to determine the potential 
effectiveness of the mail survey and to evaluate whether it met the objectives of the 
study, a pre-test and pilot study of the questionnaire was conducted before the fuII-
scale study was conducted. Measures were implemented for the despatch of the mail 
survey to ensure a satisfactory response rate 
In order to elicit more information on the impact of the NPGS and its effectiveness, 
the case study method was used. Using the survey respondents as a sampling frame, 
fifteen firms agreed to participate in this element of the research programme 
The data collected through the mail survey have been analysed using bivariate 
analysis in order to establish the relationships between variables. Factor analysis was 
used to reduce the wide ranging number of variables into more manageable groups. 
This Chapter has focused on the design of the research methodology in order to gather 
data in the best way and to test the hypotheses. The next Chapter will present the 
results of the questionnaire survey and analyse the findings. 
Notes 
1. Malaysia consists of West Malaysia and East Malaysia. West Malaysia has thirteen states excluding 
the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. East Malaysia has two states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NPGS QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the factors influencing the utilisation of the NPGS, based on 
data gathered from the questionnaire survey. Section 6.2 explains how the variables 
were prepared for analysis. Data editing and cleaning was undertaken on the raw data 
at the preparatory stage of the data analysis, in order to eliminate errors and 
inconsistencies. The output generated from the 'Frequencies' procedure of SPSS for 
MS Windows was used in the cleaning process. 
The next Section (6.3) describes the sample data, especially the characteristics of the 
firms and OMs that participated in the study. Diarnantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 
(1997) commented on the importance of descriptive analysis: 
Data description is a typical first step in any data analysis project. In addition to 
being an important, self-standing activity when a descriptive focus characterises the 
analysis objectives, descriptive analysis provides a very useful initial examination of 
the data. even when the ultimate concern of the investigator is inferential in nature 
(Le. involving estimation andlor hypothesis testing). 
Section 6.4 uses bivariate analysis to test the hypotheses generated in Chapter 4. 
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 present exploratory factor analysis and a summary of the chapter 
respectively. 
6.2 PREPARATION OF VARIABLES FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter 4, S4.2, it is hypothesised that the utilisation of NPGS-
backed facilities depends upon four independent groups of factors or variables. The 
individual variables have to be adjusted to facilitate the analysis, in order to present 
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the results in a form that can be easily understood. As Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch (1997, p49) confirm "variable transformations are often necessary to 
carry out a particular analysis and/or facilitate data reporting." The variables 
transformed into new values have been maintained in their original form for future 
analysis l . Before the transformations were made, the raw data were edited and 
cleaned. The next sub-section (6.2.1) explains how certain independent variables were 
adjusted before statistical analysis could be carried out. 
6.2.1 Independent Variables 
The demand and supply variables such as 'cost of loan', 'amount of security or 
collateral' and 'support from finance companies' were measured using interval scales 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Such variables were relatively 
straightforward to prepare for analysis. However, modifications had to be made to 
certain variables relating to the characteristics of the firm and OM. The variables 'age 
of firm', 'business activity', 'ethnic group', 'age group', 'technical training', 'academic 
qualification', and 'use of external adviser for fund raising' had to be adjusted. 
The variable 'age of firm' was originally collected using a single question based on an 
interval scale. This scale was converted to an ordinal scale by grouping the age of 
firm (originally stated in terms of years of establishment) into '4 years and below', '5 
to 9 years', '10 to 14 years', and '15 years and above'. The conversion into ordinal 
scale enables the researcher to analyse the means of the group using ANOV A, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, S5.6.2. Business activity (formerly grouped as 'general 
business', 'manufacturing' and 'agriculture') was re-categorised as 'manufacturing' and 
'non-manufacturing'. This helps the researcher to focus on the relationship between 
manufacturing firms and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
The ethnic group of the OM (originally grouped as 'Bumiputera', 'Chinese' and 
'Indian') was re-classified as 'Bumiputera' and 'Non-Bumiputera', to concentrate on the 
relationship between Bumiputera OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. Technical 
Training (originally classified as 'CIAST', 'FRlM', 'MARDI', 'MIMOS', 'YTCs', 'ITIs' 
and 'others') was transformed into 'some training' and 'no training', to utilise ANOV A. 
The academic qualification variable was rationalised to Junior or high school 
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certificate', 'college diploma' and 'university degree' (formerly 'primary school', 
'Lower Certificate of Education', 'Malaysian Certificate of Education', 'Higher School 
Certificate', 'Diploma', 'Degree or Equivalent-Sciencerrechnical' and 'Degree or 
Equivalent-BusinesslManagement'). In exploring the relationship between the level of 
education and the utilisation of the NPGS, it was much easier to work with three 
variables which represent the whole strata of education of the OM from primary 
school to university level. 
The variable on the use of 'external adviser for fund raising' was adjusted to 'none', 
'relatives! friends', 'bank managers', 'accountants and chambers of commerce', and 
'bank managers and relatives!friends' (originally grouped as 'none', 'relatives! friends', 
'bank managers', 'accountants!auditors', 'chambers of commerce' and 'others'). This 
variable was adjusted because some of the original alternatives, for example, 'auditors 
and others' were rarely used by respondents. The external adviser variable was then 
tested using ANOV A to analyse the group means. In order to gather additional 
information about this variable, an additional variable had to be created. The external 
adviser variable was coded as 'used' and 'did not use'. The new variable is used for 
descriptive purposes only and not for testing the hypothesis. 
Other variables of interest for example' gender of OM' (male or female) and 'existence 
of business plan' (yes or no) were relatively straightforward to analyse, since the 
responses could be divided easily into categories. 
6.2.2 Dependent Variable 
The preparation of the dependent variable (utilisation of the NPGS) was relatively 
straightforward, as the respondents were asked to indicate the value of loans 
guaranteed under the NPGS. The average value of NPGS loans for the firms in my 
sample was RM501 ,000, whereas the average value for the population was 
RM239,000. One firm had a loan of RM5 million and this amount might have exerted 
an undue influence on the analysis. To minimise the potential distortion of this large 
loan, this value would have been recorded as a missing value from the calculation if it 
was found to be problematic. However, the large loan did not influence my findings 
unduly, hence the total value of NPGS loans in the sample was retained. The 
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dependent variable (utilisation of the NPGS) was based on the value rather than the 
number of loans because loan value exerts a greater influence on the level of finance 
and economic additionality (KPMG, 1999/. The 'additionality' issues are much more 
important for my thesis than the impact of a large number of small loans by, for 
example, street traders and small retailers. 
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section describes the results of the 'Frequencies' data generated from SPSS. 
Using the 'Frequencies' output can alert the researcher to possible errors in the data; 
furthermore, the frequency tables can be set up for any variable, irrespective of the 
level of measurement (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 1997). For example, as 
discussed above, the variable 'age of firm' was grouped into four categories to make it 
easier for the researcher to identify the age groups of firms which utilise NPGS loans. 
The age group '4 years and below' can be classed as start up or young firms, while the 
bands '5 to 9 years' and '10 to 14 years' can be considered as middle-aged, and '15 
years and above' as older firms. These groupings facilitate the comparison of my 
findings with those in the literature survey. 
6.3.1 Firm Characteristics 
This section provides background information on the firms that participated in the 
survey. The characteristics examined include legal status, business activity, size and 
age of firm, use of external advisers in raising funds and the existence of a business 
plan. 
Legal Status 
Table 6.1 shows that the majority of the borrowers (56.5 percent) are private limited 
companies; the unincorporated firms comprise sole proprietorships (27.2 percent) and 
partnerships (16.3 percent). 
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Table 6.1: Lel!al Status 
Lee:al Status Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Private Limited Companv 52 56.5 56.5 
Sole Proorietorshio 25 27.2 83.7 
Partnership 15 16.3 100.0 
Total 92 100 
The sample contrasts with the underlying population of NPGS users, where the largest 
number (45 percent) of borrowers are sole proprietorships. However, more than half 
(63 percent) of NPGS funds were advanced to limited companies. 
SMEs in Malaysia are typically family or sole proprietorship businesses, with low 
levels of capitalisation (Lim, 1988; ADB, 1990; Md. SaUeh, 1991). These SMEs have 
restricted access to capital, modem technology, and marketing information (Abdullah, 
1999; Md. Salleh, 1991, pp3-6). As a consequence, many SMEs remain sole 
proprietorship businesses. While the percentage of private limited companies in my 
sample is higher than unincorporated firms, it is the activities of the former that are of 
prime interest to the researcher. The choice of legal structure of a business influences 
its ability to obtain external finance. As discussed in Chapter 1, S.2.3, in response to 
asymmetric information, a lender's typical reaction is to call for security or collateral. 
Storey (1994) stated that private limited companies are generally more able to access 
bank finance, and they certainly have more opportunity than unincorporated firms to 
obtain external equity (Binks et al., 1986). Achieving limited company status is 
perceived by OMs as a method of solving problems in raising finance (Posner, 1986), 
and unincorporated firms are constrained by the availability of collateral in obtaining 
finance (Godwin, 1993). Private limited companies have larger NPGS loans, and are 
of prime interest to the researcher. They operate in important sectors, are growth 
companies and generate higher levels of economic additionality. 
Business Activity 
Table 6.2 indicates that over one-half (60.9 percent) of sample firms are from the non-
manufacturing sector. The main activities in this sector are wholesale and retail 
trading, building and construction, transport and repairs, poultry farming and 
spawning, and the breeding or culturing of aquatic products. This sample mirrors the 
ADB (1990) study, where the majority of SMEs were found in the retail and 
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wholesale trades and construction. Chin and Jomo (1996) also stated that "despite 
considerable government intervention in the financial sector, more than 70 percent of 
bank lending in Malaysia has not been for productive investment (for example, 
manufacturing), but for other purposes, especially real property and share purchases, 
and consumer credit." Respondents in the manufacturing sector (39.1 percent) cover a 
range of activities, including food and drinks, tobacco, timber products and furniture, 
textiles and clothing, building materials, and printing and publishing. 
Table 6.2: Business Activity 
Business Activitv FreQuencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Non-manufacturing 56 60.9 60.9 
Manufacturing 36 39.1 100.0 
Total 92 100 
Employment Size 
Table 6.3 below reveals that 90.2 percent of the borrowers have between 1 to 49 
employees. The majority of firms, therefore, are small-scale enterprises, according to 
the Malaysian definition of SMEs. The remaining firms (9.8 percent) employ between 
50 to 199 people, classed as medium-scale enterprises. The preponderance of small 
firms in my sample is not surprising, as it is acknowledged that such firms are denied 
credit by banks; smaller and newer firms have fewer assets which can be used as 
collateral (Binks, 1979; Bannock, 1981; B inks et al., 1992a), hence they tend to rely 
upon guarantee schemes to secure bank finance. 
T hI 63 EIS' a e . mployment lze . . 
Emulovrnent Size FreQuencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 to 9 43 46.7 46.7 
10 to 19 18 19.6 66.3 
20 (0 29 10 10.9 77.2 
30 to 39 7 7.6 84.8 
401049 5 5.4 90.2 
50 to 199 9 9.8 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
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Age of Firms 
Table 6.4 below illustrates that over one-quarter (26.1 percent) of the firms have been 
in business for fewer than 4 years; and the most prominent category (37.0 percent) 
have been operating between 5 to 9 years. A significant minority of the firms in the 
sample are therefore young (operating for fewer than 5 years) and small (with fewer 
than 49 employees). Again, this profile was expected. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
S2.S.7 and in the previous section, the difficulties in raising finance were found to be 
inversely related not only to the size, but also to the age of the firm. Younger SMEs 
lack an established track record (Freer, 1980; Binks and Vale, 1990) and they face 
higher average credit costs than medium and large enterprises (ZainaI et al., p. 313; 
Jomo, 1998). As SMEs achieve a sound credit record, they are increasingly able to 
obtain funding from financial institutions (Petershon & Shulman, 1987), hence they 
place less reliance on guarantee schemes. 
Table 6.4: A!!e of Firms 
Al!e of Firms Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
4 years and below 24 26.1 26.1 
5 to 9 years 34 37.0 63.0 
10 to 14 years 18 19.6 82.6 
15 vears and above 16 17.4 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Use of External Advisers for Fund Raising 
Table 6.5(a) indicates that over three-quarters of the sample firms (80 percent) use 
external advisers, often more than one. Only one in five NPGS users (19.6 percent) 
did not use any source of financial advice. 
Table 6.5(a): Use of External Advisers for Fund Raisin!! 
Use of External Financial Advisers Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
for Fund Raisin!! 
Yes 74 8004 8004 
No 18 19.6 100.0 
Total 92 100 
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The positive responses are broken down in Table 6.5(b). The most prominent sources 
of financial advice are bankers (45.9 percent), and relatives and friends (40.6 percent). 
The chambers of commerce (13.5 percent) are used less frequently. The use of banks 
andlor friends for advice is not surprising as 5MBs cannot afford to buy in training or 
consultancy services (Wynant and Hatch, 1990). 
Table 6 5(b)' Sources of Financial Advice . . 
Sources of Financial Advice Number of ResDonses Percent 
Bankers 34 45.9 
Relatives and friends 30 40.6 
Chambers of Commerce 10 13.5 
Total 74 100.0 
Number of Respondents (n) = 74 
Business Plan 
Table 6.6 demonstrates that over half (59.8 percent) of the respondent firms have a 
written business plan. As discussed in Chapter 2, S2.5.7, business plans are used by 
banks to evaluate the ability of an 5MB to repay loans. Business plans also give the 
OM an opportunity to demonstrate his or her skills and experience (Read, 1998). 
Moha Asri (1999) argued that 5MBs worthy of Government assistance should be 
using business plans to support their operations. The predominance of private limited 
companies in the questionnaire data implies that such firms appreciate the importance 
of business plans as a tool for raising finance (Timmons et al., 1977; Schuman et al., 
1985). 
Table 6 6, Business Plan . . 
Business Plan Freauencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 55 59.8 59.8 
No 37 40.2 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
6.3.2 OM Characteristics 
This section provides background information on the OM. The characteristics 
examined include gender, ethnic group, age, formal training, formal education and 
business experience. 
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Gender 
Table 6.7 below illustrates that the vast majority of OMs (90.2 percent) in the sample 
are male. Chee (l986a) stressed that SMEs in Malaysia were mainly run by men. On 
the evidence of this sample, the situation has not changed. 
Table 6 7- Gender . . 
Gender Freauency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male 83 90.2 90.2 
Female 9 9.8 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Women in Malaysia tend to be employed in the textiles, clothing, electronics, and 
food-processing industries, rather than acting as OMs. If women do start their own 
business, they are less likely to use banks as a source of capital, because such firms 
tend to be small and viewed as more risky (Capital, Credit and Financing, 1996; 
Coleman & Carsky, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). Furthermore, SMEs owned by women are 
often required to provide more security or collateral than would be required for the 
same loan to a man (Godfrey, 1992). 
Even though the proportion of women-run business in my sample is modest, my 
evaluation may provide evidence that women continue to face problems in obtaining 
finance. If so, the findings may persuade the CGC to tackle this failing in the financial 
market. 
Ethnic Group 
Table 6.8(a) below reveals that over one-half (53.3 percent) of the firms are 
Bumiputera-owned, whereas Table 6.8(b) shows that 63.7 percent of the value of 
NPGS loans have been granted to Bumiputera-owned firms. 
Table 6.8(a): Ethnic Group (Number of firms) 
Ethnic Group FreQuencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Bumioutera 49 53.3 53.3 
Non-Bumioutera 43 46.7 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
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T bl 6 8(b) Eth . G a e : Die roup (V I a ueo fL oans ) 
Ethnic Group RM Percent Cumulative Percent 
Bumiputera 29,369,360 63.7 63.7 
Non-Bumiputera 16,707,000 36.3 100.0 
Total 46,076,360 100.0 
However, Bumiputera borrowers account for only 28.9 percent and 25.9 percent of all 
NPGS loans approved in terms of number and value respectively (CGC, 1997). Non-
Bumiputeras are therefore, under-represented in my sample. Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff (1995) commented that the problems of conducting research in a mixed-race, 
multi-lingual society should not be under-estimated; Chinese OMs are reluctant to 
participate in any finance-related survey, owing to sensitivity over questions 
regarding business funding. My current questionnaire was also affected by a low 
response rate from Chinese OMs, even though the questionnaire was translated into 
Mandarin and questions on business funding were minimised. It appears that 
Bumiputera OMs were more willing to answer the questionnaire. Moreover, the value 
of their loans were higher than the average in the underlying population. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, S2.S.7, non-Bumiputera OMs have traditionally been more 
successful than Bumiputera OMs because they have greater business experience and 
wider connections among the non-Bumiputera business community in Malaysia and 
South East Asia (Moha Asri, 1993). Furthermore, Bumiputera OMs were formerly ill 
equipped to compete with the greater business acumen and technical competence of 
non-Bumiputeras (Chee, 1986a). BNM therefore issues guidelines requiring financial 
institutions to provide guarantee cover to Bumiputera OMs. The profile of firms in the 
sample illustrates that NPGS loans are helping Bumiputeras. My research confirms 
the Aman and Mohd Desa (1990) and ADB (1990) studies which found that 
Bumiputera OMs receive more assistance from the Government and that they depend 
on banks for their financing needs. My evaluation may provide further evidence that 
Bumiputera OMs continue to face problems in obtaining finance, and that the 
Government (and CGC) are justified in tackling this issue. 
Age 
Table 6.9 below illustrates that nearly one-half (44.6 percent) of the OMs are between 
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20 to 39 years of age. The age profile in my questionnaire is different from Chee 
(l986a), as it contains a greater proportion of middle-aged OMs. The biggest category 
in my sample is the 40 to 49 age bracket (43.5 percent) with the remaining 12.0 
percent being over 50 years old. This might imply that as OMs gain experience and 
skills in running their businesses, they become more aware of the existence of the 
NPGS. Another possibility is that middle-aged OMs are more willing to share their 
experiences and problems with researcher. My findings might highlight the 
importance of CGC encouraging younger SMEs to utilise NPGS loans. 
A e Percent Cumulative Percent 
20 to 29 9.8 9.8 
30 to 39 32 34.8 44.6 
40 to 49 40 43.5 88.0 
50 and above 11 12.0 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Training in Entrepreneurial Development and Technical Courses 
Tables 6.1O(a) and 6.1O(b) reveal that nearly one-half of the respondents (48.9 
percent) had undergone some training in entrepreneurial development and around 
one-third (35.9 percent) had undergone some technical training. Entrepreneurial 
training focuses more on the strategic elements of running a business while technical 
training centres on upgrading the skills of the work force (Moha Asri, 1999). As 
elaborated in Chapter 2, S2.S.7, the majority of attendees on EMT programmes 
organised by Government agencies are Bumiputeras. The certificates acquired are 
recognised by financial institutions and assist in gaining business loans (ADB, 1990). 
The ADB (1990) study also confirmed that "the need for training far exceeds the 
supply capacity of existing government training institutions." This might imply that 
CGC and financial institutions should identify the training/development needs of 
SMEs and organise training programmes for NPGS borrowers. 
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Table 6.10(a): OM Trainin 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
48.9 48.9 
No trainin 47 51.1 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Table 6.10(b): Technical Trainin 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Some trainin 35.9 35.9 
No trainin 64.1 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Highest Academic Qualification 
Table 6.11 below reveals that over one-half (53.3 percent) of the OMs have basic 
junior or high school certificates. The remainder have a college diploma (16.3 
percent) or university degree (30.4. percent) respectively. 
Table 6.11: Academic Qualification 
Academic Qualification Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Junior and high school 49 53.3 53.3 
15 16.3 69.6 
28 30.4 100.0 
92 100.0 
This profile suggests that the utilisation of NPGS loans is not linked strongly to the 
academic qualifications of OMs. However, Boocock and Wahab (1997) found that 
OMs with a higher level of education and have experience of EMT programmes were 
more likely to apply for external finance. 
Level of Experiellce 
Table 6.12 reveals that the vast majority of the OMs (81.5 percent) had fewer than 15 
years working experience before applying for NPGS backing with nearly two-thirds 
(60.9 percent) having fewer than 9 years experience. 
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Table 6.12: Business Ex 
Business Ex erience Percent Cumulative 
1 to 3 18.5 18.5 
28.3 46.7 
14.1 60.9 
10.9 71.7 
9 9.8 81.5 
17 18.5 100.0 
92 100.0 
As discussed earlier, the profile of OMs in my questionnaire contains a greater 
proportion of middle-aged OMs. Older OMs with business experience are more aware 
of the existence of NPGS loans. General experience and particularly managerial 
experience are both regarded by lenders as critically important when evaluating SMEs 
(Brophy, 1989), and my sample would appear to confirm this conclusion. Over 80 
percent of OMs have more than 3 years experience in business. 
6.3.3 Finance Additionality 
This section provides information on the variables used to assess finance additionality 
in the questionnaire survey, notably the size of the NPGS loan and its contribution to 
the overall financial package. 
Loan Size 
Figure 6.1 shows that approximately one-third (34.8 percent) of borrowers have loans 
of less than RM2S0,OOO with two-thirds of loans exceeding RM2S0,000. This profile 
is very much in line with the underlying population, where loans guaranteed in excess 
of RM2S0,000 accounted for 68.4 percent of value in 1997 (CGC, 1997). However, 
the average value ofloans guaranteed in the sample are RMSOI,OOO compared to the 
population average of RM239,000. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, the dependent 
variable for the utilisation of the NPGS was the value of the loans rather than the 
number of loans because loan size has a major influence on the level of finance and 
economic additionality (KPMG, 1999). 
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Figure 6.1: Loan Size 
r-- 2:50,000 and below 
250,001 and above 
Ability of Firms to Raise Finance in Absence of NPGS 
Table 6.13 below shows that nearly two-thirds (38.0 percent) of firms relied solely on 
NPGS loans. This situation tends to be associated with full or 100 percent finance 
additionality, where the respondents believe that the NPGS is the only option 
available to them. (The level of finance additionality is a critical issue for the case 
studies in Chapter 7). The remainder (16.4 percent) utilised the NPGS in combination 
with other sources of finance. This situation might generate scale or partial finance 
additionality depending on how much existing or potential lenders would have been 
prepared to advance. The overwhelming majority of respondents (98.9 percent) 
considered NPGS loans to be important (Table 6. 13(b». 
T I 61 ab e • 3(a): F' . I k man cIa Pac age 
Financial Packa!!e Freouencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 34 37 37 
No 58 63 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
Table 6.13(b): Imnortant of NPGS Loans 
Important of NPGS Loans FreQuencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 91 98.9 98.9 
No 1 1.1 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 
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Having estimated the level of finance additionality, the next section discusses the 
impact of the NPGS on turnover, profit and employment. 
6.3.4 Economic Additionality 
The variables used to gauge economic additionality for the firms that participated in 
the questionnaire included the use of NPGS funds and their impact on business 
performance. 
Use of NPGS loans 
Table 6.14 indicates that over one-half (5l.1·percent) of sample firms used the NPGS 
for working capital purposes. Only 16.3 percent purchased plant and machinery in 
addition to investing in working capital. The remainder (32.6 percent) used the funds 
for a combination of working capital, purchase of plant and machinery, and other 
purposes. This failure to invest heavily in productive assets influences the sample 
firms' ability to generate increased employment and output. Funds used for working 
capital purposes only do not have much impact on the subsequent progress of the 
firm, compared to funds used (say) to purchase fixed assets or acquire another 
business. 
Table 6.14: Use of NPGS Loans 
Use of NPGS Loans 
Working Capital 
Working Capital and Purchase of plant & 
machine 
Working Capital, purchase of plant & 
machinery, purchase of property and other 
ro ert costs and roduct develo ment 
Other ro ert cost 
Purchase of plant and machinery 
Other u oses 
Total 
Anticipated Performance against Forecasts 
Number of Res 
47 
15 
26 
1 
1 
2 
92 
onses Percent 
51.1 
16.3 
28.2 
1.1 
1.1 
2.2 
100.0 
Table 6.15 shows that more than two-third (69.6) of borrowers claimed to have 
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achieved their forecast levels of turnover, profit and employment. Such a level of 
accuracy must be questionable! Only 20.7 percent felt they had under-achieved, while 
9.7 percent had exceeded their anticipated levels of turnover, profit and employment. 
Table 6.15: Antici ated Performance as a aiDst Forecast 
Anticipated perfonnance as against Frequency Percent Cumulative 
forecast Percent 
Achieved 64 69.6 69.6 
Under-achieved 19 20.7 90.3 
Exceeded 9 9.7 100 
Total 92 100.0 
The level of economic additionaIity achieved by case study finns will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7. 
6.4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The previous section profiled the characteristics of finns and OMs, and introduced the 
discussion on finance and economic additionality. This Section is concerned with the 
testing of those hypotheses relating to the utilisation of the NPGS. The hypotheses are 
tested by a series of statistical techniques, as explained in Chapter 5, S.5.7.2. 
6.4.1 Statistical Tests on the Hypotheses 
i. Demand Factors 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a negative relationship between the cost and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
To test this hypothesis, Speannan's correlation coefficient was utilised. The results 
provide evidence of a negative relationship between the cost (rate of interest) and the 
utilisation of the NPGS (Table 6.16). The wider the differential between the average 
rate of interest charged by financial institutions and the rate applied to CGC lending, 
the more incentive for borrowers to utilise the NPGS (Kanbur et al., 1995; Mohamed, 
1996). A prime objective of the CGC is to enable SMEs to have access to institutional 
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credit at reasonable cost (CGC, 1993). However, there is no evidence of a real 
relationship (either positive or negative) between cost and utilisation of the NPGS, 
suggesting that access to finance, rather than its cost, is the major problem for SMEs 
in Malaysia (Chee, 1986; Hashim 1992). The hypothesis has not been substantiated (p 
> .05, r = -.152). 
Table 6.16: Correlation between Cost and NPGS Loans 
NPGSLoans 
Cost 
NPGSLoan 
1.000 
-.152 
Cost 
-.152 
LOOO 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a negative relationship between the availability of 
security or collateral and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Spearman's correlation coefficient was again used to test this hypothesis (Table 6.17). 
The hypothesis supports the contention that the NPGS assists borrowers without 
sufficient collateral, implying that borrowers able to offer collateral would obtain 
conventional bank borrowing. The NPGS would be a genuine top-up facility for those 
borrowers without security or with insufficient security to cover their entire needs. 
This situation would be in line with the literature survey and the rationale for 
guarantee schemes. In the case of the NPGS, however, the banks tend to use personal 
security as evidence of commitment by the borrowers. The situation is also 
complicated by the existence of the BNM quotas. There was evidence from interviews 
with representatives of financial institutions that CGC loans are offered to pre-
selected customers until the quota is exhausted; in the majority of these cases, the 
facility would probably have been granted unsecured. In the face of these conflicting 
pressures, the hypothesis was put forward on only a tentative basis. However, the 
hypothesis was substantiated to a significant degree (p < .05, r = -.208, I-tailed). 
Table 6.17: Correlation between Security or Collateral and NPGS Loans 
NPGS Loan Security or collateral 
NPGS Loans 1.000 -.208* 
Security or Collateral -.208* 1.000 
'Correlation is significant at the .05 level (I.tailed) 
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ii. Supply Factors 
(Hypothesis 3 to 5 are covered in Chapter 7). 
Hypothesis 6: There will be a positive relationship between the availability of CGC 
support through finance companies and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
There is no significant association between the availability of CGC support through 
finance companies and the utilisation of NPGS loans (Table 6.18), Spearman's 
coefficient was r = .115 (p > .05). All licensed finance companies are now able to 
grant NPGS loans, and more than RM345 million or 16.7 percent of NPGS loans were 
granted by finance companies by 30th April 1998. However, the interest rate charged 
by finance companies is much higher than commercial banks. As discussed in Chapter 
4, S.4.3.2, finance companies are oriented towards consumer lending, principally hire 
purchase, housing loans and other consumer loans. The recent introduction of NPGS 
loans by finance companies means that many SMEs are not aware that CGC-backed 
facilities are available from this source. Despite the fact that access to finance, rather 
than its cost may be the principal problem for SMEs in Malaysia, the hypothesis has 
not been substantiated. 
Table 6.18: Correlation between Finance Companies and NPGS Loans 
NPGS Loan Finance Companies 
NPGS Loans 1.000 .115 
Finance Companies .115 1.000 
iii. Characteristics of the Firm 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a positive relationship between private limited 
company status and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
In order to determine whether or not there was a significant difference in the 
utilisation of NPGS loans between the three forms of legal structure (sole proprietors, 
partnerships and private limited companies), the Eta coefficient and ANOVA were 
used. 
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Table 6.19 reveals a strong positive relationship between private limited company 
status and the utilisation of NPGS loans, the Eta coefficient (r = .3lS). As discussed 
in S6.3.1, more than half (63 percent) of the funds advanced in NPGS loans was 
granted to limited companies, even though sole-proprietorships represented the largest 
(4S percent) number of recipient firms for NPGS loans. 
Table 6.19: Correlation between Private Limited Company and NPGS Loans 
NPGS Loan Private Limited Companies 
NPGS Loans 1.000 .315** 
Private Limited Companies .315** 1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (I-tailed) 
An ANOV A also provides evidence of significant differences in the utilisation of 
NPGS loans among the three groups. The overall F ratio of S.684 is significant at the 
.OOS level, implying that sole proprietorship, partnership and private limited 
companies utilise NPGS loans to different degrees (Table 6.20). 
Table 6.20: ANO V A Summary Table Legal Structure of Companies 
Group Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6385571450358.97 2 3192785725179.49 5.684 .005 
Within Groups 49988606660441.0 89 561669737757.765 
Total 56374178110800.0 91 
Group 
Private limited company 
Partnership 
Sole Proprietorship 
Count 
52 
15 
25 
Mean 
RM731,853.08 
RM210,333.33 
RMI94,600.00 
In addition, an LSD post hoc multiple comparisons procedure was used. The LSD 
procedure confirmed that private limited companies have a higher (p < .OS) utilisation 
rate for NPGS loans than partnerships and sole proprietorships (Table 6.21). (The 
average NPGS loan for private limited companies in the underlying population was 
RM386,844, with the averages for partnerships and sole proprietorships being 
RM171,887 and RM13S,342 respectively). As discussed in Chapter 2, private limited 
companies are more likely to rely upon bank finance (Storey, 1994), as limited 
liability status gives greater credibility to lenders/investors (Freedman and Godwin, 
1992; Boocock and Wahab, 1997). Therefore, the hypothesis has been substantiated. 
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Table 6.21: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans across Legal 
Structure of Companies 
Mean difference 
between groups (RM) 
Limited Companies 
Partnership 
Sole Proprietorship 
*p < .05 
Limited Companies Partnersbip Sole Proprietorship 
521,519.74* 537,253.08* 
15,733.33 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a positive relationship between manufacturing finns 
and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
In Table 6.22, the Eta coefficient reveals a moderate positive relationship between 
manufacturing firms and the utilisation of NPGS loans (r = .250). The literature 
review in Chapter 2 confirmed that banks generally prefer to lend on tangible, hard 
assets such as plant and equipment (Loscocco and Robinson, 1991) to counteract the 
problems associated with asymmetric information. Non-manufacturing sectors lack 
tangible assets; furthermore, the assets of service-sector firms tend to have low resale 
value in the event of bankruptcy, hence non-manufacturing firms often receive less 
favourable terms of credit than those in the manufacturing sector (Therrien et al., 
1986; Riding and Swift, 1990). Even though the NPGS is aimed at firms lacking 
collateral, and despite the fact that hypothesis 2 was substantiated, it is not unexpected 
that the above hypothesis has been substantiated. 
Table 6.22: Correlation between manufacturing firms and NPGS Loans 
NPGS Loan Mannfactnring Firms 
NPGS Loans 1.000 .250** 
Manufacturing Firms .250** 1.000 
"Correlation is significant at the .01 level (l.tailed) 
Manufacturing firms obtained NPGS loans of RM745,000 on average, higher than the 
average for agricultural firms (RM602,000) and general businesses (RM307,000). An 
ANOV A in Table 6.23 yielded a significant F ratio of 6.00, which confirmed a 
significant difference between groups in terms of their utilisation of NPGS (p < .05). 
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Table 6.23: ANOVA Summary Table of NPGS Loans across Business Activity 
Group Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3523117674958.73 1 3523117674958.7 6.000 .016 
Within Groups 52851060435841 90 587234004842.68 
Total 56374178110800.0 91 
Group 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 
General Business 
Count 
36 
7 
49 
Mean 
RM744,898.89 
RM602,830.00 
RM307,040.82 
The results illustrate that manufacturing firms obtain significantly larger NPGS loans 
than non-manufacturing firms. A follow-up LSD test indicated that manufacturing 
firms utilise significantly larger NPGS loans (p < .05) than general businesses, but 
there are no significant differences between the loan sizes of manufacturing and 
agricultural firms (Table 6.24). 
Table 6.24: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans across Business 
Activity 
Mean difference between groups Manufacturing Agriculture 
(RM) 
Manufacturing 142,756.03 
Agriculture 
General Business 
p<.OS 
General 
Business 
437,858.07* 
295,102.04 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a positive relationship between the size of firm and the 
utilisation of the NPGS. 
The Eta coefficient in Table 6.25 provides evidence of a strong positive relationship 
between the size of firm and the utilisation of NPGS loans (r = .508). Smaller firms 
command lower loans because they lack an established track record (Freer, 1985; 
Binks and Vale, 1990) and they have fewer assets which can be used as collateral 
(Binks, 1979; Bannock, 1981; Binks et aI., 1992). 
Table 6.25: Correlation between Size of Firm and NPGS Loans 
NPGSLoans 
Size of Firm 
NPGSLoan 
1.000 
.508** 
**Correlation is significant at the .OIlevel (I-tailed) 
Size of Firms 
.508** 
1.000 
Preliminary analysis was conducted to determine if there were significant differences 
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in utilisation between the size bands (1 to 9 employees versus 10 to 19 employees and 
so on) The ANOV A test (F (5,85) = 6.982, p < .05, refer to Table 6.26) did indicate 
significant differences in the utilisation among the six groups of firms. 
Table 6.26: ANOVA Summary Table of Size of Firms 
Sum of Squares df Mean Sqnare 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
10454066063715.32 5 2090813212743.06 
25455135965998.97 85 299472187835.28 
35909202029714.29 90 
Group 
50 and above (group 1) 
20 - 29 Employees (group 2) 
30 - 39 Employees (group 3) 
40 - 49 Employees (group 4) 
10 - 19 Employees (group 5) 
1 - 9 Employees (group 6) 
Count 
9 
9 
7 
5 
18 
43 
Mean 
RMl,338,555.56 
RM735,555.56 
RM592,480.00 
RM564,400.00 
RM293,888.89 
RM236,046.51 
F Sig. 
6.982 .001 
The LSD test was used to determine significant differences at the .05 level between 
the six groups (Table 6.27). Group 1 had significantly higher NPGS loans than all 
other groups (p < .05). Group 2 had also significantly higher NPGS loans than Group 
6 (p < .05). The average NPGS loan in the sample is RM500,830. 
The results clearly confirm that bigger firms command higher NPGS loans than 
smaller firms. These results are consistent with the findings of Binks et al., (1986) and 
Yoon (1988), and the inverse relationship between the size of firm and the existence 
of difficulty in obtaining larger loans is also observed in other studies (e.g. Chee, 
1986; Terpstra & Olson, 1993; Moore, 1994). Smaller firms face difficulties in raising 
larger loans because of insufficient assets to use as collateral (Bannock, 1981; Binks 
et al., 1992a). Although Hypothesis 2 indicated that NPGS-backed facilities did assist 
borrowers without sufficient collateral, and micro firms form the largest group by 
number in my sample, the hypothesis has been substantiated. 
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Table 6.27: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans across Firm Size 
Mean Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
difference 
between 
groups 
(RM) 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
*p < .05 
603,000* 746,075' 
143,076 
774,155* 
171,156 
28,080 
1,044,666* 
441,667 
298,591 
270,511 
1,102,509* 
499,509* 
356,433 
328,353 
57,842 
Hypothesis 10: There will be a positive relationship between the age of the firm and 
the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Younger SMEs with short track records appear to make less use of bank and 
institutional finance than established SMEs (Binks, 1979; Bannock, 1981; Oakey, 
1984; Kee et al., 1986; Petersen & Schulman, 1987, Van Auken & Doren, 1989; 
University of Cambridge, 1992). As elaborated in S6.3.1, the significant minority of 
the firms in the sample are young and small and therefore lack collateral or security. 
However, the Eta coefficient (Table 6.28) provides no real evidence of a positive 
relationship between age and the utilisation of NPGS loans. It would appear that some 
young firms can command large loans. Furthermore, some middle-aged firms in the 
sample would have been able to obtain conventional funding from financial 
institutions, thus they would require lower NPGS-backed loans. As a consequence, 
the hypothesis has not been substantiated (p > .10, r = .121). 
Table 6.28: Correlation between Age of Firms and NPGS Loan 
NPGS Loan Age of Firms 
NPGS Loan 1.000 .121 
Age of Firms .121 1.000 
The ANOV A test also indicated there was no significant difference between groups in 
term of age, F (3,88) = .433, p >.05 (Table 6.29). 
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Table 6.29: ANOV A Summary Table of Age of Firms 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
820827029935.95 3 273609009978.6 
55553351080864 88 631288080464.4 
56374178110800 91 
Group Count Mean 
15 years and above 16 RM667,500.00 
5 to 9 years 34 RM521,058.82 
10 to 14 years 18 RM475,742.22 
4 years and below 24 RM379,875.00 
F 
.433 
Hypothesis 11: There will be a positive relationship between the use of external 
advisers for fund raising and the utilisation of the NPGS 
Sig. 
.730 
On the basis of an Eta coefficient (Table 6.30), the results provide evidence of a 
strong positive relationship between the use of external advisers for fund raising and 
the utilisation of NPGS loans (r = .356, p < .01). This relationship is to be expected as 
most sample firms rely upon banks and relatives/friends for advice. From the 
literature review in Chapter 2, bank managers are an important source of financial 
advice for SMEs (Lovett, 1980; Smallbone et al., 1990 & 1993a; Curran and 
Blackburn, 1994). Such assistance commonly relates to advice on borrowing (Back, 
1977) and financial planning (Barclays, 1993; Smallbone et al., 1993b). As discussed 
in S6.3.1, SMEs tend to seek financial advice from banks because they cannot afford 
to buy in training or consultancy services (Wynant and Hatch, 1990). 
Table 6.30: Correlation between Use of External Advisers and NPGS Loans 
NPGSLoans 
Use of External Advisers 
NPGS Loan 
1.000 
.356** 
-*Correlation is significant at the .Ollevel (l-tailed) 
Use of External Advisers 
.356** 
1.000 
To examine the impact of differences in the use of advice from different external 
advisers, ANOV A analysis was conducted (Table 6.31). Significant differences were 
found, F(4,87) = 2.495, p < .05. 
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Table 6.31: ANOVA Summary Table of the Use of External Advisers for Fund 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
5800700187963.40 4 1450175046990.85 2.495 .049 
50573477922836.60 87 581304343940.65 
56374178110800.0 91 
Group Count Mean 
Bank manager & Relatives/friends(Group 3) 
None (Group 5) 
Bank manager (Group 2) 
Relatives/friends(Group 4) 
Accountants & chambers of commerce (Group 1) 
29 
19 
17 
17 
19 
RM853,896 
RM421,756 
RM411,765 
RM234,211 
RM231,250 
The external advisers were arranged in five groups, according to the frequency of use 
by borrowers. Comparisons of the groups were made using the LSD test, refer to 
Table 6.32. Group 3 was significantly different from Groups 4 and 1 (p < .05). Large 
loans are thus taken out by borrowers who use bankers and relatives/friends as the 
principal source of financial advice, rather than those depending only on one source, 
or accountants and chambers of commerce. This suggests that, for example, a 
borrower having difficulty in getting an NPGS loan from his bank might seek advice 
from a friend who would introduce the borrower to his own bank. The introduction 
from a respected referee might help to alleviate asymmetric information. Accountants 
and the chambers of commerce were rarely used as a source of advice. Boocock and 
Wahab (1997) found that the role of accountants in Malaysia was restricted to the 
preparation of financial statements for LSEs. Overall, however, the hypothesis has 
been substantiated. 
Table 6.32: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans across Use of 
External Advisers for Fund Raising 
Mean difference Group 3 Group S Group 2 Group 4 Group 1 
between groups (RM) 
Group 3 
GroupS 
Group 2 
Group 4 
Group 1 
*p <.05 
432,141 442,132 
9,991 
619,686* 
187,545 
177,554 
622,647* 
190,506 
180,515 
2,961 
Hypothesis 12: There will be a positive relationship between the existence of a 
written business plan and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
ANOV A (Table 6.33) provides evidence of a moderate positive relationship between 
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the existence of written business plans and the utilisation of NPGS loans. Hypotheses 
11 and 12 are both associated with a professional and informed approach to fund 
raising. Loan applications are rarely considered without a well-formulated and well-
presented business plan (Deakins and Hussein, 1991; Berry et al., 1993; Carty, 1994). 
Of those borrowers who had prepared business plans, nearly two-thirds (64 percent) 
were Bumiputeras and 82 percent of that sub-group had undergone entrepreneurship 
training programmes organised by Government agencies. There is clearly strong 
evidence to suggest that assisting borrowers to prepare business plans helps them to 
obtain CGC-backed loans. Therefore, the hypothesis has been substantiated (F(I,90) 
= 6.810, P < .05). 
Table 6.33: ANOV A for Comparisons of Means for Business Plan 
Existence of a Written Business Plan 
Yes No 
Number 55 37 
Mean 671,115.64 247,702.70 
Standard deviation 965,502.03 239,799.09 
Source 
Between group 
Within grOUPS 
Sum of Squares 
396556274917.5 
52408615363882.5 
iv. Characteristics of the OM 
df 
1 
90 
Mean Square 
3965562746917.5 
582317948487.5 
F 
6.810 
Sig 
.011 
Hypothesis 13: There will be a positive relationship between male OMs and the 
utilisation of the NPGS 
In Table 6.34, an ANOV A displays no real evidence of a positive relationship 
between the gender of OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS (F(l,90) = .216, P > .05). 
Cole & Wolken (1995) state that SMEs run by women are less likely to use banks as a 
source of capital than businesses owned by men. As revealed in S6.3.2, SMEs may be 
less attractive to banks and other potential creditors because women-run firms are 
small and viewed as being more risky (Capital, Credit and Financing, 1996). 
Moreover, lenders may not discriminate against women on the basis of gender, but on 
the basis of firm size, preferring to lend to larger and more established firms 
(Coieman, 1998). Female OMs tend to be more heavily concentrated in service 
businesses, which may not have assets that can be used as collateral (Riding & Swift, 
1990; Coleman & Carsky, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). In the face of these arguments, and 
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the prevailing culture in Malaysia, it is surprising that the hypothesis has not been 
substantiated. It appears that, although there are few women OMs in my sample, there 
is no gender difference between the size of loans granted. 
Table 6.34: ANOV A for Comparisons of Means for Gender 
Number 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Source Sum of Squares df 
Male 
83 
513,450.12 
806,381.76 
Gender 
Mean Square 
Between group 135129575478.98 1 135129575479.0 
Within groups 56239048535321 90 624878317059.1 
Female 
9 
384,444.44 
603,989.05 
F Sig 
.216 .643 
Hypothesis 14: There will be a positive relationship between Bumiputera 
OMs and the utilisation o/the NPGS. 
The Eta coefficient in Table 6.35 shows no real evidence of a relationship between 
Bumiputera OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS loans (r= .140,p > .05). 
Table 6.35: Correlation between Bumiputera OMs and NPGS loans 
NPGS Loan Bumiputera OMs 
NPGS Loans 1.000 .140 
Bumiputera OMs .140 1.000 
As elaborated in S6.3.2, the NPGS guidelines or quotas issued by BNM favour 
Bumiputera SMEs, as part of a general policy of assisting this part of the community. 
Further analysis using ANOV A (Table 6.36) reveals no significant differences among 
the three ethnic groups (F(2,89) = .888, p > .05) in the statistical relationships. As 
discussed in Section 6.3, Bumiputera borrowers account for only 28.9 percent and 
25.9 percent of all NPGS loans in the underlying population, in terms of number and 
value respectively (CGC, 1977). The host of small loans granted to Bumiputera OMs 
are underpresented in my sample, as are loans to non-Bumiputera borrowers. Despite 
the inclusion of many large loans to the Bumiputera business community, the 
hypothesis has not been substantiated. 
178 
The NPGS Questionnaire Survey: Results & Analysis 
Table 6.36: ANOV A Summary Table of NPGS Loans across Ethnic Groups 
Group Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1102592901791.71 2 551296450895.86 .888 .415 
Within Groups 55271585209008.30 89 621029047292.23 
Total 56374178110800.00 91 
Group 
Bumiputera 
Chinese 
Indian and Others 
Count 
49 
33 
10 
Mean 
RM599,374.69 
RM412,939.39 
RM308,000.00 
Hypothesis 15: There will be a positive relationship between the age of the 
OM and the utilisation of the NPGS 
ANOV A in Table 6.37 provides some evidence of a positive relationship between the 
age of the OM and the utilisation of NPGS loans (F(2,89) = 2.757, P < 0.1 0). 
Table 6.37: ANOVA Summary Table of Age of OM 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
3288684616440.0 2 1644342308220.0 
53085493494360.0 89 596466219037.75 
56374178110800.0 91 
Group 
40-49 (Group 2) 
20-39 (Group 1) 
50 and above (Group 3) 
Count 
40 
41 
11 
Mean 
RM716,109 
RM342,OOO 
RM310,000 
F Sig. 
2.757 .069 
The LSD test (Table 6.38) indicates a significant difference between Group 2 (40 to 
49 years) and Group I (20 to 39 years). This finding is consistent with Cressy (1993) 
in that middle-aged OMs are more likely to own assets and therefore have more 
security/collateral. There was no significant difference between Group 2 (40 to 49 
years) and Group 3 (50 and above). This may imply that Group 3 OMs have fewer 
problems in raising finance, since older OMs might have more assets/resources to 
introduce into the business (Boocock and Wahab, 1997). Younger OMs are more 
likely to face difficulties in raising finance. However, the overall evidence from the 
questionnaire responses on this issue is not strong, hence the hypothesis has not been 
substantiated 
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Table 6.38: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans across Different Age 
Groups of OMs 
Mean difference 
between groups (RM) 
*p < .05 
Group 2 
Group 1 
Group 3 
Group 2 Group 1 
374,109* 
Group 3 
406,109 
32,000 
Hypothesis 16: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of technical 
training undertaken and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Loans are higher on average for firms where the OM has had some technical training 
but the ANOV A test (Table 6.39) provides insufficient evidence of a positive 
relationship. As discussed in 56.3.2, one third of respondents (35.9 percent) had 
undergone some technical training mainly 'on the job training' with their former 
employers. However, the need for training far exceeds the capacity of existing 
government institutions to supply training (ADB, 1990), hence many potential OMs 
do not have the opportunity to participate in training programmes when in 
employment. In the face of this shortfall, the hypothesis has not been substantiated (F 
(1,90) = .956, p > .05). 
Table 6.39: ANOV A for Comparisons of Means for Technical Training of 
OM 
Number 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Technical Training 
Yes No 
33 59 
608,151.52 440,802.71 
1,053,421.33 591,188.25 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between group 592684419520.65 1 
Within grOUpS 56374178110800.0 90 
592684195209.7 
619794376839.9 
.956 .331 
Hypothesis 17: There will be a positive relationship between the amount of EMT and 
the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Once again, the Eta test (Table 6.40) provides evidence of only a moderately positive 
relationship between the amount of EMT and the utilisation of NPG5 loans (r = .338). 
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Table 6.40: Correlation between Amount of EMT and NPGS Loans 
NPGSloans 
EMT 
NPGS Loans EMT 
1.000 .338 
.338 1.000 
Further analysis performed by ANOVA shows no significant differences stemming 
from different types ofEMT or, indeed, no training at all (Table 6.41). Therefore, the 
hypothesis has not been substantiated (F(5,86) '" 1.486, p > .05). 
Table 6.41: ANOV A Summary Table of Amount of EMT 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
4483361602295.5 5 896672320459.1 
51890816508504.5 86 594103805136.4 
56374178110800.0 91 
Group 
MEDEC (group 4) 
Others (1) 
MARA (group 2) 
None (group 6) 
NPC (group 5) 
MARA,MEDEC,NPC (group 3) 
Count 
7 
13 
13 
47 
7 
5 
Mean 
RMl,123,337 
RM675,385 
RM616,462 
RM380,830 
RM314,286 
RM264,OOO 
F Sig. 
1.486 .203 
Even though ANOV A failed to determine a significance difference among the groups, 
the LSD test (Table 6.42) reveals that OMs attending EMT programmes organised by 
MEDEC (Group 4) had a higher utilisation of NPGS loans than those not attending 
any training programmes (Group 6). There were no significant differences among the 
other groups. 
Hypotheses 12 and 17 explore the relationship between the preparation of business 
plans and attendance at EMT and the utilisation of NPGS loans. Bumiputera OMs 
attending EMT organised by MEDEC (the EMT provider for Bumiputera OMs) are 
taught to prepare business plans and this might help to explain lender willingness to 
provide NPGS loans. The MEDEC programmes focus on the development of business 
plans, obtaining sources of finance, assessment of the viability of business 
propositions, company formation and basic management skills. The current survey is 
consistent with Boocock and Wahab (1997), who found that "EMT was significantly 
associated with the utilisation of government-backed schemes; this was not surprising 
as most training programmes are organised through government agencies". 
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Furthermore, Moha Asri (1999) stated that EMT provided by government agencies 
(MARA and NPC) is sometimes considered as a basic requirement by commercial 
banks and development financial institutions for approving loans to Bumiputera 
borrowers (MARA and NPC collaborate with these financial institutions in linking 
EMT and financial assistance). 
The CGC does not have similar collaboration with financial institutions, hence the 
approval of NPGS loans does not depend on prior EMT. The questionnaire data 
therefore suggest that Bumiputera OMs who undertake EMT might extend their range 
of choice when they approach external financiers, but there is no clear cut relationship 
overall between EMT and NPGS utilisation. 
Table 6.42: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans Across 
EMT 
Mean 
difference 
between 
groups (RM) 
Gronp 4 Group 1 Group 2 Group 6 Group S Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 6 
GroupS 
Group 3 
*p < .05 
447,953 506,876 
58,923 
742,508* 
294,555 
235,632 
809,051 
361,099 
302,176 
66,544 
859,337 
411,385 
352,462 
116,830 
50,286 
Hypothesis 18: There will be a positive relationship between higher levels of 
Formal Education ofOMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
The Eta coefficient in Table 6.43 provides evidence of a moderate positive 
relationship between higher levels of education and utilisation of NPGS loans (r = 
.325). 
Table 6.43: Correlation between Level of Education and NPGS Loan 
NPGS Loan Level of Education 
NPGS Loan 1.000 .325* 
Level of Education .325* 1.000 
·Correlation is significant at the .05 level (l·tailed) 
Education, general and managerial, is regarded both by lenders as critically important 
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when evaluating companies (Brophy, 1989; Berry et al., 1993). Notwithstanding this 
assertion, ANOV A fails to find sufficient evidence of significance differences 
between the three groups Quniorlhigh school, college and university), see Table 6.44. 
NPGS-backed facilities appear to be utilised, irrespective the OMs level of academic 
education. Fong (1990) highlighted that 56 percent of the technical skills acquired by 
OMs were job-related, compared to 13 percent through formal education. Likewise, 
44 percent of OMs learned their management and administrative skills from their jobs 
compared to 17 percent through formal education. 
Table 6.44: ANOV A Summary Table of Higher Levels of Education 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
1619097974617.51 2 
34290104055096.78 88 
35909202029714.29 90 
809548987308.76 
389660273353.37 
Group 
University degree (group 3) 
College Diploma (group 2) 
Junior and high school (Group 1) 
Count 
31 
20 
40 
2.078 .131 
Mean 
RM624,270 
RM446,500 
RM319,850 
Despite the importance of on the job training, further analysis by the LSD test 
revealed a significant difference between Group 3 and Group 1. This indicates that 
borrowers with a university degree obtain larger NPGS loans than those with a lower 
level of education. There was no significant difference between Groups 3 and 2 
(Table 6.45). 
Table 6.45: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loans Across 
Higher Levels of Education 
Mean difference between groups (RM) 
*p < .05 
Group 3 
Group 2 
Group 1 
Group 3 Group 2 
177,770 
Group 1 
304,420' 
126,650 
Overall, however, the hypothesis has not been substantiated (F (2,88) = 2.078, p > 
.05). 
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Hypothesis 19: There will be a positive relationship between previous business 
experience and the utilisation of the NPGS. 
Table 6.46 uses the Eta coefficient to measure the relationship between previous 
business experience and the utilisation of the NPGS. The results indicate only a 
modest positive correlation (r = .301). 
Table 6.46: Correlation between Previous Business Experience and NPGS Loan 
NPGS Loan Previous Business Experience 
NPGS Loan 1.000 .301 
Previous Business experience .301 1.000 
Berry et at. (1993) found that lenders associate past experience with the skills 
required to start a new business, thereby helping to avoid problems of adverse 
selection. However, ANOV A (Table 6.47) could not provide evidence of significant 
differences among the groups (F (5,86) = 1.721, p > .05). 
Table 6.47: ANOVA Summary Table of Previous Business experience 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5127206730883.98 5 1025441346176.797 1.721 .138 
Within Groups 51246971379916.0 86 595895016045.535 
Total 56374178110800.00 91 
Group 
13 to 15 years (Group 5) 
16 years or more (Group 6) 
4 to 6 years (Group 2) 
7 to 9 years (Group 3) 
1 to 3 years (Group 1) 
10 to 12 years (Group 4) 
Count 
9 
17 
26 
13 
17 
10 
Mean 
RMl,126,667 
RM560,000 
RM506,115 
RM440,923 
RM338,353 
RMI77,336 
The LSD test (Table 6.48) indicates significant differences between Group 5 (13 years 
to 15 years) and all other groups except Group 6 (16 years or more). These findings 
reveal that borrowers having more experience make greater utilisation of NPGS loans. 
They are probably more aware of the existence of the NPGS loans. However, there is 
not a linear relationship between age and size of loans. For example, some younger 
borrowers, obtain large loans, and some middle-aged OMs are able to obtain funding 
from other sources hence they have lower NPGS loans. Overall, therefore, the 
hypothesis has not been substantiated. 
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Table 6.48: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons of NPGS Loan Across 
Business Experience 
Mean difference Group 5 Group 6 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 4 
between groups 
(RM) 
GroupS 
Gronp6 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 1 
Group 4 
*p < .05 
566,667 
6.4.2 Summary of the Results 
620,551 " 
53,885 
685,744" 
119,077 
65,192 
788,313" 
219,250 
165,365 
100,173 
A summary of the results is shown in Table 6.49 below. 
T bl 6 49 T t f H th a e . . es so lypO eses . 
Independent Variables 
Demand Factors 
cost ofloan 
amount of security or collateral 
Supply Factors 
support from finance companies 
Characteristics of Recipient firms 
legal structure of business 
manufacturing firm 
size of firm 
age of firm 
use of external adviser for fund raising 
existence of business plan 
Characteristics of OMs 
gender 
ethnic 
age 
formal technical training 
formal EMT 
formal education 
business experience 
* 
** 
SIgnificant at 0.05 SIgnificance level, a ]·tOlled test 
Significant at 0.0] significance level, a ]·tailed test 
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not substantiated 
substantiated" 
not substantiated 
substantiated"" 
substantiated"" 
substantiated"" 
not substantiated 
substantiated" 
substautiated' • 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
949,331 " 
382,664 
328,779 
263,587 
163,414 
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None of the characteristics of OM (i.e. gender, ethnic group, age, formal technical 
training and EMT, formal education and business experience) were able to explain the 
utilisation of the NPGS. My findings thus do not support the conclusions found in the 
existing literature. 
The anomalies could perhaps be explained by some elements of the prevailing culture 
in Malaysia, or perhaps by some characteristics of my sample. For example: women 
tend to be relegated to a minor role in the business community, yet there was no 
significant difference in the size of loans granted to men and women; the training and 
education findings were all broadly in line with the literature, yet the statistical 
relationships were not strong enough to substantiate any of the hypotheses; the 
relationship between age and utilisation is complicated by the influence of the 
availability of assets as security. 
The most striking anomaly perhaps relates to the lack of a significant difference 
between loans of different ethnic communities despite the fact that the respondents 
were mostly Bumiputeras with large loans. Again, the relationship was not strong 
enough to justify the hypothesis 
6.5 FACTOR ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter 5, S.5.7.3, factor analysis was used to discover whether a 
small number of components or underlying factors accounted for most of the variance 
in the explanatory variables. In other words, to discover whether the explanatory 
variables could sensibly be grouped together to form 'themes' or 'factors'. The 
method used was based on the principal components method or component analysis. 
Hair et al. (1995) emphasised that 
The component factor model is appropriate when the analyst is primarily concerned 
about prediction or the minimum number of factors needed to account for the 
maximum portion of the variance represented in the original set of variables, and 
when the factor analyst has prior knowledge suggesting that specific and error 
variance represent a relatively small proportion of the total variance. 
For component analysis, the figure placed in the diagonal of the correlation matrix is 
186 
The NPGS Questionnaire Survey: Results & Analysis 
equal to unity. In doing this, it is assumed that the communalities are equal to 1.0, i.e., 
all of the variance is common. A varimax rotation was carried out to simplify the 
factor structure. Eleven variables were used and most of these were measured using a 
Likert scale. 
In testing whether component analysis (hereafter refer to factor analysis) was 
appropriate for summarising the underlying factors (demand and supply factors, and 
characteristics of firms and OMs/OMs), the computation of correlation matrix was 
carried out on these eleven variables. These variables must be related to each other for 
the factor model to be appropriate. If visual inspection reveals no substantial number 
of correlations greater than 0.3, then factor analysis is probably inappropriate (Hair et 
al., 1995). As discussed in Chapter 5, S.5.7.3, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and 
Bartlett tests were used to summarise the entire correlation matrix. The results are 
reproduced in Table 6.50. 
Table 6.50: KMO and Bartlett Test results for the Utilisation of NPGS Loans 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .62449 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 196.38667, Significance = .00000 
From Table 6.50, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value for the utilisation of NPGS was 
.62449, indicating that the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis is 'mediocre' 
(Kaiser, 1974). The data was therefore barely adequate for use in factor analysis. Of 
the 11 variables, the factor analysis extracted four factors or components which 
explained 62.5 percent of the variance, as shown in Table 6.51. Four components 
were chosen because they had eigenvalues greater than 1.0, i.e., greater than the 
variance contributed by anyone variable. 
Table 6.51: Component with Eil!;envalue Greater than One 
FACTOR EIGENVALUE PCT.ORVAR CUM.VAR. 
1 2.29008 20.8 20.8 
2 2.23304 20.3 41.1 
3 1.28675 11.7 52.8 
4 1.00671 9.7 62.5 
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The loadings on first four components after rotation are shown in Table 6.52 below. 
Table 6.52: Loadings on the Final Four Components using Varimax Rotation 
Rate of interest 
Low principal payment 
No Collateral/Security 
Turnover 
Size 
Academic Qualification 
No alternative/choice 
Finance Companies 
Commercial Bank 
Net Profit Margin 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
.85861 
.77775 
.68704 
.75030 
.69923 
.58954 
(.54241) 
.83645 
.82017 
(.75764) 
One variable (State) is omitted from Table 6.52 because all factor loadings are above 
0.5. The task was to identify the four components. Factor 1 focuses on the 'demand 
side' of the NPGS, and it has most to do with the cost (interest rate) and 
collateral/security requirements by financial institutions. Studies conducted by 
Kanbur et al. (1995) and Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996) also found cost (interest 
rate) and collateral/security factors had a negative relationship on the utilisation of 
NPGS loans. The 'low principal payment' factor is excluded from the analysis because 
it is included in the cost (interest rate) charged by financial institutions. 
Factor 2 centres on the characteristics of the firms and OMs. 'No alternative/other 
choice' shows a strong negative association with size of firm, indicating that small 
firms which lack collateral/security might have to resort to NPGS loans, despite the 
pecking order theory. This confirms Hypotheses 2 above. However, this factor was 
not associated with the utilisation of NPGS loans. 
Factor 3 reflects the supply of NPGS loans - the availability of CGC support through 
the commercial banks and finance companies. 
Finally, Factor 4 relates to net profit margin, a factor separate from the other 
variables. Once again this factor was not found to be associated with the utilisation of 
the NPGS. (Net profit margin is discussed in relation to economic additionality 
Chapter 7.) 
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This component analysis was rotated using V ARIMAX rotation, in an attempt to 
identify separate or distinct factors. The result of this factor analysis has, according to 
Hair et aI. (1995), helped "to summarise the information contained in a number of 
original variables into a smaller set of new, composite dimensions or variates (factors) 
with a minimum loss of information, that is, to search for and define the fundamental 
constructs or dimensions assumed to underlie the original variables." My preliminary 
results on the factor analysis indicated that the four factors or components explain 
62.5 percent of the overall variance on the utilisation of the NPGS loans. This figure 
is considered 'mediocre' but the data were adequate to address certain critical 
research questions. 
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has analysed the data derived from the questionnaire survey, in particular 
it related the fout main independent groups of factors or variables to the utilisation of 
NPGS loans (dependent variable). 
The SPSS 'Frequencies' procedure was used to summarise the characteristics of firms 
and OMs, as well as finance and economic additionality. The statistical procedures 
outlined in Chapter 5 were then used to test the hypotheses, i.e., the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables. Ten of the sixteen hypotheses were 
rejected. 
The independent variables that did have a significant relationship with utilisation 
were the amount of security or collateral, limited company status, manufacturing 
sector, size of firm, use of external advisers for fund raising, and the existence of a 
written business plan. 
There was anecdotal evidence from interviews with representatives of financial 
institutions that CGC loans are offered to pre-selected customers until quotas are 
exhausted but questionnaire responses suggested that NPGS loans do help borrowers 
lacking collateral. Limited companies are more likely to rely upon NPGS loans since 
their status gives credibility to lenders. Furthermore, they are less constrained by the 
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availability of collateral as compared to unincorporated firms in obtaining finance. 
Banks generally prefer to lend to manufacturing firms that have hard assets such as 
plant and equipment. The study also indicated that smaller firms are more dependent 
upon personal resources than larger firms (confirming the 'pecking order hypothesis). 
Firms using external advisers utilise NPGS loans to a greater extent. Finally, small 
firms with realistic and workable business plans increase their chances of obtaining 
NPGS loans. 
Factor analysis was used to identify the relationships among the 11 independent 
variables and estimate the underlying factors and the contributions of each variable to 
the factors (termed loading). The preliminary results show that four factors or 
components explain 62.5 percent of the overall variance. The data were adequate to 
address certain critical research questions. 
Chapter 7 will discuss finance and economic additionality and the cost of the NPGS to 
the Treasury. These are critical components in the effectiveness of the NPGS. The 
questionnaire responses will be used to support the case study analysis, where 
appropriate. 
1. The old values of the variables were transformed into new values in the variables using the 'Recode 
Into Different Variable' procedure in the 'Transform' menu of SPSS for MS Windows. The old values 
of the variables will be retained and used infuture research. 
2. The findings of a major evaluation of the LGS in the UK (KPMG, 1999) only came to my attention 
after completion of my literature review and empirical survey 
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CASE STUDIES: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter analysed the data derived from the questionnaire study, focusing 
on the utilisation of the NPGS. The questionnaires provide quantitative data on the 
demand and supply factors, and the characteristics of the firms and OMs. This chapter 
concentrates not on utilisation, but on the effectiveness of the NPGS. As a first step, it 
assesses finance and economic additionality from the case studies, based on 
interviews with firms and their financial institutions, as well as key informants. (Full 
information on all fifteen case study firms is presented in Appendix 7.1). It was 
recognised that the level of finance and economic additionality could not be easily 
assessed using questionnaires. In-depth interviews provided the researcher with 
invaluable information on whether the NPGS provided a source of funds which would 
not otherwise have been available, or which would have been available only at a later 
date. The net cost is another element of the effectiveness of the NPGS. The researcher 
could have relied solely upon secondary data to investigate the net cost of the 
Scheme, but interviews with key informants yielded much important information. The 
informants also helped the researcher to understand the rationale of, for example, 
targeting loans to priority sectors, and gave the researcher an opportunity to explore 
ways in which the effectiveness of the NPGS could be enhanced. 
7.2 FINANCE ADDITIONALITY 
As discussed in Chapter 3, S.3.3.4, the effectiveness of any loan guarantee scheme 
can be enhanced by increasing finance and economic additionality, and reducing 
displacement (Pieda, 1992). In reality, these outcomes are difficult to achieve. There 
tends to be a specified level of securityfcollateral required by financial institutions 
from borrowers, to reduce the incidence of defaults. Consequently, finance 
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additionality is reduced by denying finance to owners lacking security (Boocock and 
Mohd Shariff, 1996). An equilibrium is sought, whereby the incidence of default is 
minimised, without jeopardising finance and economic additionality. 
These case studies are primarily concerned with establishing the level of finance 
additionality generated by the NPGS. In-depth interviews with fifteen firms and their 
financial institutions identified how much the NPGS loan formed as part of the total 
financial package made available, and enabled the researcher to estimate how much 
the financial institutions would have been able to lend in the absence of the NPGS. 
This research methodology has not previously been adopted in Malaysia (except in 
Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996) or in other developing countries. It is extremely 
labour intensive, but offers the chance to assess the operation of the Scheme in a far 
more rigorous way than relying upon questionnaire data. 
There are statistical tools, for example NUDIST, that analyse the qualitative aspects 
of interviews. However, it was relatively straightforward to assess finance and 
economic additionality by summarising the themes explored in a semi-structured 
checklist of questions. It was not therefore considered necessary to utilise computer 
software in this instance. 
7.2.1 Calculation o/Finance Additionality 
This sub-section attempts to assess finance additionality at the micro level. A series of 
questions, based on Figure 7.1, attempted to establish whether the case study firms 
provide additional or non-additional (zero additionality). In some cases, the level of 
finance additionaIity could only be classed as doubtful! 
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Fi ure 7.1: Assessment of Additionalit (Cases with Borrower and Lender Data) 
N. 
Firm's Abillly to Raise 
Non-NPGS Finance 
Q.25 with Lender 
N. 
Could Firm Have Raised 
Non-NPGS Finance? 
Q.15 with Borrower 
N. 
Did Firm Have 'Free' 
Assets After Borrowing? 
Q.30 with Borrower 
Firm's Ability to Raise "'-'N.c.---' __ -'Y"-":......., 
Non-NPGS Finance I .... 
Q.25 with Lender 
N. 
Yes No 
Adapted and modified from Pieda (1992) 
Three critical questions on the checklists used in the semi-structured interviews were 
used to gauge finance additionality. Question 25 for the borrowers (refer to Appendix 
5.2) asked what alternatives were available if the application for the NPGS loan had 
not been approved, or if the NPGS facility had not existed. A follow-up Question 30 
asked the borrowers whether they had free assets which could have been used to raise, 
for example, a conventional bank loan. Finally, Question 25 for the lenders (refer to 
Appendix 5.3) asked their views on the ability of firms to raise non-NPGS finance. 
The responses to these questions provided a rich source of data, summarised in Table 
7.1. 
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T bl 71Th NPGS F' Add' . r (IIti RM h ) a e . : e . mance ItlOna Ity a 19ures: t ousands . 
Firm' Fuuding Package from Financial Institutions FIs and others' Est. Add' 
and others maxamt Amount(%) 
FIs & others NPGS loan Total 
A 0 1,680 1,680 900 780(46) 
B 0 2,650 2,650 2,650 0(0) 
C 70 30 100 100 0(0) 
C 0 100 100 87 13(13) 
D 0 250 250 100 150(60) 
E 0 1,400 1,400 600 800(57) 
F 0 2,500 2,500 1,250 1,250(501 
G 0 67 67 67 0(0) 
H 0 130 130 100 30(23) 
I 0 500 500 100 400(80) 
J 170 100 270 170 100(37) 
K 0 240 240 100 140(58) 
L 0 180 180 110 70(39) 
M 0 80 80 40 40(50) 
N 0 212 212 138 74(35) 
0 0 250 250 165 85(34) 
All 240 10,369 10,609 6,677 3,932(37) 
Notes: 
I, The sixteen rows show the calculations for the 15 firms in the case studies, Firm C had gained NPGS 
backing from two financial institutions, 
2. Financial institutions and others including government bodies = an estimate of the maximum amount 
available of credit from financial institutions and others, if the NPGS had not existed. 
3. Est. Add. = the estimated level of finance additionality, after taking account the amount that the 
financial institutions and others could have advanced. 
Source: Mohd Shariff and Boocock, 1999. 
Three examples are now worked through, to illustrate how finance additionality was 
calculated. 
Firm A (Additional) 
In 1990, Firm A requested a RM1.3 million loan from Bank M. This was rejected. At 
that time, Firm A was a manufacturing company with no track record and insufficient 
security/collateral. The security/collateral available at the time of the NPGS 
application consisted of property (approximate value, RM 1.0 million), a debenture 
over fixed and floating assets, and joint and several guarantees from the Directors. In 
March 1995, Firm A was given a NPGS loan of RM1.68 million. Bank A chose the 
NPGS loan to enhance its inadequate security position. In the absence of the 
NPGS, the firm would have been unlikely to raise the full amount of the required 
loan. Bank A stated: 
Compared to the original request of RMl.3 million, a lower amount of RM900,OOO 
would have been advanced with the security (excluding CGC guarantee) and terms 
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and conditions remaining more or less the same. 
Bank A would have been able to lend RMO.9 million if NPGS support had not been 
available. There were insufficient alternative sources of finance available to Firm 
A, hence the finance additionaIity provided by the NPGS was 46 percent. 
Two more non-NPGS loans, amounting in total to RM5.646 million, were granted in 
June and October 1996, to provide for additional working capital and for investment 
in productive capacity. Bank A provided these conventional loans because of Firm's 
A experienced management team, product innovation, marketable products, skilled 
workforce and optimal production capacity. 
Firm B (Zero Additionalityl 
At the time of its application for the NPGS loan of RM500,OOO, Firm B could have 
approached other government agencies such as MARA (Council for Indigenous 
Peoples), PUNB (National Entrepreneurs Investment Berhad) and Bank 
Pembangunan dan Infrastruktur Malaysia Berhad (Malaysian Development and 
Infrastructure Bank Berhad). PUNB already had an interest in the firm (holding 28.6 
percent of the shares). Bank B could have advanced a conventional loan, albeit at a 
higher interest rate, as it felt that Firm B was a well-managed company with a sound 
track record and prospects, despite the fact that the existing collateral (a debenture 
covering the fixed and floating assets of the firm and a guarantee from the directors) 
was insufficient. However, Bank B directed Firm B to the NPGS because the 
borrowing would be marginally cheaper. The NPGS-backed facilities were project-
linked, and the CGC guarantee was released upon completion of the project. 
Finn C (Doubtful AdditionaJity) 
The OM had previously requested a RMI0,OOO loan from various financial 
institutions but his application was rejected. In July 1994, the OM approached Bank C 
and applied for a RM30,OOO loan. His application was granted under the Block 
Guarantee Scheme of the NPGS. He also received a RM70,OOO loan from a 
govemment agency (MARA) to purchase optometry equipment. The MARA interest 
rate was subsidised and much cheaper than conventional loan rates, as part of a 
Govemment effort to help Bumiputera OMs to purchase fixed assets. 
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Firm C was asked whether it would have been able to get a conventional loan in the 
absence of the NPGS. Firm C felt that it would not have been able to borrow from 
financial institutions. However, Bank C stated that it might have granted a non-NPGS 
loan to Firm C at a higher interest rate. This would imply zero additionality but the 
precise figure was difficult to establish. 
A second NPGS loan of RM 100,000 was later sanctioned by a different bank. 
7.2.2. Finance Additionality as a Measure of Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the NPGS depends upon achieving a high level of finance 
additionality, as discussed in Chapter 4, S.4.4.3. 
Table 7.1 shows that three firms experienced zero additionality. Twelve firms 
experienced some degree of finance additionality, the highest being Firm I (80 
percent) and the lowest Firm C (13 percent). The total finance additionality for this 
sample was 37 percent. Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996), in their pilot study of the 
old PGS in the states of Kedah and Penang, found that 63 per cent of the finance 
provided was additional. However, they estimated that the overall finance 
additionality for the same sample, taking into account funds available from non-
financial institutions, would have fallen below 50 percent. Studies conducted by 
NERA (1990) and Pieda (1992) on the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme, showed finance 
additionality of 48 percent and 68 percent respectively. The low level of finance 
additionality for the Malaysian studies stems from the ability of case study firms to 
obtain finance from internal sources, their present banks and, especially, from other 
financial institutions (both public and private). 
The need to provide some security/collateral in support of NPGS borrowing was 
another reason for the low finance additionality in my case studies; banks frequently 
switched to the NPGS to bolster a marginal collateral position. Table 7.2 below shows 
that all but one of my case study firms had to provide some sort of security/guarantee 
in order to obtain their NPGS loans. The most common types of collateral were 
mortgages on property (35 percent), fixed deposits (25 percent) and personal 
guarantees/other guarantees (20 percent). Some firms provided more than one form of 
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security. The OM of Firm G commented that: 
NPGS loans without any collateral are not possible to my knowledge. 
These comments confirm the findings of Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1994) who 
found that 93.8 percent of old PGS borrowers had given some form of collateral. 
Table 7.2: Type of Security/Guarantees Required for NPGS Borrowing (Case 
Studies) 
Number of res onses Percent 
7 35.0 
5 25.0 
arantors 4 20.0 
Debentures 2 10.0 
Mutual shares 1 5.0 
Unsecured 1 5.0 
Number of Responses = 20 
The researcher then tried to compare the findings from the case studies with results 
obtained from the questionnaire survey. Both sources of data identified the need for 
borrowers to provide some sort of security/guarantee. Table 7.3(a) below illustrates 
that a clear majority of borrowers (80.4 percent) in the questionnaire survey had to 
provide security in order to obtain their NPGS loan. Only 19.6 percent of the 
borrowers did not have to provide any collateral. 
In contrast to the case studies, Table 7.3(b) below shows that the most common types 
of collateral given in the questionnaire survey were personal guarantees/other 
guarantors (42 percent), fixed deposits (31.8 percent) and mortgages on property (26.1 
percent). Again some respondents provided more than one type of collateral 
Table 7.3(a): Sort of Security/Guarantees Required for NPGS Borrowing 
(Questionnaire Surve ) 
Security/guarantees needed for NPGS Loans 
Unsecured 
Secured 
Total Res ondents 
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Number of 
res onses 
18 
74 
92 
Percent 
19.6 
80.4 
100.0 
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Table 7,3(b): Type of Security/Guarantees Required for NPGS Borrowing 
( , S QuestionnaIre urvey) 
Tvne of securltyllluarantees Number of responses Percent 
Personal guarantees/other guarantors 37 42.0 
Fixed deposits 28 31.8 
Mortl!al!e on nronerties 23 26.1 
Number of Responses = 88 
Table 7.4 below uses the questionnaire data to show the ability of firms to raise 
finance in the absence of the NPGS. It should be noted that the data in Table 7.4 is 
based on the number of firms, not the value of loans. Nearly 54.4 percent of the firms 
experienced some degree of finance additionality (38.0 percent stated that they 
could not have raised the finance, 16.4 percent stated they would have raised less). 
These figures of 38.0 percent and 16.4 percent represent 100 percent finance 
additionality and partial finance additionality (Pieda, 1992). If finance additionality 
also includes the ability of firms to borrow the funds immediately, then the proportion 
of firms experiencing some form of finance additionality would be much higher at 
78.3 percent. 
T bl 74 Ab" fF' a e , , Ihty 0 Irms to R' F' , Ab aIse mancem fNPGS senceo 
Ability of Finns to Raise Finance in Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Absence of NPGS Percent 
No, I could not have raised the finance 35 38.0 38.0 
No, I would have raised less 15 16.4 54.4 
Yes, from alternative sources with a delay 22 23.9 78.3 
Yes, from alternative sources without delay 8 8.7 87.0 
Yes, from the same source without delay 12 13.0 100.0 
Total 92 100 
The aggregate data on finance additionality from the questionnaires are presented in 
Appendix 7.2. In the Appendix, finance additionality is expressed in terms of value, 
and it amounts to 54 percent, higher than the 37 percent found in the case studies. 
This is to be expected, as the additionality derived solely from the questionnaires does 
not take into account the views of the financial institutions. The latter were able to 
confirm the borrowing capacity of the case study firms in an objective independent 
manner. 
The results from both data sources clearly suggest that some degree of finance 
additionality is found in NPGS loans. The 37 percent finance additionality achieved in 
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the case studies, according to Bannock and Partners (1997), is comparable to other 
guarantee schemes that are properly designed and implemented. Such schemes 
typically yield additionality of around 30-50 percent. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, S.3.3.5, Levitsky (1997) and Bannock and Partners (1997) emphasise that 
"not less than 60 percent of loans should be additional preferably nearer 80 or even 90 
percent. If additionality is below these targets then appropriate action should be 
taken". 
The relatively low level of finance additionality in the case studies stems from the 
ability of firms to obtain finance from alternative sources. A number of firms could 
have obtained finance from internal sources, relatives and personal contacts, their 
present FIs, or other FIs (both public and private). Some case study firms had 
financed the early stage of their businesses through personal savings and loans from 
relatives/friends. The majority of the Bumiputera firms in my case studies had 
received financial assistance, other than NPGS-backed facilities, through Government 
agencies. The finance provided by these Government agencies was mainly used to 
purchase plant and equipment, whereas the bulk of the NPGS-backed facilities were 
used for working capital. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.3.1. 
There were three instances (Firms B, C, and G) of zero finance additionality. The 
banks would normally have been prepared to grant the facility: they would have given 
a higher than normal value to the offered security (Firms B and C); or, there were 
assets in the background which could have been used to secure the borrowing (Firm 
G). 
The requirement for some sort of securitylcollateral from the borrowers was another 
reason for the low finance additionality. My case study firms (except for Firm C) all 
had to provide some form of collateral in order to obtain their NPGS loans. Levitsky 
(1997b) stated that some collateral should be obtained from borrowers (even if 
inadequate to cover the whole loan), in order for the guarantee scheme to operate in 
the best manner. However, this requirement does deny guarantee support to firms 
lacking security. Such firms would be expected to have higher additionality than those 
with security. However, a high default rate is associated with cases of high finance 
additionality, typically lending to OMs with no record of achievement, or to 
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businesess with little prospect of generating high returns (Pieda, 1992). In my 
questionnaire survey, firms with partial finance additionality accounted for the largest 
number of additional jobs and had the highest ratio of additional employment to total 
employment. The issue of partial finance additionality will be discussed in relation to 
economic additionality below. 
According to Morsman (1986), asymmetric information also influences the lenders' 
decision to obtain collateral from NPGS borrowers. Some of the case studies were 
new or start-up firms and the OMs had not much idea of whether or not their business 
would succeed. By contrast, the lenders had prior knowledge of similar businesses at 
that particular stage of development (Storey, 1994a). There is also evidence from the 
case studies that larger loans given to bigger and older firms tend to have a higher 
degree of finance additionality. The issue of track record is also important here. New 
or start-up firms require the CGC guarantee to counter the impact of asymmetric 
information. Once a firm is established, a good working relationship with a financial 
institution should develop. 
The majority of case study firms have good banking relationships with their Fls, 
through prompt payment of interest and capital commitments on the due dates and 
regular submission of business plans. Their FIs were willing to provide additional 
non-NPGS finance after the NPGS-backed facilities were exhausted. These findings 
confirm that sustained banking relationships are important to reduce asymmetric 
information and are associated with greater availability of capital, less frequent 
pledging of collateral, lower charges for credit lines and lower monitoring 
requirements (Binks & Ennew, 1996; Blackwell & Winters, 1997). 
7.3 ECONOMIC ADDITIONALITY 
The previous section was concerned with finance additionality. According to NERA 
(1990), as discussed in Chapter 4, finance additionality "is a necessary pre-condition 
for economic additionality because if the Loan Guarantee Scheme has not resulted in 
extra funds becoming available to a firm, it is unlikely to have had any impact on its 
level of activity." In view of the problems in establishing the precise level of finance 
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additionality, this pre-condition has been ignored for this study. Moreover, the fact 
that finance is additional does not automatically mean that increased employment, 
profits or turnover are generated. In the case studies and the questionnaire survey, the 
researcher found some exceptions: 
• Certain firms, for example, Firm J had defaulted after the loan drawdown; 
• Djsplacement effects occurred in certain sectors of the economy, especially the 
general business sector (Mohd Shariff and Boocock, 1999). 
The concept of economic additionality can be divided into two broad areas: the direct 
benefit fdr the firms in terms of increased employment, profits or turnover; and the 
~ indirect 'imp~ct on~e wider economy (NERA, 1990) 
7.3.1 Assessment of Economic Additionality 
. : The researcher started by estimating the direct benefit to NPGS recipients. From the 
case studies, all the borrowers claimed that finance was used in accordance with the 
original application. Table 7.5 shows that nearly half (46.7 percent) used the NPGS 
loan solely for working capital purposes. These results are in substantial agreement 
with those of NERA (1990). A further 6 firms (40.0 percent) used the funds for some 
combination of working capital, purchase of plant and machinery, and product 
development. 
Table 7.5: Use of NPGS Loans 
Use of NPGS Loans 
lant and machine 
Working capital & purchase of plant & machinery & Product 
develo ment 
Other 
Total 
No. of Percent 
Res onses 
7 46.7 
3 20.0 
3 20.0 
2 13.3 
15 100.0 
When the funds are applied for working capital purposes, Boocock and Mohd Shariff 
(1995) concluded that it is more difficult to establish a link between funding and 
subsequent progress, compared to when the funds are used (say) to purchase fixed 
assets or acquire another business. Furthermore, the provision of funds for working 
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capital purposes is probably less likely to lead to sustainable rises in employment and 
output than capital expenditure. 
The types and uses of the NPGS-backed facilities for the case study firms are shown 
in Table 7.6. 
T bl 76 T a e . : rypes an dU fNPGS B k dF T' ses 0 
-
ac e aCllhes 
Firms Types Uses 
A Term Loan purchase of plant and machinery 
Overdraft, Multiple Trade Line, Letter of Credit, working capital 
Trust Receipts, Shipping Guarantee, Letter of 
Guarantee, Banker Acceptances 
B Term Loan purchase of plant and machinery 
Overdraft and Letter of Credit working capital 
C Overdraft working capital 
0 Overdraft and Term Loan working capital 
E Overdraft working capital 
Letter of Credit product development 
F Overdraft, Trust Receipts, Bankers Guarantee working capital 
G Overdraft working capital 
H Overdraft ... working capital and purchase of plant 
and machinery 
I Overdraft working capital 
J Overdraft working capital 
K Overdraft working capital 
Term Loan purchase of plant and machinery and 
product development 
L Term Loan working capital, 
purchase of plant and machinery 
and market expansion 
M Overdraft working capital 
N Overdraft working capital 
0 Overdraft working capital 
Term Loan purchase of plant and machinery, 
other property costs and product 
development 
The researcher attempted to link the NPGS funding to the subsequent progress of the 
firm. Most of the firms used overdraft facilities to pay for raw materials and to meet 
the demands of trade creditors. The majority of manufacturing firms used term loans 
for the purchase of plant and machinery (Firms A, B, K and L). Only one firm 
(aquaculture farming) used its term loan to invest in plant and machinery, other 
property and product development. 
The provision of term loans to four firms (A, B, K, and 0) led to sustainable rises in 
employment (85 to 183 employees) and turnover (RMl1.6 million to RM14.805 
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million) in the third year after the NPGS-backed facilities was granted, as shown in 
Table 7.7. All four firms were limited companies and three of them were engaged in 
manufacturing. The representatives from financial institutions highlighted the 
importance of extending the term of NPGS-backed loans from 5 to 10 years, because 
the five year period was too short for firms to reinvest their profits and increase 
employment and turnover. Furthermore, most firms were just beginning to organise 
their businesses in the two year period after the term loan was disbursed and could 
only generate profits from year three onwards. 
T bl 77 S b , lE a e , : u stantJa , Add" r S I d F' conomlC ItJona Ity: e ecte lrms 
Firm Legal Status Business Employment Turnover 
Activity (No, of Employees) (RM'OOO) 
Before After Before After 
A Limited Company Manufacturing 20 70 5,100 5,400 
B Limited Company Manufacturing 45 75 3,900 4,300 
K Limited Company Manufacturing 15 29 2,500 5,000 
0 Limited Company Aquaculture 5 9 100 105 
Total 85 183 11,600 14,805 
Taking the:case studies as a whole, Table 7.8 below shows the economic additionality 
measured by employment in the one year period from 1996-1997. There were 395 
employees in the case study firms, of which 154 were considered to be additional jobs 
resulting from the existence of the NPGS. This represented additional employment of 
63.9 percent across the sample firms. The researcher found that those firms with 
partial finance additionality accounted for the largest number of additional jobs, 120. 
Howeyer, those with zero finance additionality had the highest ratio of additional 
employment to total employment. Two firms (B and C) accounted for additional 
employment of 44 workers after the NPGS drawdown, but Firm G defaulted and thus 
resulted in the loss of 10 jobs. The net gain was still 40.5 percent. 
The majority of the case study firms had giyen some sort of security/guarantee, hence 
additionality was never 100 percent. This is somewhat disappointing, as NERA 
(1990) found that firms having 100 percent additionality accounted for the largest 
number of additional jobs and also had the highest ratio of additional employment to 
total employment. My findings are out of line with NERA, but my sample is much 
smaller and it is difficult to compare the two studies. 
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Table 7.8: Em 10 ment Additionalit : Total for Case Studies 
(1) (2) (2) + (1) 
Total Additional 
No. No. % 
All firms 241 154 63.9 
Firms: Finance 100% additionality 0 0 o 
Firms: Finance additionalit artial 191 120 62.8 
Firms: Finance not additional 50 34 68.0 
Note: 
1. This data are based on the year after the NPGS loan was financed. 
2. The firms include Firm J, classified as Non-Performing. 
The economic additionality for the case study firms was then compared with 
economic additionaJity estimated from the questionnaire data. 
Fi ure 7.2: Em 10 ment Additionalit : Total For Surve 
The questionnaire responses also showed an improvement in employment before and 
after the NPGS loans were granted. A total of 1,413 employees before receipt of the 
NPGS loans had increased to 2,073 employees over a period of one year, an addition 
of 660 (46.7 percent) - refer to Figure 7.2. The case studies employment additionality 
(63.9 percent) differed from the questionnaire survey. Questionaire respondents with 
partial finance additionaJity generated employment additionaJity of 72.8 percent, 
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while lOO percent finance additionality and zero finance additionality yielded 48.0 
percent and 30.4 percent employment additionality (Table 7.9). This profile was more 
in line with the researcher's expectations. 
In the questionnaire responses, firms with partial finance additionality accounted for 
the largest number of additional jobs and the highest ratio of additional employment 
to total employment (252 and 72.8 percent respectively). In cases of partial 
additionality, NPGS-backed firms usually had to offer some sort of security/guarantee 
to financial institutions; manufacturing firms achieved the highest number of 
additional jobs. The findings also confirm that SMEs in the manufacturing sector 
create employment opportunities; they generated almost 60 percent of net 
employment creation during the period 1991-1995 (Moha Asri, 1999). 
Table 7.9: Em 10 ment Additionalit : Total for uestionnaire Surve 
(1) (2) (2) +1 
Total Additional 
No. No. % 
All firms 1413 660 46.7 
Firms: 100% finance 477 229 48.0 
additionalit 
Firms: Partial finance 346 252 72.8 
additionalit 
Firms: Finance not additional 588 179 30.4 
Note: 
I. The employee data are based on the accounting year after the NPGS loan was financed. 
2. The firms include Firm J that was subsequently classified as Non-Performing. 
Having discussed economic additionality of recipient firms in terms of employment, 
the analysis now focuses on sales and net profit margins, two more indicators which 
can be used to measure the impact of the NPGS. 
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Fi ure 7.3: NPGS-Backed Facilities: Im act on Turnover (%) 
Notes: 
1. The data are based on a one year period 
2. Breakdown of 13 increases in turnover for the case study firms 
3. Breakdown of 81 increases in turnover for the survey firms 
Figure 7.3 depicts the increases (in percentage terms) of the case study firms reporting 
that turnover had increased. Five firms (33.3 percent) increased their turnover by 6 to 
10 percent, while six firms (46 percent) increased their turnover by more than 20 
percent per annum. Of those six firms, three (E, F and K) are from the manufacturing 
sector. Firms E and K operate in furniture manufacturing and their turnover is mainly 
derived from export markets. Firm F supplies switch gears and other electrical 
products to the industrial sector. Firms E, F and K used the NPGS-backed facilities 
for working capital, purchase of plant and machinery, and product development 
purposes. The working capital requirements were mainly to finance international 
trade, whereas term loans were utilised for the purchase of plant and machinery and 
product development. The NPGS appears to have had a significant impact on the 
progress of these firms and benefited the wider economy by generating exports. 
The other three high growth firms (C, G, and I) are involved in general business. Firm 
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C's higher turnover stems from the opening of more outlets in the state of Perak. Firm 
G is involved in computer services and derives its growth principally from an increase 
in the number of contracts to supply computers to the public and private sectors, as 
well as consultancy and training support to its clients. Firm I is involved in 
wholesaling and has captured sales from other competitors in the state of Penang. The 
impact of these three firms on the wider economy is reduced as their competitors are 
situated in their own or neighbouring States. 
The questionnaire data (Figure 7.3) reveals that 59 firms (64.1 percent) in the survey 
had increased turnover by less than 20 percent per annum, while 22 firms (23.9 
percent) achieved more than 20 percent. 8 firms (8.7 percent) reported no differences 
in their turnover, while 3 firms (3.3 percent) reported a small decrease in turnover. 
Figure 7.4 below shows that nine of the eleven case study firms (81.8 percent) 
reporting enhanced profit margins experienced an increase of less than 20 percent per 
annum. Only two firms (C and F) increased net profit margins by more than 20 
percent. Firm C, the only Bumiputera-owned shop in the Chinese-dominated 
optometry business, has benefited from an effective marketing campaign. Firm F 
manufactures high technology switch gears for a variety of industrial sectors, and it 
has a reputation for a high level of technical know-how. I judge that the performance 
of Firm F is a 'model' of how NPGS funding can assist high technology firms. 
The questionnaire respondents also claimed to have achieved improvements in profit 
margins. Figure 7.4 shows that 63 firms (68.5 percent) increased net profit margins by 
less than 20 per cent per annum, while only 10 firms (10.9 percent) achieved an 
increase in net profit margin of more than 20 percent. 19 firms (20.6 percent) reported 
no change in their net profit margins. As discussed in Chapter 6, S.6.3.1, over one-
half (60.9) percent of sample firms are from the non-manufacturing sector. Of the 10 
firms increasing their net profit margin by more than 20 percent, 8 are from the non-
manufacturing and 2 firms are from the manufacturing sector. This split was 
somewhat surprising. I would have expected the manufacturing firms to feature more 
strongly. The growth in profit of the non-manufacturing firms probably results from 
displacing other firms within their States in Malaysia. High growth firms were mostly 
in construction, a very volatile sector of the economy. 
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Fi ure 7.4: NPGS-Backed Facilities: Im act on Net Profit Mar in (%) 
Notes: 
I. Breakdown of 11 increases in net profit margin for the case study firms. 
2. Breakdown of 73 increases in net profit margin for the survey firms. 
The second element of economic additionality takes account of displacement effects, 
i.e., whether additional activity in the assisted firms translates into corresponding 
increases in the level of activity in the SME sector or the economy as a whole. The 
analysis here is confined to the case study firms. Seven of the 15 firms (46.7 percent) 
were from the manufacturing sector, while the remainder were engaged in general 
business. Economic additionality was found to be low for general business firms, 
especially where retailers were involved. Manufacturing firms generally have a 
greater economic impact and create jobs (NERA, 1990; Mohd Shariff and Boocock, 
1999). At the national level, five of the manufacturing firms export their products or 
offer substitutes for imports. Two of the five firms are appointed as partners or agents 
to manufacture high technology equipment for use in the domestic market. The other 
three export furniture and plastic materials to overseas markets. In addition, the 
aquaculture firms exports tiger prawns to overseas markets. In the general business 
sector, the NPGS loans largely displaced activity from one local firm to another. 
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A more tenuous strand of indirect economic additionality concerns the ability of 
SMEs to create a more dynamic and innovative society. In my case studies, the 
evidence of 'dynamism' in NPGS-assisted firms was quite modest. Table 7.1 0 below 
shows that only eight out of the fifteen respondents had undertaken major investment 
projects or been involved in product/process innovation. 
Firm B is a good example of an innovative firm. It has undertaken a number of major 
investment projects during the last three years. These include the manufacture and 
installation of telecommunication towers for the Ministry of Finance in Sabah and 
Sarawak. Since the NPGS loan was granted, Firm B has been involved in 29 projects, 
worth RM6.3 million. Some of these major projects are shown in Appendix 7.3. With 
the Malaysian Government's new definition of an SME, Firm B is now classed as a 
medium-sized firm, hence it will be able to attract more funds to carry out future 
projects. 
Growth 
Barkham et al. (1996) used employment change over a three year period as a measure 
of growth and divided firms into three categories: 
1. Fast-growth (100% employment growth or more) 
2. Medium/slow-growth (1-99% employment growth) 
3. Static/declining (zero or negative employment change) 
I also used these measures of growth to classify my case study firms. Growth was 
measured by the increase in employment over a three year period to March 1998 (the 
date the interviews were carried out) - see Table 7.10. This was a straightforward 
calculation for those respondents whose NPGS loan covered the whole three year 
period (1995-1997). 
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Table 7.10: Characteristics of Firms 
Case Industry Legal Date of .... Employees: Innovation . Growth'. 
. 
Status Establish (Number)·. .. 
I ! • .... . . -ment ... 
. . . . 
. 
.: ... 
A Plastic Limited 1990 70 Yes 
packaging Company 
manufacture 
B Engineering Limited 1990 75 Yes 
manufacture, Company 
trading & 
services 
C' Optometry Sole 1992 15 Yes 
centre Proprietor 
D Travel agent Limited 1983 9 No 
Co~any 
E Furniture Limited 1981 40 Yes 
manufacture Company 
F Switch gears Limited 1988 55 Yes 
manufacture Company 
G Computer Sole 1990 9 No 
services Proprietor 
H Construction Sole 1994 8 No 
Proprietor 
I Wholesale Sole 1985 9 No 
distribution Proprietor 
J Furniture Limited 1994 19 No 
manufacture Company 
K Furniture Sole 1989 29 Yes 
manufacture Proprietor 
L Soya sauce Partnership 1988 33 Yes 
manufacture 
M Pharmama- Sole 1973 6 No 
teucal shop Proprietor 
N Stationery Sole 1987 6 No 
sho~ Pr"prietor 
0 Aquaculture Limited 1992 9 Yes 
farming COlIl]Jany 
Notes 
1. "fast-growth; 'medium/slow growth ;J.staticldeclining 
2. The NPGS was launched on 1 March 1994 
3 and 4. Firms C and D had sought NPGS loans from two financial institutions. 
5. Finn J's NPGS loan was categorised as non-performing in June 1997. 
** 
* 
** 
J, 
** 
•• 
• 
* 
• 
"-
* 
• 
J, 
• 
* 
. •. : .. 
NPGSloan: 
amt(RMOOO) 
I ... and approved . 
I .• :.· ...... :. date' : .. : 
1,680& 
Mar9S 
1,997 & Dec 
9S 
650 & Jan95 
2,000 & 
Ju1y95 
30 & Ju1y94 
100 & Aug95 
300 & Feb95 
250 & Jan96 
1,400 & 
Juoe97 
2,500& 
Au~97 
267 & May97 
130& May97 
500 & Ja096 
170 & Jan96 
240 & Jun96 
180 & Feb97 
80 & Ja097 
212 & Dec96 
85 & Nov97 
The measurement of growth for other respondents was difficult, for example, if they 
received the NPGS loan during late 1997. However, in some cases, the researcher was 
able to assess their short -run growth potential; for example, if they had exported 
products, introduced new technology and or injected more personal capital since 
receiving NPGS-backing. Three brief summaries of fast growth firms are given 
below. 
Since receiving the NPGS loan in June 1997, employment in Firm E has grown from 
20 to 40 people (100 percent). It has been able to employ more people because of 
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demand from overseas for its products and the competitiveness of the Malaysian 
Ringgit. The firm has been able to penetrate the export market for furniture (stools 
and chairs) and 80 percent of its increased sales were in overseas markets. 
Firm A has increased its workforce from 20 to 70 employees (250 percent growth) 
since receiving its NPGS loan in March 1995. Firm A achieved rapid growth by 
producing c1eanroom environment materials for multinational companies in the semi-
conductor electronic and industrial packaging industries. The firm has introduced new 
technology to manufacture air bubblepak, expanded polyethylene foam and laminated 
products. 
Firm C has grown rapidly from one to three outlets, and increased its workforce from 
6 to 15 employees (150 percent). An injection of the OM's capital input into the 
business motivated him to seek growth actively as a means of increasing his return on 
capital. 
In summary, the results for all the case study firms suggest that economic 
additionality is low for general business and high for manufacturing firms. There were 
395 employees in the case study firms, of which 154 jobs resulted from the existence 
of the NPGS. Those case study firms with partial finance additionality generate the 
largest number of additional jobs and also have the highest ratio of additional 
employment to total employment. Manufacturing firms generally have a greater 
economic impact and create jobs. Economic additionality was found to be low where 
general business firms, especially retailers are involved. In the general business 
sector, the NPGS largely displaced activity from one local firm to another. The NPGS 
did have some impact on the performance of high technology firms and it enabled 
such firms to progress rapidly. 
In terms of the innovation and 'dynamism' of the NPGS-assisted firms, 
manufacturing firms contributed significantly but those in the general business sector 
generally failed to do so. Some of the NPGS-backed firms showed a very positive 
attitude towards growth. For example, Firm E had increased its workforce 
significantly and begun to export to overseas. 
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7.4 NET COST 
The third and final element of the effectiveness of the NPGS is the net cost of 
operating the Scheme. 
The costs of any guarantee scheme - administering the scheme and settling claims 
arising from bad debts - can be offset to an extent by the premiums charged to 
borrowers for the guarantees and security realisations. The gap between income and 
expenditure for any individual scheme will principally depend upon: the default rate 
of assisted firms; the premium charged; the percentage of cover offered by the 
guarantee; and, the contribution sought from private sector financial institutions 
(Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1994). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, S4.3.6, the net cost of the NPGS can be assessed by 
deducting claims paid by CGC, and the cost of running its offices from the income 
from guarantee fees, interest earned on CGC funds and the proceeds of security 
realisations. The CGC's operating revenue, comprising mainly guarantee fees and 
interest income, increased from RM24.1 million in 1996 to RMS3.4 million in 1997. 
With operating expenses (including office expenses) amounting to RMS.7 million, 
operating profit for 1997 totalled RM49.6 million. When interest income amounting 
to RM34.6 million was added, the total surplus for the year reached RM84.2 million 
(CGC, 1997). Thus CGC, in theory, should have been able to settle any reasonable 
claims for payment from the financial institutions. 
Such claims arise from non-performing loans, a problem which has long been a 
sensitive issue for the CGC (Levitksy and Prasad, 1989). As elaborated in Chapter 3, 
S3.3.3, the payment of claims would be almost automatic in guarantee schemes 
operating elsewhere. In Malaysia, the situation is very different even though the CGC 
purports to have set out its claims procedure with more clarity (Boocock and Mohd 
Shariff, 1996). The CGC has not provided an accurate breakdown of claims processed 
and paid since 1993. The researcher thus attempted to calculate the cost of NPGS 
defaults by using secondary data from CGC and BNM, and comments from the 
interviews with financial institutions. 
212 
-------------------------------------------------. --
Case Studies: Analysis & Discussion 
The researcher first estimated claims processed over the period 1994-1998. A 
positive relationship was hypothesised (Chapter 4) between the amount of claims 
processed by CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. The value of claims processed 
(Column 5) in relation to NPLs (Column 2) was generally higher over 1994-1998, 
although these figure are only my estimates - see colum 6 of Table 7.11. Taking a 
one-year time lag, to allow expectations to take effect, the hypothesis states that 
utilisation will increase as the proportion of claims processed in relation to NPLs 
increases. However, when Column 6 is considered in relation to utilisation (Column 
1) there is no clear-cut relationship. The hypothesis has not been substantiated, but I 
suspect my estimated figures are incorrect and other factors exerted more influence on 
utilisation. 
T 1 C' P able 7.1 : lalfns rocesse db CGC ~y 
... 
. 
.. Non Performing Loans· .. 
. ... 
Claims Processed .. 
... .. 
. 
. .. 
.. 
. Utilisation Value 
I 
Perceut··. Number. Value. 
(RMm) .. 
Percent*~ , 
. . ...... 
I . (RMm). (RMm) . .. .. 
(Call) (Col 2) (Col 3) (Col 4) 
1986 124.3 201.2 26.8 210 
1987 76.5 229.3 34.2 221 
1988 50.5 239.5 40.7 228 
1989 100.2 236.3 49.2 604 
1990 313.3 223.2 38.9 909 
1991 206.3 215.0 35.7 641 
1992 174.7 209.0 36.0 301 
1993 205.8 184.8 34.0 449 
Total 1,251.6 N/A N/A 3,563 
1994 530.1 261.0 32.0 1,501 
1995 1,758.7 416.8 25.0 1,605 
1996 3,578.8 704.0 22.0 1,983 
1997 3,847.4 844.8 20.0 314 
1998 515.9 622.5 17.2 232 
Total 10,230.9 N/A N/A 5,635 
Notes: 
·Banks' estimate of potential bad debts 
** Non Performing Loans as a percentage of outstanding CGC loans 
Source: Kanbur et al., 1995 and CGC Annual Reports 
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(Col 5) (Col 6) 
1.99 0.99 
2.02 0.89 
2.74 J.J4 
2.92 1.23 
9.10 4.08 
8.40 3.91 
3.90 1.87 
5.30 2.87 
36.37 N/A 
12.52 4.80 
16.40 3.93 
17.30 2.46 
29.10 3.44 
27.0 4.34 
102.32 N/A 
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Second, a positive relationship was hypothesised between the proportion of claims 
paid by CGC and the utilisation of the NPGS. My contention is that PIs would seek to 
increase NPGS loans if claims were processed promptly and payments made 
automatically. Table 7.12 again reveals underlying improvements compared to the 
period 1986-1993. A higher proportion of claims processed was paid over the period 
1994-1998 (RM33.01 million, 32.3 percent of RM102.32 million) compared to 1986-
1993 (RM9.4 million, 25.8 percent of RM36.37 million). However, it was difficult to 
establish any relationship between claims paid in relation to claims processed (column 
7) and utilisation of the NPGS, even if a one-year time lag was applied. Interviews 
with FIs in the case studies highlighted continuing problems with claims, especially 
for the debts of small borrowers. One PI commented that it always had to wait for the 
claims to be paid, and the claims money was then lodged in an escrow account for an 
inordinate period. Once again therefore, the hypothesis has not been substantiated. 
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T bl 7 12 Cl' P'd b CGC a e . : alms al >y 
... 
Non Performing' Claims Processed; 
.. 
. 
... Loans· .. ... . ..•......... 
I Utilisation· ·.Value .%*' •.. Number I Value 
(RMm) .. (RMm)· . . ....... .. .·.·(RMm) 
(Call) (Col 2) (Col3) (Col 4) (CoI5~ 
1986 124.3 201.2 26.8 210 1.99 
1987 76.5 229.3 34.2 221 2.02 
1988 50.5 239.5 40.7 228 2.74 
1989 100.2 236.3 49.2 604 2.92 
1990 313.3 223.2 38.9 909 9.10 
1991 206.3 215.0 35.7 641 8.40 
1992 174.7 209.0 36.0 301 3.90 
1993 205.8 184.8 34.0 449 5.30 
Total 1451.6 N/A N/A 3563 36.37 
1994 530.1 261.0 32.0 1.501 12.52 
1995 1.758.7 416.8 25.0 1,605 16.40 
1996 3,578.8 704.0 22.0 1,983 17.30 
1997 3,847.4 844.8 20.0 314 29.10 
1998 515.9 622.5 17.2 232 27.00 
Total 10.230.9 N/A N/A 5,635 102.32 
Notes: 
'Banks' estimate of potentia! bad debts 
,. Non Performing Loans as a percentage of outstanding eGe loans 
Source: Kanbur et aI., 1995 and CGC Annual Reports 
i .. Claims Paid.. 
.......• ...;.. 
Value· ....... % 
··.·.··(RMin) . ... ................. 
J,CaI6) lCal7) 
0.25 12.56 
0.54 26.73 
0.65 23.72 
1.04 35.62 
1.19 13.08 
2.02 24.05 
1.30 33.33 
2.40 45.28 
9.39 25.8 
7.38 58.95 
5.30 32.32 
7.20 41.62 
7.63 26.22 
5.50 20.37 
33.01 32.3 
The net cost of the NPGS to the Treasury for 1997 can now be estimated. The surplus 
for 1997 amounted to RM84.2 million. Claims paid amounted to RM7.63 million, 
leaving unpaid over RM21 million of claims processed. It is no wonder that 
representatives from FIs still feel frustrated about the non-payment of claims for bad 
debts. 
On the subject of bad debts, the level of NPLs could be influenced by the quotas 
imposed by BNM on FIs in respect of NPGS loans. Problems experienced in claiming 
under the guarantee have been a major factor in the financial institutions' reluctance 
to utilise the CGC; many financial institutions prefer to pay the penalty rather than 
adhere to the guidelines. As mentioned in Chapter 3, S.3.3.4, these quotas might cause 
banks to approve guaranteed loans for high-risk borrowers simply to meet the quota 
(ADB, 1990; Levitsky, 1997). Meyer and Nagarajan (1996) stress that "suspicions 
about the credibility of government sponsored guarantee schemes are reported to have 
contributed to institutions choosing not to participate." 
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In Chapter 4, SA.3.2, a positive relationship was hypothesised between the guidelines 
imposed by BNM and the utilisation of the NPGS. The hypothesis was tested using 
secondary information provided by BNM and interviews with key informants from 
the financial institutions. These targets are frequently not met, despite the imposition 
of financial penalties for non-compliance. Table 7.13 shows that the overall target for 
March 1998 for NPGS loans was satisfied, but a number of FIs still failed to comply 
with their individual quotas. 
T bl 713 L dO G Od r ~ NPGS a e 
° 
: en mg UI e me or 
Lending Guidelines 1996 
(compliance date 31 March 1998) 
Target Achieved 
(3113/199~ 
NPGS 
Total guarantee cover (RM million) 
Commercial banks 1,000.0 2,341.1 
Finance companies 240.0 1,216.1 
Non-compliance (no. of institutions) 
Commercial banks 9 
Finance companies 8 
NPGS 
(for Bumiputera community) 
Total guarantee cover (RM million) 
Commercial banks 500.0 585.6 
Finance companies 120.0 278.7 
Non-compliance (no. of institutions) 
Commercial banks 16 
Finance comp!lnies 8 
Source: BNM annual report 1997 
Nine commercial banks and eight finance companies were fined for failing to achieve 
the quota set by BNM. Likewise, the overall quota for Bumiputera firms was 
achieved, but 16 commercial banks and eight finance companies were penalised. 
Nine of the fifteen (60 percent) financial institutions lending to case study firms 
claimed to have achieved the BNM quotas specified by their Head Offices. The 
remainder were uncertain whether their quotas had been reached (Table 7.14). 
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T bl 7 14 BNM Q t f C S d F' a e . uo a or ase tUly Irms . . 
BNMQuota Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Achieved quota 9 60 60 
Uncertain 6 40 100 
Total 15 100 
Four of the nine institutions that had achieved their quotas thought they had exceeded 
their requirements by far. Financial institution J (hereafter referred to as PI J) claimed 
that CGC had asked it to stop sanctioning NPGS loans after reaching its quota, 
because of the high level of NPLs. This outcome lends support to Meyer and 
Nagarajan (1996) who suggested that quotas and associated incentives or penalties 
might lead FIs to make loans they were convinced would be unprofitable. PIs might 
expect losses but, in the face of penalties for non-compliance, feel they might as well 
exhaust their quotas. In certain circumstances, FI officials are not being penalised (in 
terms of their promotion prospects) if borrowers fail, because NPGS loans are granted 
to Government-favoured customers, especially the Bumiputera business community. 
This situation is especially prominent in Government-owned banks, institutions which 
follow Government lending guidelines more slavishly than private sector financial 
institutions. 
Given that banks in Malaysia react to the imposition of quotas in very different ways, 
it was not possible to establish a relationship between utilisation and the existence of 
BNM guidelines. The quotas were frequently subject to change at short notice, and 
the researcher found great difficulty in identifying which quota was in operation 
during any specific time period. Even though the quotas do seem to exert an 
influence, it was therefore not possible to 'prove' or 'disprove' the hypothesis. 
7.5 INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS 
7.5.1 Interview with Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ofCGC 
The researcher was privileged to interview some key players in the industry notably 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Credit Guarantee Corporation. A number of 
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critical issues were discussed, especially the objectives of the CGC, the monitoring of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) and recovery of claims paid, and the targeting of loans 
to priority sectors. The interview was carried out in March 1998, during the period 
where CGC was experiencing low utilisation of its loans owing to the prevailing 
economic recession. The CEO confirmed that the main objective of the CGC is to 
provide ready access to credit at a reasonable cost. The issue of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) was very sensitive at the time of the interview, because the level of NPLs 
across the financial sector was alarming. According to the CEO, the NPLs for CGC 
loans were reasonable (17 percent), compared to the industry average of 20-24 
percent. When prompted further on this issue, he was adamant that the NPLs had to 
be viewed in the context of the principal objective of CGC. 
In looking at the overall effectiveness of the NPGS, he felt that the net benefits 
outweighed the costs, and that the benefits could not be measured solely in 
quantitative terms. The researcher tried to extract quantitative figures on the costs and 
benefits of the NPGS, but unfortunately the CEO was very hesitant. The high NPLs 
faced by the banking industry and the economic recession at the time prevented him 
from divulging this information. However, he stressed the benefit of the NPGS to the 
wider economy and the limitations of using cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the 
Scheme: 
For example, since we (CGC) operate under the Ministry of Entrepreneurial 
Development, jobs cannot simply be translated into dollars and cents. You cannot 
just look at NPLs. What about developmental costs? And you cannot compare NPLs 
against the benefit that these people are getting. The impact of CGC support is felt by 
the recipients and people around them in a chain reaction. An OM gets new business, 
and he can give other people business, so there is a kind of chain reaction. Cost-
benefit analysis is impossible to do, unless you limit your scope to dollars and cents; 
how much you payout and how much income you get from the Government. But 
that's not right. You just said that I payout less than I get and, therefore, I earned 
something. If I payout more than I collect, I'm running at a loss. That's simplifying 
too much. 
The CGC is funded by compulsory endowments from BNM and the FIs rather than 
annual budget appropriations from the Government. Meyer and Nagarajan (1996) 
suggested that: 
The method used to fund guarantee programmes influences the difficulty with which 
they can be evaluated. Programmes financed out of annual budget appropriations 
offer one advantage with respect to public policy. The annual costs of these 
programmes are more transparent than in programmes funded out of endowments so 
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the benefits can be more easily debated relative to the costs. Most accounting systems 
for endowed guarantee funds assume the funds have a zero opportunity cost. As long 
as the fund survives without further capitalisation, this implicit subsidy is disguised 
and may never be evaluated relative to the benefits obtained from guarantees or 
relative to other means for assisting the target sector. 
The issue of high NPLs and their impact on CGC's ability to run a guarantee scheme 
was discussed. The researcher cited certain countries like Japan which have guarantee 
schemes that experience higher NPLs but are still sustainable. To this question, the 
CEO stated that CGC operates in a different climate from that prevailing in Japan. 
The CGC needs to manage its Schemes prudently and profitably, because it operates 
without an annual grant from the Government. The CGC depends on funds from its 
shareholders: 
Here our (CGC) support from the Government has always being detached, not a 
direct support. We never get annual grants. Whatever we get, we get from our 
shareholders; whatever we get, we get in the form of loans which we have to pay 
back and we're running a company like any other company registered under the 
Registrar ... We're not in that sense a cost centre. We have to run a profitable concern 
to survive. So is different when you said about the Japanese Scheme. Of course, the 
Japanese are not worried because their Government backs them all the time. In 
Malaysia is different. The Government may decide to close down CGC. So, we have 
to take caution of the fact that we don't have that kind of guarantee from the 
Government... So, that has always been our primary concern. How far we can go, 
how far we can push, is very much dependent on whether we will break even or 
not.. .. To the question of whether we have the capacity to increase our guarantees 
that is entirely dependent on ourselves. There is no guarantee that the Government 
will support or will bail us out, in case something happened. There is no, maybe, 
there is implied support from the Government, but there has never being something 
that is clear. 
The cautious approach taken by CGC's management towards the utilisation of the 
NPGS therefore stems from its reluctance to face the prospect of making losses. The 
threat of higher NPLs is a deterrent even though CGC has a secure source of endowed 
funds in the form of interest income on soft loans. Furthermore, as mentioned in 
Section 7.4, FIs have to wait an inordinate time for the claims to be paid, and many 
claimes are rejected. Several FIs prefer to pay the penalty rather than abide by the 
guidelines set by BNM. 
My discussion with the CEO also touched on the allocation of loans to priority 
sectors, monitoring of NPLs, recovery of claims paid, and the management of the 
CGC's client base, as well as new activities such as advisory services for selected 
companies. 
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The CEO explained the rationale behind recent changes in the implementation of the 
NPGS, especially the allocation of loans to priority sectors. Given its limited capital, 
CGC's main concern is to reach as many borrowers as possible. Over the years, the 
guarantees have increased at a faster pace than CGC's reserves. However, the 
majority of CGC loans were still above RMSOO,OOO and its guarantees did not reach 
many smaller borrowers. CGC has recently focused on smaller loans (below 
RM250,000), giving them priority in terms of higher guarantee cover and lower 
guarantee fees. The aim is to encourage banks to lend more to SMEs (rather than 
micro or large enterprises) and to reach as many potential borrowers as possible. For 
loans above RM250,000, CGC believes that bigger borrowers can afford to pay higher 
guarantee fees and, of course, they also have access to other forms of credit. 
With regard to the monitoring of NPLs, the CEO stated that the value of guaranteed 
loans has recently grown by more than lOO percent each year. For example, in 1994 
CGC managed loans valued at RM600 million; by 1997, the value of guaranteed loans 
had increased to around RM3.9 billion. CGC is increasingly concerned with the 
management of its portfolio and the monitoring of loans is critical: 
If you don't manage your base well. a lot of loans are not going to be repaid, people 
. (borrowers) are to going to ignore the terms of the guarantee and they may default on 
the loans. There's no point in bringing new loans when the existing ones are rotting 
away. 
CGC is seeking to take action before loans become bad, and it has improved its 
Management Information System (MIS). This is electronically linked to the financial 
institutions, involving a shared data base and the electronic submission of information 
between CGC and the financial institutions. 
The CEO also discussed other activities such as consultation and advisory services 
and cross selling of products, covered in more detail in Section 7.5.2. 
As discussed in Chapter I and Chapter 3, S3.3, there must be sufficient liquidity in the 
banking system for guarantee schemes to function effectively. The Malaysian banking 
system was adversely affected in the wake of speculative attacks on the currencies of 
a number of East Asian countries. Banking institutions became preoccupied with 
managing their bad debts and curtailed their lending sharply. The CGC focused its 
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guarantee support away from certain sectors or industries which the Government 
categorised as low priority, for example, property development, car dealing or retail 
outlets. In contrast, a number of productive industries have been given high priority, 
such as manufacturing, and export-oriented or import-substitution firms. 
In summary, the interview with the CEO highlights certain areas that are crucial for 
CGC to function effectively. The NPLs for CGC loans according to the CEO are 
reasonable, compared to the industry average of 20-24 percent. However, the 
reseacher was unable to determine the exact value of NPLs because of the reluctance 
of the CEO to divulge this information. The CEO stated that smaller loans (below 
RM2S0,OOO) would be a priority in future. However, the case studies indicate that 
borrowers having larger loans have a greater impact in terms of finance and economic 
additionality. Furthermore, growth-oriented companies might have difficulty in 
getting loans since the average value of loans taken by limited companies was 
RM387,OOO. The CEO is adamant that CGC has to reduce loans to sectors that are 
categorised as unproductive. The monitoring of NPLs is to be improved by the 
sharing of data between CGC and the financial institutions. 
7.5.2 Interviews with Financial Institutions 
The interviews with the OMs and their FIs also gathered information on issues 
pertinent to the activities of the CGC, notably the marketing activity conducted by 
CGC and the loan approval process. 
Marketing the Guarantee Service to SMEs 
According to Graham Bannock and Partners (1997), the importance of marketing 
guarantee schemes is often underestimated. Bank Negara (1995) and Boocock and 
Mohd Shariff (1996) highlighted the poor awareness and take up of CGC-backed 
facilities. Interviews with OMs in the case studies, and also the questionnaire 
responses confirmed these problems. Figure 7.5 shows that the majority (73.4 percent) 
of the OMs in the case studies learned of the NPGS from their financial institutions 
and the remainder became aware of the Scheme through friends and/or the press, or 
from personal enquiries to the CGC. 
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Fi ure 7.5: NPGS-Backed Facilities: Awareness 
Some of the OMs recommended that CGC should be more aggressive in promoting its 
Schemes by advertising through the media, newspapers or other government agencies. 
They felt that the target audience could be new or start-up companies. Brochures and 
information on the various CGC-backed facilities should be distributed widely. In 
Thailand, for example, the Small Industry Credit Guarantee Corporation (SICGC) was 
criticised for funding firms around Bangkok and it responded with a direct mail 
campaign to 7,000 manufacturing businesses in three areas away from the capital 
(Graham Bannock and Partners, 1997). 
Since 1998, CGC has provided information sessions and exhibitions to create 
awareness of its Schemes. Although a total of 36 sessions were held over the country, 
attracting 7,160 participants, the impact of these sessions appears to have been 
limited. 
The support of financial institutions for CGC is welcome provided that key users are 
able to represent their interests effectively (Graham Bannock and Partners, 1997). If 
the FIs are simply coerced into investing in the guarantee company, without seeing a 
commercial benefit from participation, problems will surely ensue. Representatives of 
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the financial institutions rarely considered the relationship with CGC to be an integral 
part of their strategy to help SMEs. However, financial institutions with specialised 
units to cater for the SME sector were prepared to formulate a coherent strategy 
involving the use of CGC guarantees. 
Another important area to raise the profile of CGC is the provision of training and 
consultancy services for SMEs. The majority of the firms interviewed in the case 
studies commented that such support from CGC was non-existent. One OM facing 
bankruptcy stated that: 
CGC and the FI should monitor the clients closely to provide guidelines and ensure 
sound management. My company is now in trouble due to mismanagement by the 
full time directors. Could have been avoided ifthere was closer monitoring. 
The CGC aims to provide support services, but this ambition has not yet been 
realised. Experience has shown that "providing developmental services such as 
business counselling, extension services, technical assistance and business 
information puts the guarantor into a relationship with the borrower" (Allahar and 
Brown, 1995). This is supported by Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid (1996) who 
argued that support services (such as consultancy) were very important to SMEs. The 
availability of such services could help to reduce defaults which stem from poor 
management. 
Approving Applications 
A number of adverse comments were made by borrowers and FIs regarding the 
processing of loan applications. The borrowers complained that it took three to four 
months for the applications to be approved. FIs confirmed that: applications took 
about one to two months to approve, and 6 months exceptionally; the procedures 
given by CGC were very restrictive; some NPGS loans approved by FIs were rejected 
by CGC without any reason (this happened over the recessionary period of 1997-
1998); and, finally CGC charged SMEs before the guarantee was provided to the 
bank, a procedure which is obviously to the disadvantage of borrowers. The 
borrowers also complained that some of the FIs were reluctant to provide the NPGS-
backed facilities without collateral/security. For example, one borrower stated: 
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No loan is given without collateral. Bank do not give the loans as intended by CGC. 
Another borrower was dissatisfied that his bank requested a fixed deposit of 
RM80,OOO against an NPGS loan of RMlOO,OOO and questioned the point of having a 
guarantee in such situations. 
7.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarised the fifteen case studies, developed more fully in 
Appendix 7.1. The interviews with the borrowers and their financial institutions 
provided valuable qualitative data on finance and economic additionality, and the net 
cost of the NPGS to the Treasury. 
The case studies demonstrate that NPGS has achieved finance additionaIity of 37 
percent of the total funds made available to borrowers. This is less impressive than 63 
percent achieved in an earlier study carried out by Boocock and Mohd Shariff (1996). 
However, the 1996 study did not take into account finance from non-bank institutions. 
The low level of finance additionality in the present study stems from the ability of 
firms to obtain finance from other sources, and the presence of insufficient security, 
as banks switched to the NPGS to bolster a weak collateral position. However, the 37 
percent finance additionality achieved in the case studies is comparable to other 
guarantee schemes that are properly designed and implemented elsewhere. The level 
of finance additionality could be increased if larger loans were given to growth 
companies and limited companies in the manufacturing sector. 
Turning to economic additionality, the case studies suggest that NPGS loans enable 
borrowers to increase employment, profits or turnover. There were 395 employees in 
the case study firms, of which 154 were considered to be additional jobs resulting 
from the existence of the NPGS. This represented 63.9 percent of the employment 
additionality across the sample firms in the one year period. Those firms with partial 
finance additionality accounted for the largest number of additional jobs. The 
questionnaire respondents also claimed an improvement in employment before and 
after the NPGS was provided. A total of 1,413 employees before receipt of the NPGS 
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increased to 2,073 employees over the following year, an addition of 660 (46.7 
percent). The researcher found that survey firms with partial additionality accounted 
for 72.8 percent of additional jobs, while 100 percent finance additionality and zero 
additionality firms accounted for 48.0 percent and 30.4 percent respectively. 
Using data from case study firms only, five firms increased their turnover by 6 to 10 
percent, while six firms increased their turnover by more than 20 percent per annum. 
The NPGS appears to have had a significant impact on the progress of these firms and 
benefited the wider economy by generating exports. In terms of net-profit margin, 
only two firms increased their net profit margin by more than 20 percent. One firm, 
Firm F, performed remarkably well and is a 'model' of how NPGS funding can assist 
high technology firms. In relation to growth, some of the NPGS-backed firms showed 
a very positive attitude towards growth. Economic additionality was found to be low 
where general business firms, especially retailers were involved. Manufacturing firms 
generally have a greater economic impact and create more jobs. 
The net cost of the NPGS was difficult to determine with any degree of precision 
because it is almost impossible to ascertain the default rate of NPGS-backed firms. 
The CGC's operating revenue, comprising guarantee fees, interest income and 
security realisations, minus operating expenses, left a surplus for 1997 amounting to 
RM84.2 million. Thus CGC, in theory, should have been able to settle any reasonable 
claims for payment from the financial institutions. However, the level of claims paid 
remains a problem, especially where small sums are involved. The financial 
institutions insist that claims paid were still lagging behind. A mere 32 percent of bad 
debt claims processed over the period 1994-1998 were settled. Some Fls still face 
penalties for non-compliance with the BNM directives. 
Finally, the interviews with key informants also provided information on other 
operational issues. The cautious approach undertaken by CGC's management will not 
help the utilisation of the NPGS loans. CGC is reluctant to incur losses, even though it 
has a secure source of endowed funds in the form of interest income on soft loans, and 
refuses to pay claims on time. The CGC's focus is on areas identified by the 
Government, whereas private limited companies involved in manufacturing should be 
encouraged. 
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Marketing the guarantee service to SMEs is important. Interviews with OMs in the 
case studies and the questionnaire responses highlighted the poor awareness and take-
up of CGC-backed facilities. Some OMs felt that CGC should be more aggressive in 
promoting its Schemes. The target audience could be new or start-up companies. The 
CGC has not yet provided training, advisory and consultancy services to SMEs even 
though it has expressed its intention to do so. The processing of loans was also 
criticised. The borrowers complained that it took three to four months for applications 
to be approved. The FIs confirmed these allegations by stating that it typically took 1 
to 2 months to approve the NPGS loans. Some NPGS applications were rejected by 
CGC without any valid reason (this happened over the recessionary period of 1997-
1998). 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
My thesis can be divided into three broad themes. 
First, it is generally acknowledged that SMEs can play a crucial role in economic 
development, for example, by increasing employment and national income, offering 
flexibility and innovation, and supporting larger enterprises. However, these benefits will 
not accrue if SMEs are disadvantaged by inequalities in the financial markets. SMEs face 
difficulties in obtaining appropriate financial packages in the start -up, growth and 
development phases. Such difficulties stem from a number of interlinked factors, 
including the higher risk of SMEs failure, information asymmetries between SMEs and 
lenders, and the costly administration of SME loans. For a rapidly developing country 
like Malaysia, with an overriding ambition to be a fully-industrialised nation by 2020, it 
is vital that the SME sector is given every opportunity to prosper. This study examines a 
key initiative by the Malaysian Government to assist the SME sector. 
Second, lenders seek security to overcome the problems associated with financing SMEs, 
and collateral is often in short supply. Government-backed loan schemes have therefore 
been established to protect lenders against 100 percent losses when SMEs default on 
loans. Although guarantee schemes operate in many countries, there are a variety of 
models under which such schemes can operate and a number of parameters that can be 
applied to any particular loan scheme. This study describes the operation of the principal 
loan scheme (the NPGS) administered by the Credit Guarantee Corporation in Malaysia, 
and compares its activities to guarantee schemes offered elsewhere. The researcher was 
able to assess whether the approach adopted by the CGC is suitable for the country, and 
its SMEs and financial institutions. 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
Third, and most important, this study evaluates the extent to which the NPGS is 
successful. This evaluation has two dimensions. My research explores whether the 
NPGS is appropriate to the financing needs of Malaysian SMEs, by examining the factors 
that influence the utilisation of the Scheme. Utilisation depends upon demand and supply 
factors, as well as the characteristics of firms and OMs. A high degree of utilisation, 
however, does not automatically result in an effective guarantee scheme. Effectiveness is 
measured in terms of finance and economic additionality, as well as the net cost to the 
Malaysian Treasury. The two dimensions of utilisation and effectiveness are not 
independent. A balance has to be struck, for example, between increasing finance 
additionality and accepting higher levels of default. The researcher gathered sufficient 
data to make judgements on how to improve the utilisation and effectiveness of the 
NPGS. 
In evaluating the extent to which the NPGS is appropriate to the financing needs of 
Malaysian SMEs, the study started by identifying the variables or factors that determine 
its utilisation and effectiveness. These factors were drawn from a survey of the literature 
(Chapters 2 & 3). A theoretical framework was developed to explain utilisation, the 
relationships between factors were established and the research hypotheses were 
generated (Chapter 4). Second order objectives were concerned with judging 
effectiveness. The effectiveness of the NPGS depends on a number of interdependent 
elements, namely finance and economic additionality, and the net cost of the Scheme 
(Chapter 4). 
The researcher used a research methodology that combined a questionnaire survey, in-
depth interviews to build case studies, and interviews with key informants (Chapter 5). 
The questionnaire responses provide quantitative data on the demand and supply factors, 
and the characteristics of firms and OMs. The data were analysed using bivariate analysis 
(Chapter 6). The case studies yielded invaluable information on finance and economic 
additionality and, together with secondary data, gave insight into the net cost of the 
NPGS. Interviews with key informants helped to understand the rationale behind, for 
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example, targeting loans to priority sectors and gave the researcher an opportunity to 
explore ways in which the effectiveness of the NPGS could be enhanced (Chapter 7). 
The present chapter summarises the main findings of the study, and makes 
recommendations on how the NPGS and the operations of the CGC might be improved. 
8.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this study have to be interpreted in the light of the potential limitations set 
out in Chapter 1, S 1.5. Sectoral, regional, response-rate and economic bias might 
influence the findings. These factors are considered in turn. 
Over one-half (60.9 percent) of the sample firms came from the non-manufacturing 
sector, mainly firms engaged in general business. However, a sample drawn randomly 
from the underlying population of CGC borrowers would have favoured the general 
business sector even more strongly. The activity of such firms tends to displace other 
local firms and economic additionality is typically low. To focus on an issue of critical 
importance to the researcher, the number of manufacturing companies in the sample was 
increased, to prevent sectoral bias. 
Regional bias could have been present if the characteristics of firms and OMs differ 
between regions. However, evidence from previous studies has refuted the importance of 
regional and locational factors in studies of SMEs. Furthermore, my focus on certain 
States in Malaysia, as opposed to a genuine national sample, was justified on the basis of 
convenience (proximity to the researcher), and time and cost constraints. 
In terms of response-rate bias, the researcher encountered difficulties in obtaining data 
from certain sectors of the community within a multi-racial and multi-lingual society. It 
was difficult to get full co-operation from questionnaire respondents and the interviewees 
229 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions & Recommendations 
for the case studies, particularly on sensitive questions concerning how the business is 
funded. However, steps were taken to ensure that the responses were consistent and valid. 
Lastly, economic bias was a source of some concern to the researcher, as the collection of 
data over the period March to May 1998 was a time when Malaysia was experiencing a 
deep economic recession. The perceptions of borrowers, lenders and policy makers 
towards the economy as a whole, and CGC in particular, would surely have been affected 
by the economic climate. This would have influenced their views on the utilisation and 
effectiveness of NPGS loans. To minimise these biases, the researcher asked the 
respondents to focus on the position before the onset of the recession. 
Having established that the data were robust, and that sources of bias were minimised, the 
findings are summarised below. 
A number of independent variables had a significant relationship on the utilisation of the 
NPGS - the amount of security or collateral, limited company status, manufacturing 
sector, size of firm, use of external advisers for fund raising, and the existence of a 
written business plan. However, all the hypotheses relating to the characteristics of the 
OM were rejected. This anomaly is explored below. The case studies demonstrate that 
NPGS has achieved finance additionality (albeit modest) and some degree of economic 
additionality. It proved very difficult to calculate the net cost of the NPGS to the 
Treasury, because detailed information on NPLs and claims paid was not made available. 
These conclusions are now explored in more detail. 
8.2.1 The Utilisation a/the NPGS 
The utilisation of the NPGS depends on demand and supply factors, as well as the 
characteristics of firms and OMs. The questionnaire survey was the main testing ground 
for hypotheses on utilisation, although some supply-side factors were considered in the 
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interviews with borrowers, financial institutions and key informants. The major findings 
on utilisation are summarised in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Summary of Empirical Results: Utilisation of the NPGS (Test of 
Hypotheses) 
Independent Variables Results 
Demand Factors 
Cost ofloan 
Amount of security or collateral 
Supply Factors 
Bad debt claims processed 
Amount of claims paid 
Guidelines (quotas) imposed by BNM 
Support from finance companies 
Characteristics of the Firm 
Legal Structure of companies 
Business activity 
Size of firm 
Age of firm 
Use of external adviser for fund raising 
Existence of business plan 
Characteristics of OM 
Gender 
Ethnic group 
Age 
Formal technical training 
Formal entrepreneur/business management training 
Formal education 
Business experience 
Demand Factors 
not substantiated 
substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not 'proved' or 'disproved' 
not substantiated 
substantiated 
substantiated 
substantiated 
not substantiated 
substantiated 
substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
not substantiated 
It was hypothesised that SMEs seeking access to external funding would be attracted to 
NPGS loans if the cost of borrowing was competitive with the rate of interest charged by 
financial institutions. The overall cost of NPGS borrowing is marginally below that 
charged by financial institutions for SME facilities. The questionnaire findings, however, 
suggested that there is no real relationship (either positive or negative) between cost and 
utilisation for the NPGS. The most probable explanation is that access to finance, rather 
than its cost, is the major problem for SMEs in Malaysia. 
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The questionnaire data support the hypothesis that the NPGS assists borrowers without 
sufficient collateral. This could imply that the NPGS is used as a top-up facility for those 
borrowers without security or with insufficient security to cover their expansion plans. 
However, the FIs tend to use personal security as evidence of commitment by the 
borrowers. The situation is also complicated by the existence of the BNM quotas, an 
issue which was frequently raised in discussions with representatives of FIs. 
The hypothesis was substantiated, but the link between security and utilisation is, at least, 
open to interpretation. It is not clear whether the NPGS is aimed at firms with no security, 
firms with security which would probably have qualified for conventional bank finance, 
or preselected firms directed by FIs to the NPGS principally to fulfil the BNM quota. 
Likewise, the decision to use 'clean' or 'secured' NPGS loans seems extremely opaque, 
and the procedure for dividing any security proceeds is impossible to establish (even if 
claims processed are paid). The situation cries out for clarity, and some recommendations 
in this respect are put forward in the next section. 
Supply Factors 
The supply-side hypotheses were either rejected, or neither proved or disproved in the 
case of the quota system. 
Claims processed fluctuated in relation to NPLs, and there was no obvious relationship 
between the proportion of claims processed and subsequent utilisation of the NPGS. The 
figures for NPLs are not released by CGC, hence my estimates are suspect. However, 
representatives from the FIs persistently claimed that the procedure for processing claims 
was vague and ambiguous in favour of the CGC. Likewise, interviews with FIs 
highlighted continuing problems with the payment of claims, especially for the debts of 
small borrowers. The payment of claims was definitely not automatic as compared to 
guarantee schemes operating elsewhere. 
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The FIs appear to have valid cause for complaint. The CGC had a surplus of over RM84 
million in 1997, yet, of RM28 million claims processed only RM8 million were paid. The 
whole situation regarding claims processed and paid needs to be far more transparent. It 
is surely no co-incidence that a mildly critical academic study (Kanbur et aI., 1995) on 
this issue was followed by the CGC's failure to publish data on claims processed and 
paid from 1994 onwards. 
The quotas imposed by BNM for NPGS loans are generally met, but a number of FIs still 
fail to comply with their individual quotas. Problems experienced in claiming under the 
guarantee have been a major factor in the financial institutions' reluctance to utilise the 
CGC. Government-owned banks follow the official lending guidelines more slavishly. 
However, the quotas were frequently subject to change at short notice, and the researcher 
found great difficulty in identifying which quota was in operation during any specific 
time period. The problem with the quotas is that they influence so many factors 
indirectly, even though it was not possible to 'prove' or 'disprove' the hypothesis relating 
the quotas to utilisation. It would create a much healthier climate for all parties if the 
quota system were abolished - this point is developed in the next section. 
The only supply factor tested in the questionnaire survey found no significant association 
between the availability of CGC support through finance companies and the utilisation of 
NPGS loans. The interest charged by finance companies was much higher than 
commercial banks. Furthermore, finance companies are oriented towards consumer 
lending, principally hire purchase, housing loans and other consumer loans. The recent 
introduction of NPGS loans by finance companies meant that many SMEs were not 
aware that CGC-backed facilities are available from this source. 
Characteristics of Firms 
The majority of the questionnaire respondents are private limited companies. The sample 
contrasts with the underlying popUlation of NPGS users, where the majority of the 
borrowers are sole proprietorships. The data reveal a strong positive relationship between 
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the legal structure of companies and the utilisation of NPGS loans. Limited companies 
obtain larger NPGS loans because they give greater credibility to FIs, and they can offer 
more collateral than unincorporated firms. Limited companies operate in important 
sectors of the economy, and they tend to be growth companies which generate high levels 
of economic additionality. The questionnaire findings are therefore not unexpected, but it 
is questionable whether limited companies should utilise the same guarantee scheme as 
small traders or modest partnerships. 
The majority of sample firms are from the non-manufacturing sector, involved in 
wholesale and retail trading, building and construction, etc. Respondents from the 
manufacturing sector cover a range of activities, including food and drink, tobacco, 
timber products and furniture. There is a moderate positive relationship between 
manufacturing firms and the utilisation of NPGS loans. Evidence from the case studies 
confirms that FIs generally prefer to lend on tangible, hard assets such as plant and 
equipment because of their desire to counteract the problems associated with asymmetric 
information. The question of security is again prominent in this context. The banks, in 
particular, use the NPGS to back firms with tangible assets whereas one could argue that, 
for example, service-sector firms involved in e-commerce are vital for the development 
of an economy nowadays. 
The majority of questionnaire respondents are small-scale enterprises. It was no surprise 
that the results indicate that bigger firms command higher NPGS loans than smaller 
firms. Apart from the obvious fact that small companies generally seek smaller loans, 
small firms have difficulties in obtaining external finance because of insufficient assets 
that can be used as collateral. However, the study found that NPGS-backed facilities did 
assist borrowers without sufficient collateral, and small firms form the largest group by 
number in the questionnaire sample and the underlying population of CGC borrowers. 
By contrast, the questionnaire findings provide no real evidence of a positive relationship 
between the age of a firm and the utilisation of NPGS loans. A significant minority of the 
firms in the sample are young and small, but some of these firms command large loans. 
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Furthermore, some established firms would have been able to obtain conventional 
funding from FIs, thus they require less substantial NPGS-backed loans. 
The study provides evidence of a strong positive relationship between the use of external 
advisers for fund raising and the utilisation of NPGS loans. The most prominent sources 
of financial advice are bankers and relatives/friends. Only one in five NPGS users did not 
use any source of financial advice. The results reveal that large loans are taken out by 
borrowers who use bankers and relatives/friends as the source of financial advice, rather 
than those depending on one source. These findings illustrate the importance of 
networking among SMEs, as OMs tend to rely upon longstanding relationships with 
banks and/or friends that they trust. The task for the CGC is to increase awareness of its 
services among the business community and, in particular, to convince bank officials that 
the NPGS is worthy of recommendation to their SME customers. 
Over half of respondent firms have a written business plan. The results provide evidence 
of a moderate positive relationship between the existence of written business plans and 
the utilisation of NPGS loans. The business plan is principally used by the respondents as 
a tool for raising finance. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents who prepared business 
plans were Bumiputeras and the majority of them had undergone EMT programmes 
organised by Government agencies such as MEDEC, MARA and PUNB. The benefits of 
business planning for SMEs are sometimes overestimated. It is not automatic that firms 
with a business plan are successful! However, business plans frequently provide an 
important tool for resource allocation in firms with limited resources. It would probably 
be too restrictive to insist that NPGS loans are only granted to firms with a written 
business plan, but the practice should certainly be encouraged by CGC as part of a wider 
process of greater involvement in business support activities. 
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Characteristics of OMs 
None of the hypotheses relating to the characteristics of OMs were able to explain the 
utilisation of the NPGS. My findings therefore do not support the established contentions 
in the literature. 
The vast majority of OMs in Malaysia are male, yet there in no evidence of a positive 
relationship between male OMs and the utilisation of the NPGS. Despite the fact that 
SMEs owned by women may be less attractive to FIs because, for example, female 
entrepreneurs tend to be more heavily concentrated in service-sector businesses, there 
were no significant gender differences in the size of loans granted (RM513,OOO and 
RM384,OOO for males and females respectively). The explanation may lie in the sample 
data; female OMs may have been keen to participate in my survey to encourage other 
women to enter business. Alternatively, the findings may reflect the fact that the CGC is 
encouraging women, in line with a general Government policy to utilise the talents of 
women to a greater extent than hitherto. 
The findings indicate no evidence of a real relationship between Bumiputera OMs and 
the utilisation of NPGS loans. Bumiputera OMs are favoured by the Government - many 
official schemes are aimed at correcting historical racial imbalances, and BNM quotas for 
CGC-linked loans discriminate in favour of Bumiputeras. However, Bumiputera OMs 
still tend to be concentrated in the food, furniture and handicraft industries. These 
industries face strong competition, with low profit margins and high mortality rates. 
Despite this focus of activity, my questionnaire findings demonstrate that Bumiputera 
OMs are able to obtain larger NPGS loans (RM600,OO on average for the sample) and the 
case studies confirm that many Bumiputera OMs are able to compete successfully on a 
national and global scale. However, without fuller information on NPLs, it is debatable 
whether the NPGS should be used as a policy instrument to engineer further changes in 
the business and social structure of Malaysia. 
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The study provides some evidence of a positive relationship between the age of OMs and 
the utilisation of NPGS loans; However, the evidence is not strong, and the hypothesis 
has not been substantiated. Once again, the questionnaire findings raise questions about 
the operation of the CGC. Middle-aged OMs (40-49 years) obtain NPGS loans of 
RM716,000 on average, whereas OMs aged 50 and above have NPGS loans averaging 
RM310,000. Even if a few larger loans distort the overall picture, the difference in loan 
size is striking. The explanation may lie in the security requirements - middle-aged OMs 
have enough collateral to enable banks to support NPGS applications - or it may lie that 
middle-aged OMs have greater ambition for their firms and require larger loans to 
support their expansion plans. 
One third of respondents had undergone some technical training. The findings, however, 
provide insufficient evidence of a positive relationship between the amount of technical 
training and the utilisation of the NPGS. On the same theme, the results provide evidence 
of a moderate positive relationship between the amount of EMT and the utilisation of 
NPGS loans. The majority of Bumiputera OMs have received some basic EMT from 
Government agencies, but EMT is not a prerequisite for the approval of NPGS loans. The 
need to obtain appropriate sources of finance should be an integral part of many forms of 
technical training or EMT, but the CGC would find it difficult to insist that training is 
undertaken before NPGS loans are approved. Once again, there is a need for CGC to 
become actively involved in raising awareness of its services, not only within the SME 
community, but also within those institutions offering business education and training. 
My questionnaire data suggest a moderate positive relationship between the OMs' level 
of education and utilisation of NPGS loans. Education, both general and managerial, is 
regarded by lenders as important when evaluating companies. However, ANOV A 
analysis fails to find sufficient evidence of significant differences among groups with 
different levels of formal education (Table 6.44). The most probable explanation is that 
OMs acquire knowledge through their former jobs. However, university educated OMs 
did have the largest loans on average (RM624,000). 
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Finally, the results indicate a modest positive correlation between previous business 
experience and the utilisation of the NPGS. Borrowers having more experience tend to 
have larger NPGS loans, but the relationship is not linear. Some younger borrowers 
obtain large loans, while some older OMs have more resources to introduce into the 
business, hence they require smaller NPGS loans. These findings are encouraging. While 
there is a danger that young OMs will be too ambitious and try to expand too quickly, it 
is important to encourage entrepreneurial activity by younger members of society. 
Although the statistical relationships are not strong enough to substantiate any of the 
hypotheses relating the characteristics of OMs to utilisation of the NPGS, the findings 
offer some encouragement to the CGC. For example, female OMs comprise only 9 
respondents of 92 in the sample, yet they do not seem to be disadvantaged with respect to 
the size of NPGS loans. Likewise, younger entrepreneurs can gain access to NPGS-
backed facilities despite their relative lack of business experience and/or collateral. 
Finally, Bumiputera OMs benefit from the BNM quota system and, despite the fact that 
Bumiputera OMs tend to be located in Iow technology sectors of the economy, many 
Bumiputera OMs have secured large NPGS loans and contribute significantly to the 
economy. 
8.2.2 The Effectiveness of the NPGS 
The effectiveness of the NPGS depends upon achieving a high level of finance 
additionality. My case studies demonstrate that NPGS has achieved finance additionality 
of 37 percent, compared to the questionnaires where the figure was 54 percent. This 
difference is to be expected as the finance additionality figure derived from the 
questionnaires does not take into account the views of the FIs. The FIs were able to 
confirm the borrowing capacity of the case study firms in an objective independent 
manner. My methodological approach, using 'triangulation', is labour-intensive but it 
offers the chance to assess the operation of the Scheme in a rigorous manner. 
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The lower finance additionaIity in the case studies stems from the ability of firms to 
obtain finance from internal sources, their present FIs, and other PIs (both public and 
private). The majority of Bumiputera firms had received financial assistance through 
Government agencies other than the CGC. (There was no evidence of SMEs using 
venture capital or equity financing; the heavy reliance on debt finance supports the 
existence of an 'equity gap' for SMEs in Malaysia.) Another reason for a reduced level of 
finance additionality was insufficient security, as banks switched to the NPGS to bolster a 
weak collateral position. All but one of my case study firms had to provide some sort of 
security/guarantee in order to obtain their NPGS loans. 
On the positive note~ the level of finance additionaIity in my case studies, according to 
Bannock and Partners (1997), is comparable to guarantee schemes elsewhere that are 
properly designed and implemented. Such schemes typically yield additionality of around 
30-50 percent. However, Levitsky (1997) and Bannock and Partners (1997) stress that 
'not less than 60 percent of loans should be additional - preferably nearer 80 or even 90 
percent. If additionality is below these targets then appropriate action should be taken'. A 
number of suggestions to increase additionali ty are given in the next section. 
Apart from the finance additionality associated with the initial financial package, the 
majority of my case study firms enjoy good banking relationships with their FIs through 
prompt payments of interest and capital and submission of regular business plans. The 
FIs were willing to provide additional non-NPGS finance after the NPGS-backed 
facilities were exhausted. My research confirms previous studies which argue that 
sustained banking relationships are important to reduce asymmetric information and are 
associated with the greater availability of capital, less frequent pledging of collateral, 
lower charges for credit lines and lower monitoring requirements. 
Turning to economic additionality, my case studies provide evidence that NPGS loans 
tend to be used for working capital purposes. My results confirm that the provision of 
funds for working capital is probably less likely to lead sustainable rises in employment 
and output than capital expenditure (NERA, 1990). Limited companies engaged in 
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manufacturing used term loans for the purchase of plant and machinery, and this led to 
substantial rises in employment and turnover. 
The case studies as a group employed 395 full-time workers, and 154 of those jobs 
resulted from the existence of the NPGS. This represented an increase of 63.9 percent in 
employment in the year after the NPGS drawdown. Those firms with partial finance 
additionality accounted for the largest number of additional jobs, because the vast 
majority of firms had to provide collateral. The NERA (1990) study found that firms 
having 100 percent finance additionality accounted for the largest number of additional 
jobs, but it was not possible to compare my research with that study. 
The questionnaire respondents also claimed a remarkable improvement in total 
employment before and after the NPGS loans were provided. A total of 1,413 employees 
before receipt of the NPGS increased to 2,073 employees, an addition of 660 (46.7 
percent). In the survey responses, firms with partial finance additionality accounted for 
the largest number of additional jobs and had the highest ratio of additional employment 
to total employment (referred to Table 7.9). These firms all had to offer some sort of 
security/guarantee to FIs. Furthermore, manufacturing firms are able to offer tangible 
assets such as plant and equipment which Frs prefer. The study also confirms that the 
manufacturing sector generates more employment opportunities. 
In relation to turnover, almost half of the case study firms increased their turnover by 
more than 20 percent, although only two firms increased net profit margins by more than 
20 percent. The study also produced evidence of innovation and 'dynamism' principally 
in the manufacturing sector and export-oriented companies. One firm (Firm F) 
manufactures high technology switch gears for the industrial sector and its performance 
should definitely encourage NPGS funding to high technology firms. 
The net cost of the NPGS to the Treasury was difficult to determine, because the default 
rate of NPGS-backed firms is not a matter of public record. On the basis of my estimates 
for NPLs, claims processed and claims paid (Tables 7.1 and 7.2), and certainly on the 
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basis of discussions with representatives from PIs, the processing of claims is slow and 
many claims are rejected for reasons unknown to the PIs. It has to be repeated that the 
payment of claims in guarantee schemes elsewhere is almost automatic. 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The researcher set out to establish the factors contributing to the utilisation of the NPGS 
and its effectiveness. The research programme has shed new light on certain aspects of 
the CGC's operations, and confirmed that other areas are difficult to comprehend. There 
are inherent contradictions in the way in which CGC supports SMEs, many stemming 
from the existence of quotas and collateral requirements 
On the basis of my research programme, I judge that the CGC could improve its services 
to SMEs by addressing the following interlinked issues: 
i) Eligibility Criteria 
In establishing priorities for its future activities, the CGC has to clarify its 
objectives. At present, it seems to adopt a piecemeal approach which leads to 
anomalies and contradictions. Established schemes such as the NPGS are changed 
and/or new schemes are introduced, without explanation or critical evaluation of 
past achievements or failures. 
The first step is to tailor different schemes to meet the needs of different 
applicants - micro firms with no security, expansion minded firms which lack 
sufficient security to secure conventional bank loans, etc. Presently, the CGC 
offers two major schemes for SMEs - the NPGS and the Flexible Guarantee 
Scheme (FGS). Although these schemes claim to target a different client base, in 
practice they overlap considerably in the disbursement of funds. 
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The FGS could be used to support micro firms start-up companies with no 
security, or small manufacturing firms with no track record. This approach would 
leave the NPGS to support those companies which might offer the most benefit to 
the economy. 
ii) Finance Additionality 
For finance additionality, Graham Bannock and Partners (1997) stress that: "not 
less than 60 percent of loans should be additional - preferably nearer 80 to 90 
percent." Finance additionality could be increased from its present level (37 
percent in the case studies and 54 percent in the questionnaires) in a number of 
ways. 
For applicants without security, additionality should always be higher and 
frequently 100 percent. For applicants without security, the situation is more 
complicated. The approach adopted in the UK is to insist that any collateral is 
used to secured conventional bank loans. The excess borrowing requirement is 
effectively unsecured, apart from the government guarantee. This ensures that any 
LGS borrowing is genuinely 'additional'. At present, FIs in Malaysia can use the 
NPGS to support additional borrowing (a 'clean' facility) or the NPGS can 
support all borrowing (with any security being shared between the PI and the 
CGC). This choice of 'clean' or 'secured' facility seems to lead to uncertainty and 
confusion. 
To clarify the situation, I propose that the guarantee given under the NPGS should 
be restricted to genuine 'additional' finance (i.e., over and above the value of any 
security). This would mean that NPGS-backed borrowing would effectively be 
unsecured. A system of this type could only operate if: 
a) the FIs only lend if the proposal would be worth backing if security was 
available 
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b) the risk of the loans would be increased hence FIs have to be assured that 
they received a satisfactory return on any borrowing and that all 
reasonable claims will be met. 
c) the guaranteed portion of the loan is sufficient to ensure that the FIs do not 
take excessive risks and/or encourage moral hazard on the part of 
borrowers. 
iii) Economic Additionality 
The research programme for this thesis clearly demonstrated that firms in certain 
sectors of the economy generate higher levels of economic additionality. If 
economic additionality is to be a priority, as I believe it should be, target groups 
would be limited companies in the manufacturing sector, with export-orientation 
or import-substitution potential, or those engaged in the production of high-
technology products. If the NPGS is to achieve a higher degree of economic 
impact, the CGC's present portfolio of companies has to be radically altered 
(Boocock and Mohd Shariff, 1996). The exclusion of certain types of applicants 
(particularly retailers) would offer higher economic additionality, but a focus on 
high risk innovative companies would almost certainly result in increased bad 
debts. If the Government decides that, for example, high-tech companies are a 
priority for the CGC, then it has to be prepared to increase the resources available 
to CGC to meet potential claims. 
iv) Monitoring of Additionality 
The monitoring of finance additionality could be based on the methodology 
adopted for this thesis. Finance additionality should not be encouraged as an end 
in itself, but it has to be balanced against default rates. If lenders persistently 
choose to back high risk borrowers, evidenced by a high failure rate, the CGC 
could penalised those lenders by reducing the guarantee level or enforcing a much 
higher premium (to be met by the PI), 
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Likewise, economic additionality should be monitored in a far more systematic 
way than hitherto. The indicators used in my thesis could be applied to a selection 
of CGC borrowers on a regular basis; the indicators include increased 
employment, sales and profits, as well as indirect measures such as displacement 
and dynamism. 
v) Handling a/Claims 
The conditions for triggering claims and repayment have to be set out clearly by 
the CGC. Some rejection of claims is a desirable discipline, where conditions are 
not fulfilled, and the lender does not take due care in screening, approving, 
supervising or collecting loans (Graham Bannock and Partners, 1997). However, 
there are genuine cases in my research that indicate claims have not been 
processed promptly and legitimate claims have been refused. Graham Bannock 
and Partners (1997) recommend that claims should be triggered when: 
• Arrears and non-payments reach 90 days 
• Default has been appropriately notified to the borrower 
• The outstanding loan has been called in 
• The loan has been written-off in the accounts of the lender 
• Legal proceedings have been initiated to foreclose on any collateral and to 
recover the debt. 
These seem to me to be reasonable conditions for the FIs to satisfy before the 
CGC pays a claim. 
vi) Support Services for SMEs 
The CGC has operated at arm's length from both the banks and it ultimate SME 
clients. The NPGS is a classic example of the Individual Model of a credit-
guarantee scheme, where the guarantor has no contact with the borrower. The 
CGC should introduce training, advisory and consulting services to help SMEs, 
and also to reduce the transaction costs of FIs. To date, the CGC has promised to 
introduce support services, but has not yet done so. The importance of training 
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and business planning was highlighted in the previous section, and the provision 
of support in these areas should help to reduce default rates stemming from poor 
management on the part of OMs. To provide effective support services, people 
with the right level of commercial and financial experience have to be attracted 
and offered appropriate rewards and career development opportunities within 
CGC. 
The CGC already operates a Block Guarantee Scheme (BGS) within the NPGS 
for loans up to RM50,OOO. This facility might be expanded to loans up to 
RMIOO,OOO. Alternatively, the CGC's support services could assist FIs to approve 
certain types of loan. For example, an independent assessment unit could be 
established to help in the appraisal of applications from the manufacturing and 
technology-related sectors. This unit could, for example, have the power to 
recommend loans for up to 10 years, to give innovative firms time to generate 
profits if the development stage of a product is protracted. 
vii) Marketing the Guarantee Service to SMEs and Lenders 
The marketing stance of the CGC should be pro-active, and it should have strong 
publicity links with lenders, SMEs and training providers. The CGC should be 
more aggressive in promoting its services by advertising through the media, as 
well as direct mail campaigns to its target groups. The features of the various 
schemes should also be regularly up-dated on the Internet. The establishment of 
branch offices by CGC should be adequately resourced with qualified staff, 
especially those with expertise in communications. 
viii) Abolish the Quota System 
The previous section suggested that the quota system has a pervasive influence on 
the operation of the NPGS. My research has shown that some FIs abuse the 
quotas by lending to pre-selected customers or by backing high-risk companies 
who see the funding as a grant rather than a loan to be repaid. Any quota is a 
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distortion of market forces and the quotas imposed by BNM have certainly not 
resulted in high levels of finance and economic additionality. My 
recommendation is that the quota system should be abolished. If the changes 
suggested above were introduced, then FIs and SMEs would be prepared to use 
the NPGS, confident in the knowledge that they receive a fair return for the risks 
incurred. The abolition of the quota system does not mean that the Malaysian 
Government should no longer assist SMEs. The SME sector needs official 
support, but assistance (financial or otherwise) can be targeted at particular groups 
of companies. The CGC has undoubtedly helped many SMEs and it can point to 
some notable successes, as the case studies demonstrate. However, my research 
suggests that it is very difficult to integrate an industrial (and social) policy with a 
guarantee scheme. The outcome is a relatively blunt instrument which tends to 
miss the target. 
8.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are opportunities for further work, building on the present research, especially in 
the evaluation of the guarantee schemes. 
The inconclusive results associated with the supply factors and OM characteristics should 
not be viewed as constituting a total rejection of such variables in explaining utilisation. 
The present research could serve as a point of departure for a more in-depth study 
encompassing a larger sample of SMEs, and an attempt to profile defaulting companies. 
Such a profile would demonstrate to financial institutions where problems of NPLs have 
arisen in the past. 
My evaluation of the net cost of the NPGS to the Treasury is very much at an exploratory 
stage. The relationship between the capital base of the CGC and its ability to generate 
loans and (more importantly) to pay legitimate claims arising from non-performing loans 
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is a key area where information is denied to researchers. I would hope that the CGC will 
adopt a more open and transparent approach to its activities in future. 
This research has focused on the interest-based NPGS. There is now an interest-free 
NPGS that runs in paraJlel with the conventional NPGS. It would be interesting to 
explore the utilisation and effectiveness of the new Scheme. A comparative study of the 
Islamic and conventional NPGS could add significantly to the body of knowledge and 
provide important information for policy makers in Malaysia. 
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Appendix 2 
Funding Schemes Administered by BNM 
BNM has established a number of financing schemes for SMEs, offering medium and 
long-term funds at concessionary rates. The Government has also made available new 
funds, at a reasonable cost, to rehabilitate ailing business enterprises and promote 
investments in the priority sectors (BNM, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1998). 
These measures together with Schemes operated by the CGC were designed to ensure 
greater access for viable SMEs lacking collateral, especially those eligible for loans under 
the Fund for Small and Medium Industries (FSMI), Rehabilitation Fund for Small and 
Medium Industries (RFSMI), New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF) and Fund for Food (3F). In 
March 1999, the CGC introduced the Flexi Guarantee Scheme (FGS) to enable wider 
participation of OMs to have ready access of fund from the four Schemes through the 
appointed banks and financial institutions. The FGS will be discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 3, S.3.5.2. 
Beside the four Schemes mentioned above, other financial assistance from BNM through 
the appointed banks or financial institutions are shown in Table A2.1 below. The degree 
of utilisation of these Schemes has improved over the years. We will highlight these 
Schemes in order to understand their problems and impact on SMEs . 
Appendix 2 
T bl A21 F d" S h a e 
" 
: un mg c ernes Ad " "t d b BNM F d U T rnlfilS ere v : un h IsatlOn 
Type of fund Date Fund Total as end Total as end 1998 Annual Change Outstanding 
Estah- Allocation 1997 as at end 
lishcd (RMm) 1998 
ApDrovals Approvals Approvals 
No. Am! No Am! No. Am! Amount 
RMm RMm RMm (RMm) 
Enterprise 06-02-88 800 745 841 761 850 16 9 136 
Rehabilitation Fund 
New Entrepreneurs 12-12-89 1,250' 2,069 973 2,186 1,064 117 91 652 
Fund 
Special Fund for 10·03-90 200 212 241 211 239 -I' -2 103 
Tourism 
Ship Financing 30-10-92 600 32 547 32 547 0 0 390 
Facility 
Fund for Food (3F) 04-01-93 1,000' 1,025 302 1,689 493 664 191 260 
Bumiputera Industrial 04-01-93 lOO 45 58 101 99 56 41 77 
Fund 
Fund to Accelerate 29-10-93 500 58 379 58 379 0 0 78 
the Construction of 
Low-Cost Houses 
Abandoned Housing 10-08-94 600 74 331 74 331 0 0 94 
Projects Fund 
Fund For Small and 02-01-98 1,500 0 0 873 882 873 882 236 
Medium Industries 
Rehabilitation Fund 23-11-98 500 0 0 I 0.1 I 0.1 0 
For Small and 
Medium Industries 
. . .. Imtlal allocatIOn was RM750 millIon. AddlllOnal allocation ofRM500 mdhon was approved by the 
Minister of Finance in 1998_ 
2 Initial allocation was RM300 million. The Minister of Finance announced an additional allocation of 
RM300 million in 1994, RM400 million in 1997. 
3 Approval withdrawn by bank/applicant. 
'Allocation reduced from RM750 million to RM500 million as 4 August 1999_ 
Source: BNM, Annual Report 1998 
The Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund (ERF) was set up In 1988 with an allocation of 
RM500 million, to assist Bumiputera Entrepreneurs affected by the recession during 1985 
and 1986_ During 1996, the ERF approved an additional allocation of RM300 million for 
existing projects. The combination of seed capital and financial assistance has 
successfully contributed towards reviving ailing Bumiputera entrepreneurs who faced 
hardship during the recession_ Local banks have been lending more in 1999, with loan 
approvals rising by 41.7 per cent and loan disbursements increasing by 22 per cent from 
January to June 1999. As of 15 June 1999, ERF has approved RM139.5 million in loans 
under the fund. 
The Government, in order to meet the principal objective of the NEP, launched the New 
Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF) in December 1989_ An initial amount of RM750 million was 
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allocated to encourage new Bumiputera entrepreneurs to set up businesses in 
manufacturing, agriculture, tourism and export oriented industries, or industries 
supporting the export drive, as well as business activities under the franchise 
development programme of Internal Co-ordination Unit of the Ministry of Entrepreneur 
Development (MED). Bumiputera entrepreneurs producing parts/raw material 
components for established corporations are eligible for the NEE In view of the 
encouraging response to the schemes, its allocation was increased by RM500 million in 
1998. As at end-1998, the participating institutions had approved 2,186 applications 
amounting to RM I ,064 million an increase of 9 A percent of amount from 1997. 
The Special Fund for Tourism (SFT) was set up in March 1990 with an allocation of 
RM120 million to develop tourism and to finance tourism related projects. All SMEs 
operating in the tourism field are eligible for funding, as long as the cost of the project 
does not exceed RM3 million. However, projects costing up to RM5 million may be 
considered, depending on the merits of each case. The allocation under SFT was 
increased to RM200 million in 1994 (Visit Malaysia Year). 
The Ship Financing Facility was established in 1992 with an allocation of RM600 
million. The SFF, together with the RM200 million (plus RM300 million from the private 
sector) Shipping Venture Facility, provides funding for the expansion of cargo carrying 
capacity in the Malaysian Shipping industry. The smaller shipping companies are given 
preference in terms of access to financing, up to 50-70 percent of loans for the purchase 
of new and second-hand ships. The loans are of attractive fixed rate terms, for up to IO 
years duration. 
The Fund for Food (3F) Scheme is designed to promote investment in new productive 
capacity for primary food production and processing (fresh and sea water seafood, animal 
husbandry, vegetables and fruits). The 3F scheme encourages the efficient marketing of 
food and food products and also covers processed food where raw food materials are 
sourced from domestic sources. Export-oriented projects are also eligible, provided at 
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least one-half of the total production is sold in the domestic market. The Scheme was 
established in January 1993 with an initial allocation of RM300 million. The Scheme 
faced many operational problems in promoting new productive capacity and financing 
new investments at reasonable cost (Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid, 1996). 
The Bumiputera Industrial Fund (BIF) was established in January 1993 with an allocation 
of RM 100 million. The fund aims to stimulate the growth of SMEs, with at least 70 
percent Bumiputera management and equity control, with the assistance of participating 
principal companies which support SMEs under an umbrella concept. The BlF provides 
maximum loans of RM2.5 million, at an interest rate of 5 percent for a maximum tenure 
of eight years. 
The Abandoned Housing Projects Fund (AHPF) was launched in 1990 with an allocation 
of RM600 million to revive housing projects that had been abandoned during the 1985-86 
recession. As at the end of 1996, 78 applications amounting to RM377 million had been 
approved under the AHPF. 
The Fund For Small and Medium Industries (FSMI) was established in January 1998 with 
an initial allocation of RMI billion, to promote productive capacity, in selected sectors, 
namely manufacturing, agro-based and supporting service industries. This allocation is 
part of the Government's efforts to promote exports and new growth industries, including 
high technology industries. The Government increased its allocation to the fund to RMI.5 
billion in May 1998. As at the end of April 1998, 1,718 applications amounting to 
RMI,455.9 million loans had been approved under the Scheme (Berita Harian, 18 May 
1999) 
The Rehabilitation Fund For Small and Medium Industries (RFSMI) was launched in 
November 1998 with an allocation of RM750 million, to help SMEs restructure their 
existing debts and to provide financial assistance to viable firms facing temporary cash 
flow problems. The minimum loan is RMSO,OOO and maximum loan is RMS million for 
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expansion in productive capacity and/or working capital. While RFSMI loans cannot be 
used for refinancing existing credit facilities, banking institutions may utilise up to 30 
percent of an approved facility to refinance and restructure existing non-performing loans. 
In the wake of lower utilisation of the RFSMI, BNM announced that the allocation of 
RM750 million was to be reduced to RM500 million in August 1999. The excess RM250 
million would be allocated to the FSMI, a Scheme which has a higher utilisation rate. 
Funding Schemes Administered by other Government Agencies 
Apart from BNM Schemes channelled through the other commercial banks, financial 
institutions, other Government agencies play an active role in promoting the growth of 
SMEs, particularly Bumiputera SMEs. 
The Soft Loans for Automation and Modernisation channels funds through Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia Berhadi (Development Bank Malaysia Berhad), providing 
assistance for the modernisation of small SMEs, and promoting the wider use of modern 
technology. In 1995,42 applications were approved, involving a total sum of RMI7.4 
million. As at the end of December 1995, the three main industries to benefit, in terms of 
value, were machinery and engineering (22.7 per cent), metal works and metal products 
(21.3 per cent) and the electronics industry (21.3 per cent). BPMB aims to give out 
RM350 million worth of loans to SMEs by the end of 1999. As at the end of April 1999, 
the Bank had approved 192 applications for funding worth a total of RM 163 million (The 
Star, 23 June 1999). 
The Soft Loans for Furniture and Food-Based Products Scheme was renamed Soft Loans 
for Quality Upgrading in 1994, to encourage applications from a wider range of 
industries. It was set up by Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) with an 
allocation of RM50 million under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP). An additional amount 
of RM20 million was approved, as the take up exceeded the RM50 million originally 
allocated. 
- -------
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The Industrial Technical Assistance Fund (ITAF) fund was set up in 1990 to encourage 
the development of small and medium scale enterprises into a progressive high quality 
and modern sector capable of supporting larger enterprises in Malaysia. The Government 
wanted to ensure the development of technological competency among SMEs, and to 
encourage the use of outside consultants in upgrading their managerial functions. The 
current allocated amount for the fund is RM70 million. Despite its good intentions, 
certain drawbacks occurred during its implementation. Claims take around 16-18 months 
to be approved and reimbursed. This is unacceptable. In addition, the company must 
already be) operational to be eligible for the grant. These conditions, together with the 
, 
bureaucratic delay in the application process, pose a heavy financial burden on applicants 
(Abdul Hamid and Abdul Rashid, 1996c). 
The Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB) Venture Capital Fund was 
launched in 1991 with an allocation of RMIOO million, to facilitate the entry of 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs into strategic industries and commerce. Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs with viable projects are eligible to apply and are expected to contribute at 
least 20 percent of the total equity. Priority will be given to enterprises producing high 
value-added and high-technology products for the export market or firms with guaranteed 
markets under the Vendor Development Programme. Boocock and Wahab (1997) found 
that PUNB beneficiaries were non-high-tech furniture manufacturers, indicating that the 
Scheme is not equivalent to private sector venture capital. As mentioned in Section 2.6, 
this is due to the lack of an active venture capital which hindered the development of 
innovative, high-risk SMEs. 
MajUs Amanah Rakyat (MARA) is actively involved in matters relating to the formulation 
and management of Bumiputera industrial and commercial companies to enhance 
entrepreneurship within the community. Under its loan division, small Bumiputera 
enterprises with net assets or shareholders' funds of up to RMSOO,OOO would be granted 
credit for the purchase of fixed assets and working capital. In line with the Government's 
efforts to create and develop a viable Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
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(BCIC), as outline in the National Development Policy, MARA is actively involved in the 
formulation and management of Bumiputera industrial and commercial companies. 
In summary, therefore, that various financing schemes were established by BNM (the 
central bank) to make credit more readily and cheaply available to SMEs. The measure 
taken include the imposition of Priority Lending Guidelines and forcing financial 
institutions to allocate prescribe proportion of their loans to SMEs and the Bumiputera 
business community. The CGC also played a role whereby the FGS was launched to help 
viable SMEs lacking collateral to have greater access to credit from four Schemes under 
its auspices. The FGS was only implemented quite recently and its impact would not be 
known until a few years of its operations. 
The lack of active venture capital has hindered the development of innovative, high-risk 
SMEs. The conservative lending policies of the commercial banks together with the lack 
of experience staff to assess the technological and commercial prospects of the proposal 
of SMEs made commercial banks unsuitable for this type of lending to SMEs. 
Despite, the various Schemes offered by BNM through financial institutions, the feeling 
still persist that SMEs are disadvantaged in the financial market; in particular, there 
appears to be an 'equity gap' (for share capita and/or long term loans) in Malaysia 
(Boocock and Wahab, 1997. 
Notes 
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia 8erhad (Malaysian Development Bank 8erhad) was renamed Bank Pembangunan dan 
Infrastruktur Malaysia Berhad (Malaysian Development and Infrastructure Bank 8crhad) in 1999 to focus in 
financing of infrastructure projects but its original objective to help SMEs does not change. 
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A d" 3 FEATURES OF THE FLEXI GUARANTEE SCHEME (FGS) ~en IX : 
I. Loan Funds Eligible for I. Fund for Small and Medium Scale Industries (FSMI) 
Guarantee 2. Rehabilitation Fund for Small and Medium Industries 
(RFSMI) 
3. New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF), and 
4. Fund for Food (3P) 
2. Eligibility Criteria Based on the individual eligibility criteria of the FSMI, 
RFSMI, NEF and FFF. 
Must be Malaysian owned or Malaysian controlled 
(majority of shareholdinglinterest is Malaysian). 
3. Maximum Loan Limit RM5.0 million - FSMI & RFSMI 
RM3.0 million - 3F 
RM2.0 million - NEF 
4 Credit Facilities Covered Based on the credit facilities eligible under the FSMI, 
RFSMI, NEF and FFF respectively. 
5. Interest Rates Lending Rate Cost of Funds 
FSMI 6.5% p.a. 4% 
RFSMI 5.0% p.a. 1% 
3F 4.0% p.a. 1% 
NEF 6.0% p.a. 1% 
6. Guarantee Cover Ranging from 30% to 80% as required by the lending 
institutions. 
Maximum g!!arantee cover (for unsecured Ilortion only} 
RM2.50 million (manufacturing sector) 
RMO.75 million (priority sector) 
RM0.50 million (other sectors) 
There is no capping of guarantee cover for the secured 
portion of the loan. 
7. Guarantee Fee The annual guarantee fee, payable in advance annually, 
is to be borne bI the lending institution and is 
calculated based on the guarantee cover issued. 
Guarantee cover Unsecured portion Secured portion 
30% 0.75% 0.50% 
40% 0.75% 0.50% 
50% 0.75% 0.50% 
60% 1.00% 0.75% 
70% 1.25% 1.00% 
80% 1.50% 1.25% 
8. Participating Financial According to participating financial institutions for the 
Institutions FSMI, RFSMI, NEF and FFF respectively. 
Source: CGC, 1998 
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Mohd Noor Mohd Shariff 
Researcher 
Entrepreneurial Development Institute 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 
Kedah Darnl Aman 
TcI: 04-7005635 Fax: 04·9241088 
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0000 
. . 
An Evaluation Of A Government-Backed Loan Scheme In 
Malaysia 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE 
. . . 
Would you like a copy of the findings? Yes 1 No 2 
Please circle the appropriate number 
If Yes, please supply your name, address and telephone number below: 
Name ..................................................................................................................................... . 
Position ................................................................................................................................... . 
Address ................................................................................................................................... . 
Tel.No .................................................................................................................................... . 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the FREE POST 
envelope supplied 
Thank you for your time and help 
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~ 
~ (BACKGROUND OF"FIRM-AND ENTREPRENEURlOWNER~MANAGER)~ 
Please circle numbers or tick boxes as instructed 
1. What is the legal status of your firm? 
Sole proprietorship 
Partnership 2 
Private Limited Company 3 
Other (please specify) 4 
2. In which year was the firm established? Year 
3. What is your business activity 
General Business 
Manufacturing 2 
Agriculture 3 
Mining & Quarrying 4 
4. How many people are presently working in your firm? (including owners and full-time employees) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
9 
19 
29 
39 
49 
50 & above 
5. Gender of the owner/manager 
Male 
Female 
6. Ethnic group of the owner/manager 
Bumiputera 
Chinese 
Indian 
Other (please speci!v) 
------
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2 
2 
3 
4 
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7. Could you please indicate your age group 
Under 20 1 
20·29 2 
30·39 3 
40·49 4 
50· S9 5 
60 and above 6 
8. Could you please tell us your highest academic qualification 
Primary school 1 
Lower Certificate of Education (LCE) 2 
Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE) 3 
Higher School Certificate (HSC) 4 
Diploma S 
Degree or Equivalent - Scienceffcchnical 6 
Degree or Equivalent - BusinesslManagement 7 
Other (please specify) 8 
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9. Was your business established before you applied for the NPGS or was it formed at that time? 
Established 
New 2 
10. Did you have any experience in running a small business before you applied for the NPGS? 
Yes 
No 2 
IF NO, PLEASE PROCEED TO OUESTION 12 
11. If yes, how many years of business experience? 
Under I year 
I to 3 years 
4 to 6 years 
7 to 9 years 
10 to 12 years 
13 to 15 years 
16 years or more 
12. What external source(s) of financial advice have you used? 
(You may tick more than one, if applicable) 
None 
RelativeslFriends 
Bank Manager 
Accountant! Auditor 
Chamber of Commerce 
Other (please specify) 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13. Have you attended any entrepreneurial develQpmentlbusiness management training courses 
organised by the government or private sector? 
Yes 
No 2 
IF NO, PLEASE PROCEED TO OUESTION 15 ON PAGE 4 
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14. If yes, who provided the entrepreneurial developmentlbusiness management training courses? 
(you may tick more than one, if applicable) 
MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat) 0 
NPC (National Productivity Centre) 0 
MEDEC (Malaysian Entrepreneurial Development 0 
Centre) 
UPMSBDC (University Putra Malaysia Small 0 
Business Development Centre) 
Other (please specify) o 
-----
15. Have you attended any technical training courses organised by the government or private 
sector? 
Yes 
No 2 
IF NO, PLEASE PROCEED TO QUESTION 17 
16. If yes, who provided the technical training courses? (you may tick more than one, if applicable). 
CIAST (Centre for Instructor and Advanced Skills 0 
Training) 
FRIM (Forest Research Institute of Malaysia) 0 
PORIM (Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia) 0 
MARDI (Malaysia Industrial Research Development 0 
Institute) 
MIMOS (Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics 0 
Systems) 
YTCs (Youth Training Centre) 0 
ITIs (Institute of Training Institutions) 0 
Other (please specify) 0 
17. Did the firm have a written business plan before seeking to raise the loan? (A definition of a 
business plan is a document which contains an analysis of the firm's current position. where it would 
like to be in the future, and how it plans to get there) 
Yes 
No 
I 
2 
18. Did the NPGS finance form part of a finance package? 
Yes 
No 2 
IF NO, PLEASE PROCEED TO QUESTION 20 ON PAGE 5 
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19. If yes, to Question 18, what were the other elements of the package? 
NPGS Loan 
Owners Equity 
Third Party Equity 
Other Bank Loan 
Bank Overdraft 
MARALoan 
Other (please specify) 
TOTAL 
RMOO,OOO,OOO 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RMOO,OOO,OOO 
RM 00,000,000 
20. How did you use the money raised through the NPGS ? (you trUly tick more than one, if applicable) 
Working Capital 
Purchase of Property 
Purchase of Plant and Machinery 
Other Property Costs 
Product Development 
Other(please specify) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
21. If the NPGS had not been available would you still have been able to raise the same amount of 
finance? (Please circle one) 
Yes, from the same source without delay 
Yes, from alternative sources without delay 2 
Yes, from alternative sources with a delay 3 
No, I would have raised less 4 
No, I could not have raised the finance 5 
IF YOU COULD HAVE RAISED THE SAME FINANCE WITHOUT DELAY, 
PLEASE PROCEED TO OUESTION 23, ON PAGE 6, OTHERWISE PROCEED TO 
OUESTION22 
22. Would the absence of the NPGS have had any impact on the development of your business? 
No, business would have developed as it did 
Yes, development of business would have been 2 
slower 
Yes, business would not have developed as much 3 
as it has 
Yes, business would not have survived 4 
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23. Why did you prefer to accept the NPGS loan? 
24. 
(Please circle the appropriate number for each reason on a scale of I to 5) 
l=Strongly Disagree 2=Disagree 3=Uncertain 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
Rate of interest was lower 2 3 4 5 
No need to have collateral or security I 2 3 4 5 
Easy to apply through finance companies 2 3 4 5 
Easy to apply through commercial banks 2 3 4 5 
No other choice 1 2 3 4 5 
Low repayment 2 3 4 5 
Other (please specify) 2 3 4 5 
What sor! of security/guarantees did you have to provide to obtain the NPGS loan? 
None 
Personal guarantee/other guarantors 
Mortgage on properties 
Stock exchange securities 
Fixed Deposit 
Other (please specify) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
25. When preparing your application for the NPGS you were asked to forecast the anticipated 
levels of turnover, profit and employment. In general, how has your business performed against 
those forecasts? 
26. 
Exceeded 
Achieved 
Under-Achieved 
Can you estimate your current annual turnover? 
(to the nearest thousand) 
2 
3 
RM 00,000,000 
IF YOUR FIRM HAS NO TURNOVER, PLEASE PROCEED TO 
OUESTION 28 ON PAGE 7 
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27. With the money raised through the NPGS, by how much has your annual turnover increased? 
28. 
Increased by I to 5 percent 
Increased by 6 to \0 percent 
Increased by II to 15 percent 
Increased by 16 to 20 percent 
Increased more than 20 percent 
No Difference 
Decreased (please specify) 
------
With respect to profit can you estimate your current 
annual net profit margin (pre-tax)? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
29. With the money raised through the NPGS, what increased level of profit margin have you 
achieved? 
30. 
Increased by I to 5 percent 
Increased by 6 to 10 percent 
Increased by II to 15 percent 
Increased by 16 to 20 percent 
Increased more than 20 percent 
No Difference 
Decreased (please specify) ________ _ 
What was the level of employment in your company 
at the time you applied for the loan provided under the 
NPGS? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
DDDemployeels 
31. With the money raised through the NPGS what level of employment do you think you have 
achieved? 
Increased by I to 5 employees 
Increased by 6 to 10 employees 2 
Increased by I1 to 15 employees 3 
Increased by 16 to 20 employees 4 
Increased more than 20 employees 5 
No difference 6 
Decreased (please specify) 7 
32. Since receipt of the NPGS what proportion of your new business has come from: 
Within your state 
Elsewhere in Malaysia 
Export business 
000% 
000% 
000% 
33. What proportion of your increased sales do you think you have won from: 
Competitors located in your state 
Other firms in Malaysia 
Overseas firms 
34. How important do you consider the NPGS has been to your firm? 
Vital 
Very Important 
Important 
Unimportant 
2 
3 
4 
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35. If there any other aspects of the New Principal Guarantee Scheme you would like to comment 
on please do so below: 
Thank you for your co-operation. Your contribution to this study is highly appreciated. 
Please return this questionnaire using the FREEPOST ENVELOPE provided. 
Address for correspondence: 
Director 
Entrepreneurial Development Institute 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 
Kedah Darul Aman 
(Attention: Encik Mohd Noor Mohd Shariff) 
APPENDIX 5.2 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
(TRANSLATION - BAHASA MALAYSIA) 
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UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
Stntok. 06010 JUra. Kedah Darulaman. MaJaylltL Tel : 04-741001 ·8 Cable : trrAMAS Telex: MA. 42052 Fax: 04~741959. 
I Mac 1998 
TuanlPuan 
Penyelidlkan Mengenai Skim Pinjaman Sokongan Kcrajaan DI Malaysia 
Perusahaan Kecil clan Sederhana (PKS) me:upa!cln pengerak bagi pertumbuhan negara maju dan 
membangwl. Kemudahan kredit adalah penting untuk memastikan bahawa PKS dapat 
memainkan peranan dalam mengerakkan Feiuang pekeIjaan, memperteguhkanrantaian industri, 
dan meningkatkan pendapatan ekspot. 
Skim pinjaman sokongan kerajaan memainkan peranan yang penting dalam pembiayaan PKS 
yang mempunyai kekurangan cagaran dan kemudahan kredit. SyarikatJaminan Kredit Malaysia 
Berhad (CGG) di ben tanggungjawab di :lalam proses ini. Sepanjang tempoh hayatnya, CGC 
telah banyak membantu sebahagian besar PKS roelalui Skim Jaminan Utama Barn (SJUB). 
Kami sedang mengendalikan suatu penyelidiklm mengenalpasti faktor-faktor yang menentukan 
penggwlaan clan keberkesanan SJUB. Olel! yaIlg demikian saya memohon kexjasama tuanlpuan 
meluangkan sedikit masa untuk mengisi borang soal-selidik yang di lampirkan. Segala maklumat 
yang tuan/puan kemukakan akan dirahsi:l.kan dan kami tidak akan mendedahkan samasekali 
.nama tuan/puan atau nama syarikat tuanlpuan sernasa menyediakan laporan ini. Nombor 
pengenalan yang tertera pada muka hadapan bermg soal-selidik akan hanya digunakan untuk 
mengeluarkan nama tuan/puan dari senarai k:uni sebaik sahaja borang yang telah diisi 
dikembaIJ.'kan kc:pada kami. Bersama-,ama ini disertakan salinan surat dari Ketua 
Eksekuti£IPengurus Besar CGC yang memberi !:okongan clan keIjasama terhadap kajian ini. 
Di samping itu kami ingin mendapatkan kebe:laran daripada tuanlpuan untuk menemuduga 
institusi kewangan tuan. Kebenaran benalis dllripada tUanlpuan mesti dip"roiehl mengikut 
Seksyen 99(1) (a), Akta Perbankan clan lnstitul;i Kewangan, 1989. Bersama-sama ini disertakan 
surat yang perlu mendapat tandatangan daripada tuan/puan mernbenarkan kami untuk 
menemuduga institusi kewangan tuan/puan. Di harap dapat sekiranya tuan/puall lampirkan surat 
kebenarm yang di tandatangani oieh tuan/puan bersama dengan borang soal selidik di dalam 
sampul surat jawapan bersetem. 
Jika tuan/puan mempunyai pertanyaan mengenai penyelidikan ini sila kemukakan kepada: 
Dr. Harnzah Dato' Ab<! Rahman 
Pengarah 
Institut Pernbangunan Keusahawanan 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 
Kedah Darul Aman 
Sekian, terima kasih. 
..... A ~' MOJ:OO;'~ Sharlff 
Penyelidik 
.;', 
\ 
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0000 
Mohd Noor Mohd Shariff 
Penyelidik 
lnstitut Pcmbangunan Keusahawanan 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 
Kedah Darul Aman 
Tcl: 04·7005635 Faks: 04·9241088 
Penilaian Skim Pinjaman Sokongan KerajaanDi 
Malaysia 
SEGALA MAKLUMAT ADALAH SULIT 
Adakah anda ingin salinan laporan kajian? Ya 1 Tidak 2 
Si/a bulatkan nornbor yang berkenaan 
ika Ya, sila berikan nama dan alamat syarikat dibawah: 
Nama ......................................................................................................................................... . 
Jawatan ..................................................................................................................................... . 
Alamat. ..................................................................................................................................... . 
SiIa kembalikan borang soal-selidik yang telah dipenuhi di 
sampuI surat bersetem yang disediakan 
Terima kasih kerana kerjasama anda 
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BAHAGIAN A 
_LATARBELAKANG FIRMA DAN USAHAWAN/PEMILIK·PENGURUS_ 
Sila bulatkan nombor atau tandakan di kotak seperti di arahkan 
I. Apakah status firma anda? 
Perseorangan 
Perkongsian 
Syarikat Sendirian Berhad 
2 
3 
Lain-lain (sita nyatakan}.......................................... 4 
2. Dalam tahun berapakah firma anda ditubuhkan? Tahun ........... . 
3 Apakah aktiviti perniagaan anda? 
Perniagaan Am 
Pembuatan 
Pertanian 
Perlombongan & Kuari 
2 
3 
4 
4. Berapa ramaikah kakitangan dalam firma anda pada masa sekarang? (termasuk pemilik 
dan pekerja sepenuh masa) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
9 
19 
29 
39 
49 
50 & ke atas 
5. Jantina pemiliklpengurus 
Lelaki 
Perempuan 
6. Kumpulan kaum pemiliklpengurus 
Bumiputera 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2 
Cina 2 
~a 3 
Lain-lain (sita nyatakan}....................................... 4 
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7. Sila nyatakan kategori umur anda 
Bawah 20 tahun 
20 29 tahun 2 
30 39 tahun 3 
40 49 tahun 4 
50 59 tahun 5 
60 tahun & ke atas 6 
8 Sila nyatakan tahap kelayakan akademik anda yang tertinggi 
Sekolah Rendah 
Sijil Rendah Pelajaran (SRP) 2 
Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) 3 
Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran (STP) 4 
Diploma 5 
[jazah atau setaraf· SainsITeknikal 6 
Ijazah atau setaraf - Perniagaan/Peogurusan 7 
Lain-lain (sita nyatakan) .......................................... 8 
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BAHAGIANB 
_PERMOHONAN PINJAMAN SKIM JAMINAN UTAMA BARU (SJUB)"""", 
9. Adakah perniagaan anda di tubuhkan sebelum atau semasa permohonan sJun di buat? 
Lama (sebelum) 
naru (semasa) 2 
10. Sebelum anda memohon SJUB, adakah anda mempunyai apa-apa pengalaman 
rnengurus perniagaan keeiI dan sederhana? 
Ada 
Tiada 
11. Jika ada, berapakah tahun pengalaman perniagaan anda? 
Di bawah I tahun 
I ke 3 tahun 
4 ke 6 tahun 
7 ke 9 tahun 
\0 ke 12 tahun 
13 ke 15 tahun 
16 tahun atau ke atas 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
12. Dari manakah anda memperolehi khidmat nasihat berkaitan dengan kewangan 
perniagaan anda? (anda boleh tandakan lebih dari satu, jika berkaitan) 
Tiada 0 
Ahli KeluargaJRakan 0 
Pegawai Bank 0 
Akauntanl]uru Audit 0 
Dewan PerniagaanfPersatuan Perniagaan 0 
Lain-lain (sita nyatakan) ...................................... 0 
13. Pernahkah anda menghadiri kursus atau latihan dalam bidang pembangunan 
keusahawananlpengurusan perniagaan yang dianjurkan oleh agensi kerajaan atau 
pihak swasta? 
Pernah 
Tidak Pernah 2 
JIKA TIDAK PERNAH, SILATERUS KE SOALAN 15 DJ MUKA 
SURAT4 
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14. Jika pernah, organisasi manakah yang menyediakan kursus pembangunan 
keusahawananlpengurusan perniagaan? (Anda boleh tandakan lebih dart satu. jika 
berkaitan) 
MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat) 0 
NPC (Pusat Produktiviti Nasional) 0 
MEDEC (Pusat Pembangunan Keusahawanan 0 
Malaysia) 
UPMSBDC(Pusat Pennbangunan Perniagaan 0 
Universiti Putra Malaysia) 
Lain-lain (sila nyatakan) .......................................... 0 
15. Pernahkah anda menyertai mana-mana kursus lalihan teknikal yang dianjurkan oleh 
agensi kerajaan atau swasta? 
Pernah 
Tidak Pernah 2 
16. Jika pernah, organisasi manakah yang menganjurkan kursus lalihan teknikal? (Anda 
boleh tandakan lebih dari satu, jika berkaitan) 
CIAST (Pusat Latihan Instruktor dan Kemahiran 0 
Lanjutan) 
FRIM (Institut Penyelidikan Perhutanan Malaysia) 0 
PORIM (lnstitut Penyelidikan Kelapa Sawit 0 
Malaysia) 
MARDI (Lembaga Penyelidikan Pembangunan 0 
Pertanian Malaysia) 
MIMOS (lnstitut Sistem Mikroelektronic Malaysia) 0 
YTCs (Pusat Latihan Belia) 0 
ITIs (lnstitut Latihan Institusi) 0 
Lain-lain (sila nyatakan) ........................................ 0 
17. Adakah firma anda memiliki dokumen Rancangan Perniagaan? 
(Definisi sebagai suatu dokumen yang mengandungi anaUsis kedudukan perniagaan masa 
kini dan perancangan masa hadapan) 
Ada 
Tiada 2 
18. Adakah pinjaman Skim Jaminan Utama Baru (SJUB) sebahagian daripada pakej 
pinjaman yang anda dapati? 
Ya 
Tidak 2 
JIKA TIDAK, SILA TERUS KE SOALAN 20 DI MUKA SURAT 5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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19. Jika ya, kepada Soalan 18, apakah perkara-perkara yang lain di dalam pakej pinjaman 
SJUB tersebut? 
Pinjaman Skim Iaminan Utama Baru (5JUB) 
Ekuiti Pemilik 
Ekuiti Pihak Ketiga 
Pinjaman dari lain-lain Bank 
Overdraf Bank 
Pinjaman MARA 
Lain-lain (sUa nyatakan) .................................... . 
JUMLAH KESELURUHAN 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
RM 00,000,000 
20. Bagaimana anda mengunakan pinjaman yang di dapati melalui SJUB? (Anda boleh 
tandakan lebih dari satu,jika berkaitan) 
Modalkeda 0 
Pembelian hartanah 0 
Pembelian loji dan mesin 0 
Kos harta benda yang lain 0 
Pembangunan Barangan 0 
Lain-lain (sila nyatakan) ........................................ 0 
21. Jika anda tidak mendapat pinjaman di bawah SJUB, adakah anda bolch mcndapatkan 
pinjaman lain dengan jurnlah yang di kehcndaki?(Sila bulatkan nambor yang berkaitan) 
Ya, daripada sumber institusi kewangan yang 1 
sama tanpa kelewatan 
Ya, daripada sumber institusi kewangan yang 2 
lain tanpa kelewatan 
Ya, daripada sumber institusi kewangan yang 3 
lain dengan ada kelewatan 
Tidak, ,aya akan mendapat pinjaman yang kurang 4 
daripada jumlah yang di pohon 
Tidak, saya tidak dapat pinjaman yang dikehendaki 5 
JlKA ANDA BOLEH MENDAPATKAN DARIPADA SUMBER 
INSTITUSI KEWANGAN YANG SAMA TANPA KELEWATAN, SILA TERUS 
KE SOALAN 23 DJ MUKA SURAT 6, JlKA TIDAK SILA TERUS KE 
SOALAN22 
22. Adakah lanpa pinjaman daripada SJUB boleh memberi kesan lerhadap perkembangan 
perniagaan anda? 
Tidak, pcrniagaan akan berkembang ,eperti biasa 
Ya, perniagaan akan bcrkembang dcngan perlahan 2 
Ya, pcrniagaan tidak akan berkembang seperti mana 3 
yang dikehendaki 
Ya, perniagaan tidak akan hidup 4 
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23. Kenapa anda menerima pinjaman di bawah SjUB? 
(Sita bulatkan nombor yang berkenaan bagi setiap alasan mengikut skala J hingga 5) 
l=Sangat Tidak Setuju 2=Tidak Setuju 3=Tidak Pasti 4=Setuju 5=Sangat Setuju 
Sangat Tidak Setuju Sangat Setuju 
Kadar facdah adalah rendah I 2 3 4 5 
Tidak memerlukan cagaran atau sckuriti 2 3 4 5 
Mudah membuat permohonan melalui 2 3 4 5 
syarikat kewangan di seluruh negara 
Mudah membuat permohonan melalui 2 3 4 5 
bank perdagangan di seluruh negara 
Tiada pilihan lain 2 3 4 5 
Bayaran balik rendah 2 3 4 5 
Lain·lain (sita nyatakan) ............................ 2 3 4 5 
24. Apakah jenis sandaranJjaminan yang telah anda kemukakan semasa mendapatkan 
pinjaman di bawah SjUB? 
Tiada 
Jaminan persendirianllain·lain penjamin 2 
Cagaran terhadap harta 3 
Sijil saham 4 
Deposit Simpanan Tetap 5 
Lain·lain (sila nyatakan)........................................ 6 
25. Apabila menyedia permohonan anda untnk pinjaman di bawah SjUB, anda di 
kehendaki meramalkan jangkaan pusing ganti, keuntungan dan pekcrjaan. Umnmnya, 
bagaimana pencapaian perniagaan anda berbanding dengan ramalan tersebut? 
Terlebih jangkaan 
Tercapai 
Di bawah jangkaan 
2 
3 
26. Bolehkah anda memberi anggaran pusing ganti tahunan? I RM 00,000,000 I 
(dalam ribn ringgit tordekat) 
JIKA FIRMA ANDA TIDAK MEMPUNYAI ANGGARAN PUSING 
GANTI TAHUNAN, SILA TERUS KE SOALAN 28 DI MUKA SURAT 7 
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27. Apabila memperolehi pinjaman di bawah SJUB, berapa peratuskah pusing ganti 
tahuRan anda meningkat? 
Meningkat daripada I hingga 5 peratus 
Meningkat daripada 6 hingga 10 peratus 2 
Meningkat daripada Ilhingga 15 peratus 3 
Meningkat daripada 16 hingga 20 peratus 4 
Meningkat lebih daripada 20 peratus 5 
Tiada perbezaan 6 
Menurun (sHa nyatakan) ........................................ 7 
28. Berkaitan dengan keuntungan, bolehkah anda memberi 000 % 
anggaran keuntungan margin bersih (sebelum cukai)? 
29. Apabila menerima pinjaman melalui SJUB, berapakah tahap peningkatan keuntungan 
bersih yang anda capai? 
30. 
Meningkat daripada I hingga 5 peratus 
Meningkat daripada 6 hingga 10 peratus 2 
Meningkat daripada II hingga 15 peratus 3 
Meningkat daripada 16 hingga 20 peratus 4 
Meningkat lebih daripada 20 peratus 5 
Tiada perbezaan 6 
Menurun (sita nyatakan) ....................................... 7 
Apakah tahap pengambilan pekerja di dalam firma anda 
semasa anda memohon mendapat pinjaman di bawah SJUB? 
OOOorang pekerja 
31. Apabila mendapat pinjaman melalui SJUB, apakah tahap pengambilan pekerja yang 
anda fikir tercapai? 
Meningkat daripada I hingga 5 orang pekerja 
Meningkat daripada 6 hingga 10 orang pekerja 2 
Meningkat daripada II hingga 15 orang pekeja 3 
Meningkat daripada 16 hingga 20 orang pekerja 4 
Meningkat lebih daripada 20 orang pekerja 5 
Tiada perbezaan 6 
Menurun (sila nyatakan) ......................................... 7 
32. Sejak menerima pinjaman di bawah SJUB, berapa peratuskah daripada perniagaan 
barn anda datang dari: 
Ncgcri tempat perniagaan anda 
Merata temp at dalam negara Malaysia 
Ekspot ke luar negeri 
000% 
000% 
000% 
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33. Berapa peratus daripada peningkatan joalan yang anda fikir dapat dimenangi 
daripada: 
Pesaing di negeri tempat perniagaan anda 
Lain-lain firma dalam Malaysia 
Firma luar negeri 
000% 
000% 
000% 
34. Bagaimana pendapat anda mengenai kepentingan SJUB terhadap perniagaan anda? 
Perlu 
Sangat Penting 
Penting 
Tidak Penting 
2 
3 
4 
35. Jika ada perkara-perkara lain yang anda ingin berikan komen mengenai Skim Jaminan 
Utama Baru, bolehlah anda menulis di bawah: 
Terima kasih kcrana kcrjasama anda. Sumbangan anda terhadap kajian iDi sangat di hargai. 
Sila kembalikan borang soal selidik ini menggunakan sampul surat bersetem yang di lampirkan. 
Alamat perhubungan: 
Pengarah 
Institut Pcmbangunan Keusahawanan 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
060 I 0 UUM Sintok 
Kcdah Darul Aman 
APPENDIX 5.3 
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COVER LETTER TO RESPONDENTS 
... 
my t 
,., i .. • 
AppendiX S.4 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MAIAYSIA 
Slntok. 06010Jltra. f(odah Darulaman. Malaysia. Td: 04-741801- 8 Cable: UTAMASTelcx: MA 42052 Fax: 04-741959. 
1st March 1998 
Dear SirlMadam. 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are considered to be the engine of growth in both 
developed and developing countries. Access to funding is vital to ensure that SMEs play a major 
role in generating employment opportunities, strengthening industrial linkages, and eaming valuable 
export revenue. 
I 
Government-backed loan schemes play a major role in financing SMEs which lack collateral and 
access to credit. The Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) has been charged with a critical role in':: 
.: '_':",:".t> 
this process. Over its lifetime, the CGC has assisted a large nnmber of SMEs through the Ne}'\'. ~.:~" 
Principal Guarantee Scheme (NPGS). ..i);i.:(;i. 
J ';"''>':':,:.~'' 
.-',' .. ,,. ... \; 
We are conducting a survey to identify the factors that determine the utilisation and effectiveness of ,;;;~j 
the NPGS. May I ask you for a small amount of your time to complete the questionnaire encIosedji~ 
with this letter. The utmost confid~nti~ity ~ill be observed .in using ~e information provi~e<J.;,l~ti;;l,~~ 
name or the name of your organisatIOn will not be used III reporting our research findings.Wey%~ 
enclose a copy of a letter from the Assistant General Manager of CGC in support of the study.·· .. · ~.;:./,' 
We would also like permiSSIOn to interview your lender. Written consent from .you must be 
obtained in accordance with Section 99(1) (a), Banking and Financial Institution Act, 1989. We 
enclose a standard letter for your signature giving me this permission. Please return this with the 
questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope provided. 
If you have questions regarding this study please contact: 
Dr. Harnzah Dato' Abd Rahman 
Director 
Entrepreneurial Development Institute 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 DUM, Sintok 
Kedah Darnl Aman 
Many thanks in anticipation of your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mohd Noor Mohd Shariff 
Researcher 
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QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
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L [St t ega a us 
Constitution Population Collected Sample 
N % n % 
Private Limited Co 14,076 38.89 52 56.5 
Partnership 5,679 15.94 15 16.3 
Sole Proprietorship 16,336 45.17 25 27.2 
Total 36,203 100.0 92 100.0 
Business Activity 
Business Sector Population Collected Sample 
N % n % 
Non-manufacturing 30,811 85.11 56 60.9 
Manufacturing 5,392 14.89 36 39.1 
Total 36,203 100.0 92 100.0 
Ethnic Group 
Racial Composition Survev Sample Collected Sample 
N % n % 
Bumiputera 10,813 30.00 49 53.30 
Non-Bumiputera 25,390 70.00 43 46.70 
Total 36,203 100.00 92 100.0 
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INTERVIEW CHECK LIST 
BORROWERS 
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AN EVALUATION OF A GOVERNMENT-BACKED LOAN 
SCHEME IN MALAYSIA 
Interview With Borrowers 
1. Date: __ I __ I__ 2. Time Start: __ :__ 3. Time End: __ I __ 
4. Company Name: _______________________ _ 
5 Address: __________________________ _ 
6 Telephone Number: ______________________ _ 
7 Interviewee Name: ______________________ _ 
8 Position: __________________________ _ 
9 Company Established: _____________________ _ 
10. Status of Company (e.g. sole proprietorship, partnership, and plc): _______ _ 
11. Main Acitivity: ________________________ _ 
12. Number of Employees: _____________________ _ 
13. Does the company operate from other sites or plants? 
Yes 
No 
14. How many sites, in total, has the firm? 
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IS. In __ {refer to file) your firm obtained funds through the NPGS loan. Can you tell me for 
what purpose those funds were intended and lor why you needed to raise the funds? 
16. Why did you decide that you needed/wished to go to an outside inveslor 10 raise the finance? 
17. When you firsl decided to seek outside finance whal was Ihe lolal sum you were aiming 10 
raise? 
18. Whal advice was obtained from Ihird parly aboul possible sources of finance? 
19. Whal was Ihe lotal package of finance of which Ihe NPGS loan formed a part? 
Type of Finance LenderlInvestor Amount Terms/Security 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
20. Before you applied under the NPGS loan, can you tell me which potential lenders 
(i.e.financial institutions) you approached to try to raise this finance? 
(Indicate whether loan or equity investment sought) 
21. For any such approaches, can you please tell me: 
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whether the lenders were willing to provide some, all or none of the finance you needed? 
why the lenders were unwilling/unable to provide finance? 
why (if appropriate) you refused any offers of finance? 
Lenders Approached Response 
2 
3 
22. How did you learn about the NPGS loan? 
23. Who suggested applying under NPGS loan? 
Borrower 
Lender 
Advisor 
Other(plcase specify) 
Reasons for RefusaJ/Unwillingness 
to Accept Orfer 
0, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
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24. Did the decision to use the NPGS loan lead to any change in the size or composition of your 
intended borrowing? 
Led to reduction of amount borrowed 
Led to increase in the amount borrowed 
Led to use of loan rather than equity 
Affected the term of the loan 
Other(please specify) ________ _ 
0, 
O2 
0, 
0, 
0, 
25. If your application for the NPGS loan had not been approved, or if NPGS loan had not been 
available, what alternatives were open to you? 
26. Why did you prefer NPGS loan1 
27. Excluding the NPGS loan what security/guarantees have you had to provide to obtain loans 
for your business? 
28. At the time of applying through the NPGS loan did you have any other assets, business or 
personal, which could be used as security for a loan? 
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29. What security (if any) did the bank require for the NPGS loan? 
30. After you had obtained the CGC loan, did you then have any assets which could be used to 
raise a loan 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
31. Can you please detail these assets and their value? 
32. Were you willing to use these assets in order to raise finance? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
33. Did your lenders know about these assets when the NPGS loan was granted? 
Yes 
No 
34. Was the NPGS loan used in the way envisaged? (i.e. as described at Q15) 
YES 
NO 
0, 
02 
35. In what way was the use of the funds different from what was intended? 
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36. I would like to ask you about tbe performance of your firm since you obtained the NPGS 
loan. Could you please tell me the following? 
Year prior to Loan 
Turnover (RMOOOs) 
Profit (RMOOOs) 
Employment (FrE) 
37. If you had !!l!!.been able to obtain the funds (from any source) which you obtained through 
the NPGS loan, what do you consider would have been the effect on the performance of your 
business(as set out at Q39)? 
Please Indicated Expected Difference 
Profit would be lower -RM 
Profit would be higher +RM 
Sales would be lower -RM 
Sales would be higher +RM 
Employment would be lower Number (FrE): 
Employment would be higher Number (FfE) 
Would not be in business at all 
Other 
----------------
38. Have you undertaken any important investment projects since the NPGS loan was 
obtained? 
YES 
NO 
01 
02 
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39. What have these been and how they affected the development of bnsiness? 
Description Sum Involved 
40. Would this investment have occurred if your original project supported by NPGS had not 
taken place? 
41. Please explain why you consider this to be the case? 
42. Has the NPGS loan enabled you to attract new customers? 
YESOI Go to Q46 
NO 02 Go to Q47 
(Please indicate annual value of new business) 
43. What proportion of this business has come from: 
a. within the federal territory 
--_% 
b. within the state of Selangor 
--_% 
c. within the state of Perak % 
---
d. elsewhere in Malaysia % 
---
e. export business % 
---
RMOOO 
I " I I 
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44. Can you name your three most important competitors? 
Location(TownlCountry) 
a. 
b. 
c. 
45. Do you think that you have gained market share from these competitors as a result of the 
investment made with the aid of NPGS finance? 
Yes 
No 
01 
02 
46. What proportion of your increased sales do you think you have won from: 
competitors located within your states 
--_% 
other firms in Malaysia 
--_% 
APPENDIX 5.7 
INTERVIEW CHECK LIST 
LENDERS 
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AN EVALUATION OF A GOVERNMENT ·BACKED LOAN SCHEME 
IN MALAYSIA 
INTERVIEW WITH LENDERS 
Case No. 0000 
l. Date: __ I __ I __ 2. Time Start: __ . __ 3. Time End: __ I __ 
4. Interviewee: 
5. Lending Institution: 
6. Address: 
7. Telephone Number: 
8. Company Name: 
9. Address: 
10. Borrowers Name: 
11. Was the borrower a new or existing customer? 
12. What banking services had you provided to the company at that time? 
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THE NPGS APPLICATION 
~t::..=~,;:,~:,,~~ .. :~,,_"_"~:; ~:._ ~,"- :::::fu,~;:~;~:;;":"::~:;·.;:~;~;;'=,:,,"~=~;"~,,:'=_:':;::;~~l;;~:::-'::1:~,;~ 
13. When did the firm approach you for finance? 
14. What information did they provide? 
15. What other information did you require to perform an appraisal of the project and its associated 
risk? 
16. What additional information do you normally seek for investments with a higher than average 
rate of risk? 
17. What impact does the associated risk have on the interest rate you apply? 
18. Who suggested the NPGS? 
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19. Had the firm already pledged any form of security to the bank? 
20. How did you ascertain whether or not further security was available? 
offer by customer? 
research by bank? 
21. What security was available at the time of this application? Was this used for the NPGS loan? 
22. At the time the firm applied for the NPGS loan what alternative sources or types of finance were 
available to the firm? 
23. Which of these, if any, were considered by the firm? (Probe for the NPGS loans from other 
providers.) 
--- - - --------
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24. Why was the NPGS chosen in this case? 
25. In the absence of the NPGS do you think the firm could have raised the loan required? 
26. Why do you consider this to be the case? 
27. What offer would your bank have made to the firm in the case without the NPGS? (Probe for 
the amount of loan and terms and conditions including security.) 
28. Are you aware of any additional finance raised by the firm which was contingent on the receipt 
of an NPGS loan? 
29. Has the firm approached your bank or to your knowledge other banks for further loans? 
30. When, and for how much did the firm apply? 
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31. What was your response to the firm? 
32. How did your previous experience with the firm under the NPGS affect your response? 
~".". ·C., ",,, "FIRM'S PERFORMANCE SINCE RECEIVING NPGS LOAN"'''~'''';''"''''!''''''''' 
~t~ ,"',_ '. ~ i,,' <e:<~ :·'!.""~~/~'~~:~;~"&'~~f.'" ~ '<' ".,~~~~'"~, "i ~"~" ' , ~ , ,~)" ,,' ~>'""~~ 
33. Has the firm met all interest and capital payments on the due date? (Ascertain details if not.) 
34. What impact do you think the NPGS loan has had on the firm? 
35. How does its actual performance since receiving the NPGS loan compare with its forecast 
performance at the time of application? 
36. What factors do you think explain this? 
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37. In the absence of the NPGS would you grant this firm a loan now? 
38. If this firm approached you for a loan in the future in an improved economic climate would you 
alter your response as given at question 44 above? 
'C" • • LENDING UNDER THE NPGS .' ., ~ 
," c, ' ) (" T , 1e 
39. How many NPGS applications and actual loans have you handled under the NPGS at this 
branch? 
40. What is bank policy on the NPGS and what it should be used for, as you understand it? 
41. What are the procedures for dealing with the NPGS applications? 
42. How are Bank Negara targets for the NPGS facilities advised to your branch? 
43. How do the terms and conditions of NPGS finance compare with those for commercial lending to 
small firms? 
44. Can you briefly summarise your experience with the NPGS so far, relating to the specific cases 
you have handled? 
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45. Are there any changes which you think could be made to further improve the operation of the 
NPGS? 
I 
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ISSUES IN CASE STUDIES 
Appendix 5.8 
Appendix 5.8 
Principal issues to be discussed 
A. Application for NPGS loan 
- Purpose and amount of loan 
- Decision to use the NPGS 
- Total package of finance of which NPGS loan formed a part 
- Potential lenders approached 
B. Security and Guarantees 
C. Impact of NPGS loan 
- Performance of firm since obtaining the NPGS loan 
- Important investment projects since the NPGS loan was obtained 
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LETTER ASKING FOR PARTICIPATION IN CASE STUDIES 
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UNIVERSITI UTARA MAIAYSIA 
Stntok. 06010 Jltra. Kedah Daru1aman. Malaysia. TeI : ~741BOI - 8 Cable : urAMAS Telex: M.H2052 Fax: ~741959. 
April 29, 1998 
MrF 
Managing Director 
F Furniture Export Sdn. Bhd 
Lot 100, Rulu Bernarn 
35900 Tanjong Malim Pos 
Peral Daml Ridzuan 
Dear Mr F, 
With referenCe to my survey on the study of a government-backed loan scheme in MlI.a'vsia",iS\ 
(NPGS) , under the Credit Guarantee Corporation loan, I thank: you for sending back the' 
questionnaire. 
At this stage in the research project, I am very keen to conduct a short follow-up on sellec1ted 
borrowers. I hope that you will be prepared to participate in this study. I can assure you that all, 
information will be kept confidential, and the results will be presented only in aggregate form.' • r,""""c 
In these circumtances, I would be very grateful if you could spare me half an hour ofyciiu-' 
valuable time to discuss the issues set out on the attached sheet. I have made a provisional 
timetable for the proposed visit and I wonder if it would be possible for me to visit your company 
on: 
Date: May 19, 1998 
Time: 10.30 am 
May I ask you to fill in the enclosed form to indicate whether you are prepared to help. A pre~ " 
paid envelope is enclosed. 
If you would like any further information regarding this request, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. Thank you. 
Many thanks in antipation of your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mohd Noor Mohd Shariff 
Researcher 
,__ --, -------------------
I 
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INFORMATION ON CASE STUDY FIRMS 
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Full Information on the Case Study Firmsl 
Firm A 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
The firm was incorporated in 1990. It is a private-limited company run by a Chinese 
entrepreneur. It commenced operations in 1990 and now has a workforce of seventy 
employees involved in the manufacturing of air bubblepak, expanded polyethylene foam 
and laminated products. It has an authorised share capital of RM 10 million. Its factory is 
located on a 3.9 acres site owned by the company. It services a major share of the 
semiconductor, electronic and industrial packaging industries, and takes great pride in 
producing quality products and services. 
Its success is dependent on the abilities and continued efforts of its existing 
directors/senior management and employees, as well as its ability to attract and retain 
skilled personnel for grades below management. 
NPGS application and security 
The firm approached its bank in March 1995 for a NPOS loan. The firm was an existing 
customer of the bank, with a range of facilities, including an overdraft, a term loan, a 
multiple trade line (MTL) including a letter of credit (LC), trust receipts (TR), a shipping 
guarantee (SO), a letter of guarantee (LO) and banker's acceptances (BA's). In support of 
the NPOS application, the firm had to provide comprehensive information, including a 
company profile, audited accounts for the period 1990 to 1993, management accounts and 
projected cash flows for 1994 and 1995, and other internal information. Its bank required 
these documents to appraise the project and to make a judgement on the associated risk. 
Appendix 7.1 
Bank A decided to advance funds to the firm under the NPGS, and to charge an interest 
rate according to NPGS lending guidelines. The security available to Firm A at the time 
of the NPGS application consisted of property, a debenture over fixed and floating assets, 
and the joint and several guarantee of the Directors. The bank also established with the 
borrower that no further security was available. 
Finance additionality 
At the time of application for the NPGS loan, the borrower (Firm A) was asked: 'If your 
application for the NPGS loan had not been approved, or if NPGS loan had not been 
available, what alternatives were open to you?' The response was that there were no 
alternative sources of finance available (i.e., a case of genuine additionality). This was 
confirmed by Bank A. In answer to the question: 'In the absence of the NPGS do you 
think the firm could have raised the loan required?', the banker replied that it was 
unlikely. The bank chose the NPGS loan in this case in order to enhance the overall 
security position which was insufficient. 
The next step was to ask the banker to estimate the amount that the bank would have been 
able to lend if NPGS support had not been available. The bank responded: 'Compared to 
the original request of RM 1.3 million a lower amount of RM900,OOO would have been 
advanced with the security (excluding CGC guarantee) and terms and conditions 
remaining more or less the same'. The bank decided to lend RM 1.680 million in March 
1995. As Table A7.1 indicates, the level of finance additionality was 46 percent. 
1 Table A 7 .• The N fi PGS: mancea dd" r (fi thona Ity I ure: RM thousan d) 
Firm Funding package (excluding existing Bankmax amount' Est.Add' 
bank facilities) from the bank amount (%) 
Bank NPGS Loan Total 
A 0 1,680 1,680 900 780 (46) 
Notes: 
I. Bankmax ~ an estimate of the maximum available level of bank credit, if the NPGS had not 
existed, 
2. Est. Add ~ the estimated level of finance additionality, after taking into account what the bank 
could have advanced. 
2 
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Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The firm has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates. The NPGS loan was 
repaid after 2Y:z years, before the expiration of the guarantee period of 3 years. Its actual 
performance after receiving the NPGS, compared to its original forecasts, was on track. 
This stems from having a good and experienced management team, product innovation, 
marketability of products, quality service, a skilled workforce and operating at optimal 
production capacity. Two more non-NPGS loans, amounting to RM5.646 million, were 
approved during 1996. The bank is willing to grant loans to the firm in future, provided 
that the economic climate improves. 
The firm used the NPGS-backed funds for working capital and the purchase of plant and 
machinery. The firm has grown rapidly in the past few years increasing its product range 
from basic plastic packaging materials to the manufacture of air bubblepak, expanded 
polyethylene foam and laminated products. It also demonstrated rapid growth potential, in 
producing cleanroom environment materials for multinational companies in the semi-
conductor industry. The firm intends to set up a plant in Sarawak, East Malaysia. 
In addition, the firm has increased its workforce by 50 employees since receiving the 
NPGS loan. Its current annual turnover is RM5.4 million, a figure which is increasing by 
6 to 10 percent annually. Its current annual net profit margin before tax is estimated at 20 
percent, a figure which is increasing annually by 2 to 3 percentage points. The firm sells 
20 percent of its products to Singapore, 40 percent within the state of Perak and the 
remainder to other customers in Malaysia. The firm has captured 40 percent of increased 
sales within the state of Perak and 30 percent of increased sales from other competitors in 
Malaysia. 
3 
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FirmB 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
Firm B, a Bumiputera-owned limited company was incorporated in November 1990, with 
the intention of supplying marine equipment and hardware to firms in the expanding 
marine industry in Malaysia. The founder of the firm, Mr. B (an ex Royal Malaysian 
Navy Officer) also planned that the company would develop the capacity to offer 
engineering services, to take advantage of the vast opportunities to construct naval vessels 
for the Ministry of Defence for the expanding Malaysian Navy. The privatisation of the 
Royal Malaysian Dockyard in Lumut, later renamed the Naval Dockyard Sdn. Bhd 
(NDSB), was seen as a catalyst for the construction of naval vessels domestically, 
especially a proposed Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) project worth several billion ringgit. 
In essence, the company had taken the opportunity to position itself early, in an attempt to 
capture future market share. 
In May 1991, the firm began operations with a small workshop in Subang Jaya, producing 
fabricated items such as battery stands, metal racks and pallets. A contract was awarded 
to produce various goods in support of new power supply systems for Petronas 
(Petroleum Nasional Malaysia), Malaysian Telecom and many other major bodies. By 
acquiring these orders, the company became closely associated with the manufacturing 
sector. 
Several technicians from the Royal Malaysian Navy (ex-servicemen) joined the company 
and the recruitment of these workers further enhanced the company's reputation for 
marine engineering. The company was registered as an official contractor/supplier with 
relevant marine bodies, particularly dockyards, as well as the Ministries of Finance, and 
International Trade and Industry. Registration with government bodies was vital to 
penetrate the marine market and to participate in the tendering process. 
4 
Appendix 7.1 
It was then decided that the firm's workshop/factory should be located closer to the 
potential marine market. Bandar Baru Seri Manjung in Perak was chosen, in view of its 
close proximity to the privatised Royal Malaysian Navy Dockyard and the major 
operational base of the Royal Malaysian Navy in Lumut. In December 199 \, the 
workshop and its facilities in Subang J aya was moved to new premises in Bandar Baru 
Seri Manjung. More machinery and equipment was acquired to enhance the engineering 
capabilities of the firm. A major contract for cable rewiring a support vessel of the Royal 
Malaysian Navy was awarded to the firm by the NOSB soon after the move. This was the 
first of a series of major contracts awarded to the firm. The firm subsequently grew in 
strength, both in terms of manpower and production capabilities. 
Fabrication became a core business, supported by marine electrical engineering, 
insulation and lagging, as well as trading. The company was recognised as one of the 
major subcontractors of the NOSB, and a key contract to manufacture metal enclosures 
for switching systems for Telecom Malaysia Berhad was obtained. As the manufacturing 
volume increased, the workshop and factory in Manjung could no longer accommodate 
production demands. 
With the assistance of Perbadanan Usahawan National Berhad (PUNB), the firm bought a 
factory in the state of Selangor and started full manufacturing activities in November 
1995. More machinery was acquired and production increased. 
The marine serVIce arm of the company was upgraded with the recruitment of 
experienced engineers and technicians. The firm was recognised as one of the prime sub 
contractors of the NOSB, specialising in electrical repairs for ships, engine monitoring, 
degaussing, exocet missile cabling and firing systems, insulation and lagging, hull 
plating, and the fabrication of exhaust trunking systems. 
5 
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NPGS application and security 
The firm approached its bank and received an initial advance of RM650,OOO in January 
1995. An additional amount of RM2.0 million under the NPGS was made available in 
early July 1996, to support profitable projects being undertaken by the firm. It had 
previously maintained an account with the bank in respect of letters of credit (LCs) and 
project financing. The purpose of seeking the NPGS loan was mainly for working capital 
and the purchase of fixed assets. The firm had to provide information such as audited 
accounts, projected cash flows and details of any projects on hand. The firm had no 
difficulty in getting the NPGS loan, since Permodalan Usahawan Nasional Berhad 
(PUNB) had an interest in the firm (holding 28.6 percent of the shares) and it also had a 
mutual understanding with Bank B with regard to the provision of loans and advances. 
Bank B placed Firm B under a clean facility for the NPGS, because the existing collateral 
(a debenture covering the fixed and floating assets of the firm, and a guarantee from the 
directors) was insufficient. Bank B chose the NPGS loan based on the projects to be 
carried out by Firm B. There was no further security available to support the NPGS loan. 
Finance additionality 
At the time of the application for the NPGS loan, firm B could have approached other 
government agencies such as MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat), PUNB and Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia (Malaysian Development Bank). However, the terms and 
conditions of the NPGS were not onerous, the processing of the NPGS was simple and 
the loan was cheaper than bank borrowing. Bank B would have provided a conventional 
loan at a higher interest rate, as the Bank felt that firm B was a well-managed company 
with a sound track record. 
If the NPGS support had not been available, Bank B would have provided the same 
amount of RM2.650 million in total. Table A7.2 therefore, indicates that the level of 
finance additionality was zero. 
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Table A 7.2. The NPGS: finance additionalit (ft ure: RM thousand) 
Firm Funding package (excluding existing Bankmax amount Est.Add 
~ ______ -r~~ba7n~k~fa~c~i1~it~ie~s~)~IT~o~m~th~e~b~a~n~k~ __ ~ ______________ t-a~mount(%) 
Bank NPGS Loan Total 
B ° 2,650 2,650 2,650 0(0) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The firm has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates. With the NPGS loan 
in place, Firm B was able to take on a bigger contract and increase its workforce. Its 
actual performance after receiving the NPGS loan was better than the forecast. It is now 
able to service more customers and is also looking into potential export markets, for 
example, exporting steel towers for telecommunications. Turnkey projects in the marine 
market and also the installation of telecommunication infrastructure systems could be 
tackled in future. 
The firm has increased its work force by 30 employees since receiving the NPGS loan. Its 
current annual turnover is RM4.3 million, compared to RM2.3 million before the NPGS. 
Its current net profit before tax is RMI40,000, compared to a loss before the NPGS (see 
Table A7.3 below). The annual value of new business is currently RM4S0,000, 45 percent 
within the federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, 25 percent from the states of Perak and 30 
percent elsewhere in Malaysia. It has captured 50 percent of increased sales from its 
competitors, the remainder is new business. 
'J Table A7.3: Turnover, Profit and Em 10 ment 
~ ______ ~ __ ~ ____ -r~Y~ea~r~r~i~or~ro~L=o~a=n~~ __ ~Y~e~ar~l ____ ~ ____ Y~ear2 
I-:T;:.:u::.:,r:,:;no::.,:v::=:er",(,:,;R::,:M",O""O",O""s l__ +-_--=.;R::cMc-=2"',3"'O,;;:,0 __ -f-_-'.R",M-::3,=,:,9",O",O_-+_--=R",M:.:-4,300 
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*including owners and employees~fun-time and part-time 
Several foreign firms have recognised !he strength of Firm B and appointed it as local 
agent or partner. These foreign firms acknowledge that Firm B can provide local expertise 
and content, and facilitate the transfer of technology (TOT) programme as required by the 
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Malaysian Government. Messier Vosper Thornycroft (UK) Ltd, a firm based in the 
United Kingdom, won a contract to supply steering and stabiliser systems, and a platform 
management system, for the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) programme undertaken by the 
Malaysian Government. Firm B was appointed agent by Messier Vosper Thornycroft in 
January 1995 
Firm C 
Firm C is owned by a Bumiputera proprietor and was established in 1992. The OM 
operates an optometry centre in Ipoh, the only Bumiputera outlet among the Chinese 
dominated optometry sector in that state. The OM has expanded his business and now has 
two outlets in Perak. Before starting his own venture, he worked in another optometry 
shop in Ipoh for 6 years. He has a degree in optometry. 
NPGS application and security 
The OM established the business through his personal savings and funds from relations. 
He had previously requested a RMIO,OOO loan from various financial institutions but his 
application was rejected. His business eventually began to expand and he needed more 
working capital and capital equipment. In July 1994, he approached his bank (Bank C) 
and applied for a RM30,000 loan. His application was successful, granted under the 
Block Guarantee Scheme of the NPGS. He was also given a RM70,000 loan by a 
Government agency (MARA) to purchase optometry equipment. 
In August 1995, the OM applied for a loan from another bank (Bank Z) for business 
expansion. He had to provide financial statements for 1993 and 1994, a business plan to 
cover the expansion, bank statements and a summary of other funds received. On the 
basis of this information, Bank Z granted a loan for RM 100,000 under the clean facility 
of the NPGS. 
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Finance additionality 
If the NPGS loans had not been available, the OM felt that he would not have been able 
to borrow from financial institutions. However, Bank C stated that it would have 
granted a non-NPGS loans to Firm C at a higher interest rate. The RM70,OOO loan that 
Firm C received from MARA was part of a Government effort to help Bumiputera SMEs 
to acquire fixed assets. The interest rate was subsidised and was much cheaper than 
con ventional loan rates. 
The next step was to ask Banks C and Z to estimate the amount that they would have 
been able to lend if the NPGS had not been available. Bank C stated that it might have 
granted a non-NPGS loan to Firm C at a higher interest rate. This would imply zero 
additionality but the precise figure was difficult to establish. Bank Z would have 
advanced RM87,OOO, compared to the original request of RMlOO,OOO. Table A7.3 below 
indicates, the level of finance additionality for both banks: 
T bl A73 Th NPGS fi a e . . e : mance a dd'( J't (fi I Iona lly Igure: RMth ousan d) 
Firm' 
C 
C 
Notes: 
1. 
2. 
3 
Fuuding package from all financial Financial Est.Add' 
institutions institutions and amount (%) 
others' maxamt 
Other financial NPGS Total 
institutions Loan 
MARA 70 30 100 100 
0 100 100 87 
Firm C had sought NPGS from two financial institutions. 
Financial institutions and others including government bodies:;:: an estimate of the 
maximum available of credit for financial institutions, if the NPGS had not existed. 
0(0) 
13 (13) 
Est. Add = the estimated level of finance additionality. after taking into account what the financial 
institutions and others could have advanced. 
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Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The OM has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates. With the NP GS loans, 
the OM has been able to expand his business from one to three outlets. He has increased 
his stockholding, and purchased equipment for his new outlets. Table A.7.4, s howed an 
increased in turnover over the period from 1993-96. 
Table A7.4: Turnover 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Turnover RM260,000 RM412,000 RM656,000 RM 708,000 
There were six employees at the time the OM applied for the NPGS loan. Today the 
number has increased by IO employees. Net profit before tax has increased by more than 
20 percent, and the business has captured 40 percent of increased sales from its 
competitors. The OM has been successful in attracting Bumiputera customers, as the only 
Bumiputera-owned optometry shop in Ipoh. With sophisticated eye-testing equipment and 
a effective advertising campaign, the OM should continue to attract more customers in 
the future. 
FirmD 
Background offirm and entrepreneur 
The firm was incorporated in 1983. It is a private-limited company run by an Indian OM. 
He is 50 years old, has Malaysian Certificate of Education (M.C.E.), and more than 16 
years of experience in the travel and tourism business. The firm arranges travel packages 
for customers intending to visit the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia. The firm is 
located in the heartland of Kuala Lumpur City. 
10 
Appendix 7.1 
NPGS application and security 
The firm approached Finance Berhad in January 1996 for a NPGS loan. At that time, the 
firm was a new customer of the finance company. The firm had to provide its 
Memorandum of Association, three years audited financial statements, bank statements 
for the past 6 months, and lists of trade debtors and creditors. Finance Berhad considered 
these documents sufficient to appraise the project and assess its associated risk. Finance 
Berhad also checked the alternative sources and types of finance available to Firm D. The 
finance company decided to sanction a NPGS loan of RM250,000 and charge interest at 
16.7 percent (this was much higher than the interest charged by commercial banks). The 
security provided in support of the NPGS loan was RM50,000 fixed deposits. 
Finance additionality 
Firm D would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same source. This 
statement was confirmed by Finance Berhad; it would have been willing to lend twice the 
security (fixed deposit) held, i.e. a lower amount of RM I 00,000; see Table A7.5. 
Table A7.S. The NPGS: finance additionality (figure: RM thousand) 
Firm Funding package from Finance Finance Co Est.Add' 
Co. max. amount' amount(%) 
Finance NPGS Total 
Berhad Loan 
D 0 250 250 100 150(60) 
Notes: 
1. Finance Co. max. amount = an estimate of the maximum available level of finance company 
credit, if the NPGS had not existed. 
2. Est. Add = the estimated level of finance additionality, after taking into account what the finance 
company could have advanced. 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Firm D has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates, and operated within 
borrowing limits. The impact of the NPGS was incremental, as turnover increased by 5 
II 
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percent in 1996 from RM3.5 million in 1995. This performance was 'acceptable' to Bank 
D, as Firm D was part of lATA (International Association of Travel Agencies) and able to 
exploit a corporate market niche by organising tours for corporations. Payment to Firm D 
is on short credit terms or cash, so debt collection is never a problem. 
FirmE 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
The firm was formerly a sole-proprietorship but in 1981 it switched to private limited 
company status. The OM is Chinese, with a High School education. Firm E is involved in 
the making of furniture (stools and chairs) for export. The firm is situated near Tanjong 
Malim in Perak. The OM has more than 10 years experience in furniture manufacture. 
NPGS application and security 
The firm approached Bank E in June 1997 for a NPGS loan of RM1.4 million. The 
limited company was a new customer to the bank, but the OM had been dealing with the 
bank in a personal capacity for more than 10 years. The OM had many years of business 
experience in furniture making, a good track record and had been dealing with the bank 
since the early 1970s. The firm had to provide information on purchaser/supplier terms of 
credit, as well as financial accounts. The bank placed Firm E under the auspices of the 
NPGS, because the security provided was not sufficient to cover the loan. The clean 
portion of the loan was 80 percent guaranteed by CGC, amounting to RM800,OOO (i.e., 80 
percent of RMI million). This is the top up portion of the NPGS loans guaranteed by 
CGC. The security provided by Firm E comprised a Fixed Deposit of RM300,OOO and a 
semi-detached house of RM 130,000. This amount of collateral was not adequate to cover 
the full amount of the NPGS loan. In the case of default, the collateral proceeds would be 
shared between Bank E and CGC in the ratio of 10 to 90. 
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Finance additionality 
Firm E could have raised a lower amount than that requested. Bank E confirmed that a 
lower limit would have been granted. The bank chose the NPGS for Firm E in order to 
enhance the overall security position. Compared to the original request of RMI.4 million, 
a lower amount of RM600,OOO would have been advanced by Bank E, with the security 
(excluding NPGS guarantee) and terms and conditions remaining more or less the same. 
As table A 7.6 below indicates, the level of finance additionality was, therefore, 57 
percent. 
T bl A76 Th N GS fi a e . e P : mance a dd' . r (fi Ihona Ity .gure: R M thousan d) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount (%) 
Bank NPGS Total 
Loan 
E 0 1,400 1,400 600 800 (57) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The firm has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates and the account has 
been very active. The impact of the NPGS funding has been tremendous, with an average 
deposit of RM300,OOO per month into the account. In 1996, turnover was RM2.3 million; 
by 1997 the turnover had risen to RM5.7 million. Its pre-tax profit margin has increased 
from 15 to 20 percent. The firm was also exporting more, despite the depreciation in 
value of the Malaysian Ringgit. The firm has increased the number of employees from 20 
to 40 full-time workers. The firm has captured 80 percent of increased sales from 
overseas and the remainder from other firms in Malaysia. Since receipt of the NPGS, all 
new business has come from exports. 
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FirmF 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
This private limited company run by a Bumiputera businessman was incorporated in 
1988. It is involved in the manufacture of Switch Gears under the Vendor Programme for 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (the Malaysian National Power Corporation). It is located about 
13 miles from Kuala Lumpur. Firm F was also given a licence from Siemen Hendof of 
Germany to manufacture its products in Malaysia. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm F approached Bank F in June 1997 for a NPGS loan of RM2.S million, as a new 
customer. Firm F had to provide financial statements, and details of managerial 
experience, past track record and various projects carried out during the year. A major 
factor in favour of the application was that Firm F operated under the Tenaga Nasional 
Vendor Programme. In addition, Firm F was a manufacturing company with good export 
potential. However, Bank F suggested a NPGS facility. The security provided by Firm F 
consisted of Fixed Deposits of RM2S0,OOO and Directors' Guarantees. The bank 
ascertained that there was no further security available. 
Finance additionality 
Firm F stated that there were alternative sources of finance available, with a delay. 
Bank F confirmed it was unlikely that Firm F could have raised the loan required because, 
following strict credit decision criteria, its past track record was not good enough. The 
bank would refuse to assist, even though the firm had a strong management team 
supported by experienced and qualified personnel and were thought to be 'honest, 
hard working businessmen'. 
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If NPGS support had not been available, the bank would have been willing to lend 
RMI.25 million as opposed to RM2.5 million requested. As Table A7.7 below indicates, 
the level of finance additionality was 50 percent. 
T hi A77 Th NPGS fi a e . . e : mance a dd' . r (fi 1110na Ity Il!ure: RM h t ousan d) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount(%) 
Bank NPGS Total 
Loan 
F 0 2.500 1.250 1,250 1.250 (50) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The conduct of firm's account has been satisfactory. The impact of the NPGS loan on the 
firm's performance has definitely been positive. The NPGS enabled the firm to invest in 
working capital, and to increase turnover from RM2.5 million by more than 20 percent. 
Profit before tax has increased from 10 to 20 percent. The workforce has increased from 
45 to 55 employees. Since receipt of the NPGS loan, 80 percent of its new business has 
come from within the state of Selangor and 20 percent from elsewhere in Malaysia. The 
firm intends to export in future. 
FirmG 
Background offirm and entrepreneur 
The firm is owned by a Bumiputera proprietor in Alor Setar, Kedah. The firm was 
established in 1990 and provides computer services in hardware and software 
development, as well as consultancy and training support. The proprietor is 35 years old 
and has a Degree in Computing. He has 6 years experience in this business sector. 
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NPGS application and security 
The OM had to finance the early stages of the business from personal savings and loans 
from relatives. In 1997, he decided to expand his business and applied for a NPGS loan. 
His banker suggested that he utilise a NPGS loan since he had a security (land) worth 
RMI20,OOO and the business was viable. He received an NPGS loan of RM67,OOO. The 
bank requested profit and loss forecasts and details of collateral. 
Finance additionality 
The borrower stated that he would have been able to borrow from alternative sources, 
without a delay. This was confirmed by his banker. Bank G would have been willing to 
lend RM67,OOO because the loan was covered by the collateral. Table A7.8 below 
indicates, the level of finance additionality: 
T hi A78 Th NPGS fi a e . e : mance a dd" r (Ci l!Jona Ity 19ure: RM h t ousan d) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount (%) 
Bank NPGS Total 
Loan 
G 0 67 67 67 0(0) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Firm G has met all interest and payments on the due dates. The impact of the NPGS loan 
on the development of the business has been positive. as shown by his active account. 
Payments to his suppliers were made in cash, his customers were given 3 months credit 
terms and therefore sales increased. Furthermore, the borrower was able to secure a 
Government contract to supply computers, because the firm was now backed by the CGC 
guarantee. Since receiving the NPGS loan, the firm's current annual turnover has risen to 
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RM2 million, an increase of more than 20 percent on the previous year. Its pre-tax profit 
margin has increased from 5 to 10 percent. The level of employment has increased from 5 
to 10 employees. Since receipt of the NPGS loan, 80 percent of its new business has 
come from within the state of Kedah and 20 percent from elsewhere in Malaysia. The 
firm has captured 20 percent of increased sales within the state of Kedah. 
FirmH 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
The firm is owned by a Bumiputera proprietor in Kangar, Perlis. Established in 1994, the 
firm is a small scale construction business. The OM is 52 years old and has a Lower 
Certificate of Education (L.C.E.). He has more than 12 years of experience in the 
construction business, having formerly been an army officer. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm H received a loan of RMIO,OOO under the clean facility of the old PGS in 1992. In 
1997, Firm H decided to apply under the NPGS to finance additional working capital and 
the purchase of new machinery. He had to provide information such as financial 
statements and a business proposal. He had to offer his 'Amanah Saham Bumiputera' 
mutual share of RM20,000 as collateral. Bank H then granted him a loan of RM130,000 
under the clean facility of the NPGS. 
Finance additionality 
Firm H stated that it would have been able to borrow the same amount from the same 
bank without delay. Bank H, however, insisted that they would only have granted a loan 
with a shorter period of payment or a reduced amount of RM I 00,000. Bank H stated that, 
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the risk was high in the construction business. Table A7.9 indicates the level of finance 
additionality. 
Tbl A79Th NPGS fi a e . . e : mance a dd'f l't (fi I IOna ny 19ure: RM h t ousan d) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount (%) 
Bank NPGS Total 
Loan 
H 0 130 130 100 30 (23) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Interest and capital payments are on schedule. Firm H used the NPGS loan to increase its 
working capital. In fact, actual business performance was ahead of forecast performance. 
Turnover increased by 10 percent and the net profit margin before tax increased by 5 
percent. The main factor behind this growth was a strong demand for property during the 
boom period of the economy (1992 - 1996). 
Firm I 
Background of.firm and entrepreneur 
Firm I is owned by a Chinese proprietor and established in 1985. The OM operates a 
wholesale shop in Penang. He is 50 years old, has an M.C.E., and more 9 years 
experience in the wholesaling business. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm I approached Bank I in 1996 requesting a loan of RM500,000 for working capita\. 
Firm I had to provide financial statements and faced a tough interview with the bank. The 
outcome was that Firm I was required to provide security, consisting of an apartment with 
a market value of RM 120,000 and fixed deposit of RM I 00,000. Bank I sanctioned the 
request under the clean facility of the NPGS and CGC guaranteed RM350,000 (70 
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percent of the loan amount, i.e. 70 percent of RM500,000). The remainder was 
guaranteed by Bank 1. The security is required to cover losses in the event of default. If 
the firm defaults (assuming RM350,000 is in default), the following would occur: 
Claims paid by CGC 
Recoveries *(20:80) 
Loss/Shortfall 
Lender 
350,000 
44,000 
306,000 
'Assuming the security is disposed for RM220,OOO (market value) 
Finance additionality 
CGC 
(350,000) 
176,000 
174,000 
Firm I stated that it could have raised a smaller sum from the same source. Bank I 
confirmed that it would only have been willing to lend RMIOO,OOO without the CGC 
guarantee. The exposure of RM300,000 would have been too high for an unsecured, clean 
facility. Table A 7.10 indicates the level of finance additionality. 
T bl A710 Th NPGS fi a e . . e : mance a dd" r (fi ItJona Ity Igure: RM h t ousan d) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount (0/0) 
Bank NPGS Loan Total 
I 0 500 500 100 400 (80) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
The NPGS loan has enabled the firm to support a 20 percent increase in annual turnover. 
Its annual net profit margin has remained at a modest 2 percent, while the level of 
employment increased from 6 to 9 employees. Firm I has captured 30 percent of increased 
sales from its competitors. Nearly 40 percent of new business has come from within the 
state of Penang and 60 percent from elsewhere in Malaysia. 
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Firm .T 
Background offirm and entrepreneur 
Firm J is a private limited company owned by a Bumiputra proprietor in Seremban, 
Negeri Sembilan. Firm J was established in 1994 and is involved in the making of 
furniture for Guthrie Berhad under Vendor Programme. The OM is 39 years old, with a 
Higher School Certificate and more than 3 years experience in the furniture business. He 
was formerly a banker and did not have an experience in technical matters. He underwent 
technical training from Petronas Training Centre and attended EMT organised by 
chambers of commerce. 
NPGS application and security 
The firm approached Finance Company J, as a new customer, for a NPGS loan in late 
1995. Firm J had to provide a Letter of Recommendation from Guthrie Berhad, details of 
existing raw materials and machinery, a business plan and financial forecasts. Firm J 
requested a RM270,OOO loan for working capital and the purchase of new machinery. 
Finance Company J granted RM 100,000 for working capital under the NPGS (part of the 
finance package of RM270,000) and RMI70,OOO for machinery under its own 
commercial loan scheme. Firm J was only required to provide a Director's guarantee 
because it operated under a Vendor Programme and sales to Guthrie were assured. 
Finance additionality 
Without the NPGS, Firm J would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same 
source. Finance Company J confirmed that Firm J could only have raised the amount of 
RM170,OOO for the machinery and that it would not have been willing to lend 
RMIOO,OOO for working capital, despite the existence of the Vendor Programme. The 
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machinery acted as collateral for the RM 170,000 loan. Table A 7.11 indicates the level of 
finance additionality. 
Table A7.1l. The NPGS: finance additionaJity (flgure: RM thousand) 
Firm 
J 
Funding package from Finance 
Co.J 
Finance 
Co. 
170 
NPGS 
Loan 
100 
Total 
270 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Finmax amount 
170 
Est.Add 
amount (%) 
170 (63) 
The loan was disbursed on May 1996. However, the firm has not been able to maintain 
interest and capital payments to Finance Company J. The loan was categorised as Non 
Performing in June 1997. Firm J had not received orders under the Vendor Programme 
since January 1998, and Finance Company J resorted to loan recovery on April 1998 
Owing to the cancellation of the contract between Firm J and the Guthrie, Firm J was 
unable to pay the loan to Finance Company J. 
FirmK 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
Firm K is private limited company owned by a Chinese entrepreneur in Klang, Selangor. 
The firm was established in 1989 and is involved in the timber trading business. The OM 
is 49 years old and has the M.C.E. He has more than 16 years experience in the timber 
trading business. 
NPGS application and security 
The OM had to finance the business from personal savings in the early stages of the firm's 
life. He had to use his relations as a referee after failing to get an NPGS loan from other 
finance companies. His relations introduced the OM to Finance Company K which 
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granted him RM240,000 of the NPGS loans. The OM had to provide security consistmg 
of 3 houses valued at RM300,OOO. 
Finance additionality 
Firm K would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same source. Finance 
Company K stated that it would only have been willing to advance RMlOO,OOO to firm K, 
taking into account the security (property) available. Table A 7.12 indicates the level of 
finance additionality. 
Table A 7.12. The NPGS: finance additionality (figure: RM thousand) 
Firm Funding package from Finance Co. J Finmax amount 
Finance Co. NPGS Loan Total 
K o 240 240 100 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Est.Add 
amount(%) 
--l 
140 (58) 
Firm K has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates. The interest charged is 
14 percent (Base Lending Rate of 11 percent plus 3 percent). Firm K turnover has almost 
doubled, from RM2.5 million to RM5 million annually. Its net profit margin before tax 
has increased by 5 percent. The level of employment has increased from 15 to 30 
employees. Since receipt of the NPGS loan, 30 percent of its new business has come from 
within the State of Selangor and 70 percent from export business. The firm has captured 
15 percent of increased sales from the State of Selangor and 50 percent from overseas 
firms. 
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FirmL 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
Firm L is a partnership, a father and son, situated in the State of Kedah. Firm L was 
established in 1988 and is involved in the making of soya sauce. The manager (and my 
interviewee) is the son aged 39 years old, with the M.C.B and more than 12 years 
experience in the business. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm L approached Bank L in early 1997 for a NPGS loan of RM 180,000. The firm was 
an existing customer of the bank. Firm L was granted the loan for working capital and the 
purchase of machinery. The firm had to provide property worth RM120,000 as security 
for the loan. 
Finance additionality 
Without the NPGS, Firm L would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same 
source. Bank L confirmed that they would have been willing to offer Firm L a lower limit 
of RMl 10,000, as the security of RM 1 20,000 could not cover the amount of RMISO,OOO 
requested. Table A 7.13 indicates the level of finance additionality 
T b A713 Th NPGS fi d" r (fi a le . . e : mance ad lhona lty l~ure: R h M t ousan d ) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add 
amount(%) 
Bank NPGS Loan Total 
L 0 180 180 110 70 (39) 
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Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Interest and capital payments are on schedule. The impact of the NPGS is difficult to 
gauge at this stage. The firm was unable to generate turnover and profit in the year after 
the loan was granted, because an auto-filling tanker purchased using the NPGS loan 
broke down and it had to be repaired. However, Firm L's annual net profit margin before 
tax has remained at 8 percent, while the level of employment has increased from 33 to 39 
employees. Nearly 70 percent of new business has come from within the state of Kedah 
and 30 percent from elsewhere in Malaysia. 
Firm M 
Background of firm and entrepreneur 
Firm M is owned by a Chinese proprietor in Teluk Intan, Perak. Established in 1973, the 
firm is involved in selling traditional Chinese medicines and drugs. The OM is 60 years 
old, with a Lower Certificate of Education (L.C.E.) and more than 16 years experience in 
the pharmaceutical business. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm M received a loan of RMSO,OOO under the NPGS in 1997, to finance additional 
working capital. He had to provide financial and bank statements in support of the 
application. The security provided was RM40,000 fixed deposits. 
Finance additionality 
Firm M would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same source. Bank M 
would have been willing to lend RM40,000 without the NPGS support, the amount of the 
available collateral. Table A 7.14 indicates the level of finance additionality. 
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Table A 7.14. The NPGS: finance additionality (fij(ure: RM thousand) 
Firm 
M 
Funding package from the bank 
Bank 
40 
NPGS 
Loan 
40 
Total 
80 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Bankmax amount 
(1) 
40 
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Est.Add (2) 
amount:...o..;'il::::.o '--I 
40 (5;.:,0),------, 
Firm M has since met all interest and capital payments promptly. The impact of the 
NPGS loan on the development of the business has been modest. Current annual turnover 
has risen from RM800,000 to RM840,000 , an increase of around 5 percent, and the pre-
tax profit margin has increased from 10 to 20 percent. The level of employment has 
remained stable. Since receipt of the NPGS, all new business has come within the state. 
The firm has captured 20 percent of increased sales from other competitors in the state of 
Perak. 
FirmN 
The firm is a stationery supplier owned by a Chinese proprietor in Ipoh, Perak. Since her 
husband dIed, she has taken control of the management of the shop. She IS 49 years old, 
has the M.C.E., and 6 years experience in this line of business. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm N approached Bank N in 1996 requesting a loan of RM212,000 for working capital. 
Firm N had to supply financial and bank statements. The OM had to provide security 
consisting of property value at RM 170,000. 
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Finance additionality 
Firm N would have been able to raise a smaller sum from the same source. Bank N 
stated that it would have been willing to advance RM 138,000 to firm N, taking into 
account the security available. Table A 7.15 indicates the level of finance additionality. 
Table A7.1S. Tbe NPGS: finance additionality (fij!;ure: RM thousand) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount Est.Add (2) 
(1) amount (%) 
Bank NPGS Loan Total 
N 138 74 212 138 74 (35) 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Interest and capital payments are on schedule. Business performance is in line with 
forecasts. Current annual turnover has risen to RM60,000, an increase of more than 5 
percent, and the pre-tax profit margin has increased from IO to 20 percent. The firm has 
increased its number of employees from 5 to 9 full-time workers. Since receipt of the 
NPGS loan, 90 percent of its new business has come from within the state of Perak and 
10 percent from elsewhere in Malaysia. 
Firm 0 
The firm was incorporated in 1992. It is a private-limited company run by 29 years old 
Chinese OM, who has the M.C.E. and more than 7 years experience in aquaculture 
farming. He also has a licence to rear crocodiles. 
NPGS application and security 
Firm 0 sought NPGS finance of RM250,000 for working capital and the purchase of 
plant and machinery. Firm 0 had to supply financial statements and a detailed business 
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proposal. Fixed Deposits of RM 100,000 were available as collateral and Bank 0 
ascertained that there was no further security available. 
Finance additionality 
Firm 0 stated that it would have been able to borrow the same amount from the same 
bank without delay. Bank 0, however, insisted that it would only have granted a 
reduced amount of RM 1 65,000, given the available security and the fact that the 
aquacuIture business was in its infancy. Table A 7.16 indicates the level of finance 
additionality. 
Table A 7.16. The NPGS: finance additionality (figure: RM thousand) 
Firm Funding package from the bank Bankmax amount 
Bank NPGSLoan Total 
o 165 85 250 165 
Firm's performance and economic additionality 
Est.Add 
amount (%) 
85(34) 
Firm 0 has met all interest and capital payments on the due dates. The impact of the 
NPGS loan on the development of the business has been modest. Profit before tax 
increased from 20 to 30 percent, and annual turnover rose from RM 100,000 to 
RM I 05,000. The workforce has increased from 5 to 10 employees. Since receipt of the 
NPGS loan, 40 percent of its new business has come from within the state of Selangor, 30 
percent from elsewhere in Malaysia, and 30 percent from overseas exports. The firm has 
captured 70 percent of increased sales within the state of Selangor and 30 percent of 
increased sales from other competitors in Malaysia. 
1 The actual names of the firms and the OMs have not been used to preserve business confidentiality. The 
case studies have been developed to illustrate finance and economic additionality, a particular concern of 
this study. 
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Aggre! ate Figure on Finance Additionality for Questionnaire Survey_ 
Firms' Funding_Package from FIs and Others FIs and others' Estimated Additionality' 
PIs and NPGS loan Total maxamt Amount Percent 
others 
RM RM RM RM % 
I 0 80,000 80,000 0 80,000 100 
2 150,000 250,000 400,000 150,000 250,000 63 
3 0 165,000 165,000 165,000 0 0 
4 50,000 350,000 400,000 50,000 350,000 88 
5 0 150,000 150,000 0 150,000 100 
6 70,000 130,000 200,000 70,000 130,000 65 
7 100,000 200,000 300,000 100,000 200,000 67 
8 0 3,500,000 3,500,000 0 3,500,000 100 
9 0 200,000 200,000 200,000 0 0 
10 3,160,000 2,500,000 5,660,000 3,160,000 2,500,000 44 
\1 0 500,000 500,000 500,000 0 0 
12 0 300,000 300,000 0 300,000 100 
13 20,000 200,000 220,000 20,000 200,000 91 
14 0 500,000 500,000 0 500,000 100 
15 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 
16 50,000 55,000 105,000 50,000 55,000 52 
17 0 400,000 400,000 400,000 0 0 
18 1,400,000 122,000 1,522,000 1,400,000 122,000 8 
19 
° 
250,000 250,000 0 250,000 100 
20 200,000 700,000 900,000 200,000 700,000 71 
21 0 2,950,000 2,950,000 2,950,000 0 0 
22 
° 
80,000 80,000 80,000 0 0 
23 0 250,000 250,000 250,000 0 0 
24 0 100,000 100,000 100,000 0 0 
25 0 1,950,000 1,950,000 0 1,950,000 100 
26 210,000 384,000 594,000 210,000 384,000 65 
27 
° 
600,000 600,000 0 600,000 100 
28 400,000 450,000 850,000 400,000 450,000 53 
29 0 80,000 80,000 0 80,000 100 
30 150,000 200,000 350,000 150,000 200,000 57 
31 60,000 150,000 210,000 60,000 150,000 71 
32 650,000 2,000,000 2,650,000 650,000 2,000,000 75 
33 0 1,050,000 1,050,000 1,050,000 0 0 
34 0 100,000 100,000 
° 
100,000 100 
35 80,000 200,000 280,000 80,000 200,000 71 
36 0 70,000 70,000 700,000 0 0 
37 60,000 350,000 410,000 60,000 350,000 85 
38 0 150,000 150,000 150,000 
° 
0 
39 0 120,000 120,000 120,000 0 0 
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40 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
41 0 650,000 650,000 650,000 0 0 
42 0 50,000 50,000 50,000 0 0 
43 0 60,000 60,000 60,000 0 0 
44 600,000 500,000 1,100,000 600,000 500,000 45 
45 775,000 1,400,000 2,175,000 775,000 1,400,000 64 
46 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
47 0 60,000 60,000 0 60,000 100 
48 0 150,000 150,000 0 150,000 100 
49 0 700,000 700,000 0 700,000 100 
50 0 250,000 250,000 250,000 0 0 
51 200,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 200,000 1,200,000 86 
52 0 130,000 130,000 130,000 0 0 
53 0 250,000 250,000 250,000 0 0 
54 0 1,997,000 1,997,000 1,970,000 0 0 
55 0 50,000 50,000 0 50,000 100 
56 0 60,000 60,000 0 60,000 100 
57 0 250,000 250,000 0 250,000 100 
58 0 140,000 140,000 0 140,000 100 
59 0 1,000,000 1,000,000 0 1,000,000 100 
60 3,950,000 1,200,000 5,150,000 3,950,000 1,200,000 23 
61 0 500,000 500,000 0 500,000 100 
62 20,000 60,000 80,000 20,000 60,000 75 
63 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
64 0 20,000 20,000 0 20,000 100 
65 0 463,360 463,360 0 463,360 100 
66 50,000 200,000 250,000 50,000 200,000 80 
67 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
68 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 
69 0 50,000 50,000 50,000 0 0 
70 0 5,000,000 5,000,000 0 5,000,000 100 
71 150,000 160,000 310,000 150,000 160,000 52 
72 100,000 50,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 33 
73 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
74 0 300,000 300,000 0 300,000 100 
75 0 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 0 0 
76 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 
77 200,000 500,000 700,000 200,000 500,000 71 
78 50,000 450,000 500,000 50,000 450,000 90 
79 100,000 200,000 300,000 100,000 200,000 33 
80 0 800,000 800,000 800,000 0 0 
81 0 300,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 
82 0 130,000 130,000 0 130,000 100 
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83 0 60.000 60.000 0 60,000 lOO 
84 50,000 150,000 200,000 50,000 150,000 67 
85 0 200,000 200,000 200,000 0 0 
86 0 200,000 200,000 0 200,000 100 
87 0 500,000 500,000 0 500,000 100 
88 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 lOO 
89 0 750,000 750,000 0 750,000 100 
90 0 650,000 650,000 650,000 0 0 
91 0 100,000 100,000 0 100,000 100 
92 0 100,000 100,000 100,000 0 0 
Total 13,055,000 46,276,360 59,331,360 27,080,000 32,251,360 54 
Notes 
1. The top 92 rows show the calculations for 92 firms respond to the questionnaire 
2. Financial institutions and others including government bodies = an estimate of the maximum 
amount available of credit for financial institutions and others, if the NPGS had not existed. 
3. Est. Add. '" the estimate level of finance additionality, after taking into account what financial 
institutions and others could have advanced. 
The 100 Percent Finance Additionality Cases 
In 35 of the cases, the firms stated that they could not have raised the finance (NPGS 
finance was 100 percent additional). 18 firms had no assets available to use as security. 
The majority of firms (17 out of 35) stated that equity was available as an option but they 
were simply not prepared to choose equity offered because of fear of loss of control and 
also the unacceptably low valuation of equity in such firms by outsiders. 
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MAJOR PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN 
NO COMPANY PROJECTS YEAR PROJECT 
NAME* VALUE 
(RM) 
1 B Engineering Sdn. Manufacture & install Cable 1st 126,049 
Bhd. Ladder & Accessories for Ten Half 95 
Telekom Proiect 
2 Naval Dockyard Lagging & Insulation work & 1st 352,835 
Sdn. Bhd manufacture new Exhaust Half 95 
Arrangement for Main Engines, 
Plating work at various locations 
& acc. works, cabling & rewiring 
works on Missile Firing Cables, 
Main Engine Cables & 
Degaussing System on Navy ship 
3 Naval Dockyard Renew plating & piping works on 1st 205,008 
Sdn.Bhd various locations, cabling & Half 95 
rewiring works in Main Engines 
& Missile Firing Cables & 
lagging work on Port & STBD 
Main Engine Exhaust Trunking 
on 3 naval vessels 
4 JNPTenaga Manufacture 19" Rack c/w 1st 166,387 
Sdn.Bhd. components and accessories Half 95 
5 Naval Dockyard Manufacture Mobile Sheed clw 1st 134,104 
Sdn Bhd Rubber Metal Wheels & Supply Half 95 
workers overall and insulation 
cloth 
6. JNP Tenaga Sdn. Manufacture 19" Rack c/w 
Bhd. accessories and Battery Stand for 
SMR Project 
7 Ways & Frey (M) Dismantling of 1995 137,400 
Sdn.Bhd. Telecommunication Tower at KL 
Tower site Kuala Lumpur 
8 Comtel (M) Sdn. Manufacture Radio Consoles & 1st Qtr 200,000 
Bhd. Telecommunication Tower for 96 
RMN Naval Base Sabah 
9. Projak Engineering To design, manufacture & supply Nov97 ·212,400 
Sdn Bhd. of Cable Ladder and accessories 
to various site at southern region 
of Peninsular Malaysia 
Note: 
*The actual names of the firms have not been used to preserve business confidentiality. 

